Karma in Buddhism and the Problems of Cross-Cultural and Cross-Religious Comparison of “Guilt” and “Forgiveness”

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Abstract

To enter into a dialogue with other cultures and religions on questions of peace and reconciliation, we have to be aware that complex concepts charged by the developments of intellectual history and religious ideas cannot be simply related across cultural and linguistic boundaries. If one wants to relate, for example, guilt and karma to each other, it might be useful to break down both concepts to their elements and categories according to Wittgenstein’s idea of family resemblance and to work out similarities and differences on this level. The paper investigates the possibility of deleting karma versus the expungement of guilt and the extent to which determinism, autonomy, and self-responsibility are inherent in both concepts. It concludes that differences in motivations and basic ideas between some aspects of Buddhist doctrine, Christianity, and legal conceptions pose considerable challenges to cross-cultural comparison and that, suspending the religious, empathy, and the golden rule are probably the best candidates for cross-cultural similarities. The second conclusion is that for a reconciliation with the other, it is probably crucial that the agent must think (or feel) his way into the minds of those who are to perceive the reparation like the atheist Willy Brandt has done through the spontaneous religious gesture of kneeling in catholic Poland.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For a major proponent of “Secular Buddhism,” see Batchelor (2015). For a critique of this approach, see Sobisch (2021).

  2. 2.

    A German Collaborative Research Center at Bielefeld University is currently focusing on comparison as a central cultural practice to identify equivalencies, differences, and incomparablenesses. The idea is here, too, to be able to finally mediate between cultures. See https://www.uni-bielefeld.de/sfb1288/.

  3. 3.

    Nibbedhika Sutta (A iii 415): “It is volition that I declare to be kamma.”

  4. 4.

    The language of karma is highly metaphorical. Karmically effective causes and results are called “seeds” (Skt. bīja) and “fruits” (Skt. phala), and the texts speak of sowing, ripening, rea**, and so forth.

  5. 5.

    Malalasekera (1938, 35). It plays a role here that patricide was considered one of the five ānantarya/ānantarika offenses, cf. Parikuppa Sutta (A iii 146, 5.129). According to Nyanatiloka (1953, 22), such an offense must inevitably be atoned for first (I owe this information to Lambert Schmithausen, email communication, June 2020).

  6. 6.

    However, this is postcanonical literature and certainly politically motivated.

  7. 7.

    Buddhaghosa (2010, 626); Warren and Kosambi (1989, XIX.16). See also Schmithausen (1991, 9–10).

  8. 8.

    This kind of karma is defined in Vitthāra Sutta (A ii 232): “[T]he intention to give up dark deeds with dark results, bright deeds with bright results, and both dark and bright deeds with both dark and bright results. These are called neither dark nor bright deeds with neither dark nor bright results, which lead to the ending of deeds.” What is meant with “both dark and bright deeds with both dark and bright results” is explained in Kammavibhanga Sutta (M iii 207): Some actions will have a delayed and some an accelerated result. Thus it only appears to the ordinary person as if the perceived “bright” action leads to the perceived “dark” result; cf. Sobisch (2020, 172). Schmithausen points out (email communication, June 2020) that this kind of karma as defined in Vitthāra Sutta refers to the path of salvation. Through progress on this path, one may attain a state of no more birth so that karma cannot ripen anymore, or it can only in this last existence ripen in a weaker form; cf., for example, Vetter (1988, 89–90), Manorathapuraṇī II 213, 10–11, and A ii 232, 8.

  9. 9.

    “Bodhisattva” refers in the context of Mahāyāna Buddhism to the new ideal, which is not aiming for Arhatship, that is, personal salvation, anymore. A Mahāyāna bodhisattva is someone who resolves to become a buddha to guide all beings to liberation. The fact that this is infinitely more difficult than mere personal salvation has led to the assumption in some Mahāyāna scriptures that extraordinary means are necessary. The nature of these extraordinary means is controversial. For a detailed discussion, see Sobisch (2018).

  10. 10.

    This is already mentioned in the Bodhisattvabhūmi and Aṅgulimālīyasūtra, cf. Schmithausen (2007, 423–426), and Schmithausen (2003).

  11. 11.

    For such a critical position, see Sobisch (2020, 594–601, 608–618).

  12. 12.

    Buddhism has a complex cosmology of saṃsāra, which, roughly speaking, distinguishes between higher and lower realms of existence. In the higher realms there are human beings and gods, that is, beings who have a certain autonomy in their actions. In the lower realms, beings are so plagued by pain, greed, and ignorance that they have very little autonomy of action. For a comprehensive overview of Buddhist cosmology, see Gethin (1997).

  13. 13.

    In the Buddhist hells, however, even though the beings there suffer much more than in the animal realms, they have no chance to commit nonvirtue and thus are losing their bad karma without creating new causes for suffering.

  14. 14.

