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Due Diligence and the Regulation of Transnational Economic Activity: Regulation (EU) No 511/2014 Compared to Other EU Due Diligence Schemes

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Global Transformations in the Use of Biodiversity for Research and Development

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 95))

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Abstract

The Due Diligence obligation is a central component of the ABS Regulation No. 511/2014, which transposes the Nagoya Protocol into European Union law. This chapter explores the concept of ‘due diligence’ and the particular ways in which it got implemented by the Regulation. Built on the idea of a ‘self-standing duty’, the regulation absorbed the regulatory spirit of neighboring regulations of autonomous EU law. It is against this background, that Reg. 511/2014 has to be interpreted. We argue that the transposition into binding EU law transforms the standard of care into an objective one, leaning towards the standard established by due diligence in international business law (‘what ought to be done needs to be done’). Concurrently, the subjective dimension is strict (‘what the user ought to know’) and correlates with the informational infrastructure stipulated by the respective due diligence regime. As far as the allocation of responsibilities between private and public actors is concerned, we identify Reg. 511/2014 as a rather peculiar due diligence regime compared to other EU Regulations.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Regulation (EU) No 511/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on compliance measures for users from the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization in the Union (2014) Official Journal L150, p. 59.

  2. 2.

    Barber et al. (2003). This is standard practice in private international law, see Kegel and Schurig (2004), pp. 135ff. For the CBD, it was conceptualized under the principle of ‘common but differentiated duties’ as acknowledged in International Environmental Law, and implemented in the UNFCCC, see Godt (2003).

  3. 3.

    Analyzed from the angle of both, public and private law. Public lawyers stress the “perforated sovereignty”, e.g. Meyer (2018), pp. 66, 98 (analyzing standards and enforcement in transnational meat markets); Private lawyers focus on market regulation, e.g. Joerges (2013), p. 409 (proposing a concept of a “three dimensional conflict of laws”).

  4. 4.

    Some have and some have not. As of August 2020, only five countries have installed member state access regulations: France, Spain, Bulgaria Malta and Croatia, for further details see Winter in this volume.

  5. 5.

    After John Ruggie as Special Representative had delivered his “Framework”-Report to the Secretary General in 2008, the UN Human Rights Council adopted the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011), on the relationship of DD-considerations and UN-principles on businesses and HR, see ILA Study Group on DD (2016), p. 28.

  6. 6.

    OECD Guidelines for Multilateral Enterprises, adapted on 25 May 2011 by OECD members as well as Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Latvia, Lithuania, Morocco, Peru and Romania, http://oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf (last visited 14.3.2019).

  7. 7.

    At that time, the International Law Association (ILA) had already installed a ‘Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law’ (ILA Study Group on DD). The study group issued two reports, the first on 7 March 2014, the second in July 2016.

  8. 8.

    Reg. (EU) No 995/2010 (2010) Official Journal L295, p. 23 (applicable since 03.03. 2013); complemented by Commission Implementing Reg. (EU) No. 607/2012 (2012) Official Journal L177, p. 16 and Commission Delegated Reg. (EU) No 363/2012 (2012) Official Journal L115, p. 12.

  9. 9.

    Reg. 995/2010 is also referred to by the European Commission in its Guidance Document (2016) Official Journal C313/1 [hereinafter: EU Commission (2016)] at p. 11.

  10. 10.

    Ibid.

  11. 11.

    Dir. 2014/95/EU (2014) Official Journal L 330, p. 1 lays down the rules on disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by large companies, amending the general accounting Dir. 2013/34/EU (2013) Official Journal L182, p. 19. It requires companies to publish reports on their policies on environmental protection, social responsibility, treatment of employees, human rights, anti-corruption and diversity.

  12. 12.

    Reg. (EU) 2015/757 of the EP and the Council on the monitoring, reporting and verification of carbon dioxide emissions from maritime transport (2015) Official Journal L123, p. 55, also abbreviated ‘MRV-Regulation’.

  13. 13.

    Reg. (EU) 2016/679 (2016) Official Journal L119, p. 1.

  14. 14.

