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Economy and Monetary Union

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The European Union in Crisis

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Abstract

This chapter reviews the substantive issue of the contemporary intertwining of both national and overall EU economy in relation to the spectre of monetary union through first evaluating a country’s readiness for euro entry through a comparison between the convergence criteria stipulated in the Treaty on European Union and the theory of optimal currency areas, which leads to discussion of the economic costs and benefits of euro membership. However, given the unprecedented strain eurozone has now come under the chapter also examines the background to the current eurozone crisis; specifically, how the Global Financial Crisis induced Great Recession triggered the problems within the eurozone. Subsequently, the chapter explores how the advent of EMU has significantly redefined the operation of fiscal and monetary policy with the former retained by member states, but proscribed by EMU-wide rules, whilst the latter has been assumed by a specifically created independent central bank. Hence, the chapter explores the theoretical underpinnings of the operation of monetary and fiscal policy within EMU, where it examines the conduct, coordination and philosophy of macroeconomic policymaking. This analysis is then extended by discussing a series of potential remedies, consisting of an evaluation of EU instigated solutions, together with a series of alternative propositions. However, whilst the economic remedies to the eurozone crisis may eventually succeed, the greater long-term damage may well emerge through the political sphere with the imposition of unelected technocrat governments, together with growing dissatisfaction of mainstream political parties with support for either the far-right, protest parties, anti-euro parties, anti-EU parties, or member states losing confidence in the direction of ‘ever closer union’.

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  1. Division of Economics, School of Social and International Studies, University of Bradford, Bradford, BD7 1DP, UK

    Mark Baimbridge

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    Kyriakos N. Demetriou

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Baimbridge, M. (2015). Economy and Monetary Union. In: Demetriou, K. (eds) The European Union in Crisis. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08774-0_5

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