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Article 5 [Principles on the Distribution and Limits of Competences]

(ex-Article 5 EC)

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Abstract

The vertical division of powers in any federal or regional system is reflected by the vertical distribution of competences between the federal/central level and the state/regional level. Although it is not intended here to insinuate a federal- or regional-like system of vertical division for the evolution of the EU, the distribution of competences of a “supranational union” or “Staatenverbund” (in the terminology of the German FCC) may follow similar models of distribution of powers between the Union and the MS.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Treaty of Nice, Declaration No. 23) on the future of the Union, O.J. C 80/85 (2001).

  2. 2.

    European Council, Conclusions Bull EU 12/2001, I.

  3. 3.

    See Final Report of Working Group I, CONV 286/02, and Working Group V, CONV 375/02.

  4. 4.

    See European Convention, Draft of Articles 1 to 16 of the Constitutional Treaty, CONV 528/03, p. 16. For the genesis see Mangiameli (2006), p. 47 et seq.

  5. 5.

    Oppermann (2003), p. 1165; see now German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 58—Lisbon (English translation available online).

  6. 6.

    Oppermann (2003), p. 1172 fn. 39); opposing interpretations Götz (2004), p. 44.

  7. 7.

    Schwarze (2004), p. 510, 528; Dougan (2003), p. 769.

  8. 8.

    The term was first used by the ECJ in Joined Cases 7/56, 3/57 to 7/57, Algera et al. v Common Assembly (ECJ 12 July 1957), p. 57.

  9. 9.

    Case C-155/91, Commission v Council (ECJ 17 March 1993); Calliess (1999), p. 32.

  10. 10.

    The CJEU has interpreted the principle of conferral in a rather extensive manner; see Blumann and Dubouis (2011), p. 405 et seq.

  11. 11.

    Pache and Rösch (2008), p. 479.

  12. 12.

    Bast and von Bogdandy, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 5 EUV para 10.

  13. 13.

    Bast and von Bogdandy, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 5 EUV para 15 with reference to the Lisbon judgment of the FCC 123, 267 (349 et seqq.).

  14. 14.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009)—Lisbon.

  15. 15.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 233—Lisbon.

  16. 16.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 234—Lisbon.

  17. 17.

    Judgment of 26 November 2008—Pl ÚS 19/80, para 132 and 184; confirmed in the second Lisbon Ruling of 3 November 2009—Pl. ÚS 29/09 para 224.

  18. 18.

    Judgment of 24 November 2010, Ref. No. K32/09 (operative part published in Dz.U. No. 229, it 1506).

  19. 19.

    Polish Constitutional Court, Ref. No. K32/09, p. 21; also p. 28. German translation by the author and commentary in EuGRZ 39(2012), p. 139; p. 172 et seqq.

  20. 20.

    Müller-Graff (2003), p. 305; Streinz, in Streinz (2003), Art. 5 para 9.

  21. 21.

    Blanke (2004a), p. 234.

  22. 22.

    Thus Fischer and Ferrero-Waldner (2005), p. 137.

  23. 23.

    Obwexer (2004), p. 151.

  24. 24.

    Streinz, in Streinz (2003), Art. 5 EGV para 5.

  25. 25.

    Bast and von Bogdandy, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 5 EUV para 32.

  26. 26.

    Herzog (1963), p. 400; D’Atena (2004), p. 325. Foundations of the principle in the Catholic Social Doctrine as expressed in the Encyclica of Pope Leo XIII 1891 “Rerum Novarum” and “Quadragesimo Anno” of Pope Pius XI in 1931.

  27. 27.

    Bast and von Bodgandy, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 5 n. 4.

  28. 28.

    Calliess (1999), p. 185 et seq.; Calliess (2002), p. 173.

  29. 29.

    See Haratsch et al. (2006), p. 75.

  30. 30.

    Boeck (2000), p. 34; see also Herzog, in Smit and Herzog, Art. 5 TEC, 81-6.

  31. 31.

    European Council of 11/12 December 1992, Conclusions of the Presidency, COM. Sl. (92) 1050; ParlA Annex II, III; Interinstitutional Agreement of 25 October 1993, EuGRZ 1993, p. 603.

  32. 32.

    Streinz, in Streinz (2012), Art. 5 para 23.

  33. 33.

    von Bogdandy and Bast, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 5 para 53.

  34. 34.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2006), Art. I-11 para 24.

  35. 35.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2007), Art. 5 para 38.

  36. 36.

    Critically Wuermeling (2004), p. 224 Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2006), Art. I-11 para 28.