    Reg. (EU) 2017/821(2017) Official Journal L130, p. 1; complemented by Delegated Reg. 2019/429 (2019) Official Journal L75, p. 59.

  15. 15.

    Kulesza (2016), p. 3. According to Freeman, as noted in his 1955 lecture at the Hague Academy of International Law, due diligence requires “nothing more nor less than the reasonable measures of prevention which a well-administered government could be expected to exercise under similar circumstances” (cited after ILA Study Group on DD, 2014, p. 3).

  16. 16.

    Koivurova (2010).

  17. 17.

    French, cited by ILA Study Group on DD (2016), p. 1.

  18. 18.

    The ILC engaged in codifying the Law of state responsibility since the 1950, first focusing on wrongful acts, since the 1970s opening a second track on injurious consequences of acts not prohibited by international law. In 1996 draft Articles and Commentary dealing with prevention, co-operation, and strict liability for damages were proposed. In 2001, the ILC (International Law Commission) submitted Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities (the ‘Prevention Articles’), Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. to the General Assembly on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2), and in 2006 Principles on the Allocation of Loss in case of Transboundary Harm Arising Out of Hazardous Activities (‘Loss Allocation Principles’), Int’l Law Comm’n Rep. to the G.A, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2006/Add.1; ILA Study Group on DD (2016), p. 24; in depth: Kulesza (2016), p. 115ff.

  19. 19.

    ILA Study Group on DD (2016), p. 2.

  20. 20.

    Ibid.

  21. 21.

    Takano (2018), p. 2.

  22. 22.

    ILA Study Group on DD (2014), p. 2; ILA Study Group on DD (2016), p. 15.

  23. 23.

    ILA Study Group on DD (2016), p. 11 (on control) and pp. 14–16 (on economic differentiation in various contexts).

  24. 24.

    “The golden thread”, ILA Study Group on DD (2016), p. 8.

  25. 25.

    ILA Study Group on DD (2016), pp. 12, 21, 23.

  26. 26.

    Dupuy and Viñuales (2015), p. 60. McIntyre (2011), pp. 136, 143 clarifies that the International Court of Justice in the Pulp Mills case (Argentina v. Uruguay, 20.4.2010) as the respective landmark decision conceptualized procedural rules as preventive, but substantial rules as separate obligations, yet complementary. The Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in its Advisory Opinion “Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Resprect to Activities in the Area” (case no. 17, 1.2.2011), para. 120 concurs and suggests that the DD obligation is a conceptual bridge between harm prevention and precaution, cautioning: Brunnée (2016), p. 7.

  27. 27.

    Bremer (2017).

  28. 28.

    Known as “Framework for Business and Human Rights” (2008), published in UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5, p. 1.

  29. 29.

    Known as “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights”, above n. 5.

  30. 30.

    Lambooy (2010), p. 429.

  31. 31.

    ILA Study Group on DD (2016), p. 26. An even earlier precedent is the IMO-created fund for oil spills.

  32. 32.

    ILA Study Group on DD (2016), p. 29 recognizes that the terminology ‘due diligence’ was deliberately referenced to both, human rights law and business management practice, indicating this as “cleverly”. Yet, the report cautions as to the misleading potential. With regard to the intention of finding a language familiar for both, human rights and the business community, see also Martin-Ortega (2014), p. 50.

  33. 33.

    Wood (2012), p. 63 at 65 argues that leverage applies also to businesses which have not contributed to a harm and coin this type of accountability “leverage-based negative responsibility”.

  34. 34.

    Sec IV OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (2011 version), p. 31, para 3; p. 33, para 43.

  35. 35.

    ILA Study Group on DD (2016), p. 32.

  36. 36.

    ILA Study Group on DD (2016), pp. 34–35—(at p. 34 reminding that Guiding Principle 17 explains that business enterprises conducting appropriate human rights due diligence “should not assume that, by itself, this will automatically and fully absolve them from liability for causing or contributing to human rights abuses”).

  37. 37.

    Kulesza (2016), pp. 115ff.

  38. 38.

