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The (R)evolution of Indian model bilateral investment treaty: esca** liability without mitigating risks

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Abstract

As of June 2016, India has been a respondent inseventeen publicly known investor-state disputes which places India in the category of one of the most challenged countries in the field of international investment arbitration. This article examines the safeguards identified by India in its 2015 Model BIT that seeks to mitigate the impact of investor-State dispute settlement in relation to India’s existing and future BITs. The article argues that India should choose an approach that seeks a fine balance between protecting investor’s interests as well as the host state’s interests. In this regard, the article identifies the free trade agreements that India has negotiated with the South East Asian countries as an appropriate template. While India’s Model BIT seeks to achieve this balance, the challenge remains in integrating this new approach to other existing international investment agreements.

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Notes

  1. While UNCTAD provides all Indian investment treaties, they are not always in English. International Investment Agreements Navigator, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/96#iiaInnerMenu (considering, the Indian governmental websites that provide easily accessible investment treaties as well as trade agreements in English are useful resources.) Indian bilateral investment treaties see, Indian Ministry of Finance, http://www.finmin.nic.in/bipa/bipa_index.asp?pageid=1; Indian free trade agreements are available see, International Trade: Trade Agreements, Indian Ministry Of Commerce And Industry http://commerce.nic.in/trade/international_ta.asp?id=2&trade=i.

  2. India’s 2003 Model BIT is available at UNCTAD Investment Hub.

  3. India’s 2015 Draft Model BIT is available at GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf.

  4. None of India’s IIAs currently exclude portfolio investment from the definition of investment.

  5. Only four percent of Indian IIAs excludes specific assets from the definition of investment (the 2007 India-Mexico BIT, the 2009 Colombia-India BIT, the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  6. White Industries Australia Limited v. The Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Final Award rendered on Nov. 30, 2011,¶ 7.4.5.

    See also, James J. Nedumpara, Imagining Space in India’s Trade and Investment Agreements, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (SSRN) (Dec. 2, 2014) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2532582.

  7. Only seven percent of Indian IIAs narrow the definition of investment by requiring investment characteristics (the 2007 India-Mexico BIT, the 2009 Colombia-India BIT, the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2011 India-Japan EPA, the 2011 India-Malaysia FTA, the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  8. Only four IIAs do not include this requirement (the terminated 1999 Argentina-India BIT, the 2005 India-Singapore CECA, the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  9. The treaties that include permanent residents as investors are: the 1995 Denmark-India BIT, the 1995 India-Malaysia BIT, the 1996 India-Israel BIT, the 1996 India-Kazakhstan BIT, the 1999 Australia-India BIT, the 1999 India-Uzbekistan BIT, the 2006 Bosnia Herzegovina-India BIT, the 2007 India-Mexico BIT, the 2011 India-Malaysia FTA, the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement.

  10. Only six agreements exclude dual nationals from the definition of investor (the 1995 India-Malaysia BIT, the 1996 India-Israel BIT, the 2008 not yet in force India-Uruguay BIT, the 2009 Colombia-India BIT, the 2011 India-Malaysia FTA, the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  11. Gordon Blanke, India’s revised Model BIT: Every bit worth it!, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Mar. 20, 2016), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/03/20/indias-revised-model-bit-every-bit-worth-it/.

  12. The sixteen percent of Indian IIAs that require substantial business activity are: the 1997 India-Romania BIT, the 1997 India-Switzerland BIT, the 1998 India-Turkey BIT, the 1999 India-Morocco BIT, the 2000 India-Portugal BIT, the 2005 India-Singapore CECA, the 2006 India-Slovakia BIT, the 2007 not yet in force Ethiopia-India BIT, the 2007 Greece-India BIT, the 2007 India-Mexico BIT, the 2009 Colombia-India BIT, the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2011 India-Lithuania BIT, the 2011 India-Japan EPA.

  13. The denial of benefits clause is present in fifteen percent of Indian IIAs (the 2005 India-Singapore CECA, the 2008 India-Myanmar BIT, the 2008 India-Syria BIT, the 2009 Colombia-India BIT, the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2010 not yet in force Congo DRC-India BIT, the 2010 not yet in force India-Seychelles BIT, the 2011 India-Lithuania BIT, the 2011 not yet in force India-Nepal BIT, the 2011 not yet in force Slovenia BIT, the 2011 India-Japan EPA, the 2011 India-Malaysia FTA, the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  14. The substantive business operation requirement is present in all Indian IIAs that have a denial of benefits provision.

