Abstract
Objective
The objective of this study was to map and describe the different corporate political activity (CPA) strategies used by the sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) industry to influence public health policymaking geared toward decreasing the consumption of SSB in Mexico.
Methods
We applied an existing approach to identify and monitor the CPA of the SSB industry. A documentary analysis was conducted for two main actors in the SSB industry, for the period 2017–2019, and was triangulated with eleven semi-structured interviews with key informants in public health nutrition and from the SSB industry. The information was analyzed using an existing framework for categorizing the CPA.
Results
Although data were found for six CPA strategies, the SSB industry mainly highlighted its economic importance and spoke openly against the 2014 SSB tax. We documented the industry’s relationships with governmental bodies and civil society actors to promote corporate social responsibility and gain public support.
Conclusions
The SSB industry in Mexico uses a variety of strategies, directly or through third parties, to influence public policies related to the prevention and control of obesity and non-communicable diseases.
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“All procedures performed in this study followed the guidance of the Ethics in Research Committee of the National Institute of Public Health, Mexico, and was approved on March 11, 2019, with the ID S46 and with the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards.”
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Ojeda, E., Torres, C., Carriedo, Á. et al. The influence of the sugar-sweetened beverage industry on public policies in Mexico. Int J Public Health 65, 1037–1044 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00038-020-01414-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00038-020-01414-2