Abstract
A handful of democracies conduct only nationwide elections for the unicameral or lower chamber of its national legislature. These include Kazakhstan (PR, some appointed), Kosovo (PR), Kyrgyzstan (PR), Moldova (PR), Monaco (FPTP and PR), the Netherlands (PR), Fiji (PR), Serbia (PR), Slovakia (PR), Namibia (PR), and Israel (PR). Sources differ on whether Rwanda elects a majority of its unicameral national legislature through a PR system or is operating under a post-conflict agreement that divides the seats between Hutus and Tutsis. This list does not include those few countries or territories whose existence is disputed and are not in the United Nations, such as Taiwan, Western Sahara, South Ossetia, Northern Cyprus or Abkhazia.
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Notes
- 1.
The upper chamber (Eerste Kamer) of the Netherland national legislature has 75 members chosen (appointed) for a 4-year term by councilors in each of the twelve provinces based on proportional representation in the provincial elections.
- 2.
The upper chamber consists of 26 representatives (2 selected [appointed] by each of 13 regional councils).
- 3.
By contrast, if two or more candidates tie in an Italian FPTP constituency election the youngest candidate wins.
- 4.
For a discussion of the election system history and changes in Fiji see, A New Electoral System for Fiji in 2014: Options for Legitimate Representation by Norm Miller, Pacific Islands Brief (No. 3, 2013, Pacific Islands Development Program); Top 10 things you need to know about Fiji’s new electoral system by Thomas Carnegie, Pacific Scoop (August 31, 2014).
- 5.
For a discussion of proportional representation systems in general see APPORTIONMENT METHODS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS by Friedrich Pukelsheim, (Springer International Publishing 2014); PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION (Second Edition 2018); Seat biases of apportionment methods for proportional representation by Karsten Schuster, Friedrich Pukelsheim, Mathias Drton, and Norman Draper, 4 Electoral Studies 22 (2003); and How Proportional Representation Elections Work, FairVote @ www.FairVote.com
- 6.
Some courts have found PR systems or the PR component of a mixed system unconstitutional on the basis that a vote for a party is not a “direct” election. See, Chap. 14.
- 7.
There are several variables that affect how votes are allocated for parliamentary seats in a PR system. The two main formulas are the greatest remainder method and the highest averages method, although each type includes several variations in how the conversion takes place. The most common is the highest averages formula that divides the number of votes gathered by a party list in the electoral area (the nation for these countries or in a given district for most countries). The calculation is performed by means of a series of divisors. Variations in this method concern the divisors, for example, the simple 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. progression (d'Hondt formula); the odd-number 1, 3, 5, 7, etc. series (Saint-Lague formula); or its variant 1, 4, 3, 5, 7, etc. series (modified Saint-Lague formula). In each case, the mathematical operation results in an average, a quotient, with seats for party lists distributed successively according to the highest quotient, until all seats are filled.
- 8.
The d’Hondt method of allocating seats among parties in a PR system is named after Netherland’s political scientist, Victor d’Hondt. It uses whole numbers and is generally considered fair. Some critics believe it slightly favors large parties and coalitions over scattered small parties. Most nations with PR elections use this method of allocation, or some variation, at a national or regional level. These nations include Albania, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, East Timor, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Kosovo, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Northern Ireland, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
- 9.
There are several nations with PR voting that have no threshold or a threshold that is equivalent to one seat. An example is the Netherlands.
- 10.
Usually the threshold is raised for party coalitions.
- 11.
See, Electoral systems with a Majority Bonus as Unconventional Mixed Systems by Camille Bedock and Nicolas Sauger, Project: Electoral systems and their consequences (2014) @ www.researchgate.net
- 12.
Judgment No. 17, Italian Constitutional Court (2017). See, The Italian Constitutional Court Rules on Electoral System by Giacomo Delledonne and Giovanni Boggero in the Int’l J. Const. L. Blog (Feb. 8, 2017) @http://www.iconnectblog.com. See also, Chap. 14.
- 13.
Only some of Argentina’s states continue to use the double simultaneous vote system. It is possible that by the time this book is published no Argentinian state will use the system any longer.
- 14.
Honduras now uses an open list PR system in 18 multi-member constituencies based on the départements ranging in size from 1 to 23 seats.
- 15.
Among the countries using some variation of PR with an open list as part of their election structure are Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, Columbia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Honduras, Indonesia, Iraq, Iceland, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Japan, Norway, Poland, San Moreno, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
- 16.
Among the nations using a PR or mixed system with a closed list are Albania, Angola, Andorra, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Macedonia, Montenegro, Portugal, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Uruguay.
- 17.
See Appendix C, A Case Study of Turkey.
- 18.
See, Tricks and Treats: The 2005 Italian Electoral Law and Its Consequences by Gianfranco Pasquino, 12 South European Society and Politics 79–93 (2009).
- 19.
The Italian Constitutional Court, (No. 1 of 2014) @ www.cortecostituzionale.it. Many constitutional or supreme courts provide English versions of some of their opinions. This is true of the Italian Constitutional Court.
- 20.
See, The Italian Constitutional Court judgement on the ‘Italicum’ electoral law: another new reform for Italy ? by Roberta Damiani, The Constitution Unit [UCL] (July 2018).
- 21.
These single-member districts are in Valle d’ Acosta and Tretino-Alto Ariga.
- 22.
See, Putin and the Russian Electoral System; Reforms to Prevent Regime Change by Darrell Slider and Paul Rodrick Gregory, Soviet and Post-Soviet Review (2012) reprinted as Putin Changes September Election Rules To Prop Up His 'United Russia' Party by Patrick Roderick Gregory, Forbes (Mar 14, 2016; The Electoral System of the Russian Federation , by Bill Bowring, The European Parliament (2011) available at www.europarl.europa.eu
- 23.
Only one of United Russia’s candidates received over 50% of the vote in the 13 electoral districts in these 2 cities.
- 24.
The fact that United Russia did not even field a candidate in 19 districts is suggestive of this result. However, since most of those seats were won by parties aligned with United Russia, the lack of a United Russia candidate may have been intended to prevent the parties from splitting the vote. These districts were primarily among Russia’s ethnic republics, however, there are districts in Moscow and Saint Petersburg that ssuggest this tactic.. Interestingly, the United Russia candidate in Sevastopol (disputed part of Ukraine) won with only 34.5% of the vote.
- 25.
In 2018 municipal elections several parties other than United Russia won the largest percentage of the vote in areas near the center of these cities. An overlay of the boundaries of the 2016 legislative constituencies shows that these non-United Russia areas are carved up and submerged in areas that supported United Russia—a classic example of the gerrymandering tactic of fracturing the opposition’s areas of support. United Russia won several legislative constituencies in Moscow or St. Petersburg with as little as 22–35% of the vote.
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Bickerstaff, S. (2020). Proportional Representation and Electing Nationwide. In: Election Systems and Gerrymandering Worldwide. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30837-7_7
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