Introduction

The Mediterranean crossing, the last leg of a long journey, is one of the most dangerous phases for migrants, with a high risk of death. In recent years, even though the number of Mediterranean crossings has slightly decreased, the death toll has risen sharply. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), since 2014, 28,918 individuals have died or gone missing in these attempts, with over 80% (about 23,000) of these deaths occurring along the central Mediterranean route, particularly through the Sicilian Channel between Libya, Tunisia, and ItalyFootnote 1 (McMahon and Sigona 2018).

Irregular migration across the Mediterranean remains a major challenge for Europe, with significant humanitarian, social, and political implications (Triandafyllidou 2018). In Italy, the law criminalizes migrant smuggling under Article 12, paragraphs 3 onwards, of Legislative Decree No. 286/1998, targeting those who aid and abet irregular immigration. This offence often overlaps with the more serious crime of human trafficking, distinguished by the use of force or coercion.

This challenges the oversimplified perception of migrant smuggling as merely a criminal activity.Footnote 2 The interactions between smugglers and their clients are often less violent and more intricate than portrayed in media and law enforcement narratives (Sanchez 2017). Regarding the Mediterranean crossing, migrants often turn to illegal services out of necessity. Lacking legal alternatives, they depend on smugglers as the only means to flee from danger and conflict (Di Nicola et al. 2019; Pastore et al. 1999; Sciortino 2000).

Against this backdrop, Italy has embarked on a series of legislative and operational measures aimed at reducing the arrival of migrants and asylum seekers. These include bilateral agreements with countries of origin and transit, increased maritime surveillance, stricter legal penalties for smugglers, efforts to limit non-governmental organization (NGO) sea rescue operations, and enhanced repatriation policies.

However, the effectiveness and consequences of these measures remain topics of ongoing academic debate. This manuscript aims to assess how restrictive policies have affected Mediterranean migrant smuggling. Specifically, it will examine whether these measures have achieved the objectives set by the Italian governments that enacted them, namely the effective reduction of migratory flows and more efficient control of irregular migration routes.

Anticipating some of the concluding reflections, the study underlines that the measures to curb irregular immigration, which embody the paradigm of “border securitization” (Huysmans 2006; Campesi 2015; Basaran 2015; Benedicto and Brunet 2018; Andersson 2016) and confront the process of “criminalizing irregular immigration” (Parkin 2013; Provera 2015, 2018), exerted limited direct influence on the overall patterns of migratory flows, which are chiefly shaped by global geopolitical factors. However, these measures have indirectly influenced the adaptation of routes, operational methods, and organization of criminal groups involved in migrant smuggling.

Our study builds on a solid empirical foundation, incorporating both qualitative and quantitative data. It includes a detailed analysis of statistics from official sources and research centers, enriched by qualitative insights from interviews with expert witnessesFootnote 3 and judicial investigations conducted by Italian prosecutors between 2017 and 2023. These diverse sources offer a comprehensive view of the organization of migrant landings and the operational realities of smuggling networks along various migration routes, providing critical insights into the challenges faced by both smugglers and law enforcement agencies.

By integrating these varied analytical perspectives, our research seeks to unravel the complexities of migrant smuggling and evaluate the real-world effects of migration policies implemented by destination countries. This methodological approach allows us to draw nuanced insights into the dynamics of smuggling activities in the Mediterranean and the effectiveness of measures aimed at restricting immigration. Through this rigorous analysis, our study aims to provide valuable perspectives to the ongoing debate on migration management and policy development, highlighting the need for a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between migration policies and the evolving strategies of smuggling networks.

The structure of the essay is organised as follows: The second section delves into the context of migration, concentrating on the measures implemented by Italy and Europe to regulate irregular migration. The third section analyses the impact of migration control policies using statistical data and interviews. This part describes the characteristics and operational methods adopted by criminal groups involved in migrant smuggling along the sea route to Italy, as a reaction to the policies enforced by the destination countries, with references to scientific literature. The final section, the fourth, presents and discusses the main empirical evidence collected.

Recent Italian anti-migration measures

The debate on the effectiveness of migration policies explores their ability to regulate and reduce migration flows. Some studies highlight that control policies hardly stop migration in the long term, as factors such as conflicts, economic inequalities, and social ties exert a greater influence on migration flows than restrictive measures (Davenport et al. 2003; Hatton 2009; Moore and Shellman 2016). On the contrary, other research demonstrates the effectiveness of certain governmental policies in actually reducing illegal immigration, emphasizing how specific control strategies can be effective (Beine et al. 2011; Czaika and de Haas 2017; Helbling and Leblang 2019).