    § 11 US Securities Act of 1933, see Bainbridge and Anabtawi (2017), p. 255. Acknowledging these US roots: DiMatteo (2009), p. 292; the same is reported in the ‘human rights’ literature, see: Martin-Ortega (2014) at p. 51, referring to Spedding (2005).

  39. 39.

    For structuring the process of the various types of DD in the acquisition process see Bainbridge and Anabtawi (2017), pp. 255–263.

  40. 40.

    Art. 38 sec. 1 CISG reads: “The buyer must examine the goods, or cause them to be examined, within as short a period as is practicable in the circumstances.” It might be worth mentioning that equivalent norms do exist in national law, e.g. in Germany and Austria. However, in these two countries this rule is limited to contracts between two professional traders. On the related CISG-case law, see Schwentzer (2019), para. 6.

  41. 41.

    Hoskisson et al. (2004), p. 251.

  42. 42.

    In these concepts, due diligence serves as a defense against liability (examples: sec. 90.1 UK Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, sec. 7.2 UK Bribery Act 2010, sec.11 (b) (3) (A) US Securities Act 1933) or to reduce a sentence (example: § 8 B2.1. US Sentencing Commission’s Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2018), available at https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2018/CHAPTER_8.pdf, last visited 15.3.2019).

  43. 43.

    Chapman (2006).

  44. 44.

    Literature conceptualizes four stages of ‘effort standards’ on a continuum ranging from least to greatest efforts: “commercially reasonable efforts”, reasonable efforts”, “all reasonable efforts”/“reasonable best efforts” to “best efforts”, Bainbridge and Anabtawi (2017), p. 273.

  45. 45.

    Just as example, §§ 437, 280, 281 283, 311a German Civil Code (BGB).

  46. 46.

    In a previous legal analysis (Godt and Burchardi 2018, p. 60), we inferred that a DD liability in Art. 4.5 Reg. 511/2014, which would encompass the liability for registered collections for the stop of downstream utilization, is not in line with the origins of due diligence liability.

  47. 47.

    An element stressed by McCorquodale (2009), p. 392.

  48. 48.

    Bell (2001), pp. 125f.

  49. 49.

    In a resolution of the EU Parliament made in 2010 in context of CSR in international trade agreements, the model of public international law is clearly articulated, cp Resolution P7_TA(2010)0446, p. 11 Sec. 26 lit. e.

  50. 50.

    In document (COM SWD 2012 0292, p. 31), the Commission explicitly refers to an ICC document, which takes reference to existing DD processes inside firms.

  51. 51.

    EU Commission (2016), p. 10.

  52. 52.

    EU Commission (2016), p. 10: “If a user — no matter at which step in the value chain — takes reasonable measures in seeking, kee**, transferring and analyzing information, the user will be compliant with the due diligence obligation under the EU ABS Regulation. This way the user should also avoid liability vis-à-vis subsequent users, although this aspect is not regulated by the EU ABS Regulation.” To be clear: The Commission speaks about the contractual liability towards the purchaser, not the statutory obligation under Art. 4.5 Reg. 511/2014.

  53. 53.

    A proposed ‘triangular duty to comply’ (a diagonal duty to the provider state, enforced vertically by the user state) was rejected in the legislative process. Instead, Art. 4 Reg. 511/2014 installs a vertical (user state) ‘duty to produce (diagonal) compliance’ vis-à-vis the provider state.

  54. 54.

    Brunnée (2016), p. 7.

  55. 55.

    In contrast to respecting the residual substance (sic. ‘compliance with provider state laws’).

  56. 56.

    Legrand (1997) thereby rejects the notion of Watson (1974) to whom the tern ‘legal transplants’ is attributed.

  57. 57.

    Watson (2000) responded to Legrand’s critique that both approaches to legal transplants are not very far removed from each other. More recent: Grozev (2012); Short (2016).

  58. 58.

    Winter and Kalichava (2019), p. 41; Siems (2014), pp. 139–145 identified five categories, which influence the implementation of the transplant in the novel environment; on legal transplants in the modern context of private international law: Siems (2018), pp. 236–238, and pp. 256–260.

