Abstract
Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX), the PCAOB and the Dodd-Frank Act have pervasive effects on accounting firms, consulting firms and Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) in the US (i.e. disclosures, professional standards, regulation/compliance, standard-of-care, legal liability, etc.), and also have Global Multiplier Effects across countries and industries via US multinational corporations (MNCs) and foreign companies that do business in the US and/or list their shares/debts on US financial exchanges. This chapter explains why SOX and the PCAOB are partly or wholly unconstitutional. The theories in this chapter can be extended to similar statutes in other countries.
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Notes
- 1.
See: “The SOX tax: Many companies find initial costs were high, but they decline in subsequent years”. By Ann Bednarz. April 10, 2006.
- 2.
See: “Unions, retirees sue to block Chicago pension changes”. By Karen Pierog. Dec. 16, 2014. https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-chicago-pensions-lawsuit/update-2-unions-retirees-sue-to-block-chicago-pension-changes-idUSL1N0U01MO20141216. (states in part: “……..The lawsuit asks the court to declare the law void and illegal because pensions will be reduced in violation of a constitutional provision prohibiting the diminishment or impairment of public employee retirement benefits. A similar argument by unions and others led to a Nov. 21 Sangamon County Circuit Court ruling that tossed Illinois’ 2013 pension reform law for being unconstitutional. The Illinois Supreme Court will hear arguments in March over the state’s appeal of that ruling. Illinois has the worst-funded state pension fund, while Chicago is struggling with a huge pension funding burden. Moody’s Investors Service has said the city is an “extreme outlier” among U.S. local governments it rates, citing a $32 billion adjusted net pension liability that is equal to eight times operating revenue. A hearing on a temporary restraining order to stop the Jan.1 implementation of Chicago’s pension law is set for Dec. 29, according to AFSCME spokesman Anders Lindall. He said last month’s ruling on Illinois’ law, along with a state supreme court ruling in July over state retiree health care, have reinforced constitutional protections for retirement benefits…..…”).
- 3.
See: Phillips, N., LeBaron, G. & Wallin, S. (June 2018). Map** and Measuring the Effectiveness of Labour-Related Disclosure Requirements For Global Supply Chains. International Labour Office, Research Department Working Paper No. 32. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/%2D%2D-dgreports/%2D%2D-inst/documents/publication/wcms_632120.pdf.
- 4.
See: “Labor Department Issues Procedures For Handling SOX Whistleblower Complaints”. DLA Piper—Employment Alert, March 12, 2015. By: Daniel Turinsky & Amanda Rooney. https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2015/03/labor-department-issues-procedures/.
- 5.
See: “DOL Adopts Strengthened Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Regulations”. By Jason Zuckerman. August 9th, 2020. https://www.zuckermanlaw.com/dol-adopts-strengthened-sarbanes-oxley-whistleblower-regulations/. (OSHA has adopted Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower regulations implementing the Dodd-Frank Act amendments to the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower law. The regulations also clarify and improve OSHA’s procedures for handling Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claims, as well as to set forth OSHA’s interpretations of SOX. Some of the significant enhancements include the following:
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SOX complaints need not be in any particular form. They may be either oral or in writing. And when a complaint is made orally, OSHA will reduce the complaint to writing.
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Consistent with the ARB’s decisions in Sylvester Parexel Int’l LLC, ARB No. 07–123, (ARB May 25, 2011), the federal court pleading standards established in Bell Atlantic Corp. vs. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft vs. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) do not apply to Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower complaints filed with OSHA.
-
The final rule clarifies that a SOX whistleblower “need not show that the conduct complained of constituted an actual violation of law. Pursuant to this standard, an employee’s whistleblower activity is protected where it is based on a reasonable, but mistaken, belief that a violation of the relevant law has occurred or is likely to occur.”
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OSHA notes that its current policy is to request that each party provide the other parties with a copy of all submissions to OSHA that are responsive to the whistleblower complaint. Where the parties do not so provide, OSHA will ensure that each party is provided with such information, redacted as appropriate. OSHA will also ensure that each party is provided with an opportunity to respond to the other party’s submissions.
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A SOX whistleblower who is reinstated pursuant to an OSHA order of preliminary reinstatement but is subsequently unsuccessful at a hearing on the merits is not required to reimburse the employer for wages earned during the period of reinstatement: “Congress intended that employees be preliminarily reinstated to their positions if OSHA finds reasonable cause to believe that they were discharged in violation of Sarbanes-Oxley. However, the statutory procedural scheme does not allow for reimbursement to the employer if actual preliminary reinstatement was ordered and yet the employer ultimately prevailed. Thus, there is no statutory basis to reimburse an employer in that instance.”)
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- 6.
See: Malone, A., & Jones, R. (December 6, 2010). “Revealed: Inside the Chinese suicide sweatshop where workers toil in 34-hour shifts to make your iPod”. Daily Mail (London). Available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1285980/Revealed-Inside-Chinese-suicide-sweatshop-workers-toil-34-hour-shifts-make-iPod.html.
See: “Chinese Factory asks for ‘no suicide’ vow”. MSNBC. May 26, 2010. Available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37354853/ns/business-world_business/?ns=business-world_business.
See: Carlson, N. (April 7, 2010). “What It’s Like To Work In China’s Gadget Sweatshops Where Your iPhones And iPads Are Made”. Business Insider. Available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/what-its-like-to-work-if-chinas-gadget-sweatshops-where-your-iphones-and-ipads-are-made-2010-4?utm_source=Daily+Buzz&utm_campaign=81432d578c-nl_emv_db_04082010_a&utm_medium=email.