    However, in accordance with the Pāli text, I have changed all plurals into singulars in Bikkhu Sujato’s translation. I owe the reference to the original Pāli text to Lambert Schmithausen.

  15. 15.

    Gethin (2004, 167–188). Cf. Sammādiṭṭhi Sutta (M i 47) and Mūla Sutta (A i 201), which establish greed, aversion, and delusion as the roots of unwholesomeness. Greed, for example, is like the stench of a carrion that attracts the flies of evil thoughts (Kaṭuviya Sutta A i 280). Unwholesome states of mind are not only a defilement, but also binding to further existence (Yoga Sutta A ii 11). They are also socially and morally corrupt and thus reprehensible (Aggañña Sutta D iii 82, Kesamutti Sutta A i 190).

  16. 16.

    Cūḷakammavibhaṅga Sutta (M iii 202) and Mahākammavibhaṅga Sutta (M iii 207).

  17. 17.

    For example, “if, on reflection, you know that it would lead to self-affliction, to the affliction of others, or to both; it would be an unwholesome bodily action with painful consequences, painful results” (Ambalaṭṭhikarāhulovāda Sutta, M i 415).

  18. 18.

    Schmithausen (2001).

  19. 19.

    “All tremble at violence; all fear death. Putting oneself in the place of another, one should not kill nor cause another to kill” (Dhammapada 129, The Dhammapada 1985, 53).

  20. 20.

    All renderings in English are mine.

  21. 21.

    This is not to say that it is not important to know about karma . In fact, such knowledge is essential for self-improvement in the sense of leading a virtuous life that leads one onto the spiritual path and, finally, to overcoming saṃsāra.

  22. 22.

    He sees indications that this material has been drawn from the earlier Sinhala commentaries.

  23. 23.

    Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam, cf. Poussin (1988–90, vol. 2, 643). For Tibetan sources, see Sobisch (2002, 481–482).

  24. 24.

    Cf. Bhikṣuṇivinayavibhaṇga, Derge, fol. 43r. For further examples, see Sobisch (2020, 236–238).

  25. 25.

    “Delusion” (Skt. moha, Tib. gti mug), like the related term “ignorance” (avidyā, ma rig pa), is in Buddhism not a passive state but implies active involvement. In brief, it means that things are held to be something that, in truth, they are not, for example, the “I” is held to be something autonomous that has a real basis, whereas in truth it is an illusory construct without any real basis (such as a soul). These terms should rather be understood as “cognitive misconception”; however, their standard translations as ignorance and delusion have long been established. Cf. Sobisch (2020, 178–179).

  26. 26.

    Maithrimurthi (1999, 282, 301–302) and Schmithausen (1997, 49, 2000, 133).

  27. 27.

    My English rendering.

  28. 28.

    I am aware that some people, especially active proponents of Atheism, like to deny the idea of a fundamental good in the human condition. It would be interesting to see what suggestions they would bring forward concerning a practical approach to forgiveness, since their version of Darwinism does not seem to be a helpful concept in the context of reconciliation between peoples or cultural groups, etc., but I am afraid they see our project as an impossible endeavor.

  29. 29.

    Drewermann (1982) and Dalai Lama (2016).

  30. 30.

    See, for example, Holt (2005, 147–168); and Schopen (1984, 9–47).

  31. 31.

    Gombrich, for instance, calls it a “sleight of hand;” Gombrich (1988, 126).

  32. 32.

    In the case of transferring merit to the deceased, the idea is here that the deceased ones are present, though invisible, during the ceremony of dedication and that they are able to perceive the thoughts of the person who dedicates the merit. Scholars have criticized that there is “no actual transfer from one to the other,” or worse, that it is a Buddhist sleight of hand. I would admit that “transfer” is a metaphor. However, if my employer transfers money to my bank account and I withdraw it from the cash machine or “transfer” it further, that transfer is also a metaphor, but it pays my rent in a very real way.

  33. 33.

    For this story of King Prasenajit’s offering to the Buddha in Kośala, see the Nagarāvalambikā Avadāna, the seventh chapter of the Divyāvadāna; Rotman (2008, 167–170).

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Correspondence to Jan-Ulrich Sobisch .

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Although I always had a special interest in the Buddhism transmitted through the Pāli canon, I cannot claim real expertise in this regard. I have always relied on the way how, in particular, scholars like Lambert Schmithausen and Rupert Gethin read these texts, and I continue to be awed by their scholarship. The choice of sample passages from the canon in this paper relies heavily on Lambert Schmithausen’s works. This paper also benefited from Lambert Schmithausen’s and Carmen Meinert’s kind suggestions to a draft version of it. Without exception, however, I alone am responsible for the views expressed here.

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Sobisch, JU. (2022). Karma in Buddhism and the Problems of Cross-Cultural and Cross-Religious Comparison of “Guilt” and “Forgiveness”. In: Lotter, MS., Fischer, S. (eds) Guilt, Forgiveness, and Moral Repair. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84610-7_11

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