On Differentiated and Indivisible Commodities: An Expository Re-framing of Mas-Colell’s 1975 Model

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Advances in Mathematical Economics Volume 20

Part of the book series: Advances in Mathematical Economics ((MATHECON,volume 20))

Abstract

With a pure exchange economy and its Walrasian equilibrium formalized as a distribution on the space of consumer characteristics, Mas-Colell (J Math Econ 2:263–296, 1975) showed the existence of equilibrium in a pure exchange economy with differentiated and indivisible commodities. We present a variant of Mas-Colell’s theorem; but more than for its own sake, we use it to expose and illustrate recent techniques due to Keisler-Sun (Adv Math 221:1584–1607, 2009), as developed in Khan-Rath-Yu-Zhang (On the equivalence of large individualized and distributionalized games. Johns Hopkins University, mimeo, 2015), to translate a result on a large distributionalized economy (LDE) to a large individualized economy (LIE), when the former can be represented by a saturated or super-atomless measure space of consumers, as formalized in Keisler-Sun (Adv Math 221:1584–1607, 2009) and Podczeck (J Math Econ 44:836–852, 2008) respectively. This also leads us to identify, hitherto unnoticed, open problems concerning symmetrization of distributionalized equilibria of economies in their distributionalized formulations. In relating our result to the antecedent literature, we bring into salience the notions of (i)“overriding desirability of the indivisible commodity,” as in Hicks (A revision of demand theory. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1956), Mas-Colell (J Econ Theory 16:443–456, 1977) and Yamazaki (Econometrica 46:541–555, 1978; Econometrica 49:639–654, 1981), and of (ii) “bounded marginal rates of substitution,” as in Jones (J Math Econ 12:119–138, 1983; Econometrica 52:507–530, 1984) and Ostroy-Zame (Econometrica 62:593–633, 1994). Our work also relies heavily on the technical notion of Gelfand integration.

JEL Classification: D51

This research is supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (No. 15K03362, Suzuki) from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan. This work is part of a joint project on “General Equilibrium Theory with a Saturated Space of Consumers” with Nobusumi Sagara of Hosei University; the authors thank him for all his input in this paper, and express their regret that he did not think it enough to accept co-authorship. A preliminary version was prepared when Khan was visiting the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (SHUFE), and he thanks Haomiao Yu and Yongchao Zhang for stimulating conversation and encouragement. This final version has benefited substantially from an anonymous referee’s emphasis on the need for replacing the assumption of overriding desirability of “every homogeneous commodity” to a single money-like commodity; and the Editor’s insistence that the authors take a stand on reporting the work as a technical note for a narrow specialized readership or as an expository essay for a general audience.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    One may also mention here that Kolm [45, p. 711] writes, “Adding time constraint to budget constraint was done by Jacques Lesourne before rediscovery by Gary Becker, and the resulting cost of time was applied by others to the optimization of public transportation networks.”

  2. 2.

    For this theory, the reader is also referred to a fascinating recent overview in Arrow [1]; also see [34, 35] in addition to the texts mention in the first sentence of this essay.

  3. 3.

    Mas-Colell sights here the work of Dierker, Henry and Broome. This work found subsequent extension in [50] and in [44], building on the work of Yamazaki on non-convex consumption sets, and the papers of Khan-Rashid, and Anderson-Khan-Rashid. Since this work is not relevant to the theorem presented here, we do not burden our bibliography with it, and send the reader to [3, 4].

  4. 4.

    See Chapter V. In Mas-Colell [50], an explicit connection is made to McKenzie’s [55] paper which follows Hicks. Mas-Colell writes, “In particular, we postulate that some commodities are perfectly divisible (for simplicity, just one) and we argue that this hypothesis, besides being reasonable, is a sine qua non; see McKenzie [55].” For the relation between Hicks and McKenzie, see Khan-Schlee [40].

  5. 5.

    As is well-known to workers in the field, this problem does not arise in the spaces \(\ell^{\infty }\) and \(L_{\infty }\), see Bewley [9, 10] and Suzuki [75, 76].

  6. 6.