However, the impact of these policies can vary depending on the methodology used to evaluate their effects, including changes in the volume, composition, and orientation of migration flows. Furthermore, policies can induce substitution or displacement effects, such as changing migration routes or increasing risks for migrants (Cornelius 2001; Guerette and Aziani 2021). The literature shows that only a minority of studies have empirically examined these substitution/displacement effects, revealing the complexity of migration dynamics and the challenge in assessing the concrete effect of migration policies (Van Liempt et al. 2017; Marchesi 2022).

To fully grasp the complexities of the EU and Italy’s evolving migration policies, it’s essential to examine the changing contexts and strategic responses to irregular immigration in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Our investigation reveals a shift from initial humanitarian approaches to increasingly repressive tactics aimed at reducing migrant arrivals. This transition, marked by the outsourcing of migration controls, has often led to significant human rights concerns (Edwards and Lutterbeck 2019). Moreover, these restrictive measures have prompted a rise in more autonomous and less detectable migrant arrivals. Though receiving less media attention, these arrivals present complex detection and management challenges, reflecting a sophisticated adaptation to tightened border controls (Ambrosini 2018; Sredanovic 2019).

The Lampedusa shipwreck on October 3, 2013, stands as a pivotal moment in the recent history of Mediterranean migrant landings. This tragedy, resulting in the death of 368 people, profoundly impacted Italian public opinion. As a response, Prime Minister Enrico Letta then initiated the “Mare Nostrum” humanitarian and military mission. Under “Mare Nostrum”, the Italian Navy was tasked with rescuing migrants and arresting smugglers in a 70,000 square kilometer area. This area covered the Search and Rescue (SAR) zones of Italy, Libya, and Malta. Initially, the operation was popular and succeeded in rescuing over 150,000 migrants. However, support declined over time due to its high costs, estimated at 9.5 million euros per month. Additionally, the lack of a unified European Union response and the prevailing narrative that rescues encourage further migration contributed to the decline in support.

On November 1, 2014, “Mare Nostrum” was replaced by “Triton”. This new European operation had only a third of its predecessor’s budget. Managed by Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, “Triton” shifted its focus primarily to border control rather than rescue operations. This change was in line with Frontex’s institutional mission (Campesi 2015; Pastore and Henry 2016; Gauci and Mallia 2017). In this context, the responsibility for migrant rescue operations shifted to merchant vessels and a few ships from humanitarian organizations. However, these groups faced organizational challenges, limited resources, and inadequate equipment. As a result, their rescue efforts often led to tragic outcomes, including capsized boats (Agnew 2015; Amnesty International 2017).

The reduction in rescue operations did not lead to fewer migrant crossings. Instead, it coincided with a significant increase in deaths at sea (Heller and Pezzani 2016). In April 2015, a particularly severe tragedy occurred in the Sicily Channel. A fishing boat carrying Eritrean migrants sank, resulting in the loss of over 800 lives. This event marked one of the most catastrophic incidents in recent history. On June 22, 2015, the European Union initiated European Union Naval Force in the South-Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med), later named Operation “Sophia” after a baby born during a rescue.

Led by Italy and involving 25 of the 28 EU member states, Operation Sophia was intended as a pivotal change in the EU’s approach to the Mediterranean migration crisis. While Operation Sophia primarily focused on countering human smuggling, its effectiveness in curbing migrant crossings was questionable.Footnote 4 The migration flows to Europe via the Central and Southern Mediterranean routes saw increases of 18% in 2016 and a further 19% in the first half of 2017 (Annoni 2017). This led to further policy shifts and actions, particularly in relation to Libya’s role in the crisis.

Consequently, the situation in the first half of 2017 remained critical. During this time, despite Libya’s political instability, the Italian government, led by the centre-left, initiated a diplomatic move resulting in the signing of a memorandum with Al Sarraj, the President of the Libyan Government of National Accord (Toaldo 2017). The agreement between Italy and Libya involved Italian economic assistance to Libya and Libyan efforts to manage reception and counter irregular immigration, aiming to reduce illegal sea smuggling.

The evolving situation led to a re-evaluation of the role of NGOs in the Mediterranean, culminating in new regulatory measures. In late July 2017, a significant shift occurred in the debate over humanitarian organizations’ role in the Mediterranean.Footnote 5 Then Italian Interior Minister Marco Minniti, with EU support, proposed a “Code of Conduct for NGOs” involved in search and rescue activities. This code, which aimed to regulate NGO operations, sparked controversy for significantly restricting humanitarian ship rescues. The implementation of this protocol, along with other measures by the Italian government, had immediate effects on the situation.