  37. 37.

    Ladenburger (2011), p. 399.

  38. 38.

    Bast and von Bogdandy, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 5 EUV para 64.

  39. 39.

    Meyer and Hölscheidt (2003), p. 621; Ruffert (2004), p. 182.

  40. 40.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 305—Lisbon quoting Mellein, Subsidiaritätskontrolle durch nationale Parlamente 2007, p. 269 et seq.

  41. 41.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 305—Lisbon.

  42. 42.

    Weber (2010), p. 164.

  43. 43.

    Schwarze (2005), p. 741.

  44. 44.

    See esp. Case 8/55, Fédération Charbonnier de Belgique (ECJ 29 November 1956); see scrutiny of cases at Kischel (2000), p. 380/382.

  45. 45.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92 (Judgment of 12 October 1993) para 162 (in: BVerfGE 89, 155, 212)—Maastricht (English translation in Oppenheimer 1994, pp. 527–575).

  46. 46.

    Huber (1997), p. 517 (521); Nettesheim (1995), p. 106 (107).

  47. 47.

    Boeck (2000), p. 41.

  48. 48.

    E.g. Case 40/72, Schröder v Germany (ECJ 7 February 1973) para 32; Case 331/88, The Queen v Ministry for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte FEDESA et al. (ECJ 13 November 1990) para 13.

  49. 49.

    Communication of the Commission to Council and EP of October 27, 1992, Bull. EC 10-1992, p. 125.

  50. 50.

    See e.g. Monti Report “A new Strategy for the internal market” to President Barroso of 9 June 2010.

  51. 51.

    Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009, modified by Regulation (EU) No. 513/2011, O.J. L 145/3 (2011): see Ladenburger (2011), p. 389.

  52. 52.

    Case 147/81, Markus Fleisch-Import v Hauptzollamt Hamburg Ericus (ECJ 19 April 1982) para 12.

  53. 53.

    Davies (2003), p. 692.

  54. 54.

    It should be noted that the Commission itself has fostered the process of impact assessment not only with respect to the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, but also to a more rational decision making process introducing “impact assessment reports” after consultations with stakeholders and examination by an “impact assessment board” composed of high ranking officials; see Ladenburger (2011), p. 401.

  55. 55.

    Nettesheim (2006), p. 309.

  56. 56.

    On the TCE see Nettesheim (2004), p. 526; Oppermann (2003), p. 1172.

  57. 57.

    In its Lisbon judgment the FCC only recognises the “triad” of exclusive, shared and supporting competences as “competences” whereas the coordination of economic and employment policies and the CFSP “assign individual areas to the competence categories albeit not as a complete enumeration in terms of a list of competences”, German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 58.

  58. 58.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 59—Lisbon.

  59. 59.

    Pechstein (1987), p. 50.

  60. 60.

    Case 804/79, United Kingdom v Commission (ECJ 5 May 1981) para 17.

  61. 61.

    Case 174/84, Bulk Oil AG v Sun International Ltd (ECJ 18 February 1986) para 31; Case 41/76, Donckerwolke v Procureur (ECJ 15 December 1976) para 31, 37; Case 22/70, Commission v AETR (ECJ 31 March 1971); Opinion 1/78, International Agreement on Natural Rubber (ECJ 4 October 1979).

  62. 62.

    Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76, Officer van Justitie v Cornelius Kramer (ECJ 7 July 1976); Case 804/79, Commission v United Kingdom (ECJ 5 May 1981).

  63. 63.

    Case 40/69, Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Oberelbe v Bollmann (ECJ 18 February 1970) para 4.

  64. 64.

    European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, Part A, Annex 1, No. 4 para. 6.

  65. 65.

    European Parliament, Resolution on the adaptation of Community legislation to the subsidiarity principle, O.J. C 128/190 (1994) para 2.

  66. 66.

    See Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2006), Art. I-12 para 4.

  67. 67.

    Memorandum released by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany of 21 September 1992 concerning the principle of subsidiarity.

  68. 68.

    See argument in favour and against in Dittert (2001), p. 50.

  69. 69.

    Toth (1992), p. 1090.

  70. 70.

    Lenaerts and van Ypersele (1994), p. 3.

  71. 71.

    Correctly Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2006), Art. I-12 para 13; in this sence also Blumann and Dubouis (2011), p. 414.

  72. 72.

    For the pre-emption doctrine see e.g. Nowak and Rotunda (2000), p. 347; Konstantinides (2009), p. 170.

  73. 73.

    For TCE see Classen (2003), p. 341; Craig (2004), p. 329.