  59. 59.

    Teubner (1998), p. 11; similar: Chen-Wishart (2013), p. 1.

  60. 60.

    Hood et al. (2001), p. 21.

  61. 61.

    See e.g. Art. 9 Sec. 3 lit. a Reg. 511/2014.

  62. 62.

    Gellert (2015), p. 9.

  63. 63.

    Inter alia, see Art. 5.2 Implementing Reg. 607/2012: “In applying their due diligence system operators shall be able to demonstrate how the information gathered was checked against the risk criteria provided for in Art. 6.1.b. of Reg. 995/2010, how a decision on risk mitigation measures was taken and how the operator determined the degree of risk.”

  64. 64.

    According to Haufler, mechanisms revolving around “information politics” have come to dominate transnational business regulation, Haufler (2018), p. 116.

  65. 65.

    The disparities between global production and national regulation demarcate a “critical governance gap”, which many scholars regard as the main driver behind the promulgation of corporate social responsibility and industry self-regulation, see Haufler (2018).

  66. 66.

    Inter- means “between, among”; therefore, an intermediary denotes “someone who moves back and forth between two sides – a ‘go-between’,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/intermediary (last visited: 15.04.2019).

  67. 67.

    Abbott et al. (2017), p. 18. This way, EU public actors “increase their capacity to regulate global value chains”, Partiti (2019), pp. 95, 105.

  68. 68.

    Abbott et al. (2017), p. 20.

  69. 69.

    Orchestration describes a form of public action that “mobilizes the voluntary participation of intermediaries in the regulatory process in order to address a target in the pursuit of public goals”, Partiti (2019), p. 95f.

  70. 70.

    Abbott et al. (2017), p. 19.

  71. 71.

    R = regulator, I = intermediary, T = target (of regulation). Seminal: The RIT-Model by Abbott et al. (2017).

  72. 72.

    Abbott et al. (2017), p. 26f.

  73. 73.

    Below, Sects. 3.4, 4.4.

  74. 74.

    Abbott et al. (2017), p. 17. With its procedural and open nature, due diligence is more or less the opposite.

  75. 75.

    Abbott et al. (2017), p. 19f.

  76. 76.

    Abbott et al. (2017), p. 28ff.

  77. 77.

    Ensthaler et al. (2016), p II.

  78. 78.

    Abbott et al. (2017), p. 23; Ensthaler et al. (2016), p. XVII.

  79. 79.

    Lachaud (2018), p. 253.

  80. 80.

    Ibid.

  81. 81.

    Council Res. on a new approach to technical harmonization and standards (1985) Official Journal C136, p. 1.

  82. 82.

    Schucht (2017), p. 46.

  83. 83.

    Schucht (2017), pp. 47, 49.

  84. 84.

    Council Dir. 85/374/EEC (1985) Official Journal (1985), L210, pp. 29–33. The European Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC is based on causal (no-fault) liability.

  85. 85.

    Verbruggen (2013). This is sometimes also referred to as the “shadow of hierarchy”, Héritier and Eckert (2008).

  86. 86.

    The ‘New Legislative Framework’ is formed by Reg. (EC) 764/2008, Reg. (EC) 765/2008 and Decision 768/2008, see Reg. (EC) No 764/2008 laying down procedures relating to the application of certain national technical rules to products lawfully marketed in another Member State and repealing Decision No 3052/95/EC Official Journal L218, pp. 21–29; Reg. (EC) No 765/2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 (2008) Official Journal L218, pp. 30–47; Decision No 768/2008/EC on a common framework for the marketing of products, and repealing Council Decision 93/465/EEC (2008), L218, pp. 82–128.

  87. 87.

    Schucht (2017), p. 49.

  88. 88.

    Portalier (2017), p. 9; Schucht (2017), p. 49.

  89. 89.

    Schucht (2017), p. 49f. See also Senden (2005), p. 11.

  90. 90.

    EU Commission (2002).

  91. 91.

    Inter-Institutional Agreement on better law-making (2003) Official Journal C321, p. 1.

  92. 92.

    Best (2003), p. 3. Senden (2005), p. 12.