  15. Eleven percent of Indian IIAs denies benefits of the treaty to investors and investments from countries with no diplomatic relations (the 2008 India-Myanmar BIT, the 2008 India-Syria BIT, the 2009 Colombia-India BIT, the 2010 not yet in force Congo DRC-India BIT, the 2010 not yet in force India-Seychelles BIT, the 2011 India-Lithuania BIT, the 2011 not yet in force India-Nepal BIT, the 2011 India-Japan EPA, the 2011 India-Malaysia FTA, the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  16. India New Model BIT, art. 35.

  17. James J. Nedumpara, Imagining Space in India’s Trade and Investment Agreements, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (SSRN) (Dec. 2, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2532582.

  18. Only nine percent of Indian IIAs excludes taxation matters from the scope of the treaty (the 1994 India-Russia BIT, the 2000 India-Thailand BIT, the 2000 India-Portugal BIT, the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2011 India-Japan EPA, the 2011 India-Malaysia FTA, the 2013 India-United Arab Emirates BIT, and the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  19. Only five out of eighty nine Indian IIAs excludes subsidies and grants from the scope oft he treaty (the 2005 India-Singapore CECA, the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2011 India-Japan EPA, the 2011 India-Malaysia FTA, and the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  20. Only four out of eighty nine Indian IIAs excludes government procurement from the scope of the treaty (the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2011 India-Japan EPA, the 2011 India-Malaysia FTA, and the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  21. Eight percent of Indian IIAs excludes other subjects from the scope of the investment treaty (the 1999 terminated Argentina-India BIT, the 1999 Australia-India BIT, the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2010 India-Latvia BIT, the 2011 India-Malaysia FTA, the 2013 India-United Arab Emirates BIT, the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  22. Only seven percent of Indian IIAs extend the national treatment guarantee to both pre-and post-establishment phase (the 2001 India-Kuwait BIT, the 2005 India-Singapore CECA, the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2011 India-Japan EPA, the 2011 India-Malaysia FTA, the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  23. The treaties that limit the national treatment standard to in like circumstances are: the 1998 India-Turkey BIT, the 2001 India-Kuwait BIT, the 2005 India-Singapore CECA, the 2006 India-Slovakia BIT, the 2007 India-Mexico BIT, the 2009 Colombia-India BIT, the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2011 India-Japan EPA, the 2011 India-Malaysia FTA, the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement. See also, Kavaljit Singh, An Analysis of India’s New Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, in RETHINKING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: CRITICAL ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES 81-100 (Kavaljit Singh and Burghard Ilge 2016), 90.

  24. White Industries Australia Limited v. The Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Final Award rendered on Nov. 30, 2011, http://www.italaw.com/cases/1169,¶ 11.2.1. See also, Prabhash Ranjan, The White Industries Arbitration: Implications for India’s Investment Treaty Program, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Investment Treaty News (Apr. 13, 2012), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/the-white-industries-arbitration-implications-for-indias-investment-treaty-program/. And, Saurabh Garg, Ishita G. Tripathy and Sudhanshu Roy, The Indian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: Continuity and Change, in RETHINKING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: CRITICAL ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES 69-80 (Kavaljit Singh and Burghard Ilge 2016), 75–76. And, Kavaljit Singh, An Analysis of India’s New Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, in RETHINKING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: CRITICAL ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES 81-100 (Kavaljit Singh and Burghard Ilge 2016), 91.

  25. Four out of eighty nine Indian IIAs does not provide MFN treatment to foreign investors (the 2005 India-Singapore CECA, the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2011 India-Malaysia FTA and the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  26. Only three out of eighty nine Indian IIAs limit the scope of MFN to a list of policy areas (the 1999 terminated Argentina-India BIT, the 2006 China-India BIT, and the 2011 India-Japan EPA). And, only the 2001 India-Kuwait BIT extends the MFN treatment to both pre-and post-establishment phase.

  27. Only three percent of Indian IIAs does not provide a fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard (the 1998 India-Turkey BIT, the 2005 India-Singapore CECA and the 2008 India-Senegal BIT).

