Abstract
The paper highlights that the so-called dialogue between the Courts represents, at the same time, a fact and a value, and that the methodological perspective best suited to revealing its essence is axiological-substantial in nature. It is a question in fact of establishing in the individual cases what rule, not source (Constitution or international charter of rights), is best suited in ensuring the “strongest” protection of fundamental rights. The parameter according to which this test is carried out is that of the dignity of the human person, a “super-constitutional value”, contextualised yet also universally applicable. We then take into consideration some selected cases, specifically relating to criminal and procedural law, that show the commitment of the Courts in making their respective case law trends converge, without however renouncing the specificity of the legal system of provenance and with it the identity of the Courts themselves.
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Notes
- 1.
On this subject, see variously the proceedings of the conference on “I diritti sociali dopo Lisbona. Il ruolo delle Corti. Il diritto del lavoro fra riforme delle regole e vincoli di sistema”, Reggio Calabria 5 November 2011, and ivi, in particular, Spadaro (2011); Salazar (2012); Panzera (2012); Rauti (2011); Guazzarotti (2011); Gambino (2012); Gargiulo (2011); Mezzetti and Morrone (2011); Romeo (2011a), pp. 487 ff. Also by Romeo (2011b). Other references, also infra.
- 2.
- 3.
… as well as to non-European courts, as Groppi and Lecis Cocco-Ortu (2013) have rightly highlighted.
- 4.
In this paper, “ordinary case law” and “ordinary courts” are intended as referring to all courts or case law that ordinarily administer justice according to the organisation of jurisdiction in the legal system concerned. The role that ordinary courts play in Italy in the multilevel protection of fundamental rights is stressed with particular force in the aforementioned work by Conti, who has moreover dedicated a large number of studies to the issue (and, most recently among these, Conti 2014). Adde Ceccherini (2013), pp. 467 ff.
- 5.
This explains the increasingly insistent reference made in courtrooms to the dignity of the human person, regarding which see, albeit from a perspective different to that adopted here, Sperti (2013).
- 6.
Moreover, on various occasions, the Constitutional Court has made it clear that, due to the faulty way in which an issue of constitutional legitimacy has been presented (without reference to a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights), it has not been able to accept it, consequently leading to the cancellation of the rule of law at the basis of the dispute itself.
- 7.
Ruggeri (2013c), § 4.
- 8.
We need merely think of the ultimatums imposed by the European Union on those states whose public accounts are not in order during the extremely serious current economic-financial crisis.
- 9.
… also in the work last mentioned.
- 10.
On the mutual implications between the values in question, see, among many, Silvestri (2009).
- 11.
- 12.
The most recent constitutional case law has insisted on the need to regard the Constitution as a “system”, albeit in a theoretical-reconstructive context noticeably different from that which I personally espouse: see, therefore, the decisions of the Constitutional Court nos. 264 of 2012 and 1, 170 and 202 of 2013.
- 13.
… with the sole exception perhaps of agreements in a simplified form, whose binding force with regard to common laws is, as is known, questioned by many scholars.
- 14.
Contrary to an accredited and widespread opinion, the fundamental principles do not resist possible change, whenever this aims at the further promotion of the values expressed by the principles themselves, remaining in any case faithful to their original mould.
- 15.
The result is, for example, that the so-called doctrine of “counter-limits” against the entrance of norms of the European Union that are incompatible with the fundamental principles of the constitutional system, in the terms in which it is usually presented, may not be accepted, since no legal system may have as its basis a mixture of internal rules and rules of external origin. Rather, the system itself has to establish from time to time the way in which the rules themselves, whatever their form or origin, relate to the values of liberty and equality (and, ultimately, dignity).
- 16.
In the latter I include, although somewhat straining the point, also what happens in the European courts, which, while not abandoning their particular typical origin and nature, are de facto increasingly becoming materially constitutional courts, since they also are called to ensure compliance with those fundamental rights for whose protection the struggle was fought for the birth of Constitutions, in the meaning espoused in liberal legal systems. On the tendency of European courts to “constitutionalize themselves”, see, among others, Pollicino (2010).
- 17.
Scholarship for some time has been debating without however achieving consensus of opinion, on the criterion in application of which it may be possible to establish, without excessive uncertainties, which Charter from time to time provides the most “intense” protection of the rights at stake. Among the many others and variously, in addition to Conti (2011); Butturini (2/2010), pp. 1816 ff.; Panzera (2011), pp. 299 ff., espec. pp. 303 ff.; Randazzo (2011), pp. 313 ff.; Salazar (2013a), section II. Lastly, see also Ruggeri (2011b).
- 18.
Information on the issue can be found in Ruggeri (2011a).
- 19.
Among others, Camerlengo (2007), espec. pp. 338 ff., has greatly insisted on this latter point.
- 20.
Silvestri (2013), § 2 observed that dignity “does not need to be ‘deserved’ by the individual person and may not ever be lost”. It has been effectively argued by Glendon (2007), p. 98, that, from a Christian point of view, “human rights are based on the duty of each person to fulfil their own dignity, which in turn obliges them to respect the ‘donated’ spark of dignity present in others, whatever they may have done”. According, instead, to Zagrebelsky (1995), p. 34, “if human rights are founded on the value of man, and if we admit that not all men have the same value, … it will be necessary to say: not the same rights for everyone, but for everyone the rights they have deserved”.
- 21.
- 22.
And this moreover is confirmed by the constant monitoring of the developments in case law in Italy and Europe, found in www.penalecontemporaneo.it (see, for example, in the latter, Romeo 2013).
- 23.
