International Constitutional Political Economy and Sustainability Issues Inherent in Accounting and Derivatives Standards-Setting Organizations

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Geopolitical Risk, Sustainability and “Cross-Border Spillovers” in Emerging Markets, Volume II
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Abstract

The FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board, USA), IASB (International Accounting Standards Board), GASB (Government Accounting Standards Board, USA), the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), Partnership for Carbon Accounting Financials (PCAF), SASB (Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, USA), the ISDA (International Swap & Derivatives Association; http://www.isda.org/) and the ICMA (International Capital Market Association; http://www.icmagroup.org/) and FINRA (USA) are among a class of very powerful trade associations that have “Quasi-Executive Powers” (similar to powers of the executive branch of the federal governments of countries) even though they are not part of the government (but are implicitly supported and encouraged by governments). IASB/IAASB/PCAF/FASB/GASB/SASB perform important rule-making functions and affect accounting regulations, companies, Climate Policy, Sustainability efforts, ESG investing, financial institutions and government regulation around the world (many foreign countries raise capital or list their shares in the US markets, and many US companies operate in foreign countries). The FASB, GASB, SASB, IIASB, PCAF, ICMA, ISDA and IASB and their standards are unconstitutional and that can affect responses to accounting/derivatives regulations and standards and general economic activity.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See: Go (2003) (“Many of the post-colonial constitutions in existence in 2000 were written in the 1990s”).

    See: Law and Versteeg (2012). The Declining Influence Of The United States Constitution. NYU Law Review, 87, 762–826. http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-87-3-Law-Versteeg_0.pdf. This article notes that the US Constitution is similar to those of many countries.

  2. 2.

    See: ICMA (2015). ICMA Response to ESMA CSD Regulatory Level 2 Consultation Paper. February 19th 2015. Available: http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/short-term-markets/Repo-Markets/erc-contribution.

    See: ISDA (2017). ISDA response To The Fair And Effective Markets Review Consultation. Available: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/femr/isda.pdf.

  3. 3.

    See: “Unions, Retirees Sue To Block Chicago Pension Changes”. By Karen Pierog. Dec. 16, 2014. https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-chicago-pensions-lawsuit/update-2-unions-retirees-sue-to-block-chicago-pension-changes-idUSL1N0U01MO20141216.

  4. 4.

    See: Nwogugu (2015).

  5. 5.

    See: Arner and Taylor (2009) which states in part: “The FSB and the BIS currently serve the primary role in coordination of the process of standard-setting. As noted, the FSF was established under the auspices of a G7 mandate in February 1999, with a threefold purpose: (1) promote international financial stability; (2) improve the functioning of markets; and (3) reduce systemic risk through enhanced information exchange and international cooperation in financial market supervision and surveillance. The FSF, as originally constituted, included five different types of members: national authorities, international financial institutions, other international organizations, international financial organizations and committees of central bank experts … The FSF agreed upon twelve key standards areas (See http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/key_standards.htm)”.

  6. 6.

    See: Andrews et al. (2017), Byrne and Callaghan (2014), Bamberger et al. (2016), Kirman (2016), Salzano and Colander (2007), OECD (2016), Finch (2013), Durlauf (2012), Bayoumi et al. (2016), Room (2011), Kuhlman and Mortveit (2014), Melnik et al. (2013), Miklashevich (2003), Perc et al. (2013), Post and Eisen (2000), Williams and Arrigo (2002), Cooper (2011), and Datz (2013).

  7. 7.

    See: Otter Tail Power Co., 410 U.S. at 372–75.

  8. 8.

    See: Business Electronics Corp. vs. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988; US Supreme Court); Copperweld Corp. vs. Independence Tube, 467 U.S. 752 (1984; US Supreme Court); Monsanto Co. vs. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984; US Supreme Court); US vs. Arnold, Schwinn, et al., 388 U.S. 365 (1967; US Supreme Court); USPS vs. Flamingo Industries, #02–1290 (2004); Brown vs. Pro Football, 518 U.S. 213 (1996; US Supreme Court); Federal Trade Commission vs. Ticor Title Insurance Company, 60 U.S.L.W. 4515 (1992); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. vs. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1998; US Supreme Court); Phonetele, 664 F.2d at 728; Jacobi vs. Bache & Co., 520 F.2d 1231 (CA2, 1975).

  9. 9.

    See: Standard Oil Co vs. US, 337 U.S. 293 (1949; US Supreme Court); US vs. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948; US Supreme Court); Brooke Group Ltd. vs. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 509 U.S. 209 (1993; US Supreme Court).

  10. 10.

