Abstract
The conclusion summarises the key arguments of the book. These are that: (i) following the financial crisis different banks have taken very different paths. While some institutions, such as Lloyds and HSBC, have become more risk averse and display positive signs of learning others, for example RBS and Barclays, show little evidence of change; (ii) dissatisfaction is crucial in the learning trajectory of institutions with too little dissatisfaction failing to provide enough motivation to learn. However, too much dissatisfaction cripples and retards the learning process; (iii) the dedication of both time and resources towards the learning process is largely dependent upon institutional interpretations and responses to failures and crises; (iv) constraints mediated through the structural environment and interpreted by key agents determine, to a great extent, the learning trajectory of banks; (v) changes in culture, business models, balance sheets and institutional preferences may be set but they are not permanent.
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Notes
- 1.
Although ultimately Barclays would fail to implement lessons learned.
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Barber, A. (2021). Conclusion. In: UK Banks and the Lessons of the Great Financial Crisis. Building a Sustainable Political Economy: SPERI Research & Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70254-0_8
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