Abstract
Imposing international sanctions requires a great deal of coordination and cooperation among sovereign nations. Sanctions also force a target country to seek foreign allies and partners to go around those punitive measures and restrictions one way or the other. This chapter, therefore, analyzes why the United States, as the main architect behind Iran sanctions, had to rely constantly on its East Asian allies, particularly Japan and South Korea, to punish the Persian Gulf country economically and technologically, though the Japanese were often willing to play a mediating role between Washington and Tehran concerning sanctions. At the same time, the West-led international sanctions and limitations levied against Iranians turned out to be a huge fortune for North Korea and China which managed to make the most of the Mideast country despite the Islamic Republic’s sharp ideological differences with those communist states of East Asia.
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Notes
- 1.
Wilson reckoned sanctions to be a superb substitute for war, arguing, “A nation boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it brings pressure upon the nation that, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist.” Cited from Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 9.
- 2.
Richard N. Haass, “Sanctioning Madness,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6 (November–December 1997), pp. 74–85; and Randall Newnham, Deutsche Mark Diplomacy: Positive Economic Sanctions in German–Russian Relations (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), p. 20.
- 3.
Salim Lamrani, The Economic War against Cuba: A Historical and Legal Perspective on the U.S. Blockade (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2013), p. 13.
- 4.
John R. Bolton, The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020).
- 5.
Samuel P. Huntington, “Foreign Aid for What and for Whom,” Foreign Policy, No. 1 (Winter 1970), pp. 161–189.
- 6.
There happened to be some other charges for which Iran could face additional economic penalties. For instance, in 1987 the Reagan administration designated the Middle Eastern power “a major narcotic-trafficking country,” putting a ban on almost any type of importing goods into the United States from Iran. O’Sullivan, p. 49.
- 7.
Alan Dowty, “Sanctioning Iraq: The Limits of the New World Order,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 3 (summer 1994), pp. 179–198.
- 8.
Kenneth A. Rodman, Sanctions beyond Borders: Multinational Corporations and U.S. Economic Statecraft (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), p. 185.
- 9.
Those four decisive motions against Iran by the UN Security Council came in the form of Resolution 1737 (December 23, 2006), Resolution 1747 (March 24, 2007), Resolution 1803 (March 3, 2008), and Resolution 1929 (June 9, 2010).
- 10.
Jeremy M. Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 81.
- 11.
Before participating formally and publicly in those high-profile nuclear talks, the Obama administration had reached out to many top authorities and influential officials of the Islamic Republic from a couple of years earlier in part by opening a secret channel of informal negotiations held in a third country, Oman in particular, between a close coterie of Obama’s team and a group of trusted representatives dispatched by Tehran. For more information, see: Hillary Rodham Clinton, Hard Choices: A Memoir (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014); John Kerry, Every Day Is Extra (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018), pp. 408–439; and William J. Burns, The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal (New York: Random House, 2019).
- 12.
Steven Simon, “Iran and President Trump: What Is the Endgame?” Survival, Vol. 60, No. 4 (2018), pp. 7–20.
- 13.
Nikki R. Haley, With All Due Respect: Defending America with Grit and Grace (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2019).
- 14.
“U.S. Imposes Fresh Sanctions on Iran in Final Days of Trump Presidency,” Reuters, January 15, 2021; and “Editorial: Biden Must Undo Trump’s Original Sin on the Iran Nuclear Deal,” Los Angeles Times, April 6, 2021.
- 15.
“U.S. Tiptoes through Sanctions Minefield toward Iran Nuclear Deal,” Reuters, May 17, 2021.
- 16.
Philip H. Gordon, Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2020).
- 17.
Geoff Simons, The Scourging of Iraq: Sanctions, Law and Natural Justice, 2nd Edition (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), p. xvii.
- 18.
“World has had Enough of US Bullying: China Daily Editorial,” China Daily, August 23, 2020.
- 19.
Moritz Pieper, “Dragon Dance or Panda Trot? China’s Position towards the Iranian Nuclear Programme and Its Perception of EU Unilateral Iran Sanctions,” European Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2013), pp. 295–316.
- 20.
Miyagawa, pp. 128–129; and Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 274.
- 21.
Osamu Miyata, “Co** with the ‘Iranian Threat’: A View from Japan,” Silk Road, Vol. 1, No. 2 (December 1997), pp. 30–41.
- 22.
Kazuhiko Togo, Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1945–2003: The Quest for a Proactive Policy, 2nd Edition (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005), p. 303.
- 23.
“Korean Firms Face Risk over Iran Sanctions,” Korea Times, August 19, 2010.
- 24.
Azad, p. 18.
- 25.