See: “Apple denies claims it broke Chinese labor laws in iPhone factory”. September 8, 2019. By Saheli Roy Choudhury.
See: “Apple’s 2019 supplier report shows progress on labor and health issues”. Jeremy Horwitz. March 6, 2019. https://venturebeat.com/2019/03/06/apples-2019-supplier-report-shows-progress-on-labor-and-health-issues/.
See: “Apple and Foxconn broke Chinese Labour law to build new iPhones—US tech group and manufacturing partner admit using too many temporary workers”. Louise Lucas. September 9, 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/19fefd86-d2c3-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77.
See: “Apple—Supplier Responsibility” (PDF). Apple. https://images.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/pdf/L418102A_SR_2010Report_FF.pdf
See: Chen, B. (May 14, 2010), “Workers Plan to Sue iPhone Contractor Over Poisoning”. Wired. https://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2010/05/wintek-employees-sue/.
See: “Apple under fire again for working conditions at Chinese factories”. The Guardian. December 19, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/19/apple-under-fire-again-for-working-conditions-at-chinese-factories?CMP=EMCNEWEML6619I2.
See: “Study Casts Doubts on Apple’s Ethical Standards”. China Labor Watch. February 24, 2016. http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/report/113.
See: “Poor Working Conditions Persist at Apple Supplier Pegatron”. China Labor Watch. October 22, 2015. http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/report/109.
See: Perlin, R. (2013). “Chinese Workers Foxconned”. Dissent. 60(2): 46–52.
See: Armitage, J. (July 30, 2013). “‘Even Worse Than Foxconn’: Apple Rocked by Child Labour Claims”. The Independent. London.
See: Mozur, P. (December 19, 2012). “Life Inside Foxconn’s Facility in Shenzhen”. The Wall Street Journal. https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/12/19/life-inside-foxconns-facility-in-shenzhen/.
See: “Apple suppliers maintain tight security to avoid leaks: Foxconn said to have ‘special status’ in China”. MacNN, February 17, 2010. Available at: http://www.macnn.com/articles/10/02/17/foxconn.said.to.have.special.status.in.china/.
See: Apple’s Recent Strike in Suzhou is Sign of Continued Bad Labor and CSR Practices in China. All Roads Lead to China, January 21, 2010. Available at: http://www.allroadsleadtochina.com/2010/01/21/will-apple-be-the-next-nike-or-will-they-take-labor-compliance-seriously/.
See: “Apple—Supplier Responsibility” (PDF). Apple. Available at: http://images.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/pdf/L418102A_SR_2010Report_FF.pdf.
See: Blodget, H. (April 7, 2010). “Apple-Supplier Factory Worker Tries To Kill Herself—That’s 4 In 4 Weeks”. Business Insider. Available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/henry-blodget-another-apple-supplier-factory-worker-tries-to-kill-herself-thats-4-in-4-weeks-2010-4.
See: Apple Loses Lawsuit Over a Company Policy Tim Cook Didn’t Know About. By Sissi Cao. Feb. 14, 2020. https://observer.com/2020/02/apple-lose-lawsuit-retail-employee-security-check-pay/. (“Apple has a lost a class-action lawsuit brought by its Apple store employees regarding a seemingly miscellaneous company policy at the retail level that CEO Tim Cook wasn’t even aware of. The plaintiffs filed the class-action suit in 2013, revealing that Apple would require its retail employees to go through a security check after they clocked out every day to make sure that no company assets or trade secrets were stolen. The exit check would typically take 10 to 20 minutes and involved searches of employees’ purses, briefcases and personal iPhones”.)
See: Apple sued by employees over labor issues. by James O’Toole. July 23, 2014. https://money.cnn.com/2014/07/23/technology/apple-labor/. (“The company is facing a lawsuit certified as a class action this week from employees who say they were denied meal breaks and rest periods in violation of California labor law. Attorneys for the plaintiffs estimate that more than 20,000 current or former Apple employees from the retail to corporate level have been affected by the alleged violations. Among other things, the lawsuit claims Apple employees were forced to work for stretches of five hours or more without meals, and didn’t get breaks on shorter shifts”.)
See: “Class complaint for injunctive relief and damages, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 15 Dec 2019; Major tech companies respond to lawsuit over mining deaths”. ComputerWeekly.com. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/lawsuit-against-apple-google-tesla-and-others-re-child-labour-drc/. (“Snapshot: In 2019, IRAdvocates, a US-based NGO filed a class action lawsuit against Apple, Google, Tesla, Alphabet, Microsoft, and Dell alleging the corporations profited from child labour in their cobalt supply chains in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Plaintiffs are either guardians of children killed in cobalt mining tunnels or children who were maimed while working in the mines”.)
See: The Other Side of Apple II: Pollution Spreads Through Apple’s Supply Chain. Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs, August 31, 2011. http://www.ipe.org.cn/Upload/Report-IT-V-Apple-II.pdf.
See: Barboza, D. (2012). Apple Cited as Adding to Pollution in China. The New York Times, September 1, 2011. Accessed March 26, 2012. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/technology/apple-suppliers-causing-environmental-problems-chinese-group-says.html?_r=1.
See: Watts, Jonathan, Apple Secretive About ‘Polluting and Poisoning’ Supply Chain, Says Report. The Guardian, January 19, 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/jan/20/apple-pollution-supply-chain.
See: Jobs, Steve, A Greener Apple. Apple, Inc. https://www.apple.com/hotnews/agreenerapple/.
