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Bargaining power and firm profits in asymmetric duopoly: an inverted-U relationship

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Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of bargaining power on downstream firms’ profits. Consider a vertically related industry consisting of one upstream and two downstream firms, the latter having different marginal costs. Each pair bargains over a linear wholesale price, and then the downstream firms engage in Cournot competition. We show that the inefficient downstream firm may benefit from an increase in the bargaining power of the upstream firm. Furthermore, we obtain similar results when each downstream firm trades with its exclusive upstream agent, under non-linear demand function, or when downstream firms compete in price.

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Notes

  1. Cai and Li (2014) consider how political interaction between policymakers and domestic and foreign firms endogenously determines tariff rates.

  2. Matsushima (2015) presents numerous real-world cases where buyers encourage suppliers to organize collective associations to negotiate with them although this would weaken the buyers’ bargaining power.

  3. Grennan (2013) uses a bilateral Nash Bargaining to empirically analyze bargaining and price discrimination in the medical device market.

  4. In the context of unionized oligopoly, we consider a situation where a union charges different wage rates for different firms as in Mukherjee (2008), and Haucap and Wey (2004).

  5. In contrast, Bonnet and Dubois (2010) find that manufacturers use two-part tariff contracts with resale price maintenance in the bottled water retail market in France. Villas-Boas (2007) also obtains results consistent with non-linear pricing by manufacturers or high bargaining power of retailers in the yogurt market in the US.

  6. Christou and Papadopoulos (2015), in contrast, show that by correcting for payoffs and outside options in Chen (2003), the profit of the dominant retailer never decreases with buyer power. Matsushima and Yoshida (2016) find that the profit of the dominant retailer may decrease with buyer power when the dominant retailer works as sales promoter.

  7. Dertwinkel-Kalt et al. (2015) consider a vertically related market with downstream firms that have different input efficiencies, and they find that a higher input price benefits a subset of relatively efficient downstream firms.

  8. In management, Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003) investigate bargaining over the terms of trade between manufacturers and retailers in distribution channels. They find that when the manufacturer’s bargaining power goes from its lower to upper limit, the manufacturer’s profit first increases and subsequently decreases. Matsushima (2015) considers a Hotelling duopoly model with buyer-supplier negotiations and product positioning choices of downstream firms, and finds that a downstream firm’s profit is not always improved if it strengthens its bargaining power with its exclusive supplier.

  9. Recent studies (e.g., Fanti 2016; Vetter 2017) also examine this structure without bargaining.

  10. Following Horn and Wolinsky’s (1988b) interpretation, this setting can be viewed as a situation in which the workers join forces for the purpose of bargaining. That is, suppose for example that one of the workers is authorized to represent both. When the labor market is not completely flexible (e.g., Japan), or workers must incur high switching costs, it is difficult for the low wage firm’s worker to move to the high wage firm.

  11. We provide a numerical example of a non-linear demand function when the upstream market consists of exclusive suppliers in the next section.

  12. We discuss implications of when disagreement profits come from the monopoly profit of the other downstream firms in the Sect. 5.

  13. Matsumura and Yamagishi (2017) find that incumbents can have incentive to strengthen regulations, which affect the cost of all firms equally, depending on the demand condition.

  14. This is also true when there are two upstream agents in the next section.

  15. This assumption is not essential because the results are qualitatively the same if we consider the case where downstream firms do not incur any costs expect input prices, while each upstream firm faces a constant marginal cost of production.

  16. Fanti (2016) analyzes the effects of two-sided cross-ownership structures in a Cournot duopoly with firm-specific unions, and shows that an increase in the degree of two-sided cross-ownership reduces wage, which implies that cross-ownership and bargaining power have a similar effect on wage.

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Acknowledgements

I am especially grateful to Noriaki Matsushima for his valuable advice. I would also like to thank Koki Arai, Keisuke Hattori, Arijit Mukherjee, and the participants of the Japanese Economic Association Conference (Nagoya University) and the seminar participants at Shinshu University for their very useful comments. The author acknowledges the financial support from Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Fellows, Grant Number 16J02442. All remaining errors are my own.

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Correspondence to Shohei Yoshida.

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Appendix: Proofs

Appendix: Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1

Differentiating \(w_1^{*}\) with respect to \(\theta \), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d w_1^{*}}{d \theta }=\frac{(4+\theta ^2)(a-z_1)+4\theta (a-z_2)+(2-\theta )^2(z_2-z_1)}{(4-\theta ^2)^2}>0. \end{aligned}$$
(29)

Differentiating \(w_2^{*}\) with respect to \(\theta \), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d w_2^{*}}{d \theta }&=\frac{(4+\theta ^2)[(2+\theta )a-(4-\theta )z_2+2(1-\theta )z_1]+\theta (4-\theta ^2)(a+z_2-2z_1)}{2(4-\theta ^2)^2}\nonumber \\&>0. \end{aligned}$$
(30)

Similarly, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d w_1^{*}}{d \theta }-\frac{d w_2^{*}}{d \theta }=\frac{3(z_2-z_1)}{(2+\theta )^2}>0, \end{aligned}$$
(31)

which proves the lemma. \(\square \)

