Abstract
In this chapter, we give an introduction to several game-theoretic solution concepts that will be used in this book. The chapter starts by introducing matrix-form strategic games and the concept of Nash equilibrium. We then present extensive-form games and the concept of information sets. Stackelberg games are an important type of extensive-form games. This chapter introduces the structure of the game and the solution concept of Stackelberg equilibrium.
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Notes
- 1.
This quantity is sometimes also called the security level of P1 or the upper value of the game.
- 2.
Similarly, this quantity can be called the security level of P2 or the lower value of the game.
- 3.
Here, we use E, V, and \(V_{i}\) for \(i\in \mathbb {PL}\bigcup \left\{ 0\right\} \) to represent sets, even though the symbols are not double-struck, in order to conform to accepted notation for graphs.
- 4.
Here also \(R_{2}\) represents a set even though it is not double-struck.
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Pawlick, J., Zhu, Q. (2021). Nash and Stackelberg Games. In: Game Theory for Cyber Deception. Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications. Birkhäuser, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66065-9_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66065-9_2
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Publisher Name: Birkhäuser, Cham
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