Abstract.
In this paper we characterize strategy-proof voting schemes on Euclidean spaces. A voting scheme is strategy-proof whenever it is optimal for every agent to report his best alternative. Here the individual preferences underlying these best choices are separable and quadratic. It turns out that a voting scheme is strategy-proof if and only if (α) its range is a closed Cartesian subset of Euclidean space, (β) the outcomes are at a minimal distance to the outcome under a specific coordinatewise veto voting scheme, and (γ) it satisfies some monotonicity properties. Neither continuity nor decomposability is implied by strategy-proofness, but these are satisfied if we additionally impose Pareto-optimality or unanimity.
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Received: 18 October 1993/Accepted: 2 February 1996
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Peremans, W., Peters, H., v. d. Stel, H. et al. Strategy-proofness on Euclidean spaces. Soc Choice Welfare 14, 379–401 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050074
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050074