Proof of Proposition 1

Differentiating \(q_1^{*}\) with respect to \(\theta \), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d q_1^{*}}{d \theta }=-\frac{(4+\theta ^2)(a-z_1)+4\theta (a-z_2)+4(2-\theta )^2(z_2-z_1)]}{3 (4-\theta ^2)^2}<0. \end{aligned}$$
(32)

Similarly, differentiating \(q_2^{*}\) with respect to \(\theta \), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d q_2^{*}}{d \theta }=\frac{-(2+\theta )^2a-4(4-5\theta + \theta ^2) z_1+ (20-16\theta +5\theta ^2) z_2}{3 (4-\theta ^2)^2}. \end{aligned}$$
(33)

This expression is positive if and only if

$$\begin{aligned} z_2>\frac{(2+\theta )^2a+4(4-5\theta + \theta ^2) z_1}{20-16\theta +5\theta ^2}. \end{aligned}$$
(34)

We now show that the interval between this lower bound and the upper bound of the interior solution condition is nonempty. Comparing these two values, we have

$$\begin{aligned}&\frac{(2+\theta )(4-3\theta )a+(8-8\theta +3\theta ^2)z_1}{2(8-5\theta )}-\frac{(2+\theta )^2a+4(4-5\theta + \theta ^2) z_1}{20-16\theta +5\theta ^2} \nonumber \\&\quad =\frac{3(2-\theta )(2+\theta )(8-16\theta +5\theta ^2)(a-z_1)}{2(8-5\theta )(20-16\theta +5\theta ^2)}>0, \nonumber \\&\quad \Leftrightarrow \theta <\frac{2}{5}(4-\sqrt{6}) \approx 0.62, \end{aligned}$$
(35)

which gives the condition for Proposition 1. This completes the proof of the proposition. \(\square \)

Proof of Proposition 2

Differentiating \(Q^{*}\) with respect to \(\theta \), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d Q^{*}}{d \theta }=-\frac{2a-z_1-z_2}{3(2-\theta )^2}<0. \end{aligned}$$
(36)

Similarly, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d \left( \pi _{D1}^{*}+\pi _{D2}^{*}\right) }{d \theta }= & {} \left[ \frac{d p^{*}}{d \theta }-\frac{d w_1^{*}}{d \theta }\right] q_1^{*}+(p^{*}-c_1)\frac{d q_1^{*}}{d \theta }+\left[ \frac{d p^{*}}{d \theta }-\frac{d w_2^{*}}{d \theta }\right] q_2^{*} \nonumber \\&+\,(p^{*}-c_2)\frac{d q_2^{*}}{d \theta } \end{aligned}$$
(37)
$$\begin{aligned}= & {} \frac{d q_1^{*}}{d \theta }q_1^{*}+(p^{*}-c_1)\frac{d q_1^{*}}{d \theta }+\frac{d q_2^{*}}{d \theta }q_2^{*}+(p^{*}-c_2)\frac{d q_2^{*}}{d \theta } \end{aligned}$$
(38)
$$\begin{aligned}= & {} \frac{d q_1^{*}}{d \theta }\left( p^{*}-c_1+q_1^{*}\right) +\frac{d q_2^{*}}{d \theta }\left( p^{*}-c_2+q_2^{*}\right) . \end{aligned}$$
(39)

Note that \(p^{*}-c_1+q_1^{*}>p^{*}-c_2+q_2^{*}>0\). Since \(\left| \frac{d q_1^{*}}{d \theta }\right| >\frac{d q_2^{*}}{d \theta }\), the sign of Eq. (39) becomes negative. \(\square \)

Proof of Lemma 2

Differentiating \(w_i^{**}\) with respect to \(\theta \), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d w_i^{**}}{d \theta }=\frac{[4(a-2z_i+z_j)+\theta (a-2z_j+z_i)](16+\theta ^2)}{(16-\theta ^2)^2}>0, \quad i\ne j. \end{aligned}$$
(40)

Similarly, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d w_1^{**}}{d \theta }-\frac{d w_2^{**}}{d \theta }=\frac{12(z_2-z_1)}{(4+\theta )^2}>0, \end{aligned}$$
(41)

which proves the lemma. \(\square \)

Proof of Proposition 3

Differentiating \(q_1^{**}\) with respect to \(\theta \), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d q_1^{**}}{d \theta }=-\frac{4 \left[ (4+\theta )^2a-(80-32\theta +5 \theta ^2) z_1+4 (16-10 \theta +\theta ^2) z_2\right] }{3 (16-\theta ^2)^2}. \end{aligned}$$
(42)

The numerator of the expression can be written as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} 4\left[ (16+\theta ^2)(a-z_1)+8\theta (a-z_2)+(64-32\theta +4\theta ^2)(z_2-z_1)\right] >0, \end{aligned}$$
(43)

which proves the first part of the proposition.

