Abstract
Maschler, Peleg and Shapley make use of the bisection property of the kernel to provide an interpretation of the kernel for n-person game with grand coalition. We develop the similar results for any n-person game with coalition structure.
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References
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Chang, C. Bisection property of the kernel. Int J Game Theory 20, 1–11 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01240562
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01240562