  28. 4 % of Indian IIAs contain a qualified FET by listing elements (the 2007 India-Mexico BIT, the 2009 Colombia-India BIT, the 2011 India-Japan EPA, the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  29. Six percent of the Indian IIAs include a qualified FET by reference to international minimum standards (the 2007 India-Mexico BIT, the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2011 India-Japan EPA, the 2001 India-Malaysia FTA, the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  30. Kavaljit Singh, An Analysis of India’s New Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, in RETHINKING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: CRITICAL ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES 81-100 (Kavaljit Singh and Burghard Ilge 2016), 89.

  31. Forty eight percent of Indian IIAs has no FPS provision (the 1995 India-Tajikistan BIT, the 1995 India-Turkmenistan BIT, the 1996 India-Israel BIT, the 1996 India-Kazakhstan BIT, the 1996 India-Poland BIT, the 1997 India-Vietnam BIT, the 1997 Egypt-India BIT, the 1997 India-Kyrgyzstan BIT, the 1997 India-Oman BIT, the 1997 India-Romania BIT, the 1997 India-Belgium Luxembourg Economic Union BIT, the 1997 India-Sri Lanka BIT, the 1998 India-Bulgaria BIT, the 1998 India-Mauritius BIT, the 1998 India-Turkey BIT, the 1999 terminated India-Indonesia BIT, the 1999 India-Qatar BIT, the 1999 not yet in force India-Zimbabwe BIT, the 2000 India-Lao PDR BIT, the 2000 India-Philippines BIT, the 2001 Croatia-India BIT, the 2001 India-Mongolia BIT, the 2002 Belarus-India BIT, the 2002 Cyprus-India BIT, the 2002 not yet in force Ghana-India BIT, the 2002 India-Yemen BIT, the 2003 Armenia-India BIT, the 2003 India-Sudan BIT, the 2003 not yet in force Djibouti-India BIT, the 2004 Bahrain-India BIT, the 2005 India-Singapore CECA, the 2006 Bosnia Herzegovina-India BIT, the 2006 China-India BIT, the 2006 India-Jordan BIT, the 2007 not yet in force Ethiopia-India BIT, the 2007 India-Libya BIT, the 2008 India-Myanmar BIT, the 2008 not yet in force India-Uruguay BIT, the 2009 Bangladesh-India BIT, the 2009 India-Mozambique BIT, the 2010 not yet in force Congo DRC-India BIT, the 2010 not yet in force India-Seychelles BIT, the 2011 not yet in force India-Nepal BIT).

  32. The Indian investment treaties that refer to domestic law for the application of the FPS standard are: the 1999 Australia-India BIT, the 2008 India-Senegal BIT, the 2011 not yet in force India-Slovenia BIT, the 2013 India-United Arab Emirates BIT.

  33. Twenty four percent of Indian IIAs carve-out regulatory measures from expropriation: (the 2005 India-Singapore CECA, the 2006 China-India BIT, the 2006 India-Jordan BIT, the 2006 India-Saudi Arabia BIT, the 2006 India-Slovakia BIT, the 2007 India-Trinidad and Tobago BIT, the 2008 Brunei Darussalam-India BIT, the 2008 India-Senegal BIT, the 2008 India-Syria BIT, the 2008 not yet in force India-Uruguay BIT, the 2009 Colombia-India BIT, the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2010 India-Latvia BIT, the 2010 not yet in force Congo DRC-India BIT, the 2010 not yet in force India-Seychelles BIT, the 2011 India-Lithuania BIT, the 2011 not yet in force India-Nepal BIT, the 2011 not yet in force India-Slovenia BIT, the 2011 India-Japan EPA, the 2011 India-Malaysia FTA, the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  34. Twenty six percent of Indian IIAs include a definition of indirect expropriation (the 2001 India-Kuwait BIT, the 2005 India-Singapore CECA, the 2006 China-India BIT, the 2006 India-Jordan BIT, the 2006 India-Saudi Arabia BIT, the 2006 India-Slovakia BIT, the 2007 India-Trinidad and Tobago BIT, the 2008 Brunei Darussalam-India BIT, the 2008 India-Senegal BIT, the 2008 India-Syria BIT, the 2008 not yet in force India-Uruguay BIT, the 2009 Colombia-India BIT, the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2010 India-Latvia BIT, the 2010 not yet in force Congo DRC-India BIT, the 2010 not yet in force India-Seychelles BIT, the 2011 India-Lithuania BIT, the 2011 not yet in force India-Nepal BIT, the 2011 not yet in force India-Slovenia BIT, the 2011 India-Japan EPA, the 2011 India-Malaysia FTA, the 2013 India-United Arab Emirates BIT, the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  35. While the 1995 Germany-India BIT provides compensation only in accordance with national treatment, the 1997 India-Sri Lanka BIT grants compensation on MFN basis only.