    As for the erasure of the production sector, it has two consequence for our expository re-visitation of Mas-Colell’s model. First, we are forced to ignore the rich strand of the literature associated with Hotelling [27], Hart, Dixit-Stiglitz and their followers on optimum product diversity under monopolistic competition. Secondly, we are also led to ignore the rich literature on production externalities and the convergence of Nash equilibria to Walrasian equilibria; on this see the work of Hart, Pascoa and others, and including that of Mas-Colell himself; see [17, 51, 53] for the latter. To be sure, subsequent work extended the results to economies with production; see, for example [13, 19, 24, 60, 61, 74] among others.

  7. 7.

    Note that it is the equivalence theorem that already necessitates a continuum; the fact that indivisible commodities potentially disturb the upper hemi-continuity of the individual demand correspondence requires additional assumptions that guarantee the “regularizing effect” of the total demand; see the example in [50] and reproduced in [44] to motivate their results. We return to this issue in Sect. 3.2 below.

  8. 8.

    See Hart-Kohlberg [23] and Hart-Hildenbrand-Kohlberg [22]; also see Hildenbrand’s [26] text.

  9. 9.

    We remind the reader that Jones [30] is concerned with an economy with a finite number of consumers.

  10. 10.

    It is also well known that models with a continuum of consumers and an infinite-dimensional commodity face mathematically formidable problems. These arise from the notorious failure of technical propositions such as Fatou’s lemma or Lyapunov’s theorem. We bypass these problems in the present paper. For the technical details, as well as their resolution, of these problems, we cite [39] and references in them.

  11. 11.

    See Lemma 2.1 in [31], reproduced as Fact 5 in the Appendix below. This technique can be applied to other work; as for example, the papers of Suzuki [7577] which study economies with both indivisible and indivisible commodities in the space \(\ell^{\infty },\) and also with and without production. This work relies on “irreducibility” assumptions on the economy and assumes that the individual endowments are in the interior of the consumption set, and we note that the techniques of this paper will also work in these settings. However, note that we are limiting ourselves to a pure exchange economy, and thereby bracketing consideration of Jones’ [30] theorem on existence of equilibrium for a “private ownership economy” with a finite number of consumers and producers. The reader is also referred to [48] and [61], among others.

  12. 12.

    Thus, in a mathematical appendix below, we collect and copy for the reader’s convenience mathematical results available in easily-accessible but a veritable variety of sources; also see Footnotes 26 and 27 below.

  13. 13.

    The free Abelian group usually appears as a basic concept for the singular homology theory in algebraic topology; see Vick [80], for example.

  14. 14.

    See Precott-Townsend [65, 66]; also Forges et al. [18]. To be sure, this connection pertains only to the randomized choice of commodity bundles; these authors work with the individualized and not the distributionalized formulation of an economy.

  15. 15.

    This terminology, and the question, as well as its resolutions below, is inspired by the recent results of Khan-Rath-Yu-Zhang [38] building on those of Keisler-Sun [31].

  16. 16.

    We eliminate the technical symbolism from Mas-Colell’s text.

  17. 17.

    For an approach to large economies using nonstandard analysis, see Brown-Robinson [11], and the framing of the literature in Anderson [3, 4] and Khan [34, 35].

  18. 18.

    The pioneering papers in these two registers are respectively Radner-Rosenthal [67] and Schmeidler [72]. The reader should also note that the original draft of [57] predates [52].

  19. 19.

    For a comprehensive discussion of the technical difficulties that led Milgrom-Weber to follow the approach they did, see Khan-Rath-Sun-Yu [36]. To be sure, Milgrom-Weber also presented a pure-strategy equilibrium under the hypotheses of finite actions and conditional independence of types, a variants of results presented in Radner-Rosenthal [67].

  20. 20.

    See [41, 42] for this operation.

  21. 21.

    See Footnote 19 for the analogy to the work in [57]. Also see [33] for a disintegration of the joint probability distribution leading, in equilibrium, to a probability measure on the space of actions corresponding to each characteristic.

  22. 22.

    In the context of Milgrom-Weber [57], it is to ask whether the equilibrium distribution on the joint space of actions and types has, its support, the graph of a function from types to actions, an individualized function for each player that dictates that he or she take the same action for each of his or own revealed type, that he or she does not randomize.

  23. 23.

    Actually, this is a generalized version of the dispersedness condition by Yamazaki [82, 83].

  24. 24.