Following the introduction of the NGO Code of Conduct, further developments took place in the Mediterranean, including significant changes by Libyan authorities under the guidance of the EU. In August 2017, under EU encouragement, Libyan authorities expanded their SAR zone to 94 nautical miles off the coast and assumed responsibility for coordinating operations, restricting NGO rescue ships’ access. With support from Italy and the EU, the Libyan Coast Guard increased migrant interceptions. Consequently, the number of migrants landing in Italy decreased.

As these measures were being implemented, a political shift in Italy led to the formation of Giuseppe Conte’s first government, supported by the Five Star Movement and the League party. Matteo Salvini’s appointment as the Minister of the Interior marked a drastic shift in immigration policy. This period saw a considerable revision of the “safe harbour” concept, leading to confusion among operators of merchant and military vessels. The Conte government’s approach, notably under Interior Minister Matteo Salvini, extended beyond cooperating with Libyan actors managing smuggling. It involved deterrent actions against a broad range of actors engaged in sea rescues along the Central Mediterranean route, including not only NGOs but also merchant ships, Frontex naval assets, and the Italian Coast Guard, reflecting a more comprehensive and stringent policy stance (Villa 2018).

In the midst of these ongoing challenges, Operation Sophia underwent significant changes, transitioning into Operation “Irini”, which marked a strategic shift in the EU’s approach (Bagnoli 2020). This new operation introduced a new focus, suspending naval forces and relying solely on unmanned aerial vehicles, which were not equipped for sea rescues. In this unusual scenario where the European naval mission operated without ships, the Libyan Coast Guard took over the role of European assets at sea. However, this shift raised concerns, as operations coordinated by the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) in Tripoli often led to migrants being returned to Libya and placed in detention centers, where their rights were reportedly violated. The focus of Operation Sophia, originally on apprehending smugglers and saving lives, became secondary even during its tenure and was entirely overshadowed in Operation Irini.

Although expectations were high for a shift in migration policies following the formation of the Conte II government in late August 2019, with the Five Star Movement, the Democratic Party, and minor left-wing parties at the helm, the administration persisted with the previous government’s stance. This consistency was highlighted through the renewal of the memorandum of understanding with Libya in early November 2019. Under the broad coalition government led by Mario Draghi (2021–2022), the approach to migration and Libya remained largely unchanged. While not overtly reaffirming the agreement with Libya, the Draghi government offered “aid and support” to the nation. This assistance was provided despite persistent concerns regarding migrant smuggling, detention centers, and the violence many face in Libya, underscoring a gap between policy intentions and the actual situation on the ground.

With the conclusion of Draghi’s tenure and the rise of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government, a distinct shift was observed, especially in the approach towards migrant landings. In the early months of 2023, Meloni’s government, bolstered by its electoral mandate, enacted several measures that further reinforced the pushback policy against irregular migration. In January 2023, the Italian government issued the “Anti-NGO” decree, which sparked significant concerns among jurists, humanitarian organizations, and even the United Nations. Championed by the League party, known for its controversial Salvini decrees during the first Conte government, this decree imposed stringent restrictions on the rescue activities of NGOs in the Mediterranean.

Shortly after the Anti-NGO decree and the three-year renewal of the Italy-Libya memorandum, aimed at continuing and strengthening sea pushbacks, a devastating shipwreck occurred off the Calabrian coast near Cutro. This tragic incident, which resulted in the loss of over 90 lives including 35 minors, underscored the grave risks involved in these perilous journeys. In response to this and similar incidents, the Meloni government enacted another decree addressing immigration. This new legislation introduced stricter penalties for those identified as smugglers, particularly boat drivers. It also established a new crime of “death or injury resulting from illegal immigration”, expedited the enforcement of deportation orders, and reduced the scope of special protection, including the residence permit for humanitarian reasons introduced in 2020. Through these measures, the legislative response aimed to further tighten Italy’s approach to handling irregular migration.

Following the Cutro shipwreck in February, there was a slowdown in the maritime route from Turkey. Conversely, the situation entirely collapsed in Tunisia, along the Central Mediterranean route, where, due to political instability, the coasts emerged as the primary departure point for Sub-Saharan migratory flows, notably for Tunisian citizens endeavouring to escape the severe economic crisis engulfing the nation.

On July 16, the European Union, encouraged by Italy, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Tunisia to address the ongoing migration issues. This agreement aimed to enhance cooperation between the EU and Tunisia in various areas, starting with migration management. The memorandum between the EU and Tunisia was formalised during a visit to Tunis by leaders including Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. The EU-Tunisia agreement, involving over a billion euros, focused on Tunisia’s financial stability and reform. However, its core aim was to control migration flows, continuing a trend of financial aid in return for reducing migrant smuggling.

