Abstract
This chapter explores the dynamics of Iran’s international trade amid its political isolation and economic sanctions. Since the early 1980s, the Middle East country gradually shifted its trade pattern from Western countries to other regions before East Asian nations emerged eventually as its dominant trading partners by late the 1990s and early 2000s. Oil deals were certainly instrumental in East Asia’s rising trade stakes in Iran, but the Persian Gulf country’s growing dependence on East Asian nations for a bulk of its commercial and technological requirements played an undeniable role in East Asia’s unprecedented encroachment upon Iranian consumption markets decade after decade. Iran, moreover, had to rely inevitably on promising East Asian markets for an increasing share of its non-oil exports in the wake of international economic sanctions and unsettled political issues between Tehran and the Western countries, particularly the United States.
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Notes
- 1.
James M. Lindsay, “Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Reexamination,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1986), pp. 153–173.
- 2.
Philip Shehadi, “Economic Sanctions and Iranian Trade,” MERIP Reports, No. 98 (July–August 1981), pp. 15–16.
- 3.
“Japan–Iran Relations (Basic Data),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, September 2012.
- 4.
Iran and Japan established their official diplomatic relationship in 1929. “Iranian, Japanese Envoys Call for Promoting Friendly Ties,” Mehr News Agency, April 3, 2021.
- 5.
“Korea in Dilemma over US Request for Sanctions against Iran,” Korea Times, December 6, 2011.
- 6.
“Don’t Rush to Join Additional US Sanctions on Iran,” The Hankyoreh, December 12, 2011; “SMEs to Take a Hit if Iran Bans South Korean Imports,” The Hankyoreh, June 28, 2012; and “Iran Sanctions Eased, Relief for S. Korean Economy,” Korea Energy Economics Institute, January 1, 2014.
- 7.
“Barname kore jonoobi baray saderat 80 milyard dollari be Iran to 2025” [South Korea Plans to have $80 Billion Exports to Iran by 2025], IRNA, May 11, 2016.
- 8.
“60% of Iranian Imports From 5 Countries,” Financial Tribune, February 21, 2017.
- 9.
“Iran–China trade can reach $100b,” Iran Daily, January 18, 2017; “China Backs Iran Trade Plan,” Global Times, September 26, 2018; and “Tejarat Iran va china nesf shod” [Iran–China Trade Halved], Abrar-e Eghtesadi, March 2, 2019, p. 7.
- 10.
“Iran’s Foreign Trade Hits $65.5b,” Trend News Agency, March 10, 2021; and “China and Iran Sign 25-year Agreement to Expand Ties,” Financial Times, March 27, 2021. In 2020, China’s two-way trade with Arab countries was around $240 billion or approximately 13 times more than its bilateral trade with Iran. “China Shares Wisdom for Middle East Stability,” China Daily, March 29, 2021.
- 11.
“Agar roohiye jihad va shahadat gostaresh yabad gerayesh be shargh va gharb rakht barkhahad bast” [If Jihad and Martyrdom Spirit Broadened Inclination toward the East and the West Would Pass Away], Iran, November 12, 2018, p. 2.
- 12.
“Western Media Aren’t Telling You the Truth about Iran,” The Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2021.
- 13.
“Zarbe sangin kore jonoobi be eghtesad Iran” [Heavy Punch of South Korea to Iran Economy], Farhikhtegan Daily, December 2, 2018, p. 8; and “Varedat kala jaigozin bazgasht arz daderati” [Importing Goods Replaces Retuning Exports Money], Eskenas Newspaper, April 17, 2019, p. 1.
- 14.
“Motalebat nafti Iran va kore jonoobi ba kala tahator mishavad” [South Korea’s Debts for Iran Oil to be Bartered with Goods], Abrar-e Eghtesadi, December 2, 2018, p. 1.
- 15.
“Iran dar astanye douran ‘naft dar barabar kala’” [Iran on the Cusp of ‘Oil for Goods’ Era], Ebtekar News, July 3, 2018, p. 2. Among all “oil for goods” schemes, there was an “oil for train” proposal by China in 2017, requiring Iran to supply oil to China in exchange for getting Chinese help to improve and extend its railways system through transferring China’s technology. At that time, Iran possessed upwards of 13,000 km railways, and the Mideast country was planning to add at least another 9000 km, requiring significant finance and technology a large part of which could be supplied by China. “Pishnahad chin be Iran; naft dar moghabel ghatar” [Chinese Offer to Iran; Oil for Train], Tabnak, August 28, 2017.