    We have routinely modified Mas-Colell’s prose to fit the continuity of our text. It is also worth mentioning that Mas-Colell credits Walras for this idea.

  25. 25.

    In fact, Jones did not assume that the commodity space was the product of \(\mathbb{R}^{\ell}\) and \(\mathcal{M}(K)\). But for notational consistency between the text, we keep this setting.

  26. 26.

    Lemma 4.2 is especially crucial in this regard. For this emphasis on exposition, also see Footnotes 12 and 27, and the text they footnote, above.

  27. 27.

    This is in kee** with the expository intent of the essay; see Footnotes 12 and 26 and the text they footnote.

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Appendix

Appendix

In this section, we collect some mathematical results for the readers convenience.Footnote 27 The following is easy to see from Diestel and Uhl [16], pp. 53–54.

Fact 1

If \(g: A \rightarrow ca(K)\) is weak* measurable and \(\boldsymbol{q}g(a)\) is integrable function for all \(\boldsymbol{q} \in C(K)\) , then g is Gelfand integrable.

It is easy to prove

Fact 2

Let {g n } be a sequence of Gelfand integrable functions from A to ca(K) which converges a.e. to g in the weak* topology. Then it follows that \(\int _{A}g_{n}(a)d\lambda \rightarrow \int _{A}g(a)d\lambda\) in the weak* topology.

The next fact (Alaoglu’s Theorem, Royden [70, ch. 14]) is well known.

Fact 3

Let K be a compact metric space. The weak* topology of ca(K) is separable and norm bounded subsets of ca(K) are compact and metrizable, in particular, the set of probability measures on K is compact with respect to the weak* topology.

The next fact is also well known (Fatou’s lemma in dimensions, Hildenbrand [26, p. 69]).

Fact 4

Let \((g_{n})_{n\in \mathbb{N}}\) be a sequence of integrable functions of a measure space \((A,\mathcal{A},\lambda )\) to \(\mathbb{R}_{+}^{\ell}\) . Suppose that \(\lim _{n}\int _{A}g_{n}(a)d\lambda\) exists. Then there exists an integrable function \(g: (A,\mathcal{A},\lambda ) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{+}^{\ell}\) such that

  • (a) g(a) ∈ Ls(g n (a)) a.e. in A

  • (b) \(\int _{A}g(a)d\lambda \leq \lim _{n\rightarrow \infty }\int _{A}g_{n}(a)d\lambda\).

Let (Y, d) be a complete separable metric space (Polish space), \((A,\mathcal{A},\lambda )\) a complete and atomless probability space and g a Borel measurable map from \((A,\mathcal{A},\lambda )\) to ca(Y ). The direct image measure \(\lambda \circ g^{-1}\) is denoted by \(g_{{\ast}}\lambda\). The operator \(_{{\ast}}\lambda\) is a map from the set of all measurable maps of A to Y which is denoted by L 0(A, Y ) to \(\mathcal{M}(Y )\) where L 0(A, Y ) is the set of all (Borel) measurable functions from A to Y with the topology of convergence in measure. Recall that if a sequence of measurable functions converges a.e., it converges in measure. We then have (Keisler and Sun [31, Lemma 2.1])

Fact 5

  1. (i)

    The map \(_{{\ast}}\lambda: L^{0}(A,Y ) \rightarrow \mathcal{M}(Y )\) is surjective and continuous.

  2. (ii)

    Let \((g_{n})_{n\in \mathbb{N}}\) be a sequences in L 0 (A,Y ) and \((h_{n})_{n\in \mathbb{N}}\) a sequences in L 0 (A,Z), where Y and Z are Polish spaces. Suppose that \(\lambda _{{\ast}}g_{n} \rightarrow \eta _{1} \in \mathcal{M}(Y )\) and \(\lambda _{{\ast}}h_{n} \rightarrow \eta _{2} \in \mathcal{M}(Z)\) . Then some sub-sequence of \(\lambda _{{\ast}}(g_{n},h_{n})\) converges (weakly) to \(\theta \in \mathcal{M}(Y \times Z)\) such that \(\theta _{Y } =\eta _{1}\) and \(\theta _{Z} =\eta _{2}\) , respectively.

The next fact reveals a striking property of the saturated space (Keisler and Sun [31, Definition 2.2]).