“Trump Signs N. Korea, Russia, Iran Sanctions into Law,” Korea Times, August 3, 2017.
- 26.
“2nd ROK–US Consultation on Snap-back of US Sanctions against Iran Takes Place,” Consulate General of the Republic of Korea in Los Angeles, July 20, 2018.
- 27.
“‘Hangugeun wae miguk malman ddareuna’ ilanseo millyeonaneun hanguk kieobdeul” [Korean Companies Pushed out of Iran ‘Because Korea Only Follows American Words’] Hankyoreh, February 25, 2020.
- 28.
Shirzad Azad, East Asia’s Strategic Advantage in the Middle East (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2021), pp. 22–23.
- 29.
Joy Gordon, “The Hidden Power of the New Economic Sanctions,” Current History, Vol. 118, No. 804 (January 2019), pp. 3–10.
- 30.
“Entezar Iran az mottahedan sharghi” [Iran Expectations from Eastern Allies], Donya-e-Eqtesad, June 15, 2019, p. 8.
- 31.
Thomas Juneau, “The Enduring Constraints on Iran’s Power after the Nuclear Deal,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 134, No. 1 (2019), pp. 39–61.
- 32.
Doxey, p. 18.
- 33.
“Mosalas Tehran, Mosco, pekan batelosehr tamam doshmanihay gharb ast” [The Triangle of Tehran, Moscow and Bei**g Checkmates All Western Enmities], Kayhan, January 24, 2018, p. 1; and “Iran dar masir etelafsazi ba roosiye va chin” [Iran’s Ongoing Coalition-building with Russia and China], Shahrvand, July 26, 2020, p. 3.
- 34.
“Iran va roosiye mitavanand America ra mahar konand” [Iran and Russia Can Contain America], SMT News, September 9, 2018, p. 2.
- 35.
Bolton, Surrender is not an Option, p. 134.
- 36.
“Kick Russia Out of the Iran Nuclear Talks,” Bloomberg, April 27, 2021.
- 37.
“US Lauds Taiwan for Limiting Iran Ties,” Taipei Times, December 6, 2012, p. 3.
- 38.
Lenka Caisova, North Korea’s Foreign Policy: The DPRK’s Part on the International Scene and Its Audiences (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2019), p. 67.
- 39.
Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korean Special Forces (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), pp. 208–209.
- 40.
“‘Shuang ezhi’ zai bian” [‘Dual Containment’ Is Changing], Renmin (people’s Daily), July 17, 1998; and “**fang **gxiang jie** yilang” [The West Races to Approach Iran], Renmin, August 28, 1998.
- 41.
John Garver, “China–Iran Relations: Cautious Friendship with America’s Nemesis,” China Report, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2013), pp. 69–88.
- 42.
“Iran and China, the Totalitarian Twins,” The Wall Street Journal, July 20, 2020.
- 43.
Robert R. Bianchi, “China–Middle East Relations in Light of Obama’s Pivot to the Pacific,” China Report, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2013), pp. 103–118.
- 44.
“Yilang yu xifang jixu gaishan guanxi” [Iran and the West Continue to Improve Relations], Renmin (people’s Daily), May 4, 1999; and “When China Met Iran,” The New York Times, July 21, 2020.
- 45.
Marc Lanteigne, Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction, 4th Edition (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2020), p. 46.
- 46.
In the wake of all reinstated sanctions by the Trump administration, the two-way trade between Iran and China plummeted to around $20 billion by 2019.
- 47.
“Why China May Have Bought a $400bn Iran Liability,” Arab News, July 25, 2020; and “China, With $400 Billion Iran Deal, Could Deepen Influence in Mideast,” The New York Times, March 27, 2021.
- 48.
David K. Schneider, “Iran Sanctions: The View from Bei**g,” Diplomatic Courier, spring 2009, pp. 35–37.
- 49.
Bernt Berger and Phillip Schell, “Toeing the Line, Drawing the Line: China and Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions,” China Report, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2013), pp. 89–101.
- 50.
“Etelaf amniyati jadid dar shargh” [New Security Coalition in the East], Khorasan News, July 12, 2018, pp. 1, 16; “Ettehad Iran, roosiye va chin kaboos vahshatnak America” [Alliance of Iran, Russia and China is America’s Horrible Nightmare], Kayhan, December 29, 2019, p. 1; and “Agar namad ahzab America fil va olagh ast, namad Iranian ‘shir’ ast” [If Elephant and Donkey are Symbols of American parties, ‘Lion’ is the Symbol of Iranians], Asr-e Iranian, October 13, 2020, pp. 1, 2.
- 51.
