Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a novel electronic voting protocol which is resistant to more powerful corrupted parties and coercers than any previous works. They can be the voting authorities inside the system who can steal voters’ information and the content of their votes, or the adversaries outside who try to buy the votes, and force voters to follow their wishes. The worst case is that the adversaries outside collude with all voting authorities inside to destroy the whole system. In previous works, authors suggested many complicated cryptographic techniques for fulfilling all security requirements of electronic voting protocol. However, they cannot avoid the sophisticated inside and outside collusion. Our proposal prevents these threats from happening by the combination of blind signature, dynamic ballots and other techniques. Moreover, the improvement of blind signature scheme together with the elimination of physical assumptions makes the newly proposed protocol faster and more efficient. These enhancements make some progress towards practical security solution for electronic voting system.
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Nguyen, T.A.T., Dang, T.K. (2013). A Practical Solution against Corrupted Parties and Coercers in Electronic Voting Protocol over the Network. In: Mustofa, K., Neuhold, E.J., Tjoa, A.M., Weippl, E., You, I. (eds) Information and Communication Technology. ICT-EurAsia 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7804. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36818-9_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36818-9_2
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