Fact 6

Let Z and Y are complete separable metric spaces. Then a finite measure space \((A,\mathcal{A},\lambda )\) is saturated if and only if for every measure \(\nu \in \mathcal{M}(Z \times Y )\) and measurable function \(\mathcal{E}: A \rightarrow Y\) with \(\mathcal{E}_{{\ast}}\lambda =\nu _{Y }\) , there exists a measurable function \(\xi: A \rightarrow Z\) which satisfies \((\xi,\mathcal{E})_{{\ast}}\lambda =\nu\).

Let Z be a Hausdorff topological space. We denote the set of all closed subsets of a set Z by \(\mathcal{F}(Z)\). The topology τ c on \(\mathcal{F}(Z)\) of closed convergence is a topology which is generated by the base

$$\displaystyle{[C;G_{1}\ldots G_{n}] =\{\, f \in \mathcal{F}(Z)\vert F \cap C =\emptyset,F \cap G_{i}\neq \emptyset,i = 1\ldots n\}}$$

as C ranges over the compact subsets of Z and G i are arbitrarily finitely many open subsets of Z. It is well known that if Z is locally compact, the space \(\mathcal{F}(Z)\) is a compact metric space; see Hildenbrand [26, pp. 15–19] for details. Recall that a set \(K \subset Z\) is called \(\sigma\)-compact if it is a countable union of compact subsets of Z.

Fact 7

If F n is a sequence of closed subsets of a locally compact and \(\sigma\) -compact metric space K such that F n → F in the topology of closed convergence and μ n is a sequence of probability measures on K such that μ n ( f n ) = 1 for all n and μ n →μ, then μ( f) = 1.

Proof

The proof is similar to that of Suzuki [75, Fact 5]. □ 

Let {K n } be an increasing sequence of closed subsets of a compact metric space K converging to K in the topology of closed convergence. If \(\boldsymbol{q}_{n}: K_{n} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\) is continuous, we will write \((K_{n},\boldsymbol{q}_{n}) \rightarrow (K,\boldsymbol{q})\) if \(\boldsymbol{q} \in C(K)\) and for every subsequence n k and \(t_{n_{k}} \in K_{n_{k}}\) with \(t_{n_{k}} \rightarrow t\), \(\boldsymbol{q}(t_{n_{k}}) \rightarrow \boldsymbol{ q}(t)\). We have from [49]

Fact 8

Let \(\{\boldsymbol{m}_{n}\}\) be a bounded sequence in ca(K) with \(support(\boldsymbol{m}_{n}) \subset K_{n}\) , and \((K_{n},\boldsymbol{q}_{n}) \rightarrow (K,\boldsymbol{q})\) . Then \(\boldsymbol{q}_{n}\boldsymbol{m}_{n} \rightarrow \boldsymbol{ q}\boldsymbol{m}\).

Let \((K_{n},\boldsymbol{q}_{n})\) be a sequence as above. We will say that it is equi-continuous if for all ε > 0 there is a δ > 0 such that for all t, s ∈ K n with d(t, s) ≤ δ, \(\vert \boldsymbol{q}_{n}(t) -\boldsymbol{ q}_{n}(s)\vert \leq \ \epsilon\). Mas-Colell [49] proved

Fact 9

Let {K n } be a sequence of closed sets of a compact metric space K with \(K_{n} \subset K_{n+1} \subset \ldots \rightarrow K\) in the topology of closed convergence and \(\{\boldsymbol{q}_{n}\}\) a sequence in C(K) with \(\|\boldsymbol{q}_{n}\| \leq \hat{ q}\) for all n and for some fixed \(\hat{q} > 0\) . If \((K_{n},\boldsymbol{q}_{n})\) is equi-continuous, then there is a subsequence n k and \(\boldsymbol{q} \in C(K)\) with \((K_{n_{k}},\boldsymbol{q}_{n_{k}}) \rightarrow (K,\boldsymbol{q})\).

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Khan, M.A., Suzuki, T. (2016). On Differentiated and Indivisible Commodities: An Expository Re-framing of Mas-Colell’s 1975 Model. In: Kusuoka, S., Maruyama, T. (eds) Advances in Mathematical Economics Volume 20. Advances in Mathematical Economics, vol 20. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-0476-6_5

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