“In gorbe shir ast” [This Cat is Lion], Hamdeli Daily, December 9, 2018, p. 1; “Shared Vision Binds Iran–China Relations,” Global Times, August 26, 2019; and “China, Iran Take Path to Shared Future,” China Daily, April 1, 2021.
- 52.
“Zhapon hargez Iran ra tark nakardeh ast” [Japan Has Never Left Iran], Hamshahri, February 19, 2019, pp. 1, 24.
- 53.
“Expert: No Obstacle to Expansion of Japan–Iran Ties,” Iran Daily, December 26, 2016, p. 1; and “Japan’s Iran Dilemma,” The Japan Times, December 10, 2019.
- 54.
Mari Nukii, “Japan–Iran Relations since the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal,” Contemporary Review of the Middle East, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2018), pp. 215–231.
- 55.
“Japan–US Consultation on US Sanctions on Iran,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, June 19, 2018.
- 56.
Pretty similar to the personal relationship between George W. Bush and Junichiro Koizumi, Donald Trump’s close ties with Shinzo Abe remained cordial to the very end so that when Abe resigned as Japan’s premier in August 2020, Trump’s habitual flattery for Abe reached new heights by calling him the “greatest prime minister” in the history of Japan. “Trump Lauds Abe as Japan’s ‘Greatest Prime Minister’ as Bromance Set to End,” The Japan Times, August 31, 2020.
- 57.
“Japan Urges ‘Uninterrupted’ Implementation of JCPOA,” Iran Daily, December 8, 2016, p. 1; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook 2020 (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2020), p. 210.
- 58.
Togo, p. 303.
- 59.
“Hatoyama Comes under Fire for Iran Visit, Claims Ambush,” The Japan Times, April 12, 2012.
- 60.
It was Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda who visited the Shah-ruled Iran in September 1978.
- 61.
“Nakhostvazir zhapon dar Tehran: Frestadeh solh” [Japan PM in Tehran: Peace Envoy], Jahan-e Sanat, June 12, 2019, p. 1; and “Safir solh va amniyat” [Ambassador of Peace and Security], Tejarat News, June 13, 2019, p. 1.
- 62.
“Should Abe Try Again with Iran?” The Japan Times, June 28, 2019.
- 63.
Although many observers blamed the internal rivalry between the reformists and conservatives as a possible casus belli, the charge against external forces was hard to be discarded immediately then. As a case in point, the Saudi Arabian powerful Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Salman, had already informed Trump’s National Security Advisor, John Bolton, that he was pretty unhappy with Abe’s planned visit to Iran. For more details, see: Bolton, The Room Where It Happened, p. 387.
- 64.
“Iran va zhapon menhay America” [Iran and Japan minus America], Javan, June 12, 2019, p. 2; and “The U.S.–Iran Crisis and Tokyo’s Response,” The Japan Times, January 22, 2020.
- 65.
According to a news report by Kyodo in September 2020, in June 2019 the Japanese government under Shinzo Abe had proposed a barter deal, worth several billions of dollars, between Iran and the United States with Japan playing an intermediary role to exchange Iranian crude oil with American corn and soybeans. Despite endorsed initially by the Trump administration, the Japanese scheme eventually failed because Washington did not throw its full support behind it. For more details, see: “Japan Secretly Proposed Iranian Oil and U.S. Grain Swap in Failed Mediator Bid,” Kyodo, September 8, 2020.
- 66.
“‘Na’ Tehran be vasetegari Abe Shinzo” [Tehran’s ‘No’ to Abe Shinzo’s Mediation], Siasat Rooz, June 8, 2019, pp. 1, 5; and “Dasthay khali aghay Abe dar Tehran” [Mr. Abe’s Empty Hands in Tehran], Farhikhtegan Daily, June 10, 2019, pp. 1, 2.
- 67.
“Kolah goshad mozakre ba America inbar ba dallali zhapon!” [The Hoax of Negotiations with America this Time with Japanese Brokerage], Kayhan, May 29, 2019, pp. 1, 2; and “Iran va zhapon menhay America” [Iran and Japan minus America], Javan, June 12, 2019, p. 2. In similar fashion, many observers and pundits in Japan and other parts of the world believed that Japan was simply unfit to step in the labyrinthine complexities of the American–Iranian problems. “Why Japan Should Stay Out of U.S. –Iran Spat,” The Japan Times, May 15, 2019.
- 68.
“How Can You Trust A War Criminal, Mr. Abe?” Farhikhtegan Daily, June 12, 2019, p. 1.
- 69.
“Iran Hails Japanese PM’s ‘Valuable Efforts’ after Resignation,” Mehr News Agency, August 29, 2020.
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Azad, S. (2022). Sanctions Reverberate: Stoking up Political Allegiance. In: East Asia and Iran Sanctions. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97427-5_2
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