Abstract
Whilst inherently lawful, shelf companies enable the generation of contrived financial structures and arrangements that can facilitate actors to organise their criminal activities and conceal, convert, or control their illicit finances or assets. A stratified market for the purchase and management of such legal structures exists. At the lower end, greater accessibility to shelf companies is enabled by websites offering shell companies, or ready-to-go corporate vehicles, at various prices to anyone interested in setting up a company quickly in a preferred jurisdiction. Although these products have been considered as high-turnover and low-cost, their importance should not be underestimated. They lower barriers to entry to customers interested in concealing, controlling, and/or converting illicit finances domestically and transnationally. To gain insight into the nature and organisation of this market, this article provides a first overview of the online market for shelf companies by empirically analysing data scraped online that identified 296 online shelf company suppliers. The results highlight how some of shelf company suppliers are positioned in a way that is conducive to the facilitation of illicit activities; that there exist a diverse range of suppliers with varying sizes, scopes, and connections; and that the market is global, with a large variety of shelf company jurisdictions provided by suppliers.
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The authors would like to thank members of the EconCrimeLab and reviewers of the Manchester Organisational Non-compliance Initiative (MONI) workshop for their valuable feedback.
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Paquet-Clouston, M., Lord, N., Philibert, J. et al. Incorporating the Illicit: Assessing the Market Supply of Shelf Companies. Eur J Crim Policy Res (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-024-09594-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10610-024-09594-w