  93. 93.

    Senden (2005), p. 12; Lachaud (2018), p. 254.

  94. 94.

    Schucht (2017), p. 49f.

  95. 95.

    Ibid.

  96. 96.

    Art. 19.2 second sentence Reg. 765/2008—“well hidden” and sometimes overlooked, Schucht (2015), p. 656.

  97. 97.

    Schucht (2015), p. 658f.

  98. 98.

    Partiti (2019), p. 103f.

  99. 99.

    Note: As the Guidance Document on the scope of application and core obligations of Regulation (EU) No 511/2014 makes clear, genetic resources fall outside the scope of the regulation when they are traded and exchanged as commodities and no research and development is taking place, EU Commission (2016), p. 7. With that caveat in mind, we decided to keep the term for purposes of comparability.

  100. 100.

    For an overview on the global reach of EU law, see Scott (2014), who prefers to speak of ‘action forcing contingent unilateralism’ instead of ‘exportation’ (of regulation). See also Fishman and Obizdinski (2014) on the wider trade law implications of Reg. 995/2010.

  101. 101.

    Art. 4.1 Reg. 995/2010; European Commission (2016).

  102. 102.

    Levashova (2011), p. 294.

  103. 103.

    European Parliament (2012), pp. 28, 54.

  104. 104.

    For a discussion of procedure vs. substance in Reg. 511/2014, see below under Sect. 4.1.

  105. 105.

    Unwin (2011), p. 4f.

  106. 106.

    Ibid.

  107. 107.

    This is not dissimilar to the system of registered and non-registered collections under Reg. 511/2014. Users obtaining genetic resources from unregistered collections will not benefit from Art. 4.7 Reg. 511/2014.

  108. 108.

    Reg. (EC) No 338/97 transposing the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna [CITES] (1997) Official Journal L61, p. 1.

  109. 109.

    Reg. (EC) No 2173/2005 (2005) Official Journal L347, p. 1. Licensing scheme within the FLEGT-Regulation. The respective licenses can only be issued by countries that have a Voluntary Partnership Agreement (FLEGT-VPA) with the EU in place, confirming that the timber products at hand were logged in full compliance with the laws of the exporting country. FLEGT is the acronym for the EU’s Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Action Plan, which was established in 2003. EU FLEGT Facility, Import Procedures for FLEGT-licensed products, available under http://www.flegtlicence.org/eu-import-procedures-for-flegt-licences (last accessed 28.9.2019).

  110. 110.

    Importers who first place such timber on the market can assume that the respective wood is marketable without constraints (EU Commission, 2016, 10A, 11).

  111. 111.

    Art. 4.3 Reg. 995/2010.

  112. 112.

    Art. 8.1 lit. b and c Reg. 995/2010.

  113. 113.

    ‘Supervisory accountability’, Moser and Leipold (2019), p. 7. Cp Art. 8.4 Reg. 995/2010, Art. 6 Reg. 607/2012.

  114. 114.

    Ibid.

  115. 115.

    Ibid., ‘market accountability’.

  116. 116.

    Unwin (2011), p. 12f.

  117. 117.

    Fedi (2017), p. 383.

  118. 118.

    Deane et al. (2017), p. 2.

  119. 119.

    Art. 6 Reg. 2015/757.

  120. 120.

    Art. 13.2 Reg. 2015/757.

  121. 121.

    Art. 17 Reg. 2015/757.

  122. 122.

    Arts 5 and 11 Commission Delegated Reg. (EU) 2016/2072 (2016) Official Journal L320, p. 5.

  123. 123.

    Fedi (2017), p. 405f.

  124. 124.

    Commission Delegated Reg. (EU) 2016/2072 further details the accreditation of verifiers, which are subject to, inter alia, annual surveillance and extraordinary assessments by the national accreditation bodies.

  125. 125.

    E.g. Arts 24.3 and 28.5 GDPR.

  126. 126.

    Lachaud (2016), pp. 814, 820ff.

  127. 127.

    Eckhardt (2017), para 45.

  128. 128.

    Art. 82.3 GDPR.