- 16.
“Ba dastoor dolat: Faghat az keshvarhai ken aft Iran ra bekharand kala vared mikonim” [Government Instructed: We Import Goods only from Countries Which Buy Iran Oil], Abrar-e Eghtesadi, July 5, 2018, p. 4; and “61 darsad varedat dar dakhel ghabel toolid ast” [61 Percent of Imports could be Produced Domestically], Farhikhtegan Daily, August 28, 2018, p. 8.
- 17.
“Khoon chini dar raghay Iranian?!” [Chinese Blood in Iranian Arteries?!], Tabnak, October 5, 2015; “Bazaar shesh milyard dollari” [A $6 Billion Dollar Market], 7 Sobh, June 19, 2016, p. 1; and “Naft midahim kalay namatloob roosi vared mikonim” [We Give Oil and Import Undesired Russian Commodity], Aftab-e Yazd, December 3, 2017, p. 2.
- 18.
“Bazaar khodrohay varedati Iran dar ekhtiyar koreiha” [Iranian Market of Imported Cars in the Hands of Koreans], Etemad Daily, June 22, 2016, p. 5.
- 19.
“LG, Samsung, Daewoo Worry about Fallout from Iran Sanctions,” Korea Times, August 12, 2010; “Korea’s Mark on an Expectation-defying Iran,” Korea Herald, August 10, 2011; and “Che kesani koreiha ra gostakh kardand?” [Who Made Koreans Insolent?], Kayhan, July 28, 2020, p. 2.
- 20.
“Sood varedat 5 barabar tolid ast” [Profit from Imports Five-fold more than Production], Javan, October 23, 2017, p. 1; “‘Sood varedat’ 200 darsad va sood tolid 5 ta 20 darsad” [‘Imports Profit’ 200 Percent and production profit 5–20 Percent], Eghtesad-e Meli, May 28, 2018, p. 9; and “Hame mikhahand varedkonande shavand” [Everyone Wants to Become Importer], Vatan Emrooz, June 23, 2018, p. 1.
- 21.
Iranian customers were ultimately bearing the brunt of all costs and expenses paid to import any type of foreign products. Although sanctions had made the final cost of foreign products around 10 to 30 percent higher, still it was Iranian shoppers who had to eventually pay for all the tariffs demanded by the government for letting in imported products. As a case in point, if a Hyundai car was worth only $20,000 outside Iran, an Iranian customer would end up paying, on average, $47,200, including the actual tariff of 129 percent, to purchase that automobile somewhere inside Iran. “Yek namayande” Mafiay khodro vagheiyat darad” [One MP: Automobile Mafia is Real], Tabnak, October 8, 2014; “Toyotai 75 millioni chera 170 million tooman?” [Why is a 75 Million Toyota 170 Million Tooman?], Asr Iran, May 29, 2015; “Varedkonandegan khodro bejay sood 10 darsadi 100 darsad sood mibarand” [Car Importers Make 100 Percent Profit Instead of 10 Percent], Kayhan, October 16, 2017, p. 4; and “Edameh tahrimha be nefe sanat khodrosazi ast: Khatar tatili ghetesazan va verood chiniha” [Continuation of Sanctions Favors Auto Industry: Parts Makers Face Shut Down If Chinese Come], Seday Eslahat, April 7, 2021, p. 7.
- 22.
“Sanat pooshak Iran be dalil varedat dar hal naboodi ast” [Iran’s Textile Industry is Dying Because of Imports], Kayhan, February 23, 2017, p. 4; “Sanat va tolid keshvar ghofl shodeast” [National Industry and Production Locked], Resalat, February 19, 2017, p. 1; and “Naboodi eshteghal ba varedat enhesartalabane” [Employment Destroyed by Monopolized Imports], Tejarat News, September 14, 2017, p. 1.
- 23.