  74. 74.

    See Craig (2004), p. 328; Dougan (2003), p. 720; Schröter (2004), p. 241.

  75. 75.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2006), Art. I-13 para 9.

  76. 76.

    Statement by the Euro Area Heads of State or Government of 9 December 2011 European Council (OR.en) and signing of the Treaty on Stability. Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union on 2 March 2012.

  77. 77.

    Act of Accession, O.J. L 73/1 (1972); Case 804/79, Commission v United Kingdom (ECJ 5 May 1981).

  78. 78.

    Opinion 1/94, GATS/TRIPs (ECJ 15 November 1994).

  79. 79.

    Opinion 2/92, OECD (ECJ 24 March 1995).

  80. 80.

    Case 22/70, Commission v Council (ECJ 31 March 1971).

  81. 81.

    Götz (2004), p. 54.

  82. 82.

    Dittert (2001), p. 38; von Bogdandy and Bast, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 5 para 32.

  83. 83.

    Dashwood (1999), p. 126; Cross (1992), p. 447; Terhechte (2008), p. 155.

  84. 84.

    Case C-491/01, British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco (ECJ 10 December 2002) para 179: the status of concurring competences (“competenze concurrente”) according to the Draft Constitutional Treaty is analised more thoroughly by Mangiameli (2006), p. 30 et seq.

  85. 85.

    Weber (2008), p. 11; Konstantinides (2009), p. 170.

  86. 86.

    Götz (2002), p. 94; Nettesheim (2004), p. 529.

  87. 87.

    Now Declaration No. 18 in relation to the delimitation of competences.

  88. 88.

    See Weber (2008), p. 12; Streinz (2008), p. 119.

  89. 89.

    Obwexer (2004), p. 154; Terhechte (2008), p. 173. For the area of immigration and asylum see Chibanguza (2011), p. 170 et seqq.

  90. 90.

    Lane (1993), p. 952; Dashwood (1996), p. 122; Everling (1992), p. 1068; Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2006), Art. I-12 para 24.

  91. 91.

    Trüe (2002), p. 273.

  92. 92.

    Case 242/87, Commission v Council (Erasmus) (ECJ 30 May 1989).

  93. 93.

    Schwarze (2003), p. 544.

  94. 94.

    Trüe (2004), p. 279.

  95. 95.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2006), Art. I-17 para 1, Art. I-12 para 30.

  96. 96.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2006), Art. I-12 para 29.

  97. 97.

    Vedder, in Vedder and Heintschel von Heinegg (2007), Art. I-15 para 2.

  98. 98.

    European Convention, Draft of Articles 1 to 16 of the Constitutional Treaty, CONV 528/03, p. 17; Schwarze (2004), p. 519.

  99. 99.

    Craig (2004), p. 339. For an own category see also Chibanguza (2011), p. 131.

  100. 100.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2006), Art. I-15 para 4; Krebber (2004), p. 593.

  101. 101.

    The reform of the existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) entered into force on 13 December 2011 and strengthens the multilateral supervision of national economic policies via the preventive control of macroeconomic imbalances and budgetary proposals of MS and repressive sanctioning of deficit and indebtment criteria of the SGP (see Blanke 2011, p. 409 et seqq.; Blanke 2012; Weber 2011, p. 935 et seqq.; Weber 2012a, p. 801 et seqq.) should—according to the Declaration of the Heads of the Euro Group of 9 December 2011—be deepened by “automatic sanctions”, introduction of a rule of an annual structural deficit not exceeding 0.5 % of the nominal GDP on constitutional or equivalent level of member states and the potential accession of member states not belonging to the Euro zone to the new “fiscal compact” to be based on an intergovernmental treaty.

  102. 102.

    Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2006), Art. I-15 para 8; Vedder, in Vedder and Heintschel von Heinegg (2007), Art. I-15 para 6.

  103. 103.

    Regelsberger and Kugelmann (2003), p. 78; Herrmann (2008), § 17.

  104. 104.

    Dittert (2001), p. 39; König (2006), § 2 para 18; Lienbacher, in Schwarze (2009), Art. 5 EGV para 11.

  105. 105.

    Bast and von Bogdandy, in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 5 EUV para 46.

  106. 106.

    See Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, O.J. L 1/1 (2003).

  107. 107.

    See Proposal of conference of representatives of MS of October 2003, CI6 4/03, p. 9.

  108. 108.

    See more details at German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 63 et seq.—Lisbon.

  109. 109.

    See Opinion 2/92, OECD (ECJ 24 March 1995) para 36.

