Portmann’s View on Anthropological Difference

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Adolf Portmann

Part of the book series: Biosemiotics ((BSEM,volume 23))

Abstract

The most influential of Portmann’s concepts up to the present is his characterization of early human ontogeny as secondarily altricial. This finding is coupled with the thesis of a social womb: human children are born prematurely in comparison with other primates, and they find a second womb in a social environment nurturing their healthy development. In Portmann’s view, the interconnection of these phenomena forms a basis for the specific position of humans with regards to other forms of life. It is during the first year of extra-uterine life when a specifically human form is acquired in basic charts: it is a triad of an upright posture, linguistic utterances, and rational thought that together constitutes the core of anthropological difference. Although Portmann’s position has strong ties to the tradition of philosophical anthropology (H. Plessner, A. Gehlen; humans as beings “open to the world”; critical stance towards Darwinian reductionism), his ambition was to put together the basis for an even more basal and comprehensive account of human beings, which would unite biological, social, cultural, and philosophical aspects. Even though his programme of basal anthropology did not succeed in its original scope, Portmann’s concept of a social womb remains a source for valuable insights into the specificity of processes in human history and a point of departure for any comparisons between the social lives of humans and animal species.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Portmann does not comment on the fact that human babies (at least in some cultures) are left unattended by their mothers. According to Matsuzawa (2012: 300), the so-called supine posture of human neonates has important implications for their cognitive development (e.g. face-to-face communication, object manipulation). In contrast, postnatal chimpanzee infants constantly struggle to cling by lifting one arm and the contra-lateral leg. However, Matsuzawa’s findings cannot be generalized to all ape species: a gorilla infant called Goma was provably able to take a supine posture until the age of two months (Lang 1961: 24).

  2. 2.

    Portmann (1968b: 266) mentions the work of E. von Lange and R. E. Scammon in this respect and talks about the phenomenon of humans as prematurely born as well recognized.

  3. 3.

    In the English edition of a popular pictorial publication, The Beauty of Butterflies, Portmann (1945: 10) envisages the importance of natural selection for establishing mimicry complexes among butterflies. This contrasts with the formulation in the German original, Falterschönheit (Portmann 1935b: 20), where the usefulness of mimicry for survival is contested. Since the English edition has an introduction by Julian Huxley, a stark proponent of natural selection, it is possible that Portmann’s own opinion on mimicry was negated to serve the theoretical goals of the new synthesis.

  4. 4.

    One could also argue that Portmann, “deeply in his heart”, held consistent doubts against Darwinian ontology as such. For example, he openly criticized Darwin’s metaphor of the struggle for life and highlights various cases of cooperation among animals, asserting that “attraction to other members of the species precedes all hostility and repulsion” (Portmann 1964a: 70). Portmann’s respect to the results of neo-Darwinian genetic research was paid rather to the direct outcomes than the theoretical underpinnings. To get a sincere portrait of his relations to the proponents of the modern synthesis, we also have to take into account the conciliatory and respectful traits in his character.

  5. 5.

    A slightly different approach which might be dubbed phenomenological ethology is characteristic for Portmann (1953) (I am indebted to Jiří Klouda for discussions on this issue).

  6. 6.

    Also, Roger A. Stamm criticizes Portmann for not following new approaches in ethology (personal comm., 14.6.2017). It is fair to say that the second German edition of Das Tier als soziales Wesen (Portmann 1964c) does show some updates regarding the ethological literature. Moreover, Portmann does not seek a classic ethological programme here, but promotes a phenomenological perspective to animal behaviour (Portmann 1954: 178). W. G. van der Kloot (1962) also found Portmann (1961a) outdated due to the time lapse in translation, but his short review in Science is otherwise positive.

  7. 7.

    Virtually no English translations paid respect to the quality of Portmann’s original titles. This fact was reflected in another critical review of New Paths in Biology (1964b) by Oppenheimer (1965).

  8. 8.

    It is interesting to read Grene’s critical stance toward her earlier appreciation of philosophical anthropologists, as found in Grene (1968, 1974). She even refused to include Portmann’s work among significant influences on her thought (Grene 2002: 80–81).

  9. 9.

    Portmann asserts that the ontogeny of human beings does not make sense without an acknowledgment of the full (adult) form, which is characterized by elaborate cultural life. This need not be viewed as a teleological argument, as it is clear that the specificity of any species is grounded in early developmental phases.

  10. 10.