  36. Twenty four out of eighty nine Indian IIAs, in addition to relative right to compensation in case of strife, provide for an absolute right to compensation (the 1994 India-UK BIT, the 1995 Denmark-India BIT, the 1995 Germany-India BIT, the 1995 India-Italy BIT, the 1996 Czech Republic-India BIT, the 1996 India-South Korea BIT, the 1997 India-Spain BIT, the 1999 Austria-India BIT, the 2000 India-Lao PDR BIT, the 2000 India-Sweden BIT, the 2001 India-Kuwait BIT, the 2002 Belarus-India BIT, the 2002 Finland-India BIT, the 2003 Hungary-India BIT, the 2006 China-India BIT, the 2006 India-Jordan BIT, the 2006 India-Saudi Arabia BIT, the 2006 India-Slovakia BIT, the 2007 Greece-India BIT, the 2008 Brunei Darussalam-India BIT, the 2008 India-Senegal BIT, the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2011 not yet in force India-Slovenia BIT, the 2013 India-United Arab Emirates BIT).

  37. Exceptions in case of balance of payment difficulties and other exceptions with regard to enforcing domestic law can be retrieved in the following treaties: the 2005 India-Singapore CECA, the 2006 India-Slovakia BIT, the 2007 Iceland-India BIT, the 2007 India-Mexico BIT, the 2008 India-Syria BIT, the 2009 Colombia-India BIT, the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2010 not yet in force India-Seychelles BIT, the 2011 not yet in force India-Slovenia BIT, the 2011 India-Japan FTA, the 2011 India-Malaysia FTA, the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement.

  38. Only five Indian IIAs (6 %) prohibit performance requirements (the 2001 India-Kuwait BIT, the 2005 India-Singapore CECA, the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2011 India-Japan EPA, the 2013 India-United Arab Emirates BIT). From these five treaties only the 2005 India-Singapore CECA refers to the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures.

  39. Ten out of eighty nine Indian IIAs require the host state to observe all its obligations towards the foreign investor (the 1994 India-UK BIT, the 1995 India-Netherlands BIT, the 1997 India-Belgium Luxembourg Economic Union BIT, the 1997 India-Spain BIT, the 1997 India-Switzerland BIT, the 1998 India-Mauritius BIT, the 1999 Austria-India BIT, the 1999 India-Uzbekistan BIT, the 2001 India-Kuwait BIT, the 2011 India-Japan EPA).

  40. Kavaljit Singh, An Analysis of India’s New Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, in RETHINKING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: CRITICAL ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES 81-100 (Kavaljit Singh and Burghard Ilge 2016), 91–92.

  41. New Model BIT, art. 5.3(b)(iv).

  42. Thirteen percent of Indian IIAs contain a transparency clause that is either direct at states or investors or both (the 1999 Australia-India BIT, the 2001 India-Kuwait BIT, the 2002 Finland-India BIT, the 2005 India-Singapore CECA, the 2007 Iceland-India BIT, the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2011 not yet in force India-Slovenia BIT, the 2011 India-Japan EPA, the 2011 India-Malaysia FTA, the 2013 India-United Arab Emirates BIT, the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  43. Saurabh Garg, Ishita G. Tripathy and Sudhanshu Roy, The Indian Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: Continuity and Change, in RETHINKING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: CRITICAL ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES 69-80 (Kavaljit Singh and Burghard Ilge 2016), 79.