See: Greenpeace. “Hazardous Materials Found in Apple’s iPhone: Chemicals Include those Banned in Children’s Toys in EU”. Greenpeace International. Greenpeace. http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/media-center/news-releases/hazardous-materials-found-in-a/.
See: Chen, B. (May 14, 2010), “Workers Plan to Sue iPhone Contractor Over Poisoning”, Wired. https://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2010/05/wintek-employees-sue/.
- 7.
See: “Unions, retirees sue to block Chicago pension changes”. By Karen Pierog. Dec. 16, 2014. https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-chicago-pensions-lawsuit/update-2-unions-retirees-sue-to-block-chicago-pension-changes-idUSL1N0U01MO20141216. (states in part: “The lawsuit asks the court to declare the law void and illegal because pensions will be reduced in violation of a constitutional provision prohibiting the diminishment or impairment of public employee retirement benefits. A similar argument by unions and others led to a Nov. 21 Sangamon County Circuit Court ruling that tossed Illinois’ 2013 pension reform law for being unconstitutional. The Illinois Supreme Court will hear arguments in March over the state’s appeal of that ruling. Illinois has the worst-funded state pension fund, while Chicago is struggling with a huge pension funding burden. Moody’s Investors Service has said the city is an “extreme outlier” among U.S. local governments it rates, citing a $32 billion adjusted net pension liability that is equal to eight times operating revenue. A hearing on a temporary restraining order to stop the Jan. 1 implementation of Chicago’s pension law is set for Dec. 29, according to AFSCME spokesman Anders Lindall. He said last month’s ruling on Illinois’ law, along with a state supreme court ruling in July over state retiree health care, have reinforced constitutional protections for retirement benefits”).
- 8.
See: Nwogugu (2013).
- 9.
See: “NOTE: International Law and the Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.” (Spring 2004) Boston College International & Comparative Law Review.
See: “EDITORIAL COMMENT: Extraterritoriality and the Corporate Governance Law” (2003). American Journal of International Law (April, 2003).
See: Bather and Burnaby (2006).
- 10.
See: Freeman J (December 15, 2009). The Supreme Case Against Sarbanes-Oxley. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB10001424052748704431804574539921864252380.html.
See: Rezzy (2007).
See: Pollock, A. (2007). Reforming Sarbanes-Oxley. AEI (USA). http://www.aei.org/speech/25803.
See: Hunter, B. (2007). Punishing the Innocent: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Law Has Inflicted Endless Losses on Businesses in Time and Money. Available at: http://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/punishing-the-innocent-the-sarbanes-oxley-act/#.
See: John, D. C. & Marano, N. (May 16, 2007). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Do We Need a Regulatory or Legislative Fix? Heritage Foundation, USA. Available at: http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2007/05/The-Sarbanes-Oxley-Act-Do-We-Need-a-Regulatory-or-Legislative-Fix; or http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2007/pdf/bg2035.pdf.
- 11.
The small- and micro-cap public companies that are adversely affected by SOX constitute less than 7% of the total US equity market capitalization, and at least 70% of all the publicly traded companies in the US.
- 12.
See: Butler, H. & Ribstein, L. (2006). The Sarbanes-Oxley Debacle: What We’ve Learned; How to Fix It (AEI Press, 2006).
- 13.
See: Foley & Lardner LLP (2007). The Cost of Being Public in the Era of Sarbanes-Oxley. Available at: http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/Fstudy.ileUpload137/3736/Foley2007SOXstudy.pdf.
- 14.
See: Connally v. General Constr. Co, 269 US 385 (1926; US Supreme Court) (wage law was vague, and thus unconstitutional); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 US 479 (1965; US Supreme Court); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 US 518 (1972; US Supreme Court); Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F2d 163 (CA7, 1969); Humanitarian Law Project v. Department Of Justice, 352 F3d 382 (CA9, 2003); Board Of Education Of The City of St. Louis v. State Of Missouri, 47 SW3d 366 (Mo., 2001)(the process for electing board members was vague); Margraves v. State, 996 SW2d 302(Tx.Cr.App., 2000)(official misconduct statute was unconstitutionally void for vagueness); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US 296 (1940; US Supreme Court); Winters v. New York, 333 US 507 (1948; US Supreme Court); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 US 352 (1983; US Supreme Court); Shuttlesworth v. City Of Birmingham, 3782 US 87 (1965; US Supreme Court).
- 15.
See: Railway Express v. New York, ____US___(1949; US Supreme Court); Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Commissioners, ___ US ___(1947; US Supreme Court); Skinner v. Oklahoma, ____ US ___(1942; US Supreme Court); Korematsu v. United States, ___ US ___(1944) (US Supreme Court); Loving v. Virginia, ____US ____(1967; US Supreme Court); Washington v. Davis, ____ US ___ (1976; US Supreme Court); Arlington Heights v. MHDC, _____US ____ (1977; US Supreme Court); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (US Supreme Court; 1997); Obergefell vs. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (US Supreme Court; 2015); Lawrence vs. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (US Supreme Court; 2003); United States vs. Vaello-Madero, _____ US ____ (Case#: 20-303; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021); DeNolf vs. U.S., _____ US _____ (US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021) (https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b660749620b85c6c73e5e61/t/608d544886d55300e492a619/1619874888658/2021-22+AMCA+Case.pdf); DeNolf vs. U.S. (Case#: 01-76320; US 14th Circuit, 2020) (https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b660749620b85c6c73e5e61/t/608d544886d55300e492a619/1619874888658/2021-22+AMCA+Case.pdf); and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (US Supreme Court; 1997); Obergefell vs. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (US Supreme Court; 2015); Lawrence vs. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (US Supreme Court; 2003); United States vs. Vaello-Madero, _____ US ____ (Case#: 20-303; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021); DeNolf vs. U.S., _____ US _____ (US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021) (https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b660749620b85c6c73e5e61/t/608d544886d55300e492a619/1619874888658/2021-22+AMCA+Case.pdf); DeNolf vs. U.S. (Case#: 01-76320; US 14th Circuit, 2020) (https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b660749620b85c6c73e5e61/t/608d544886d55300e492a619/1619874888658/2021-22+AMCA+Case.pdf); and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992).