    See: http://www.iilj.org/GAL/.

  11. 11.

    See: The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2011). Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/34-64545.pdf.

    See: The whistleblower regulations of FINRA and similar non-governmental self-regulatory industry trade associations in other countries.

    See: Malone, A. & Jones, R. (December 6, 2010). “Revealed: Inside the Chinese suicide sweatshop where workers toil in 34-hour shifts to make your iPod”. Daily Mail (London). Available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1285980/Revealed-Inside-Chinese-suicide-sweatshop-workers-toil-34-hour-shifts-make-iPod.html.

    See: “Chinese Factory asks for ‘no suicide’ vow”. MSNBC. May 26, 2010. Available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37354853/ns/business-world_business/?ns=business-world_business.

    See: Carlson, N. (April 7, 2010). “What It’s Like To Work In China’s Gadget Sweatshops Where Your iPhones And iPads Are Made”. Business Insider. Available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/what-its-like-to-work-if-chinas-gadget-sweatshops-where-your-iphones-and-ipads-are-made-2010-4?utm_source=Daily+Buzz&utm_campaign=81432d578c-nl_emv_db_04082010_a&utm_medium=email.

    See: “Apple denies claims it broke Chinese labor laws in iPhone factory”. September 8, 2019. Saheli Roy Choudhury. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/09/apple-appl-claims-it-broke-china-labor-laws-at-iphone-factory-mostly-false.html.

    See: “Apple’s 2019 supplier report shows progress on labor and health issues”. Jeremy Horwitz. March 6, 2019. https://venturebeat.com/2019/03/06/apples-2019-supplier-report-shows-progress-on-labor-and-health-issues/.

    See: “Apple and Foxconn broke Chinese Labour law to build new iPhones—US tech group and manufacturing partner admit using too many temporary workers”. Louise Lucas. September 9, 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/19fefd86-d2c3-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77.

    See: “Apple—Supplier Responsibility” (PDF). Apple. https://images.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/pdf/L418102A_SR_2010Report_FF.pdf.

    See: Chen, B. (May 14, 2010), “Workers Plan to Sue iPhone Contractor Over Poisoning”, Wired. https://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2010/05/wintek-employees-sue/.

    See: “Apple under fire again for working conditions at Chinese factories”. The Guardian. December 19, 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/19/apple-under-fire-again-for-working-conditions-at-chinese-factories?CMP=EMCNEWEML6619I2

    See: “Study Casts Doubts on Apple’s Ethical Standards”. China Labor Watch. February 24, 2016. http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/report/113.

    See: “Poor Working Conditions Persist at Apple Supplier Pegatron”. China Labor Watch. October 22, 2015. http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/report/109.

    See: Perlin, R. (2013). “Chinese Workers Foxconned”. Dissent, 60(2), 46–52.

    See: Armitage, J. (July 30, 2013). “‘Even worse than Foxconn’: Apple rocked by child labour claims”. The Independent. London.

    See: Mozur, P. (December 19, 2012). “Life Inside Foxconn’s Facility in Shenzhen”. The Wall Street Journal. https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2012/12/19/life-inside-foxconns-facility-in-shenzhen/.

    See: “Apple suppliers maintain tight security to avoid leaks: Foxconn said to have ‘special status’ in China”. MacNN, February 17, 2010. Available at: http://www.macnn.com/articles/10/02/17/foxconn.said.to.have.special.status.in.china/.

    See: Apple’s Recent Strike in Suzhou is Sign of Continued Bad Labor and CSR Practices in China. All Roads Lead to China. January 21, 2010. Available at: http://www.allroadsleadtochina.com/2010/01/21/will-apple-be-the-next-nike-or-will-they-take-labor-compliance-seriously/.

    See: “Apple—Supplier Responsibility” (PDF). Apple. Available at: http://images.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/pdf/L418102A_SR_2010Report_FF.pdf.

    See: Blodget, H. (April 7, 2010). “Apple-Supplier Factory Worker Tries To Kill Herself—That’s 4 In 4 Weeks”. Business Insider. Available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/henry-blodget-another-apple-supplier-factory-worker-tries-to-kill-herself-thats-4-in-4-weeks-2010-4.

    See: Apple Loses Lawsuit Over a Company Policy Tim Cook Didn’t Know About. By Sissi Cao. Feb. 14, 2020. https://observer.com/2020/02/apple-lose-lawsuit-retail-employee-security-check-pay/. (“…Apple has a lost a class-action lawsuit brought by its Apple store employees regarding a seemingly miscellaneous company policy at the retail level that CEO Tim Cook wasn’t even aware of. The plaintiffs filed the class-action suit in 2013, revealing that Apple would require its retail employees to go through a security check after they clocked out every day to make sure that no company assets or trade secrets were stolen. The exit check would typically take 10 to 20 minutes and involved searches of employees’ purses, briefcases and personal iPhones…”).