The allocation of EU funds to Tunisia required integrating them into specific projects, a process that demanded time and clear usage guidelines. Tunisian President Kais Saied, however, preferred these funds to be transferred unconditionally to the national budget. As a result, President Saied rejected the funds, calling them “alms”, and accused the EU of not honoring the memorandum of understanding. This failure to implement the agreements from the Tunis pact led to a significant increase in migrant arrivals. Within two months following the signing of the agreement, approximately 31,000 arrivals were recorded from the coasts of Tunisia.

In the wake of the ineffective EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding, the Italian government under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni adopted a new strategy in November 2023. Meloni signed a contentious agreement with Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama to establish migrant facilities in Albania, specifically in Sheng**. This unprecedented agreement, considered controversial and later suspended by the Albanian Constitutional Court, marks the first instance of a non-EU country agreeing to host migrants on behalf of an EU member stateFootnote 6. This shift towards externalizing migration management reflects a broader trend in Italy’s evolving approach to handling the migration crisis since 2017.

In conclusion, Italy’s strategy for managing Mediterranean migration has envisaged three primary directives. Firstly, the approach involved efforts to pre-empt migrant departures by establishing agreements with North African governments and, more recently, externalizing migration management to Albania. This included the establishment of migrant facilities in Albania as part of a broader trend towards collaboration with non-EU countries. Secondly, it aimed at impeding migrant arrivals by imposing restrictions on the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) involved in rescue operations. Thirdly, the strategy included enhancing the penalties imposed on individuals and networks involved in migrant smuggling. Building on this foundation, the next section of our study delves into the impact of these strategies on the illegal organization of migrant landings, examining how these measures have reshaped the dynamics of smuggling networks and affected the routes, methods, and risks associated with migrant journeys.

The consequences of new restrictive policies on migrant smuggling

Despite the critical importance of this topic, the scholarly exploration into the illegal organization of migrant landings remains surprisingly limited (Di Nicola and Musumeci 2015). Many of these foundational studies date back to the early 2000s, a period that precedes transformative global events such as the Arab Spring (2011) and the refugee crisis (2015), events that Micallef (2017) identifies as significantly altering the methods employed by smugglers. This historical context sets the stage for a critical examination of prevailing narratives about migrant smuggling.Footnote 7

In stark contrast to widespread media narratives that depict migrant smuggling as dominated by large, monolithic criminal organizations, recent empirical investigations present a markedly different picture. Arcarons and Sánchez-Montijano (2018) challenge this portrayal, arguing for a lack of solid evidence to support such claims. Instead, emerging research points to a landscape where smuggling services across the Mediterranean are characterised by a decentralised and flexible nature. Ambrosini (2017) further elucidates that these operations often rely on networks of relationships that do not necessarily fit the traditional mold of criminality.

Supporting this perspective, Lutterbeck’s study (2013) illustrates that migrant smuggling, particularly along the Libyan route, is largely a local enterprise managed by small groups with limited international outreach. Similarly, Massari (2015) also notes that the migration journey from Libya to Italy is managed by a broad network of independent actors, lacking hierarchical coordination. Abdel Aziz et al. (2015) observe significant diversity among those facilitating migrant journeys, ranging from occasional individual operators to well-organised, professional networks.

Micallef (2016), focusing on Libya, finds that the “migrant smuggling industry” consists of diverse actors, not a uniform group. Despite the growth of the business, even sophisticated networks tend to operate as temporary “coalitions” rather than as structured “pyramids” with strict hierarchies. In these networks, the roles of individual actors are small yet vital. They hold essential local knowledge that is challenging to manage on a transnational level (Campana 2018).

Belloni (2015) points out that smugglers’ activities rely on marketing strategies, building their operations on reputation and trust between intermediaries and clients in a context marked by illegality and uncertainty. Expanding on this idea, Di Nicola et al. (2017, 2019) note that the use of new information and communication technologies, particularly social networks, has fostered the growth of informal, fluid, and interconnected networks by facilitating connections between smugglers, migrants, and external service providers.

The spectrum of migrant smuggling is thus far more intricate and dynamic than is commonly understood. Its ability to adapt to significant geopolitical changes, such as the Arab Spring and the 2015 refugee crisis, highlights the networks’ agility.

Given these insights, it becomes particularly relevant to analyse the changes in migrant smuggling before and after Italy adopted securitisation and externalisation for managing migration. By using historical data, previous research, and quotes from interviews, this study seeks to assess how Italian government measures intended to decrease migrant and asylum seeker arrivals have affected smuggling operations in the Mediterranean, from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives. This involves a thorough examination of the changes in smuggling practices in response to intensified border security and the increasing criminalization of migration, with a particular emphasis on how smuggling networks have adapted their routes, operational methods, and technological use to overcome new challenges and maintain their operations.