  129. 129.

    Art. 42 GDPR.

  130. 130.

    See Art. 58 GDPR for a list of investigative and corrective powers of the supervisory authorities.

  131. 131.

    See Art. 43.5 GDPR.

  132. 132.

    Pursuant to Art. 43.1 GDPR, accreditation may also be carried out in conjunction with national accreditation bodies named in accordance with Reg. 765/2008.

  133. 133.

    This is even provided for in the Regulation itself, see Art. 42.4 GDPR.

  134. 134.

    For the international background of Reg. 2017/821, see Martin-Ortega (2014), pp. 62ff; also Partiti and van der Velde (2017).

  135. 135.

    Heße and Klimke (2017), p. 449.

  136. 136.

    Art. 9 Reg. 2017/821.

  137. 137.

    Art. 6.2 last sentence Reg. 2017/821. This is reminiscent of the ‘green lane’ under Reg. 995/2010 (see above).

  138. 138.

    Arts 3.2 and 11 Reg. 2017/821.

  139. 139.

    Business representatives (just like NGOs) were involved at every stage of the EU negotiation process that led to Reg. 2017/821, see Partsch (2018). The regulatory markup of Reg. 2017/821 suggests that they were successful in achieving regulatory concessions.

  140. 140.

    OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (Second Edition, OECD, 2013).

  141. 141.

    Teicke and Rust (2018), p. 43.

  142. 142.

    Procedures providing access to information, risk assessment procedures and risk mitigation procedures in Art. 6.1 lit. a-c Reg. 995/2010.

  143. 143.

    For a discussion of substantive elements in Reg. 511/2014 see below, Sect. 4.1.

  144. 144.

    Teicke and Rust (2018), p. 41. Those criteria are largely contained in soft law, which is also problematic, see the discussion above in the preceding paragraph.

  145. 145.

    Verbruggen (2013).

  146. 146.

    Fedi (2017), p. 410.

  147. 147.

    Lachaud (2018), p. 252.

  148. 148.

    This may also be due to the ‘delicate’ subject matter—personal data—and the accountability principle that Reg. 2016/679 is built on, see Art. 5 Reg. 2016/679. As of October 2019, there are still not approved private GDPR certification mechanisms, let alone accreditation bodies.

  149. 149.

    Lachaud (2018), p. 251. Where oversight is not possible, e.g., when personal data is transferred to third countries, certification must be backed up by binding and enforceable commitments (e.g. contractual or otherwise) of the controller or processor in the third country.

  150. 150.

    Spindler (2016), p. 409.

  151. 151.

    We use this term with the proviso, naturally, that environmental impacts are different in the case of genetic resources (collecting/sampling) when compared to timber (logging) and minerals (mining).

  152. 152.

    Abbott et al. (2017), p. 24.

  153. 153.

    Abbott et al. (2017), p. 23.

  154. 154.

    “Driven by functional considerations”, see Abbott et al. (2017), p. 19.

  155. 155.

    Below, Sect. 4.2.

  156. 156.

    Especially if one follows the ‘logic’ that new forms of co- and self-regulation (especially in the international sphere) are indicative of a power shift to the private sector at the expense of public authority, Partsch (2018), p. 482; Green (2013). Also, Reg. 511/2014 does not use words like ‘audit’, “certification” and ‘verification’ which relate to third-party quality control (as a common feature of industry self- and co-regulation).

  157. 157.

    Bell (2001), p. 124.

  158. 158.

    Brès et al. (2019) developed a typology along the axis ‘formalized vs. unformalized’ and ‘unofficial vs. official’.

  159. 159.

    EU Commission (2016), p. 5.

  160. 160.

    Ibid.

  161. 161.

    Commercial bio-prospectors/brokers had already engaged in develo** codes of conduct in the past. For examples see Godt et al. (2020), § 3 VIII, 1–3.

  162. 162.