  110. 110.

    Streinz, in Streinz (2003), Art. 308 EC para 1.

  111. 111.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 328—Lisbon.

  112. 112.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 412—Lisbon.

  113. 113.

    Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. ÚS 19/08 (26 November 2008) para 151, 152: “Thus, it is not, and will not be possible to circumvent Art 10a of the constitution of the Czech Republic with the help of this clause – and the practice of bodies of the EU and the cited case law of the Court of Justice confirm this …”.

  114. 114.

    Oppermann (2003), p. 1173.

  115. 115.

    Working Group V, CONV 375/1/02 of 4 November 2002.

  116. 116.

    For the ordinary and simplified revision procedures see Blumann and Dubouis (2011), p. 430 et seq.

  117. 117.

    See Weber (2010), p. 163 et seq.; for the French, Czech, Lativan and German Constitutional Tribunals.

  118. 118.

    Art. 34 French Constitution, French Conseil Constitutionnel, No. 2007-560 DC (20 December 2007) para 2—Lisbon; German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 312–314—Lisbon.

  119. 119.

    Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment Ref. No. K32/09 (24 November 2010) p. 4.2.9, [p. 50].

  120. 120.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 319—Lisbon; critically Weber (2010), p. 163.

  121. 121.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 320—Lisbon.

  122. 122.

    French Conseil Constitutionnel, No. 2004-505 DC (19 November 2004), para 36—Constitutional Treaty.

  123. 123.

    Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. ÚS 19/08 (26 November 2008) para 160 et seqq.

  124. 124.

    Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment Ref. No. K32/09 (24 November 2010) para 4.2, p. 50.

  125. 125.

    See Bodewig and Voß (2003), p. 310 et seqq.; de Búrca (2008), p. 814.

  126. 126.

    See European Council of 23/24 March 2000, Conclusions of the Presidency, EC-Bull 3/2000, No. I.5.5.7.

  127. 127.

    Bodewig (2003), p. 513.

  128. 128.

    See Calliess, in Calliess and Ruffert (2006), Art. I-18 para 16.

  129. 129.

    Blanke (2004b), p. 70.

  130. 130.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 233—Lisbon, with reference to BVerfGE 89, 155 (187, 192, 199)—Maastricht; 58, 1 (37)—Eurocontrol I; 104, 151 (210)—NATO.

  131. 131.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 233—Lisbon.

  132. 132.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 233—Lisbon.

  133. 133.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 240—Lisbon.

  134. 134.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2, 5/08, 2 BvR 1010, 1022, 1259/08, 182/09 (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 240–245—Lisbon.

  135. 135.

    Weber (2010), p. 162.

  136. 136.

    Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. ÚS 19/08 (26 November 2008) para 139.

  137. 137.

    Polish Constitutional Court, K11/03 (Judgment of 27 May 2003).

  138. 138.

    German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 2661/06 (Order of 6 July 2010) para 61—Honeywell; EuGRZ 37 (2010), p. 497 [502].

Table of Cases

  • ECJ 29.11.1956, 8/55, Fédération Charbonnier de Belgique, ECR 245 [cit. in para 12]

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  • ECJ 12.07.1957, 7/56, 3/57 to 7/57, Algera et al. v Common Assembly, ECR 39 [cit. in para 5]

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  • ECJ 18.02.1970, 40/69, Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Oberelbe v Bollmann, ECR 69 [cit. in para 15]

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  • ECJ 31.03.1971, 22/70, Commission v AETR, ECR 263 [cit. in para 15]

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  • ECJ 07.02.1973, 40/72, Schröder v Germany, ECR 125 [cit. in para 12]

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  • ECJ 07.07.1976, 3/76, 4/76, 6/76, Officer van Justitie v Cornelius Kramer, ECR 1279 [cit. in para 15]

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  • ECJ 15.12.1976, 41/76, Donckerwolke v Procureur, ECR 1921 [cit. in para 15]

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  1. Faculty for Economics, Law and Social Science, University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany

    Hermann-Josef Blanke

  2. National Research Council Institute for Regionalism, Federalism and Self-Government, Rome, Italy

    Stelio Mangiameli

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  1. Faculty for Economics, Law and Social Sc, University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany

    Hermann-Josef Blanke

  2. National Research Council - Institute fo Regionalism, Federalism and Self-Governm, Rome, Italy

    Stelio Mangiameli

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Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (2013). Article 5 [Principles on the Distribution and Limits of Competences]. In: Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (eds) The Treaty on European Union (TEU). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31706-4_6

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