- 16.
The Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution states, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”.
- 17.
See: United States vs. Vaello-Madero, _____ US ____ (Case#: 20-303; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021); Espinoza vs. Montana Department of Revenue, _____ US ____ (US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021); FCC v. Beach Communications, ___US ____ (1993; US Supreme Court); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., ___US ____ (1982; US Supreme Court); Schweiger v. Wilson, ___US ____ (1981; US Supreme Court); U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, ___US ____ (1980; US Supreme Court), New Orleans v. Dukes, ___US ____ (1976; US Supreme Court), McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, ___US ____ (1969; US Supreme Court); U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, ___US ____ (1980; US Supreme Court); N.Y.C. Transit Authority v. Beazer, ___US ____ (1979; US Supreme Court); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, ___US ____ (1976; US Supreme Court); Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, ___US ____ (1973; US Supreme Court); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, ___US ____ (1995; US Supreme Court); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, ___US ____ (1990; US Supreme Court); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., ___US ____ (1989; US Supreme Court); Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, ___US ____ (1986; US Supreme Court); Fullilove v. Klutznick, ___US ____ (1980; US Supreme Court); Bernal v. Fainter, ___US ____ (1984; US Supreme Court), Ambach v. Norwick (1979; US Supreme Court); United States v. Virginia (The VMI Case) (1996); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co, 348 US 483 (1955; US Supreme Court); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 US 471 (1970; US Supreme Court); FCC v. Beach Communication Inc., 508 US 307 (1993; US Supreme Court). City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970; US Supreme Court); Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 US 563 (1910); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
See: Bard (1961).
- 18.
See: Soederberg (2008), Reiser (2004), and Mulligan (2006).
See: Aprill (2009) (which stated in part: “According to the Final Report of the SEC Advisory Committee on Smaller Companies, there are fewer than 9,500 public companies subject to SOX. The report classified smaller public companies as those with equity capitalizations of $787 million or less. In contrast, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reports that for 2003 it received information returns from 211,858 charitable nonprofit organizations, and only 63,327, or 27%, of these organizations had assets over $1 million. The total number does not include the smallest of exempt organizations—those with annual gross receipts less than $25,000, since they are not required to file an information return. Thus, the public companies subject to SOX are a small number of entities, all of which have substantial resources”). In the US, the number of publicly traded companies (there are at least 8500 publicly traded companies in the United States, including companies traded in the Pink Sheets) constitutes less than 1% of all incorporated for-profit entities.
See: Pillard (2005).
- 19.
See: Katyal (2006).
See: Collins vs. Yellen, ___ US ___ (No. 19-422; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021).
See: Collins vs. Mnuchin, ____ US _____ (Docket No. 19-422; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021).
See: Seila Law LLC vs. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, ____ US ____ (Case#: No. 19-7; US Supreme Court; 2020) (the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s single-Director structure violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the proper remedy is to sever the Director’s statutory for-cause removal restriction).
See: Humphrey’s Executor vs. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (US Supreme Court; 1935).
See: PHH Corp. vs. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1 (2016) on rehearing enbanc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir., 2018) (en banc).
- 20.
Schaumann (2004: 1317) states in part: “ As is common in securities law, large portions of the Act do not themselves create substantive regulation, but rather, authorize the S.E.C. to adopt implementing rules. At this writing, the S.E.C. has adopted rules addressing most areas under SOX, but more rules are pending”.
- 21.
See: Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light (KPL), _____US ____ (US Supreme Court); Nollan vs. California Coastal Commission, 483 US 825 (1987; US Supreme Court); Dolan v. City Of Tigard, 512 US 374 (1994; US Supreme Court); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. vs. Kansas Power and Light Co., _____ US ____ (US Supreme Court; 1983); Sveen vs. Melin, ___ US ____ (US Supreme Court; 2018).
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n. vs. DeBenedictis,</Emphasis> 480 U.S. 470, 505 (1987; US Supreme Court); Boys Scout Of America vs. Dale, 530 US 640 (2000; US Supreme Court); Trustees of Dartmouth College vs. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819; US Supreme Court); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977; US Supreme Court); Energy Reserves Group vs. Kansas Power & Light 459 U.S. 400 (1983; US Supreme Court).
- 22.
See: Schaumann (2004).
See: Gifford, R. & Howe, H. (2009). Regulation and Unintended Consequences: Thoughts on Sarbanes-Oxley. The CPA Journal. http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/604/perspectives/p6.htm.
- 23.
See: Kolender vs. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague only if it: (1) fails to give fair notice of what conduct is forbidden; and (2) therefore, encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement).
See: Village of Hoffman Estates vs. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982) (“the most important factor affecting the clarity that the Constitution demands of a law is whether it threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply”).
See: Salky, S. & Rosman, A. (2004). Is Sarbanes Oxley Vulnerable To Constitutional Challenge? Available at: http://www.zuckerman.com/files/Publication/375468a3-d518-43e5-a6da-63474799822c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/50441453-cd29-4d49-8dae-b030df75c042/media.88.pdf.
