Abstract
This introduction clarifies the nature of panenmentalism, which is an original modal metaphysics that the author introduced in 1999 and has elaborated on since then. Unlike phenomenology, which endorsed individual pure (i.e., non-actual) possibilities that are mind-dependent, panenmentalism is realist about mind-independent individual pure possibilities, while rejecting the notion of possible worlds. The introduction also specifies the reasons for rejecting this problematic notion.
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Gilead, A. (2020). What Are Individual Pure Possibilities and for What Are They Good?. In: The Panenmentalist Philosophy of Science. Synthese Library, vol 424. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41124-4_1
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