Moreover, the analysis will evaluate the repercussions of these policies on migrants’ safety and well-being, taking into account the potential for increased risks and vulnerabilities as smuggling operations become more clandestine and routes more perilous.

Building on this understanding, it is essential to examine the tangible outcomes of such policies through available data. A critical starting point is the official figures of migrants landing in Italy. Since 2017, in line with the security-focused shift in migration policies aimed at curtailing the influx of migrants to Italian shores - underscored by contentious agreements like those with Libyan authorities - the observed trends in migrant arrivals offer insights into the practical efficacy of these measures.

An analysis of Italy’s migrant landing statistics (Fig. 1) shows that the ambitious goal to significantly reduce arrivals has been only partially realised. The years 2014 to 2016, preceding the implementation of stricter security measures, recorded an average annual arrival of about 170,000 migrants, with 2016 marking a historical peak at 181,436 arrivals. This period, characterised by a relatively open border policy and minimal control, coincided with the humanitarian initiative of Operation Sophia, during which smuggling networks were notably active.

Fig. 1
figure 1

Trend of migrant arrivals in Italy from 2014 to 2023. Source: Our analysis based on data from missingmigrants.org

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However, the landscape of migration began to shift markedly following the 2017 agreements with Libya. These agreements led to a noticeable reduction in arrivals, with the years 2018 and 2019 recording the lowest figures in recent times − 23,370 and 11,471 arrivals, respectively. Yet, this trend did not hold. From 2020 onwards, a gradual increase in arrivals was noted, despite the global disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The figures climbed to 67,040 in 2021 and 105,140 in 2022, signaling a reversal of the downward trend.

The role of departure points became increasingly prominent during this time. In 2021, Libya emerged as the primary departure location, driven by a surge in departures. Meanwhile, the Tunisian coast also experienced a significant uptick in activity, contributing to the pressure on the migration route. The trend continued to intensify into 2022, with arrivals from Libya reaching their highest level since 2017 and those from Tunisia setting recent records.

By 2023, the momentum had not only sustained but also intensified, with the total number of migrants reaching over 155,000, a dramatic 50% increase from the previous year. This significant increase in arrivals from Tunisia, accounting for 62% of the total and marking the highest proportion since 2016, alongside the 38% originating from Libya, underscores the adaptability and resilience of smuggling networks in the face of stringent security measures.

This trend not only reflects the smuggling networks’ capacity to navigate and exploit changing migration control landscapes but also echoes the persistent underlying factors driving migration - ongoing conflicts, political instability, and economic disparities.

Predominantly, these journeys navigate the Central Mediterranean route, funneling migrants towards Italy and, to a lesser extent, Malta. Recent years, however, have witnessed a marked increase in the utilization of the Eastern Mediterranean route, signaling a diversification in migratory paths. This shift has led to a renewed swell in migration currents. Specifically, Calabria received 18,000 arrivals in 2022 alone, accounting for 15% of Italy’s total landings for the year and nearly doubling the previous year’s figures. Expanding the scope to a broader context, the latest Frontex report highlights a dramatic 108% surge in migration via the Turkish route compared to 2021, with 42,831 immigrants reaching European shores, half of whom landed in Italy. This rate of increase significantly outpaces that of the Central Mediterranean route, which itself experienced a substantial 51% rise, totaling 102,529 individuals.

The notable acceleration in migration rates, especially from Tunisia, has brought new focus to the departure points along its coast, particularly between Kelibia and Al Huwariyah, and around Sfax and Monastir. The proximity of these areas to Italy, with a distance of approximately 90 nautical miles (about 145 km), positions them as strategic launch sites for the perilous journey to Europe. This uptick in departures from Tunisia reflects a complex interplay of factors, including economic strain, political instability within the country, and increased security measures on more traditionally used routes. Consequently, these coastal towns in Tunisia have evolved into significant nodes within the broader migration network.

This situation sets the stage for an analysis of Italy’s legislative response to the smuggling phenomenon. As prior observed, Italian governments have enacted measures over the years aimed at further stiffening penalties against those presumed to be the boatmen. However, this legislative intervention has not been matched by a tightening of the coast guard’s anti-smuggling operations. Arrest statistics from 2023 starkly illustrate this mismatch. The number of boatmen arrested not only falls short in absolute terms compared to previous years but also shows an even more significant decrease when considered relative to the number of arrivals (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2
figure 2

Number of smugglers arrested in Italy between 2012 and 2023. Source: Our analysis based on data from arci porco rosso and alarm phone

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The arrest statistics for 2023 illustrate this gap vividly: while approximately 157,000 individuals reached Italy by sea, the rate of smuggler arrests was significantly low, with only one arrest for every 900 arrivals - a stark contrast to the higher criminalization rate observed in the previous two years. In 2021 and 2022, the rate of criminalization was twice that (1 for every 400 arrivals), and in earlier years, it was even lower.