- 24.
See: Berlau, J. (January 2006). Sarbanes-Oxley vs. the Free Press: How the government used business regulations to strong-arm the media. http://reason.com/archives/2006/01/01/sarbanes-oxley-vs-the-free-pre.
- 25.
See: U.S. v. United Foods, Inc., _____ S.Ct. _____(2001 WL 703953, Sup. Ct., 2001); Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn. vs. U.S., 119 S.Ct. 1923 (1999; US Supreme Court); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 765, (US Supreme Court); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419–420 (1993; US Supreme Court); Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 122 S.Ct. 1497, 1507 (2002; US Supreme Court); City Of Boerne v. Flores, 521 US 507 (1997; US Supreme Court); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 US 514 (2001; US Supreme Court); National Endowment Of The Arts v. Finley, 524 US 569 (1998; US Supreme Court); Rosenberger v. University Of Virginia, 515 US 819 (1995; US Supreme Court); Rust v. Sullivan, 5001 US 173 (1991; US Supreme Court); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484 (1996; US Supreme Court); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976; US Supreme Court); First National Bank Of Boston v. Belotti, 435 US 765 (1978; US Supreme Court); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990; US Supreme Court); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986; US Supreme Court); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000; US Supreme Court); Pacific Gas & Electric v. Public Utilities Commission, 475 US 1 (1986; US Supreme Court); Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001; US Supreme Court); Nike Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003; US Supreme Court); BASF Corp v. Peterson, 544 U.S. 1012 (2005; US Supreme Court); Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen’s Consumer Council Inc., 425 US 748 (1976; US Supreme Court); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997; US Supreme Court); Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182 (1999; US Supreme Court); Americans for Prosperity Foundation vs. Bonta,_____ US _____ (US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021); Mahanoy Area School District vs. B.L., _____ US _____ (No. 20–255; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021); Houston Community College System vs. Wilson, _____ US _____ (Case#: 20-804; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021); Fulton vs. City of Philadelphia, _____ US _____ (US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021); Thomas More Law Center vs. Bonta, _____ US _____ (No. 19–255; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021).
See: Butler and Ribstein (1994).
- 26.
See: Berlau, J. (January 2006). Sarbanes-Oxley vs. the Free Press: How the government used business regulations to strong-arm the media. Reason.com. http://reason.com/archives/2006/01/01/sarbanes-oxley-vs-the-free-pre.
- 27.
See: Moore vs. Texas, 581 US _____ (US Supreme Court; 2017) (whether the use of outdated standards violates the Cruel & Unusual Punishment Clause)
See: Austin vs. United States, 509 US 602 (US Supreme Court; 1993) (consideration of mitigating factors).
See: Bosse vs. Oklahoma, 580 US _____ (US Supreme Court; 2016) (court held that Payne v. Tennessee </Emphasis>did not overrule its prior decision in Booth vs. Maryland).
See: Enmund vs. Florida, 458 US 782 (US Supreme Court; 1982).
See: Harmelin vs. Michigan, 501 US 957 (US Supreme Court; 1991) (consideration of mitigating factors).
See: Kansas vs. Marsh, 548 US 163 (US Supreme Court; 2006) (consideration of mitigating factors).
See: Lockett vs. Ohio, 438 US 586 (US Supreme Court; 1978) (consideration of mitigating factors).
See: Penry vs. Johnson, 532 US 782 (US Supreme Court; 2001) (consideration of mitigating factors).
- 28.
See: Salky, S., & Rosman, A. (2004). Is Sarbanes Oxley Vulnerable To Constitutional Challenge? http://www.zuckerman.com/files/Publication/375468a3-d518-43e5-a6da-63474799822c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/50441453-cd29-4d49-8dae-b030df75c042/media.88.pdf.
- 29.
See: Bosse vs. Oklahoma, 580 US _____ (US Supreme Court; 2016) (court held that Payne v. Tennessee did not overrule its prior decision in Booth vs. Maryland.
See: Johnson vs. Texas, 509 US 350 (US Supreme Court; 1993) (whether statute/regulation/conduct that doesn’t consider “mitigating factors” violates the Cruel & Unusual Punishment Clause).
- 30.
See: Powell vs. Texas, 392 US 514 (US Supreme Court; 1968) (whether a medical condition is a mitigating factor when considering the Cruel & Unusual Punishment Clause.
See: Robinson vs. California, 370 US 660 (1962) (whether a medical condition is a mitigating factor when considering the Cruel & Unusual Punishment Clause).
- 31.
See: Moore vs. Texas, 581 US _____ (US Supreme Court; 2017) (whether the use of outdated standards violates the Cruel & Unusual Punishment Clause).
- 32.
See: Federal Republic of Germany et al. vs. Philipp et al. (No. 19–351; February 3, 2021; US Supreme Court). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-351_o7jp.pdf.
See: Republic of Austria vs. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677 (US Supreme Court).
See: Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela vs. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 581 U.S. _____ (2017; US Supreme Court).
See: Kelo vs. City Of New London, _____ US _____ (2005; US Supreme Court).
See: Lingle vs. Chevron, 544 US _____ (2005; US Supreme Court).
See: Monterrey vs. Del Monte Dunes at Monterrey, 526 US 687 (1999; US Supreme Court).
See: Dolan vs. City Of Tigard, 512 US 374 (1994; US Supreme Court).
See: Nollan vs. California Coastal Commission, 483 US 825 (1987; US Supreme Court).