“Chin hamchenan bazigardan asli bazaar tejari Iran” [China Still Major Player of Iranian Trading Market], Abrar-e Eghtesadi, February 27, 2017, p. 7.
- 24.
“Tahator kala ba chin nahaishod” [Bartering Goods with China Finalized], Akhbar-e Sanate, November 24, 2019, p. 3.
- 25.
“Rahbari bazaar khordo dar dast chiniha” [Leadership of Car Market in the Hands of Chinese], Akhbar-e Sanate, December 26, 2018, p. 8; “Jaygozini chiniha bejay koreiha dar ‘sanat lavazem khanegi’” [Chinese Replacing Koreans in ‘Home Appliances Industry’], Eghtesad-e Meli, August 26, 2019, p. 6; and “Tamigh enhesar bazaar mobile Iran baray chiniha” [Chinese Monopoly over Iran’s Mobile Market Gets Tighter], Arman Meli, July 7, 2020, pp. 1, 4.
- 26.
“China Shares 25% of Iran’s Imports,” Trend New Agency, June 30, 2015; and “Chin va emarat mabda nimi az kalahay veredati Iran” [China and UAE Source for Half of Goods Imported to Iran], Mardomsalari, August 2, 2020, p. 1.
- 27.
“Ahmadinejad 700 milyard dolar sarf eshteghal chiniya kard!” [Ahmadinejad Spent $700 Billion on Job Creation for Chinese!], Abrar-e Eghtesadi, April 26, 2015, pp. 1, 2; and “Dolat Rouhani dobarabar Ahmadinejad az chin kala vared kard” [The Rouhani Government Imported Chinese Goods Twice more than Ahmadinejad], Fars News Agency, July 5, 2016.
- 28.
“Negarani bakhsh khosoosi az edamye hojoom chiniha” [Private Sector Worried about Continuous Invasion of Chinese], Jahan-e Sanat, November 6, 2016, p. 7; and “Sayyad irani dar kam ezhdahay chini” [Iranian Fisher in the Clutches of Chinese Dragon], Ghanoon Daily, August 14, 2018, pp. 1, 3.
- 29.
“Poshtpardeh vrood kargaran chini be Kerman” [Behind the Entrance of Chinese Workers to Kerman], Aftab-e Yazd, June 17, 2015, p. 1; and “Hatta ye shenavar chini dar abhay Iran vejood nadarad!” [Not Even a Single Chinese Ferry in Iran Waters!], Kelid Newspaper, August 27, 2018, p. 4.
- 30.
“Abhay Iran dar tour mahigiran chini” [Iranian Waters Overrun with Chinese Fishers], Hamdeli Daily, August 11, 2018, p. 1; “Zeddonaghizgooyi masoulan irani dar mored hozoor chinihay mahikhar!” [Contradictory Statements of Iranian Officials Regarding the Presence of Chinese Fish-eaters], Aftab-e Yazd, August 27, 2018, p. 4; and “Kashtihay chini abhay Iran rat ark konand” [Chinese Ships Should Leave Iranian Waters], Abrar News, February 20, 2019, p. 1.
- 31.
“Mahigiran chini baray Iran karmikonand” [Chinese Fishers Work for Iran], Jahan-e Sanat, September 6, 2018, p. 10.
- 32.
“Varedkonandegan khodro bejay sood 10 darsadi 100 darsad sood mibarand” [Car Importers Make 100 Percent Profit Instead of 10 Percent], Kayhan, October 16, 2017, p. 4.
- 33.
“Kore jonoobi bedoon America gedakhanei mesl kore shomali ast” [Without America, South Korea would be a Beggar House like North Korea], Mostaghel Newspaper, July 28, 2020, p. 1.
- 34.
“Khorooj LG va Sansung az bazaar Iran” [LG and Samsung Left Iran Market], Servat, February 15, 2020, p. 2; and “Kore hich ghete lavazem khanegi be Iran ersal nemikonad” [Korea does not Send any Home Appliances Parts to Iran], Aftab-e Eghtesadi, February 25, 2020, p. 1.
- 35.
