Abstract
We analyze the formation and stability of coalitions for a situation where finitely many individuals form different coalitions and their payoffs depend on the consequence of a noncooperative game with different coalitions, and examine the moving path of individuals among various coalitions. Our main finding is to show that there exists at least one evolutionarily stable coalition equilibrium in Γnx.
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Ho, S. Evolutionarily Stable Coalition Structure. Nonlinear Dynamics Psychol Life Sci 6, 159–172 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014062211818
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1014062211818