See: Kaiser Aetna vs. United States, 444 US 164 (1979; US Supreme Court).
See: Williamson County Regional Planning Commission vs. Hamilton Bank Of Jefferson City, 473 US 172 (1985; US Supreme Court).
See: Palazzolo vs. Rhode Island, 533 US 606 (2001; US Supreme Court).
See: Lucas vs. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003 (1992; US Supreme Court).
See: Cedar Point Nursery vs. Hassid, _____ US _____ (US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021).
See: Cedar Point Nursery vs. Sheroma, _____ F.3d. _____ (US Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals).
See: PennEast Pipeline Co. vs. New Jersey, _____ US _____ (US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021).
See: Murr vs. Wisconsin, 137 S.Ct. 1933 (US Supreme Court; 2017).
See: California Bldg. Industry Ass’n vs. City of San Jose, Calif., 136 S.Ct. 928 (US Supreme Court; 2016).
See: Koontz vs. St. Johns River Water Management District, 570 U.S. 2588 (US Supreme Court; 2013).
- 33.
- 34.
See: Tate (1990), Hellerstein (June 1996), Larbalestier (1990), Merrill (2000) and Sedler (1985).
See: Dennis vs. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991; US Supreme Court); Moorman Mfg. Co. vs. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978; US Supreme Court); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. vs. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985; US Supreme Court); Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. vs. Department of Environmental Quality of Oregon, 511 U. S. 93 (______; US Supreme Court); Hughes vs. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (______); Reeves, Inc. vs. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (______; US Supreme Court); United Haulers Assn., Inc. vs. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. ______ (______; US Supreme Court); DeNolf vs. U.S., ______ US ______ (US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021) (https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b660749620b85c6c73e5e61/t/608d544886d55300e492a619/1619874888658/2021-22+AMCA+Case.pdf); DeNolf vs. U.S. (Case#: 01-76320; US 14th Circuit, 2020) (https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b660749620b85c6c73e5e61/t/608d544886d55300e492a619/1619874888658/2021-22+AMCA+Case.pdf); Perez vs. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (Congress can ban loansharking that threatens interstate commerce); Gonzales vs. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (US Supreme Court; 2005); United States vs. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (US Supreme Court; 1995) (under the Commerce Clause, the US Congress can’t prohibit firearms at public schools); Edgar vs. MITE, 457 US 624 (state law declared unconstitutional); Dynamics Corp. Of America vs. CTS Corp., 679 Fsupp 1022 (affirmed) 794 F2d 250 (reversed) 481 US 69 (state law declared unconstitutional); Department of Revenue of Kentucky et al. vs. Davis et. al., (May 19, 2008; No. 06-666; US Supreme Court); Pike vs. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142; New Energy Co. of Ind. vs. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269 (1988; US Supreme Court); Fulton Corp. vs. Faulkner, 516 U. S. 325 (1996; US Supreme Court); Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U. S. 175 (1995; US Supreme Court); Hughes vs. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322 (1979; US Supreme Court); Garcia vs. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528 (1985; US Supreme Court); Philadelphia vs. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617 (1978; US Supreme Court); Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S., at 810 (the “market participant’ exception); Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436 (the “market participant’ exception); White vs. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U. S. 204 (1983; US Supreme Court) (the “market participant” exception); Fulton Corporation vs. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (struck down higher tax on the stock of corporations with little or no presence in the State); Dean Milk Co. vs. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951; US Supreme Court); Hunt vs. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977; US Supreme Court); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. vs. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992; US Supreme Court); C & A Carbone, Inc. vs. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994; US Supreme Court); Philadelphia vs. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978; US Supreme Court); Hughes vs. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979; US Supreme Court); New England Power Co. vs. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982; US Supreme Court); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. vs. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984; US Supreme Court).
Contrast: Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592 (______; US Supreme Court).
Compare: United Haulers Assn., Inc. vs. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. ______, ______-______ (2007; US Supreme Court) (the Pike vs. Bruce Church scrutiny).
Compare: Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. State Corporation Comm’n of Kansas, 489 U.S. 493 (1989; US Supreme Court) (the Pike vs. Bruce Church scrutiny).
Compare: Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981; US Supreme Court) (the Pike vs. Bruce Church scrutiny).
- 35.
See: Gifford and Howe (2009).
- 36.
See: Gifford and Howe (2009).
- 37.
See: Free Enterprise Fund vs. PCAOB, _____ US ____ (2010; US Supreme Court). http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-861.pdf. Justice Roberts delivered the, 5–4 opinion of the Court which states in part: “The Board’s existence does not violate the separation of powers, but the substantive removal restrictions imposed do. Concluding that the removal restrictions here are invalid leaves the Board removable by the Commission at will … The consequence is that the Board may continue to function as before, but its members may be removed at will by the [Securities and Exchange] Commission”.
See: Emphasis Type="Italic">United States vs. Arthrex, Inc</Emphasis>., ___ US ___ (No. 19–1434; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021).
See: Emphasis Type="Italic">Arthrex Inc. vs. Smith & Nephew Inc</Emphasis>., ____ US ___ (No. 19–1458; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021).
See: AccountingWeb. (2010). Update: Supreme Court Rules PCAOB Violates Constitution’s Separation of Powers Principle. http://www.accountingweb.com/topic/accounting-auditing/supreme-court-rules-pcaob-unconstitutional.
See: Cutler, C. (June 10, 2010). Despite Ruling on Constitutionality, PCAOB (and SoX) Wins at Supreme Court. http://www.subjecttoinquiry.com/pcaob/news/the-us-supreme-court-today/.