This discrepancy raises concerns about the effectiveness of Italy’s anti-smuggling strategies and points to a broader issue within the migration management framework. An interviewee highlighted that many of those arrested are merely ‘small cogs’ in a vast and intricate network, suggesting the need for a more nuanced approach to addressing the root causes of smuggling beyond the mere arrest of individual boatmen (“to understand the cause of the exponential increase, we need to go beyond the arrest of individual smugglers” - Interview n. 10). The focus on penalizing smugglers also inadvertently impacts migrants, who face increased risks as smuggling operations become more covert and the journeys more dangerous.

Transitioning to insights from the “From Sea to Prison” report (ARCI Porco Rosso and Alarm Phone 2021), it’s clear that these legislative measures have negatively impacted the dynamics of migrant smuggling. The threat of legal repercussions has deterred the most capable migrants from taking on the role of captain, unintentionally forcing less experienced individuals into these dangerous roles. This lack of skilled and willing captains has also led to some being forcefully compelled to navigate the vessels, occasionally under threat of violence (Interview n. 7).

To prevent identification, these captains might undertake hazardous maneuvers that endanger the migrants. For instance, along the Adriatic route, where sailing boats are commonly utilized, passengers are concealed below deck both to minimize the risk of capsizing and to mask the vessel as a luxury yacht from aerial observation. Such practices can result in dire situations, including asphyxiation. Additionally, captains often distance themselves from the engine to avoid being recognized as smugglers. This behavior can lead to confusion and increase the risk of capsizing, particularly during crucial moments of the voyage when the danger of shipwreck peaks.

During rescue operations, the emphasis frequently shifts towards identifying the smuggler rather than prioritizing immediate concerns such as the health of migrants, identifying deceased individuals, or reuniting families. The criminalization of piloting the vessel intensifies these tragedies, as it places undue focus on the legal culpability of those steering the boat, rather than on their responsibilities and the urgent needs of those on board.Footnote 8

Recent changes in the organization of maritime crossings in the Central Mediterranean indicate a significant shift in migration patterns. There’s been a marked decrease in traditional, large-scale landings, happening against a backdrop of political discourse increasingly advocating for closed ports. This has led to an increase in autonomous landings, where migrants make their way to shore without the direct involvement of organized smuggling operations (Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica 2022).

The increase in independent landings is linked to the Italian government’s restrictive actions starting in 2017, which limited the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the coast guard in the area. This major shift in policy has led to a widespread non-assistance approach, which, unfortunately, has become the norm in the Central Mediterranean waters.

Migrants, confronted with dire situations, often find their distress calls, whether made directly to maritime authorities or through emergency communication services like Alarm Phone, routinely ignored. As a direct result of these government policies, migrants are increasingly forced to embark on the dangerous voyage to European shores by themselves.

The push for migrants to reach safety on their own is also driven by the aim to avoid detention in Administrative Detention Centers (CPR), where individuals awaiting deportation are held after receiving expulsion orders.

In contrast to past observations on the Libyan route (Micallef 2017), where large boats carried hundreds of migrants, smugglers now mainly use small-sized boats. These dinghies, essentially disposable, are mass-produced to navigate the short distance from Tunisian shores to the island of Lampedusa and the Sicilian coast.

These dinghies, constructed from thin sheet metal, have the advantage of being small enough to evade quick detection by coastal guard radars. They benefit from the camouflage offered by the large number of fishing boats in the waters between Sicily, its smaller islands, and the African coast (Licastro 2018, 2022; Mengoni 2019).

However, these iron boats feature a lower hull compared to other small vessels, making them more vulnerable to waves. As one interviewee noted, “Even in calm seas, they begin to sway and fill with water, which then adds extra weight to the hull” (Interview n. 6). The construction of these boats is basic, with iron plates welded together, contributing to their instability.

The combined weight of the water and passengers puts significant stress on the boat’s joints. When these joints fail or the boat becomes overly filled with water, it sinks almost instantly due to its metal construction, tragically taking its passengers down with it. Reflecting on their perilous nature, the deputy prosecutor of Agrigento, Salvatore Vella, has aptly described these vessels as “floating coffins”.