    See: Apple sued by employees over labor issues. by James O’Toole. July 23, 2014. https://money.cnn.com/2014/07/23/technology/apple-labor/. (“…The company is facing a lawsuit certified as a class action this week from employees who say they were denied meal breaks and rest periods in violation of California labor law. Attorneys for the plaintiffs estimate that more than 20,000 current or former Apple employees from the retail to corporate level have been affected by the alleged violations. Among other things, the lawsuit claims Apple employees were forced to work for stretches of five hours or more without meals, and didn’t get breaks on shorter shifts. …”).

    See: “Class complaint for injunctive relief and damages, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 15 Dec 2019; Major tech companies respond to lawsuit over mining deaths”. ComputerWeekly.com. https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/lawsuit-against-apple-google-tesla-and-others-re-child-labour-drc/. (“…Snapshot: In 2019, IRAdvocates, a US-based NGO filed a class action lawsuit against Apple, Google, Tesla, Alphabet, Microsoft, and Dell alleging the corporations profited from child labor in their cobalt supply chains in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Plaintiffs are either guardians of children killed in cobalt mining tunnels or children who were maimed while working in the mines…”).

    See: The Other Side Of Apple II: Pollution Spreads Through Apple’s Supply Chain. Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs, August 31, 2011. http://www.ipe.org.cn/Upload/Report-IT-V-Apple-II.pdf.

    See: Barboza, D. (2012). Apple Cited as Adding to Pollution in China. The New York Times, September 1, 2011. Accessed March 26, 2012. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/technology/apple-suppliers-causing-environmental-problems-chinese-group-says.html?_r=1.

    See: Watts, J., “Apple secretive about ‘polluting and poisoning’ supply chain, says report”. The Guardian, January 19, 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/jan/20/apple-pollution-supply-chain .

    See: Jobs, S., “A Greener Apple”. Apple, Inc. https://www.apple.com/hotnews/agreenerapple/.

    See: Greenpeace, “Hazardous Materials Found in Apple’s iPhone: Chemicals Include those Banned in Children’s Toys in EU”. Greenpeace International. Greenpeace. http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/media-center/news-releases/hazardous-materials-found-in-a/.

    See: Chen, B. (May 14, 2010), “Workers Plan to Sue iPhone Contractor Over Poisoning”, Wired. https://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2010/05/wintek-employees-sue/.

  12. 12.

    Mwakagali (2018) stated in part: “…Today, labor rights stand at a crossroads. The traditional stance where labor law and regulation rested in the state as the lawmaker, enforcer and implementer, with international labor standards as the minimum standards, has with time, been hampered by the activities of other actors, such as multinational corporations, international non-governmental organizations, paramilitary groups, international financial institutions (IFIs) and international organizations, that have inadvertently had an impact on labor standards and their governance. Here, the boundaries between domestic and international are increasingly blurred as issues which were once solely under the purview of domestic law and politics, such as environmental standards and labor regulation, are influenced and affected by such actors…”.

  13. 13.

    See: Cattaneo, O., Engman, M., Saez, S. & Stern, R., eds. (2010) International Trade in Services: New Trends and Opportunities for Develo** Countries (World Bank).

  14. 14.

    See: Cornford, A. (June 2009). Statistics For International Trade In Banking Services: Requirements—Availability And Prospects. UNCTAD. Working paper No. 194. http://unctad.org/en/docs/osgdp20092_en.pdf.

  15. 15.

    See: Trujillo, E. (2010). International Trade and the Financial Crisis. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), 104, 438–443.

  16. 16.

    See: Poretti, P. (2009). “The Regulation of Subsidies within the General Agreement on Trade in Services—Problems and Perspectives” (Kluwer Law International, 2009).

  17. 17.

    See: Delimatsis, P. (2012). Of Bailouts and Rescue Measures: Subsidies in Financial Services. Working Paper No 2012/24. Swiss National Center of Competence In Research.

    http://www20.iadb.org/intal/catalogo/PE/2012/12020.pdf.

  18. 18.

    See: International Institute For Sustainable Development (March 2009). Will Government Bailouts Lead To Trade Wars? https://www.iisd.org/gsi/news/will-government-bailouts-lead-trade-wars.

  19. 19.

