Abstract
Evidentialism holds that all epistemic justification derives from evidence. This thesis can apparently be refuted from the following three premises: (1) e is evidence for h only if the epistemic probability of h given e is higher than the prior probability of h; (2) epistemic probability satisfies the axioms of mathematical probability theory; (3) a proposition is epistemically justified whenever it is sufficiently probable. Given any threshold for “sufficiently probable” and any coherent probability distribution, some propositions must have a sufficiently high prior probability to count as justified. Given premise (1), this prior probability is not itself evidence for the proposition in question, nor does it reflect evidence for the proposition, nor do the facts explaining the high prior probability constitute evidence for the proposition. Hence, it represents a form of non-evidential epistemic justification.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
Conee and Feldman (2008, p. 83), Dougherty (2011b, pp. 6–7). For general defenses of evidentialism, see Conee and Feldman (2004), McCain (2014). I take evidentialism primarily as a thesis about propositional justification. Hereinafter, claims about epistemic justification should be taken as concerning propositional justification.
- 2.
Conee and Feldman (2011, p. 297) endorse an interpretation of likelihood in terms of evidence or justification, which would seem to support the principle I have stated in the text.
- 3.
But see Sect. 12.2 below, where I further qualify this premise.
- 4.
Proof: Start with Equation 12.1. Substitute (1 − P(h)) for P(∼h), and divide both the numerator and the denominator on the right hand side by P(e|∼h). Finally, write “h” for P(h) and “L” for P(e|h)/P(e|∼h).
- 5.
For further discussion, see my (2009, pp. 26–9; 2016b). It is possible to maintain that the ultimate prior of h merely has some range of rationally acceptable values (less than the full range from 0 to 1); in that case, the posterior probability of h will typically have a narrower range of possible values. But if the range of acceptable priors is the full range from 0 to 1, then the range of acceptable posteriors is also the full range from 0 to 1, as shown by Fig. 12.1. Also, if the posterior is to have a unique permissible value, then the prior must have a unique permissible value.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
We could resist this idea by insisting that probability (in one relevant sense) just is degree of justification; hence, by definition, nothing more than high probability is needed for justification. If, however, we understand “probability” in a logical (or other non-epistemic) sense, then high probability does not suffice for justification. We will discuss these interpretations of probability in Sect. 12.4.4 below. For now, let us simply concede as much as we reasonably can to the objection under consideration.
- 9.
If you don’t like this, see the discussion in Sect. 12.4.5 below.
- 10.
- 11.
- 12.
Conee and Feldman (2008, pp. 84–5) come close to acknowledging this, where they distinguish “scientific evidence” from “justifying evidence,” though I find their text ambiguous.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
Note that it is not the proposition that you’re in pain, or the belief that you’re in pain; it is just the pain that’s supposed to be a reason. I consider this to be a very strange philosophers’ use of “reason.”
- 16.
Below in Sect. 12.3.4, we will discuss why it is not satisfactory to construe e’s supporting h as a matter of P(h|e) being high.
- 17.
- 18.
- 19.
Vogel (2014). I have altered what Vogel says for ease of exposition. Actually, Vogel starts with the idea that e is evidence against (e & ∼p). So it is evidence for ∼(e & ∼p), so it is evidence for (∼e ⋁ p). I have replaced “h” in Vogel’s text with “p” to avoid confusion with the “h” used in my own arguments.
- 20.
- 21.
This is a simplification of Audi’s (1999) account.
- 22.
- 23.
Huemer (2009).
- 24.
For a similar example, see Dougherty (2011a, p. 141).
- 25.
- 26.
Kevin McCain has expressed this worry in comments on this paper.
- 27.
Robinson (1966).
- 28.
Variations on this response (with more sophisticated-sounding phraseology) have been offered by Trent Dougherty, Kevin McCain, and Matt Skene in informal communications.
- 29.
This is assuming you are interested in epistemology. If you’re not, then you are really wasting your time. Sorry.
- 30.
Conee and Feldman (2004, p. 1).
- 31.
The distinction is not, by the way, covered by Conee and Feldman’s (2008, pp. 84–6) distinction between “scientific evidence” and “justifying evidence.” Their distinction seems to be between an externalist notion and an internalist notion; that is, it concerns whether evidence must be identifiable as such to the subject. That is not my distinction. All of my cases (i)-(vi) are cases of internal justification accessible to the subject.
- 32.
I would like to thank Trent Dougherty, Kevin McCain, and Ted Poston for their helpful comments on a more confusing and less convincing version of this paper, as a result of which the present completely convincing version was born.
References
Arntzenius, F. (2008). Gunk, topology, and measure. In D. Zimmerman (Ed.), Oxford studies in metaphysics (Vol. 4, pp. 225–247). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Audi, R. (1999). Self-evidence. In Philosophical perspectives 13, Epistemology (pp. 205–28).
Bird, A. (2007). Justified judging. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74, 81–110.
Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (2004). Evidentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (2008). Evidence. In Q. Smith (Ed.), Epistemology: New essays (pp. 83–104). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (2011). Replies. In T. Dougherty (Ed.), Evidentialism and its discontents (pp. 283–323). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
de Finetti, B. (1937 [1964]). Foresight: Its logical laws, its subjective sources. In H. Kyburg & H. Smokler (Eds.), Studies in subjective probability (H. Kyburg, Trans.) (pp. 99–158). New York: Wiley.
Dougherty, T. (2011a). Fallibilism. In S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard (Eds.), The Routledge companion to epistemology (pp. 131–143). New York: Routledge.
Dougherty, T. (2011b). Introduction. In T. Dougherty (Ed.), Evidentialism and its discontents (pp. 1–16). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feldman, R. (2003). Epistemology. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.
Feldman, R. (2004). Authoritarian epistemology (pp. 111–34). In Conee and Feldman 2004.
Forrest, P. (2014). The epistemology of religion. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2014 edn). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/religion-epistemology/. Accessed 20 June 2016.
Huemer, M. (2003). Arbitrary foundations? Philosophical Forum, 34, 141–152.
Huemer, M. (2009). Explanationist aid for the theory of inductive logic. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 60, 1–31.
Huemer, M. (2010). Foundations and coherence. In J. Dancy, E. Sosa, & M. Steup (Eds.), A companion to epistemology (2nd ed., pp. 22–33). Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
Huemer, M. (2016a). Approaching infinity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Huemer, M. (2016b). There is no pure empirical reasoning. unpublished ms.
Jeffrey, R. (1983). The logic of decision (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kelly, T. (2014). Evidence. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2014 edn). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/evidence/. Accessed 20 June 2016.
McCain, K. (2014). Evidentialism and epistemic justification. New York: Routledge.
Mittag, D. M. (2016). Evidentialism. In Internet encyclopedia of philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/evidenti/. Accessed 15 June 2016.
Nelkin, D. K. (2000). The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality. Philosophical Review, 109, 373–409.
Robinson, A. (1966). Non-standard analysis. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing.
Savage, L. (1954). The foundations of statistics. New York: Wiley.
Sutton, J. (2005). Stick to what you know. Nous, 39, 359–396.
Vogel, J. (2014). E & ∼H. In D. Dodd & E. Zardini (Eds.), Scepticism and perceptual justification (pp. 87–107). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Whitehead, A. N. (1917). The organization of thought, educational and scientific. London: Williams and Norgate.
Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Huemer, M. (2018). A Probabilistic Critique of Evidentialism. In: McCain, K. (eds) Believing in Accordance with the Evidence. Synthese Library, vol 398. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_12
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-95993-1_12
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-95992-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-95993-1
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)