See: Memorandum of Proposed Intervenor United States in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support Of United States’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/2006/2006-147_brief.pdf.
See: King, R. (Oct. 2009). The PCAOB Meets the Constitution: The Supreme Court to Decide on PCAOB’s Conformity with the Separation of Powers Doctrine and Appointments Clause. http://www.olin.wustl.edu/docs/Faculty/KingCommentaryPCAOBSubmission.pdf.
See: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). http://www.sec.gov/answers/pcaob.htm. http://pcaobus.org/Pages/default.aspx.
See: PCAOB (USA) (Nov. 2009). Board Approves Its 2010 Budget And Related Strategic Plan. http://pcaobus.org/News/Releases/Pages/11302009_Approves_Budget.aspx.
- 38.
See: Bader, H. & Berlau, J. (Competitive Enterprise Institute) (Oct. 2005). The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board: An Unconstitutional Assault on Government Accountability. http://cei.org/pdf/4873.pdf.
- 39.
See: Russell, K. (June 28, 2010). Provision Of Sarbanes-Oxley Un-Constitutionally Interferes With Presidential Authority. http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/06/provision-of-sarbanes-oxley-unconstitutionally-interferes-with-presidential-authority/.
- 40.
See: Shapiro, I. & Cushman, T. (Dec. 5, 2009). Peekaboo, I See A Constitutional Violation. http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11033.
See: Birg, E. (2003). Is the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Constitutional?, at pg. 6. Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, Corporate Responsibility Practice Group, 2003. http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Corpresp/ApptClauseFinal.pdf. (“Board members … are appointed by the SEC as a whole”).
See: Wallison, R. (May 12, 2003). Rein In the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board; PCAOB Constitutionality Questioned. Corporate Financing Week, 29(19).
See: Nagy, D. (2005). Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status. Notre Dame Law Review, 80, 975–1053 (noting that the PCAOB may violate the Appointments Clause and the constitutional separation of powers).
- 41.
See: Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966; US Supreme Court).
See: Evans v. Abney, 396 US 435 (1970; US Supreme Court).
See: Burton v. Wilmington, 365 U.S. 715.
See: Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972; US Supreme Court).
See: Edmonson v Leesville Concrete, 500 US 614 (1991; US Supreme Court).
See: Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946; US Supreme Court).
See: Screws v. US, 325 U.S. 91 (1945; US Supreme Court).
See: Ellman (2001), Gardbaum (2003), Tushnet (2003), Gardbaum (2006), and Currie (1986).
- 42.
See: Nwogugu (2012: 198).
- 43.
See: Lebron, 513 U.S. at 399 (US Supreme Court) (“a corporation is an agency of the government for purposes of the constitutional obligations of the government … when the State has specifically created that corporation for the furtherance of governmental objectives and … controls the operation of the corporation through its appointees”).
See: Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Directors of City Trusts of Philadelphia, 353 U.S. 235 (1957) (per curiam) (College built and maintained pursuant to private trust was state actor because it was operated and controlled by a board of state appointees).
- 44.
On the Separation of Powers Doctrine, see: Collins vs. Yellen, ___ US ___ (No. 19-422; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021); Collins vs. Mnuchin, ____ US _____ (Docket No. 19–422; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021); Seila Law LLC vs. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, ____ US ____ (Case#: No. 19–7; US Supreme Court; 2020) (the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s single-Director structure violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the proper remedy is to sever the Director’s statutory for-cause removal restriction); Humphrey’s Executor vs. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (US Supreme Court; 1935); and PHH Corp. vs. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1 (2016) on rehearing enbanc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir., 2018) (en banc).
- 45.
See: United States vs. Arthrex, Inc., ___ US ___ (No. 19-1434; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021); and Arthrex Inc. vs. Smith & Nephew Inc., ____ US ___ (No. 19-1458; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021).
- 46.
See: Schaumann (2004: 1319) states in part: “ Formally, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the “Board”) is not an agency of the U.S. government; it is a nonprofit corporation organized under the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act. The Board comprises five members, of which two must—and only two may—be certified public accountants”.
- 47.
See: Niskanen, W. (2006). Congress Should Repeal the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Cato Institute. Available at: http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6624.
- 48.
On the Substantive Due Process Clause, see: Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (US Supreme Court; 1997) (“The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the ‘liberty’ it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint.”); Obergefell vs. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (US Supreme Court; 2015); Lawrence vs. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (US Supreme Court; 2003); United States vs. Vaello-Madero, ______ US ______ (Case#: 20-303; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021); DeNolf vs. U.S., ______ US ______ (US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021) (https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b660749620b85c6c73e5e61/t/608d544886d55300e492a619/1619874888658/2021-22+AMCA+Case.pdf); DeNolf vs. U.S. (Case#: 01-76320; US 14th Circuit, 2020) (https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b660749620b85c6c73e5e61/t/608d544886d55300e492a619/1619874888658/2021-22+AMCA+Case.pdf); and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania vs. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) (“Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects”).
- 49.
See: FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir., 1993).
See: Williams v. Phelps, 482 F.2d 669, 671 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (labor union could sue to challenge policies harming government employees carried out by improperly appointed head of agency).
See: Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182–183 (1995) (since “one who makes a timely challenge to the constitutional validity of an officer who adjudicates his case” can use the invalid appointment to obtain “whatever relief may be appropriate,” the defendant could challenge the composition of the Coast Guard Court of Military Review, which violated the Appointments Clause, and use it to overturn his conviction).