    See: Ramanna and Sletten (2014) (“We find that perceived network benefits increase the degree of IFRS harmonization among countries, and that smaller countries have a differentially higher response to these benefits … Further, economic ties with the European Union are a particularly important source of network effects. The results, robust to numerous alternative hypotheses and specifications, suggest IFRS adoption was self-reinforcing during the sample period, which, in turn, has implications for the consequences of IFRS adoption”).

  20. 20.

    See: Ramanna and Sletten (2014), Ahdieh (2003), Awrey (2014), and Yu and Wahid (2014).

  21. 21.

    See: Evans vs. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966; US Supreme Court).

    See: Evans vs. Abney, 396 US 435 (1970; US Supreme Court).

    See: Burton vs. Wilmington, 365 U.S. 715 (US Supreme Court).

    See: Moose Lodge vs. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972; US Supreme Court).

    See: Edmonson vs. Leesville Concrete, 500 US 614 (1991; US Supreme Court).

    See: Marsh vs. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946; US Supreme Court).

    See: Screws vs. US, 325 U.S. 91 (1945; US Supreme Court).

  22. 22.

    See: Nwogugu (2012), p. 198.

  23. 23.

    See: Governmental Accounting Standards Board (2008). Facts About GASB. Available at: http://www.gasb.org/facts/facts_about_gasb.pdf.

    See: National Association of State Auditors, Comptrollers and Treasurers. http://www.nasact.org.

    See: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association. http://www.sifma.org.

    See: American Accounting Association. http://www.aaahq.org.

    See: Institute of Management Accountants. http://www.imanet.org.

    See: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. http://www.aicpa.org.

    See: Chartered Financial Analyst Institute. http://www.cfainstitute.org.

    See: Financial Executives International. http://www.financialexecutives.org.

    See: Government Finance Officers Association. http://www.gfoa.org.

  24. 24.

    Financial Accounting Standards Board and International Accounting Standards Board (2002). Memorandum of Understanding, “The Norwalk Agreement”.

    See: Fleckner (2008).

  25. 25.

    See: Allee et al. (2008), Pererea and Baydoun (2007), and Sunder (2011).

  26. 26.

    See: Königsgruber (2010), Konigsgruber (2017), Konigsgruber (2014), Ramanna (2013), Jamal and Sunder (2014), Carmona & Trombetta (2008), Wagenhofer (2011), Konigsgruber (2013), Hoffmann and Zülch (2014), Konigsgruber and Palan (2015), Mohammadrezaei & Mohd–Saleh (2012), Dobler and Knospe (2016), Prochazka (2015), and Gros and Worret (2016).

  27. 27.

    See: Fleckner (2008), and Chiapello and Mediad (2009).

  28. 28.

    See: Nwogugu (2012: 198).

  29. 29.

    On the Substantial Inducement Theory and the Substitution Theory (which are alternatives to the State Action requirement in constitutional law), see Nwogugu (2012: 9 & 198).

  30. 30.

    On the Non-delegation Doctrine, see: PennEast Pipeline Co. vs. New Jersey, ___ US ___ (No. 19-1039; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021); see: Seila Law LLC vs. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, ____ US ____ (Case#: No. 19-7; US Supreme Court; 2020). On the Interstate Commerce Clause, see: DeNolf vs. U.S., _____ US _____ (US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021) (https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b660749620b85c6c73e5e61/t/608d544886d55300e492a619/1619874888658/2021-22+AMCA+Case.pdf); DeNolf vs. U.S. (Case#: 01-76320; US 14th Circuit, 2020) (https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b660749620b85c6c73e5e61/t/608d544886d55300e492a619/1619874888658/2021-22+AMCA+Case.pdf); Perez vs. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (Congress can ban loansharking that threatens interstate commerce); Gonzales vs. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (US Supreme Court; 2005) and United States vs. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.

  31. 31.

    See: Free Enterprise Fund vs. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 US ___ (2010; US Supreme Court case) (the court stated that “That arrangement is contrary to Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the President … Without the ability to oversee the Board, or to attribute the Board’s failings to those whom he can oversee, the President is no longer the judge of the Board’s conduct … The diffusion of power carries with it a diffusion of accountability … By granting the Board executive power without the Executive’s oversight, this Act subverts the President’s ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed—as well as the public’s ability to pass judgment on his efforts”).

  32. 32.

    See: International Agreements Without Senate Approval. Available at: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/article02/12.html.

    Compare: Dames & Moore vs. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (Court sustained a series of implementing actions by the President pursuant to executive agreements with Iran in order to settle the hostage crisis; and found that Congress had delegated to the President certain economic powers underlying the agreements and that his suspension of claims powers had been implicitly ratified over time by Congress’s failure to set aside the asserted power).