    Personal comm. with Roger A. Stamm (7.3.2019). The author did research at the personal library of Lorenz, which is accessible in the Konrad Lorenz Institute. There are copies of several books by Portmann (Portmann 1944a, b, 1956, 1960a, 1967a, 1970) and at least one (Portmann 1967a) has marks of reading by Lorenz. While Portmann’s estimation for Lorenz’s findings in ethology is visible, he expresses a critical stance toward his uncritical but catchy parallels between humans and animals (Portmann and Illies 1976: 293–297). Furthermore, he openly criticizes Lorenz’s support for the universal impact of the selection theory in the section called “Against the simplifiers” (Gegen die Simplifikateure) (Portmann 1974: 39–41). I thank Jiří Klouda for the last reference.

  11. 11.

    I thank Pietro Conte for the reference. For the concept of self-presentation and its opposition to Darwinian functionalism see Toepfer (2011).

  12. 12.

    Portmann’s former doctoral student Roger A. Stamm portrays the mutual relations of Portmann to Lorenz, Remane and Koehler as respectful rather than bitter (personal comm., 7.3. 2019).

  13. 13.

    For the link between political motivations and the frame of his theories, as well as Portmann’s own reflections on the topic, see Ritter (2000: 252).

  14. 14.

    Darwin’s original writings are surprisingly “psychosomatic”, especially consider Darwin (2009) – we can actually portray Darwin, Buytendijk, and Portmann as the thinkers transgressing the opposition between soma and psyche: the unity of both polarities is visible in behavioural acts of animals and humans. For another view on anthropological physiology see Kurismaa, Chap. 6, in this volume.

  15. 15.

    In the only English translation of Portmann’s texts dedicated to basal anthropology (from French), H. Kaal uses the term “basic anthropology”. M. Landmann, who characterizes Portmann’s approach as “anthropological monism” (Landmann 1985: 36) and put it among the cornerstones of his own synthetic approach, uses the term “fundamental anthropology” for both Portmann’s and his programme (Landmann 1985: 262). In this volume, we prefer to talk about “basal anthropology”, which better reflects a primary character of Portmann’s considerations, rather than some basic axioms of a theoretically unified system.

  16. 16.

    If we understand Portmann’s programme of anthropology more specifically, some of its basic empirical findings are echoed in the current fields of human evolutionary – and neuro-developmental science – see Kurismaa, Chap. 6,, in this volume.

  17. 17.

    Portmann does not comment on possible differences in reproduction rates between urban and rural populations.

  18. 18.

    Portmann (1970d: 378) exclaims: “Hands off any life form we did not create ourselves”. Similar moments in Portmann’s work are also significant for the appreciation of his thought by theologian Karl Barth and philosopher Karl Jaspers, who were his colleagues at the University of Basel (Barth resided in the same building as Portmann, see Rieppel 2016: 102).

  19. 19.

    It is interesting to find Portmann (1990b: 113) writing about the negative influence of solely linguistic expressivity on creativity in art and science. Further, Polanyi’s tacit knowledge is viewed not only as a prerequisite (or substituent) of linguistic communication, but as a crucial constituent of animal orientation in the world. Similar notions demonstrate that Portmann is aware of zoosemiotic (sensu Sebeok 1990) capacities in human individuals.

  20. 20.

    Even so, it is still possible to hold the distinction between the Umwelt of ape species and Welt of humans, i.e. to find a qualitative difference in the semiotic relations of apes and humans to their environment. In the tradition of biosemiotics, the uniqueness of human language for both communication and thinking is usually seen as the benchmark of human superior cognitive faculties. Nevertheless, one can also highlight the complexity of the cognitive systems of higher animals and mark important differences between the Umwelts of distinct species. This seems to be a viable option for the contemporary Zeitgeist: to acknowledge the differences without making evaluative comparisons (cf. the model of diffuse discontinuities in Brentari 2018). For a comprehensive account about the narratives of anthropological difference see Jaroš and Maran (2019).

  21. 21.

    As an example, within neo-Darwinian conceptualizations of the relations between nature and culture, we can name dual inheritance theory.

  22. 22.

    Indeed, as a pioneer of philosophical anthropology in the 21st century, Tomasello was awarded the Wiesbadener Helmuth-Plessner Award in 2014.

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Jaroš, F. (2021). Portmann’s View on Anthropological Difference. In: Jaroš, F., Klouda, J. (eds) Adolf Portmann. Biosemiotics, vol 23. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67810-4_7

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