    Until today, applications under Art. 8 Reg. 511/2014 were only successful for associations of collections, thus mostly complementing Art. 5 Reg. 511/2014. The first ‘best practices’ acknowledged on 10.5.2019 is the CETAF Code of Conduct, see https://cetaf.org/sites/default/files/documents/leaflet-a4_codeofconduct_hd.pdf (last accessed 06.03.2020), for background Neumann (2018). Two other applications from the cosmetics industry have remained (until today, Oct. 2020) unsuccessful.

  163. 163.

    Unfortunately, this is not really elaborated on. Annex IV to Commission Implementing Reg. (EU) 2015/1866 merely stipulates that associations and interested parties provide a description of how the overseeing will be carried out when applying for the recognition of best practices.

  164. 164.

    There is passive regulatory feedback (per Commission request) from associations establishing best practices in cases of non-compliance by users implementing those practices, see Art. 12 Commission Implementing Reg. (EU) 2015/1866.

  165. 165.

    In case of user associations, that would mean an overlap of the intermediary and the target, Abbott et al. (2017), p. 26.

  166. 166.

    Lambooy (2010).

  167. 167.

    Martin-Ortega (2014), p. 52.

  168. 168.

    The consequences of the EU-rejected model for possible scenarios of transnational enforcement are discussed by Godt et al. (2020), § 2 II 5 b-f.

  169. 169.

    Art. 5.7 Reg. 511/2014 reads: “Users obtaining a genetic resource from a collection included in the register of collections within the Union referred to in Article 5(1) shall be considered to have exercised due diligence as regards the seeking of information listed in paragraph 3 of this Article”.

  170. 170.

    This is exactly how national legislators transposed the norm into national laws, e.g. for Germany, see § 2 of the German Law transposing Reg. 511/2014. It reads: (1) The competent authority adopts the necessary orders to remedy breaches of the legal acts designated in section 1 paragraph (1). (2) Should a user fail to comply with an order in accordance with paragraph (1), the competent authority may in individual cases seize the unlawfully-utilized genetic resource or prohibit specific utilization activities. This shall be particularly considered if the user is unable to submit the information required in accordance with Article 4 paragraph 3 of Regulation (EU) No. 511/2014.

  171. 171.

    A situation which is “simply” unlawful does not give rise to individual obligations. Modern rule of law implies that preceding related conduct is in some way “blameworthy” in order to trigger legal consequences.

  172. 172.

    This is what in German doctrine is conceptualized as “outer care”. This does not equate with “guiltiness” which is “inner care” in the German doctrinal tradition. In the fault based German tort tradition, it is the inner care which provides for the basis of a single general clause of § 823 German Civil Code (BGB) which imbeds both, intent and negligence. For a profound critique, see Brüggemeier (2004), pp. 76ff.

  173. 173.

    EU Commission (2016), p. 11.

  174. 174.

    Art. 4.5 Reg. 511/2014 stipulates “When the information in their possession is insufficient or uncertainties about the legality of access and utilization persist, users shall obtain an access permit or its equivalent and establish mutually agreed terms, or discontinue utilization”.

  175. 175.

    From the perspective of the competent authority, this triggers a conditioned program of actions. A first step will see the CA order the user to submit ABS documentation.

  176. 176.

    From the perspective of the Competent Authority that means, if papers are not produced upon request, the CA will order the discontinuation of utilization until the papers are produced.

  177. 177.

    In principle, utilization without ABS-documents has to be stopped. However, a respective order might be unproportionate. Recent experience has shown, that political turmoil or other political reasons result in ‘no-answers’ of competent authorities in provider states. In those cases, the CA of the user state may provide for a temporary allowance.

  178. 178.

    Third, if it turns out that the approval of use is either impossible, or the user is unwilling to engage in action, the CA is entitled to prohibit utilization (including the publication of results) ad infinitum. The German law provides for the genetic resource(s) to be confiscated and destroyed.

  179. 179.

    Godt and Burchardi (2018), p. 64f.

  180. 180.