Recently, this method of arrival has become predominant. The political and economic turmoil in Tunisia, along with a subsequent decrease in surveillance by the Tunisian Coast Guard, has greatly increased the need for transportation to Italy. This demand comes from both Tunisian nationals and Sub-Saharan migrants who are passing through Tunisia from neighboring Libya and other African countries.

This situation has prompted smugglers to flood the sea with these small boats. Frequently, migrants set out on the risky crossing of the Sicilian Channel in these small vessels, measuring 5 to 6 m in length. Additionally, there’s credible evidence of “mother ships” that transport migrants close to territorial waters, after which they are moved in groups to smaller boats with limited propulsion systems. These boats then complete the journey’s final stretch under the cover of darkness.

Since becoming widely used in 2017, these boats have caused an increasing number of incidents, reaching a peak of 237 incidents in 2023. “There is no doubt that the primary cause of all these shipwrecks is the extreme fragility of the boats used by smugglers to pack in migrants. These six or seven-meter metal boats have joints that fail after just a few hours and are unable to support the weight of the passengers on board” (Interview n. 6).

The statistics available confirm this bleak picture, indicating a steady rise in the number of incidents in recent years (Fig. 3). However, these numbers are estimations, as many shipwrecks remain “unseen” - either as abandoned vessels or remains of boats not accounted for in the International Organization for Migration (IOM) records. Thus, the true scale of these tragedies is likely far larger than what is reported.

Fig. 3
figure 3

Number of sea incident along the central route from 2014 to 2023. Source: Our analysis based on data from missingmigrants.org

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Moreover, in line with the trends mentioned earlier, it’s important to note the significant decrease in the average number of passengers on boats involved in incidents (Fig. 4) compared to the period before enhanced security measures. While boats used to carry an average of over 130 migrants, this number has fallen to just over 30 passengers per vessel in recent years.

Fig. 4
figure 4

Average number of migrants on boats involved in incident from 2014 to 2023. Source: Our analysis based on data from missingmigrants.org

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This significant reduction emphasizes the change in smugglers’ operational tactics, adapting to heightened maritime patrolling and interception by using smaller boats designed to avoid detection with fewer migrants on board. However, this strategic shift has not led to safer journeys.

Supporting the earlier points, an analysis of the statistics on deaths and missing persons at sea (Fig. 5) is illuminating. The Central Mediterranean route continues to be the most perilous. In 2023, nearly 2,500 individuals died, with the vast majority (2,271) falling victim to incidents and shipwrecks in the Sicilian Channel (IOM data), a number alarmingly similar to that of 2017, following years where a decrease in fatalities was noted. The increase in deaths is partly due to government actions that have obstructed sea rescues by NGOs.

Fig. 5
figure 5

Number of deaths and missing Migrants along the Central Mediterranean Route (2014-2023). Source: Our analysis based on data from missingmigrants.org

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The Cutro decree effectively sidelined humanitarian ships from the Search and Rescue (SAR) zone for months by mandating that NGOs exit the Mediterranean following each rescue mission and directing them to ports far from central and northern Italy, as designated by the Ministry of the Interior for disembarkation. This policy led to a significant gap in rescue services within the Mediterranean, even when military assets were unavailable to respond to numerous distress calls.

Moreover, a major factor contributing to the rise in fatalities, especially on routes from Tunisia to Lampedusa, is the surge in the use of makeshift tin boats. This trend signifies a move towards low-cost migration, with these so-called metal coffins being produced in succession. Within this scenario, one interviewee observed, “The increase in deaths at sea in this area directly results from using iron boats with low-quality welds that leak” (Interview n. 5).

Conclusions

Our thorough analysis of the impact of Italian migration control policies on migrant smuggling in the Mediterranean reveals a nuanced and evolving situation that cannot be oversimplified. The results show that smuggling networks are adaptable and resilient, even against strict migration controls. Despite Italy’s attempts to reduce irregular migration through enhanced security, external agreements, and stricter laws, the goals of lowering migrant arrivals and breaking up smuggling rings have only been partially achieved.

In fact, the flow of migrants initially decreased but in recent years has returned to the peak levels of 2014–2015. Our research, including empirical data and interviews, shows that recent restrictive policies have altered how smuggling operations work. Smugglers have adapted to the measures of the EU and the Italian government by changing routes, using smaller and riskier boats, and embracing new technologies to avoid detection. This flexibility highlights their ability to counter enforcement measures, indicating that attempts to stop smuggling without tackling its underlying causes will probably have limited effectiveness.

Far more serious and concerning has been the impact of these policies on migrants. Measures aimed at hindering NGO activities, toughening penalties against smugglers, and the policy of destroying vessels by the coast guard, in particular, have led traffickers to flood the market with increasingly cheaper and more precarious boats. The growing use of unseaworthy boats and the resulting rise in accidents and deaths highlight the increased dangers and vulnerabilities migrants encounter.