  44. A non-derogation clause is only missing in the 2007 India-Mexico BIT.

  45. Only five Indian IIAs do not provide any exception on essential security interests (the 1995 Denmark-India BIT, the 1995 India-Malaysia BIT, the 1996 India-South Korea BIT, the 1997 India-Spain BIT, the 2013 India-United Arab Emirates BIT).

  46. Particularly in the FTAs the essential security exception is included, defined and self-judging (the 2005 India-Singapore CECA, the 2009 Colombia-India BIT, the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2011 India-Malaysia FTA, and the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  47. The prudential carve-out involves the more recent Indian IIAs (the 2009 Colombia-India BIT, the 2011 India-Japan EPA, the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  48. Twenty two out of eighty nine Indian IIAs does not allow for contractual breaches to be submitted to ISDS (the 1994 India-Russia BIT, the 1996 India-Portugal BIT, the 1997 Egypt-India BIT, the 1997 India-Spain BIT, the 1997 India-Sri Lanka BIT, the 1998 Bulgaria-India BIT, the 1999 India-Qatar BIT, the 2000 India-Sweden BIT, the 2000 India-Portugal BIT, the 2001 Croatia-India BIT, the 2003 India-Serbia BIT, the 2003 India-Sudan BIT, the 2005 India-Singapore CECA, the 2006 Bosnia Herzegovina-India BIT, the 2007 Greece-India BIT, the 2007 India-Mexico BIT, the 2008 not yet in force India-Uruguay BIT, the 2009 Colombia-India BIT, the 2009 India-South Korea CEPA, the 2011 India-Japan EPA, the 2011 India-Malaysia FTA, the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  49. Only four treaties out of eighty nine allow treaty interpretation submissions to the tribunal (the 2007 India-Mexico BIT, the 2011 India-Japan EPA, the 2011 India-Malaysia FTA and the 2014 not yet in force ASEAN-India Investment Agreement).

  50. Nineteen out eighty nine Indian IIAs contain a mechanism for consultation (the 1996 Czech Republic-India BIT, the 1998 Bulgaria-India BIT, the 1999 Australia-India BIT, the 1999 terminated India-Indonesia BIT, the 1999 India-Morocco BIT, the 1999 India-Uzbekistan BIT, the 2000 India-Lao PDR BIT, the 2000 India-Portugal BIT, the 2001 India-Kuwait BIT, the 2001 India-Mongolia BIT, the 2002 Cyprus-India BIT, the 2002 Finland-India BIT, the 2005 India-Singapore CECA, the 2007 Greece-India BIT, the 2007 India-Mexico BIT, the 2009 Colombia-India BIT, the 2011 India-Lithuania BIT, the 2011 not yet in force India-Slovenia BIT, the 2011 India-Malaysia FTA).

  51. Article 8.4 Draft Model BIT. See also, Kavaljit Singh, An Analysis of India’s New Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, in RETHINKING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: CRITICAL ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES 81-100 (Kavaljit Singh and Burghard Ilge 2016), 94.

  52. Prabhash Ranjan, India’s Bilateral Investment Treaty Programme—Past, Present and Future, in RETHINKING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: CRITICAL ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES 101-112 (Kavaljit Singh and Burghard Ilge 2016), 112.

  53. Ashutosh Ray, Unveiled: Indian Model BIT, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Jan. 18, 2016), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/01/18/unveiled-indian-model-bit/.

  54. Kavaljit Singh, An Analysis of India’s New Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, in RETHINKING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: CRITICAL ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES 81-100 (Kavaljit Singh and Burghard Ilge 2016), 84.

  55. Draft Model BIT, art. 4.3.

  56. Gordon Blanke, India’s revised Model BIT: Every bit worth it!, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Mar. 20, 2016), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/03/20/indias-revised-model-bit-every-bit-worth-it/.

  57. UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/96?partyRole=2.

  58. White Industries Australia Limited v. The Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Final Award rendered on Nov. 30, 2011, http://www.italaw.com/cases/1169,¶ 14.3.6.

  59. Kavaljit Singh, An Analysis of India’s New Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, in RETHINKING BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: CRITICAL ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES 81-100 (Kavaljit Singh and Burghard Ilge 2016), 100.

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Bazrafkan, A. The (R)evolution of Indian model bilateral investment treaty: esca** liability without mitigating risks. **dal Global Law Review 7, 245–261 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41020-016-0027-6

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