    The first registered collection (May 2018) is the German Collection of Microorganisms and Cell Cultures DSMZ. This collection pursues a specific service agency-approach for German research. It provides a legal check for access compliance, when requested by connected institutions; for background: Hartmann-Scholz (2018). In February 2020, the French Collection for Plant-associated Bacteria (CIRM-CFBP) became the second registered collection; in April 2020, the French ‘Pierre Fabre Research Institute Library of dry ground plant parts’ became the third registered collection, https://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/international/abs/pdf/Register-of-Collections.pdf (last accessed 22.09.2020).

  181. 181.

    Originally, the EP had proposed certification of the economic operators by the monitoring organizations. However, certification is not considered as ultimately necessary for due diligence. Yet, independent third-party auditing is mentioned as an element in the OECD DD Guidance and the UN-Expert Group Guidelines, as acknowledged by Martin-Ortega (2014), p. 73.

  182. 182.

    It seems that the efficacy of certification was doubted in international fora (for the emerging conflict mineral regime, see Martin-Ortega (2014), p. 71; for diamonds see Ekmen (2011). In the realm of genetic resources, it has been argued that the affected industries are too dispersed as to come to grips with certification.

  183. 183.

    Something, which was reiterated explicitly for conflict minerals in Recital 12 of Regulation 2017/821.

  184. 184.

    Unless we qualify the matter in terms of the dissemination of the benefits from science with regard to the human right to science, which is provided for in Art. 27 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) G.A. Res. 217A (III) UN Doc. A/810, p. 71 and Art. 15 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) United Nations Treaty Series 993, p. 3; see also Morgera (2018/19), p. 55.

  185. 185.

    Cf. the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ‘UNFCCC’ (1992) G.A. Res. 48/189 United Nations Treaty Series 1771, p. 107, the principle of origin under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ‘TFEU’ (2012) Official Journal C326, p. 47, EU Reg. 995/2010.

  186. 186.

    It is in the interest of the user to be given support by the user state; this is the guiding implementation principle of the Dutch competent agencies, see van Winkoop (2018).

  187. 187.

    After the horizontal Guidance Paper (EU Commission 2016) eight vertical Guidance Papers (3rd version April 2017) were drafted for the following sectors: animal breeding, biotechnology, cosmetics, foods and feeds, plant breeding, pharmaceuticals, the biocontrol and bio-stimulants sector, and for ex-situ collections. After deciding not to adopt them as official guidance papers, competent authorities will move forward with singular examples and (published) explanations.

  188. 188.

    EU Commission (2016), p. 12.

  189. 189.

    Notwithstanding the fact that respecting foreign law is limited by restrictions, such as the temporal scope (cut-off date 12.10.2012), the material scope (‘commodities’, strongly disputed ‘derivatives’, ‘digital sequence information’), the interpretation of the term ‘utilization’ (discussed is the exemption of activities defined as ‘pre-’ or ‘post-utilization’ which would fall under ‘utilization’ defined by provider state laws).

  190. 190.

    This is exactly the opposite rationale, when compared to the due diligence concept in international business law. Here, it is the buyer who argues that all efforts have been exhausted.

  191. 191.

    EU Commission (2016), p. 10.

  192. 192.

    See Landgericht Stuttgart, Germany 31 August 1989, IPRax 1990, 317; District Court Roermond (Fallini Stefano v. Foodik), Netherlands 19 December 1991, available under http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/911219n1.html; Supreme Court (Trekking shoes case) Austria 27 August 1999, available under: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990827a3.html.

  193. 193.

    Partiti (2019).

  194. 194.

    In this regard see also Bartley (2014), p. 102ff., who discusses how the transnational timber regime (including Reg. 995/2010) “re-centers” the state and reduces the relative space for private authority (by prioritizing the legality of timber over sustainability); very similar Partiti (2019), p. 103: “Orchestration, however, is a two-way street. It also affects the roots of public authorities’ understanding and operationalization of concepts such as […] due diligence”.

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    Christine Godt & Markus Burchardi

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Godt, C., Burchardi, M. (2022). Due Diligence and the Regulation of Transnational Economic Activity: Regulation (EU) No 511/2014 Compared to Other EU Due Diligence Schemes. In: Chege Kamau, E. (eds) Global Transformations in the Use of Biodiversity for Research and Development. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 95. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88711-7_20

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