“Chin az tahvil ghateat yadaki khodro be Iran khoddari mikonad” [China Refuses to Deliver Auto Parts to Iran], Aftab-e Eghtesadi, July 1, 2019, p. 2; and “Jaygozini chiniha bejay koreiha dar ‘sanat lavazem khanegi’” [Replacing Koreans by Chinese in ‘Home Appliances’], Eghtesad-e Meli, August 26, 2019, p. 6.
- 36.
“Sanat Iran zir charkh khodro chini” [Iran’s Auto Industry under the Wheel of Chinese Car], Aftab-e Yazd, December 6, 2014, p. 1; and “Vorood khodrohay taiwani be bazaar khoro Iran” [Taiwanese Cars Entered Iran’s Auto Market], Azarbaijan Daily, June 30, 2020, p. 2.
- 37.
“Emarat darvazeh vorood khodrohay chini be Iran” [UAE the Gateway of Chinese Cars to Iran], Tabnak, February 9, 2015; and “‘Golden Age of Chinese Cars over in Iran’,” Press TV, August 2, 2015.
- 38.
“Mobareze akharin Samurai ba koreiha dar khiyabanhay Tehran” [Battle of Last Samurai with Koreans on Tehran Streets], Jam-e Jam Daily, August 27, 2016, p. 1; and “Sanat khodroo dar dastandaz chini” [Auto Industry in Chinese Bump], Khorasan News, July 3, 2019, pp. 1, 14.
- 39.
“Araqchi: Afzoon bar 1500 tahrim bayad laghv shavad” [Araqchi: More than 1500 Sanctions Must be Removed], Ettelaat, April 11, 2021, p. 2.
- 40.
“Dar gheibat khodrohay bakeifiyat varedati, bazaar khordo be kam chiniha” [As Imported Cars of High Quality are Absent, the Automobile Market Serves the Chinese], Eghtesad Melli, October 16, 2018, p. 11.
- 41.
Miyagawa, p. 148.
- 42.
Eyler, pp. 185–186.
- 43.
Rudi Matthee, “‘Neither Eastern nor Western, Iranian’: How the Quest for Self-Sufficiency Helped Shape Iran’s Modern Nationalism,” Journal of Persianate Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2020), pp. 59–104.
- 44.
A.I. Salitskii, Zhao **n, and V.I. Yurtaev, “Sanctions and Import Substitution as Exemplified by the Experience of Iran and China,” Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences Vol. 87, No. 2 (2017), pp. 205–212.
- 45.
“Esteghbal chin az mahsoolat keshavarzi irani” [China Welcome Iranian Agricultural Products], Tejarat News, September 26, 2016, p. 5; and “Saderat gheirnafti keshavr be 47 milliard dollar resid” [Iran’s Non-oil Exports Reached $47 Billion], Ettelaat, April 2018, p. 1.
- 46.
“Chin, nakhostin moshtari kalahay irani” [China, First Customer of Iranian Goods], Tafahom News, October 19, 2016, p. 2; and “Divar boland chin maghsad 25 darsad az saderat gheirenafti Iran” [Great Wall of China Destination for 25 Percent of Iran’s Non-oil Exports], Afta-e Eghtesadi, December 31, 2019, p. 1.
- 47.
“Namgozari sal 1397 be onvan ‘hemayat az kalay irani’” [Naming 1397 Year of ‘Supporting Iranian Good’], Aftab-e Yazd, April 3, 2018, p. 1; and “Suzuki savar mishavim va az kalay irani hemayat mikonim!” [Drive Suzuki and Support Iranian Commodity!], Aftab-e Yazd, April 5, 2018, pp. 1, 2.
- 48.
“Keshvarhay hamsaye maghsad 75 darsad saderat az Iran hastand” [Neighboring Countries Destination for 75 Percent of Iran Exports], Roozgar, February 28, 2021, p. 5.
- 49.
“Tehran–Baghdad 5 barabar Iran–europa” [Tehran–Baghdad 5 Times More than Iran–Europe], Farhikhtegan Daily, September 17, 2018, pp. 1, 8; and “Jaigozin shodan aragh bejay chin dar tejarat khareji” [Iraq Replacing China in Foreign Trade], Hadafeco, February 25, 2019, p. 1.
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Azad, S. (2022). Tipped to Profit: The Non-stop Gravy Train of Trade. In: East Asia and Iran Sanctions. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97427-5_7
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