See: Williams v. Phelps, 482 F.2d 669, 671 n.3 (D.C. Cir., 1973) (standing of labor union to bring action challenging appointment of head of agency not nominated by president and confirmed by Senate as required by Appointments Clause “rests on firm ground” because that agency head carried out policies that “directly affected” the jobs of government employees who belonged to the union).
See: Freytag vs. C.I.R., 501 U.S. 868, 879 (1991; US Supreme Court) (Supreme Court entertained a challenge to a disciplinary proceeding of the U.S. Tax Court even though the defendant had not raised an Appointments Clause challenge at trial).
See: FEC vs. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 824 (D.C. Cir., 1993) (NRA could challenge presence of non-voting congressional officials on executive branch agency, even if they had no vote in its decision to prosecute the NRA and were silent).
See: Seila Law LLC vs. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, ______ US ______ (Case#: No. 19–7; US Supreme Court; 2020) (the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s single-Director structure violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the proper remedy is to make the Director removable by the President at will).
- 50.
See: Skouvakis, A. (2005). Note: Exiting the Public Markets—A Difficult Choice for Small Public Companies Struggling with Sarbanes-Oxley. Penn State Law Review, 109: 1279–1289.
See: Rose (2005); Grundfest and Bochner (2007); Backer (2004); Carney (2006); Gupta and Leech (2005); Engel et al. (2007); Bartlett (April 2008); Kamar and Karaca-Mandic (2006); Tackett et al. (2006).
- 51.
See: United States vs. Arthrex, Inc., ______ US ______ (US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021).
See: California vs. Texas, ______ US ______ (No. 19–840; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021).
- 52.
See: GAO Report No. GAO-03-339, Securities and Exchange Commission: Actions Needed to Improve Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Selection Process, at “Highlights” (unnumbered), 3 (www.gao.gov/htext/d03339.html).
- 53.
See: Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976; US Supreme Court) (government employees with “significant authority” are officers of the United States).
See: Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997; US Supreme Court).
See: United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1879; US Supreme Court) (officer’s “emoluments” are relevant to whether he is a “principal” or “inferior” officer).
See: Nagy (2005) (given the sheer scope of their power, and their fixed five-year terms, there is a “strong argument” that PCAOB Board members are “principal officers”).
See: Wallison, P. (2005). Rein in the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. http://regulators.itgo.com/ Reports/PCAOB/PCAOB_2Feb05.pdf (the “President alone” must pick PCAOB members under the Appointments Clause).
- 54.
See: Freytag vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 886–887 (1991; US Supreme Court) quoting United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510–511.
- 55.
See: Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936; US Supreme Court) (invalidating delegation to coal producers and unions of the power to set wages and prices in their industry).
See: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 109(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7219(b) (PCAOB sets its own budget, subject to approval only by the SEC, not by Congress).
See: Wallison, P. (Feb. 2005). Rein in the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. pp. 3–4 (“because the SEC does not set its own budget, and the PCAOB can perform functions on behalf of the SEC, the SEC has a built-in incentive to approve burgeoning PCAOB budgets to free up the use of its own budget, and it has in fact approved PCAOB budgets that are much more generous than the SEC’s own on a per capita basis”) (http://regulators.itgo.com/Reports/PCAOB/PCAOB_2Feb05.pdf).
See: Byrne, R. (Jan. 13, 2003). Accountants Board Tin Ear Now Golden. The Street, Jan. 13, 2003 (http://www.thestreet.com/markets/rebeccabyrne/10062297.html).
See: Schaumann (2004: 1319) which states in part: “Formally, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the ‘Board’) is not an agency of the U.S. government; it is a nonprofit corporation organized under the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act. The Board comprises five members, of which two must—and only two may—be certified public accountants”.
- 56.
See: Nwogugu (2008).
See: Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at various sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III 2003)).
See: Butler, H., & Ribstein, L. (2006). The Sarbanes Oxley Debacle: What We’ve Learned; How to Fix It (AEI Press, 2006).
See: FEI Survey: Management Drives Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance Costs Down by 23%, But Auditor Fees Virtually Unchanged. Financial Executive International, May 16, 2007. Available at: http://fei.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=press_releases&item=187.
See: Ribstein (2002), Iliev (2007), Litvak (2007), Ribstein (Oct. 2003), Romano (2004), Bainbridge and Johnson (2004), Baynes (2002), Braddock (2006), Cherry (2004), Jain et al. (2006), Jain and Rezaee (2004), Kamar et al. (2008), Zhang (2007), Burks (2010), Dey (2010), Chang and Sun (2009), Kang et al. (2010), Bargeron et al. (2010), Wang (2010), Leech (Nov. 2003a, 2003b), Linck et al. (2009), Linsley (2003), McTamaney (August 2002), Nielsen and Main (Oct. 2004), Perino (October 2002), Recine (2002), Cunningham (2002), Coates (2007), Carrillo (2008), Unger (2007), Wade (2008), Schmidt (2005), Tackett et al. (2004), Soederberg (2008), Taylor (2006), Cowart (2004), Schiller (2008), and Pautz (2009).
- 57.
See: Schaumann (2004: 1319) which states in part: “ Formally, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the ‘Board’) is not an agency of the U.S. government; it is a nonprofit corporation organized under the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act. The Board comprises five members, of which two must—and only two may—be certified public accountants”).
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Nwogugu, M.I.C. (2021). Unconstitutionality and Failure of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the PCAOB (USA) and Similar Institutions. In: Geopolitical Risk, Sustainability and “Cross-Border Spillovers” in Emerging Markets, Volume II. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71419-2_5
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