The reliance on “floating coffins” and the move to more perilous and concealed methods of crossing the Mediterranean, however, have not deterred migration.

Instead, they have intensified the risks, leading to devastating consequences. The statistics on migrant arrivals, sea incidents, and fatalities paint a bleak picture: the central Mediterranean route is still the most dangerous, and the death toll is worryingly near the high levels seen in past years. This situation shows the ongoing demand for migration, fueled by conflicts, economic differences, and political unrest in the region. The rise in migrants coming from Tunisia especially points to shifts in departure locations and underscores the importance of recognizing regional differences in migration trends.

The Italian government’s legal and operational efforts to stop smuggling have unintentionally increased the dangers for migrants. Criminalizing smuggling and targeting boat operators haven’t dismantled the networks. Instead, these strategies have driven operations underground, making journeys riskier and rescue missions harder. The disparity between smuggler arrests and the volume of arrivals highlights the shortcomings of present anti-smuggling tactics and underlines the need to rethink migration management strategies.

The strategy of the Italian government has been criticised for possibly breaching international laws and human rights standards. Its growing dependence on agreements with non-EU countries like Libya, Tunisia, and Albania for managing migration has ignited discussions about the ethics of outsourcing border control and asylum processing.

Additionally, actions taken against NGOs engaged in rescue operations have sparked controversy, as they are viewed by some as obstructing humanitarian efforts to save lives at sea. Essentially, although Italy’s strategy since 2017 has been complex and has developed over time, its main emphasis on security and criminalizing migration has led to unintended and frequently counterproductive results.

Given these findings, it’s crucial to recognize the limitations of an approach focused solely on enforcement to tackle migrant smuggling. A more comprehensive strategy that addresses the root causes of migration, improves legal avenues for migration, and promotes cooperation with countries of origin and transit is vital.

This strategy should prioritize the safety and rights of migrants and effectively combat the criminal networks exploiting their vulnerabilities. The issue is undoubtedly complex and lacks simple solutions. Although it’s not a central topic in political discussions, the European Union could allocate more resources to development initiatives in the countries of origin of migrants. This would help tackle the socio-economic factors that drive migration.

The EU could promote the creation of legal and secure migration routes, decreasing dependence on smugglers. These routes might include refugee resettlement programs, temporary work visas, and study permits. Moreover, improving global cooperation on migration is crucial, involving countries of origin, transit nations, international organizations, and NGOs. This joint effort would guarantee the protection of migrants’ rights throughout their entire journey. It’s also essential to pursue reforms of the current asylum system in Europe, especially the Dublin Regulation, which unfairly burdens countries of first entry.

To achieve these goals, migration policies must recognize immigration as a structural phenomenon, not a temporary crisis, prioritizing the lives and dignity of individuals. Only by acknowledging this can we tackle the cycle of violence and inhumanity linked to current immigration issues.

Nonetheless, the migrant agreement signed last June by the Interior Ministers of the 27 EU member states, praised as “historic” and “revolutionary” by political leaders, actually worsens the situation for those trying to enter Europe. This pact introduces stricter, more militarised border controls and sets an annual quota for relocating migrants among member states, based on each country’s population and GDP. However, it also allows governments to choose whether to accept or decline these relocations. Essentially, migrant relocations within the European Union will stay voluntary, despite Italy’s push for mandatory relocations, which Hungary and Poland oppose.

Additionally, a reciprocal deal allows Italy the right to send individuals back to the last non-European country they passed through, assuming it’s considered safe. This move significantly challenges the core of the European asylum system and risks violating the Geneva Convention’s key principle of non-refoulement.

In conclusion, this study aimed to contribute to academic and policy debates on migration management. By examining the effects of restrictive migration policies, our analysis highlighted the intricate relationship between enforcement actions, the rights of migrants, and the deep-seated causes of migration. We recognize the complexity of migration dynamics yet underscore the necessity of adopting strategies that honor human dignity and comply with international standards (Carrera et al. 2018). Undertaking this task demands an appreciation of the broader context in which these policies are implemented and the diverse challenges both migrants and policymakers face.

As Europe and the global community persist in addressing these challenges, it is our aspiration that the insights derived from our study will inform the formulation of migration policies that are both efficacious and humane. Our advocacy for policies that tackle both the symptoms and underlying causes of migration is motivated by a recognition that the rights and welfare of migrants should be paramount in policy deliberations. By disseminating our findings, we aim to stimulate a discourse that advances towards the establishment of policies capable of comprehensively addressing migration challenges, all the while preserving the fundamental dignity of all individuals involved.