Abstract
This paper investigates a new auction model in which bidders have both copy and budget constraints. The new model has extensive and interesting applications in auctions of online ad-words, software licenses, etc. We consider the following problem: Suppose all the participators are rational, how to allocate the objects at what price so as to guarantee auctioneer’s high revenue, and how high it is.
We introduce a new kind of mechanisms called win-win mechanisms and present the notion of unconditional competitive auctions. A notably interesting property of win-win mechanisms is that each bidder’s self-interested strategy brings better utility not only to himself but also to the auctioneer. Then we present win-win mechanisms for multi-unit auctions with copy and budget constraints. We prove that these auctions are unconditional competitive under the situation of both limited and unlimited supply.
Research is supported by a research grant of City University of Hong Kong (Proj. No. 7001838).
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Bu, TM., Qi, Q., Sun, A.W. (2006). Unconditional Competitive Auctions with Copy and Budget Constraints. In: Spirakis, P., Mavronicolas, M., Kontogiannis, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4286. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11944874_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11944874_3
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