Similarly, differentiating \(q_2^{**}\) with respect to \(\theta \), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d q_2^{**}}{d \theta }=-\frac{4 \left[ (4+\theta )^2a-(80-32\theta +5 \theta ^2) z_2+4 (16-10 \theta +\theta ^2) z_1\right] }{3 (16-\theta ^2)^2}. \end{aligned}$$
(44)

This expression is positive if and only if

$$\begin{aligned} z_2>\frac{(4+\theta )^2a+4 (16-10 \theta +\theta ^2) z_1}{80-32\theta +5 \theta ^2}. \end{aligned}$$
(45)

We now show that the interval between this lower bound and the upper bound of the interior solution condition is nonempty.

$$\begin{aligned}&\frac{(4+\theta )a+2(2-\theta )z_1}{8-\theta }-\frac{(4+\theta )^2a+4 (16-10 \theta +\theta ^2) z_1}{80-32\theta +5 \theta ^2} \nonumber \\&\quad =\frac{6(32-16\theta -2\theta ^2+\theta ^3)(a-z_1)}{(8-\theta )(80-32\theta +5 \theta ^2)}>0. \end{aligned}$$
(46)

This completes the proof of the proposition. \(\square \)

Proof of Lemma 3

Differentiating \(w_1^{B}\) with respect to \(\theta \), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d w_i^{B}}{d \theta }&=\frac{2[(2-\gamma ^2)A_i+\theta \gamma A_j][4(2-\gamma ^2)^2-\theta ^2 \gamma ^2]+2\theta ^2 \gamma [2(2-\gamma ^2)A_i+\theta \gamma A_j]}{[4(2-\gamma ^2)^2-\theta ^2 \gamma ^2]^2}\nonumber \\&>0. \end{aligned}$$
(47)

Similarly, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d w_1^{B}}{d \theta }-\frac{d w_2^{B}}{d \theta }=\frac{2(1+\gamma )(2-\gamma )(2-\theta \gamma -\gamma ^2)(z_2-z_1)}{[4(2-\gamma ^2)^2-\theta ^2 \gamma ^2]^2}>0, \end{aligned}$$
(48)

which proves the lemma. \(\square \)

Proof of Proposition 4

Differentiating \(q_1^{B}\) with respect to \(\theta \), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d q_1^{B}}{d \theta }= & {} \frac{1}{(1-\gamma ^2)(4-\gamma ^2)} \left[ -(2-\gamma ^2)\frac{d w_1^{B}}{d \theta } +\gamma \frac{d w_2^{B}}{d \theta } \right] \end{aligned}$$
(49)
$$\begin{aligned}&<\frac{1}{(1-\gamma ^2)(4-\gamma ^2)} \left[ -(2-\gamma ^2)\frac{d w_1^{B}}{d \theta } +\gamma \frac{d w_1^{B}}{d \theta } \right] \end{aligned}$$
(50)
$$\begin{aligned}= & {} \frac{1}{(1-\gamma ^2)(4-\gamma ^2)} \left[ -(1-\gamma )(2+\gamma ) \frac{d w_1^{B}}{d \theta }\right] <0. \end{aligned}$$
(51)

Note that we used Lemma 3 to get the inequality on the second line.

We can relatively easy derive the sufficient condition for the result. Applying the mean-value theorem, for some \(\hat{\theta }\in (0,1)\), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{q_2^{B}(1)-q_2^{B}(0)}{1-0}=\frac{d q_2^{B}(\hat{\theta })}{d \theta }. \end{aligned}$$
(52)

The condition that the left-hand side of the above expression is positive is

$$\begin{aligned} q_2^{B}(1)-q_2^{B}(0)>0 \Leftrightarrow \alpha <\frac{(3-\gamma ^2)(4-3\gamma ^2)\gamma z_1-2(2-\gamma ^2)^3 z_2}{(2-\gamma -\gamma ^2)^2(4+\gamma -2\gamma ^2)}. \end{aligned}$$
(53)

We can confirm that the interval between the above threshold value of \(\alpha \) and that of the interior solution condition is nonempty. That is,

$$\begin{aligned}&\frac{(3-\gamma ^2)(4-3\gamma ^2)\gamma z_1-2(2-\gamma ^2)^3 z_2}{(2-\gamma -\gamma ^2)^2(4+\gamma -2\gamma ^2)} \nonumber \\&\qquad -\,\frac{[8+2\gamma ^4-(8+\theta )\gamma ^2]z_2-(2-\theta )(2-\gamma ^2)\gamma z_1}{(2-\gamma -\gamma ^2)(4+\theta \gamma -2\gamma ^2)} \nonumber \\&\quad = \frac{(z_2-z_1)\gamma (2+\gamma -\gamma ^2)[2(1+\theta )(4-\gamma ^2)(1-\gamma ^2)+(2+\theta )\gamma ^2]}{(2-\gamma -\gamma ^2)^2(4+\gamma -2\gamma ^2)(4+\theta \gamma -2\gamma ^2)}>0.\nonumber \\ \end{aligned}$$
(54)

\(\square \)

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Yoshida, S. Bargaining power and firm profits in asymmetric duopoly: an inverted-U relationship. J Econ 124, 139–158 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0563-3

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