    See: United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad—Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 91st Congress, 1st sess. (1969).

    See: U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers—Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on S. Res. 151, 90th Congress, 1st session (1967).

    See: Unit Owners Assoc. vs. Gillman, 223 V.A. 752 (1982) (the Virginia Supreme Court held that the power to fine is a governmental power).

    See: James Foley vs. Osborne Court Condominium, et al., 724 A.2d 436, 1999 R.I. LEXIS 55 (C.A. No. 96–360, Superior Court of Rhode Island, Newport; 1999) (Rhode Island Supreme Court asked the lower court to determine if fining represents an unconstitutional delegation of judicial or police power to the association).

    Compare: Constitutional Litigation Clinic Wins Landmark Decision Guaranteeing Free Speech Rights to Residents of Homeowner Associations. Available at: http://www.ahrc.com/new/index.php/src/news/sub/pressrel/action/ShowMedia/id/2667.

    Compare: Committee For A Better Twin Rivers, Et Al Vs. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Association et al., Case No: A-4047-03 T24047-03 T2, Feb. 7, 2006. Available at: http://www.ahrc.se/new/index.php/src/courts/sub/lawsuit/action/display/id/135.

    Compare: McKenzie (1994).

  33. 33.

    See: Nwogugu (2012: 198).

  34. 34.

    On the Substantial Inducement Theory and the Substitution Theory (which are alternatives to the State Action requirement in constitutional law), see Nwogugu (2012: 9 & 198).

  35. 35.

    Section-9 states in part: “Section 9. No law granting irrevocably any privilege, franchise, or immunity shall be enacted”.

  36. 36.

    Section-13 states in part: “No law shall be enacted granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations”.

  37. 37.

    See: Railway Express vs. New York, ____US___(1949; US Supreme Court); Kotch vs. Bd. of River Port Pilot Commissioners, ___ US ___(1947; US Supreme Court); Loving vs. Virginia, ____US ____ (1967; US Supreme Court); Washington vs. Davis, ____ US ___ (1976; US Supreme Court); Arlington Heights vs. MHDC, _____US ____ (1977; US Supreme Court); City of Phoenix vs. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970; US Supreme Court). See: Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (US Supreme Court; 1997) (“The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the ‘liberty’ it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint.”); Obergefell vs. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (US Supreme Court; 2015); Lawrence vs. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (US Supreme Court; 2003); See: United States vs. Vaello-Madero, _____ US ____ (Case#: 20-303; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021); DeNolf vs. U.S., _____ US _____ (US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021) (https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b660749620b85c6c73e5e61/t/608d544886d55300e492a619/1619874888658/2021-22+AMCA+Case.pdf); and DeNolf vs. U.S. (Case#: 01-76320; US 14th Circuit, 2020) (https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b660749620b85c6c73e5e61/t/608d544886d55300e492a619/1619874888658/2021-22+AMCA+Case.pdf); and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992).

  38. 38.

    See: United States vs. Vaello-Madero, _____ US ____ (Case#: 20-303; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021). See: Espinoza vs. Montana Department of Revenue, _____ US ____ (US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021).

  39. 39.

    See: PennEast Pipeline Co. vs. New Jersey, ___ US ___ (No. 19-1039; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021); and Seila Law LLC vs. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, ____ US ____ (Case#: No. 19-7; US Supreme Court; 2020).

  40. 40.

    See: Energy Reserves Group, Inc. vs. Kansas Power and Light Co., _____ US ____ (US Supreme Court; 1983); and Sveen vs. Melin, ___ US ____ (US Supreme Court; 2018).

  41. 41.

    See: Thomas More Law Center vs. Bonta, ___ US ____ (No. 19-255; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021).

  42. 42.

    See: Collins vs. Yellen, ___ US ___ (No. 19-422; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021); Collins vs. Mnuchin, ____ US _____ (Docket No. 19-422; US Supreme Court; pending as of 2021); Seila Law LLC vs. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, ____ US ____ (Case#: No. 19-7; US Supreme Court; 2020); Humphrey’s Executor vs. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (US Supreme Court; 1935); and PHH Corp. vs. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1 (2016) on rehearing enbanc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir., 2018) (en banc).

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Nwogugu, M.I.C. (2021). International Constitutional Political Economy and Sustainability Issues Inherent in Accounting and Derivatives Standards-Setting Organizations. In: Geopolitical Risk, Sustainability and “Cross-Border Spillovers” in Emerging Markets, Volume II. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-71419-2_4

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