Reasons of space force me to sacrifice here ordinary case law, and this is a real shame, since it too, especially in its most advanced manifestations, represents a precious asset if we wish to describe (I won’t say comprehensively, but almost) as faithfully as possible the level achieved in the mutual acknowledgment of the system of the Constitution and the Charters of Rights. Moreover, in quite a few cases, ordinary case law has not merely passively followed the indications given to it by European and Italian constitutional case law, but rather it has given an active, and not secondary, contribution to its renewal. Unfortunately, as far as I am aware, there is so far no organic study that clarifies the relationship of mutual give and take that has existed (and continues to) between the two types of case law, although there are some specific sectorial studies of certain interest (for example, with regard to criminal law, the monograph by Manes 2012a, in which we find perceptive observations of a theoretical-reconstructive type; also by Manes 2012b, pp. 839 ff.).
I feel that this gap urgently needs to be filled.
- 24.
Why on earth, we may wonder, should the obligation be reduced only by half (or even less), to the “hard core” of European case law, even if we suppose that the “substance” can be identified and entirely dealt with in reference to it?
- 25.
See, on this point, of crucial importance for my position, Ruggeri (2013a) and the views of Cappuccio (2012), pp. 65 ff.; Caretti (2012); Tega (2012); and Guazzarotti (1/2013), pp. 9 ff. Most recently, perceptive observations have been made in Salazar (2013c). Other indications can be found in the works referred to above in note 1.
- 26.
I am referring in particular to the well-known cases Agrati v. Italy and Maggio v. Italy, which—as is known—have attracted a real tidal wave of comments.
- 27.
For example, in judgment no. 311 of 2009 and others.
- 28.
This, however, may not be taken lightly by the European Court, and in fact this is the source of the conflict.
- 29.
We can exclude the presence of the imperative reasons mentioned above in the case recently settled in judgment no. 170 of 2013, which declared the constitutional illegitimacy of legislation that, with a retroactive effect, went beyond the res judicata in the field of bankruptcy proceedings (the so-called giudicato endo-fallimentare), in violation of the principles of equality and reasonableness, as well as of the European Convention on Human Rights. This is a ruling in which we see an effort to highlight the affinity of the case law trends of the Court of Strasbourg with that of the Italian Constitutional Court itself, which however—as I will try to demonstrate here—while encountering the circumstance in question, does not seem to possess general applicability.
- 30.
Another question, which however we cannot deal with here, regards the nature, at any rate innovative, of the so-called “interpretative laws”, which, as is known, has been discussed in perceptive scholarship (references can be found in Laneve 2012, pp. 201 ff.). What this nonetheless means here is that, albeit with all good will, the legislative discipline referred to in the text did not fall within the linguistic-conceptual framework drawn by the previous discipline but clearly extended outside it. The confines marked by the text—as is known—remain, in some places marked and resistant, in others less so; in the cases mentioned above, they are quite frankly strained.
- 31.
Among which I mention here only those at the round table on “Giudicato ‘europeo’ e giudicato penale italiano: la svolta della Corte costituzionale”, in Legislazione penale, 2/2011, pp. 463 ff., with contributions by Canzio, Kostoris, Chiavario and Ruggeri, the latter of which contains some observations also taken up here. The most organic treatment in Italian scholarship, in which an attentive study is made of the numerous, serious issues regarding judgments in the face of supervening rulings by the European Court, is that of Sciarabba (2013).
- 32.
Important support for the rulings of the Court of Strasbourg has now come from judgment no. 210 of 2013 of the Constitutional Court, then taken up in order no. 235 of the same year, which recognised the value of pilot judgments and thus placed the basis for their effective and widespread observance by judges (on the rulings, see the notes by di Viganò 2013a, b; Romeo 2013).
- 33.
…, or rather, from an axiologically orientated perspective, which in other words sees the Constitution, in its essence, as being composed of a handful of positivised fundamental values, in the light of which therefore both the dynamics of regulation and those of interpretation-application may receive their correct collocation and organisation.
- 34.
Grand Chamber, 25 February 2013.
- 35.
- 36.
See, therefore, Ruggeri (2013b).
- 37.
- 38.
For example, in judgment no. 143 of 2013, with regard to interviews with the lawyers of defendants or convicted offenders held according to special detention rules (see, for all, the comment by Manes and Napoleoni 2013). A reference to Strasbourg case law (in particular the Torreggiani case) was also seen in judgment no. 235 of 2013, in the penitentiary field (and on this, the note by Della Bella 2013).
- 39.
See, for example, the approach taken in judgment no. 236 of 2011, compared to that emerging from the cases Scoppola v. Italy, Morabito v. Italy, Agrati v. Italy and, most recently, Maktouf and Damjanovi v. Bosnia-Herzegovina, as defined by the Strasbourg Court. Extensive references to the Scoppola case have most recently been found in judgment no. 210 and in order no. 235 of 2013, which highlight an effort to move closer to the positions of the European courts, of which, however, we await further confirmation.
- 40.
See, in particular, the cases Sud Fondi v. Italy and Previti v. Italy.
- 41.
This is explained by the vastness of the territories and variety of legal systems to which the Convention is applied, with recipients operating in contexts of both common and civil laws.
- 42.
- 43.
A general reflection on the principle of legality, together with perceptive observations of a theoretical-reconstructive nature, can be seen in Salazar (2013b).
- 44.
- 45.
I will omit here to observe that in general the Constitutional Court recognises that the constant case law, which is created in courtrooms, is the subject of judgments of constitutionality, even though it is frequently set aside in the name of consistent interpretation.
- 46.
I began to discuss this in Ruggeri (2001), pp. 544 ff.
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Ruggeri, A. (2015). “Dialogue” Between European and National Courts, in the Pursuit of the Strongest Protection of Fundamental Rights (with Specific Regard to Criminal and Procedural Law). In: Ruggeri, S. (eds) Human Rights in European Criminal Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12042-3_2
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