Abstract
In his 1950 Relativity: a Richer Truth, Philipp Frank promotes a generalized “relativism”, or “doctrine of the relativity of truth”, requiring the specification of the meaning of the terms used in the statements one makes (their “relativization”), not only in physics but also in ethics, politics or everyday experience. This is achieved by providing the “frame of reference” relative to which the terms (and consequently statements) are expressed and on which their truth in fact depends, in analogy with Einstein’s (special) theory of relativity. He grounds this application of the concept of relativity outside physics on his empiricist interpretation of Einstein’s theory, together with a pragmatic and operationalist theory of meaning, which insists on the qualification, and thus relativity, of particular statements. Frank’s interpretation of relativity (both within and outside physics) is fully understandable not only because of his logical empiricist stance, but also given his fight against philosophical misinterpretations of the theory of relativity, as well as against political totalitarianism. It also has particularly convincing features. Still, Frank’s interpretation of relativity in physics is debatable, since Einstein’s theory could just as well be read as a defense of absolutism. What is more, his application of relativity to ethics and politics is disputable, as it allows for a kind of moral relativism.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
See Frank’s remark on p. 12: “[...] the Conference was about to jump ‘out of the frying pan into the fire’. I saw that the fight against ‘relativism’ could easily degenerate into a fight against the spirit of modern science.” For a critique of some anti-scientific opinions held in this Conference, see Nagel (1943).
- 4.
Frank (1949, 52) summarizes RRT by denying that the “‘relativism’ of modern science” would have been harmful to the establishment of objective values in human life. “[In RRT he] made an argument to prove that the ‘relativism of science’ has also penetrated every argument about human behavior. ‘Relativism’ is not responsible for any deterioration of human conduct. What one calls ‘relativism’ is rather the attempt to get rid of empty slogans and to formulate the goals of human life sincerely and unambiguously.”
- 5.
Frank (1949, 230 sqq.) also mentions the “doctrine of the ‘relativity of truth’”, which “seemed therefore to some people a ‘social danger’, since it might contribute to a disbelief in the ‘absolute values’ of ethics.”
- 6.
Although it is studied throughout the book, the concept of relativity is mainly addressed in the first part. The second part mainly deals with other (although related) considerations, most notably: the shortcomings of the US educational system and its responsibility in bad interpretations of modern science, which are to blame (according to Frank) on its failure to integrate the sciences between themselves, and with philosophy.
- 7.
Strangely, Frank (1949, 52) endorses “‘relativism’” and “‘the relativism of science’” (with quotation marks), just after including the “relativistic” interpretation of science – along the “idealistic” and “materialistic” ones – in the “metaphysical interpretations of science” (51). He seems to oppose two acceptations of relativism: a metaphysical, wrong one; and his own.
- 8.
Bloor (2011, 428) also interprets Frank’s (1954–55/1956a) paper on “The Variety of Reasons for the Acceptance of Scientific Theories” as a further illustration of Frank’s relativism, fully endorsing the utilitarian conception of scientific theories displayed by Frank there – for whom the latter have either a “technological” or a “sociological” purpose (1954–55/1956a, 16), and the compromises between their various properties when deciding which one to accept are presented as akin to those made while choosing between the various properties of an aircraft while building it. However, what Bloor does not say is that although Frank recognizes that theories are underdetermined by evidence (making talk of “the [unique] truth” of a theory irrelevant (14), and providing grist for his instrumentalist mill) and that there is no “perfect simplicity” of a theory (3), Frank nonetheless ultimately aims at justifying the choice of scientific theories by extra-scientific (in the strict sense, i.e. political, moral or religious) factors, thanks to the “general science of human behaviour” he is envisioning, and which is supposed to incorporate the sociology of science (18).
- 9.
The only one Frank (1950/1951b) mentions. Frank (1957b, 155) also refers to the general theory of relativity.
- 10.
- 11.
“For if we want to know whether or not in a particular case a particular John is ‘wicked’ we have to find out whether or not he was actually obedient to God’s will or to Kant’s imperative” (28).
- 12.
Note that both relations (length contraction and time dilation) are symmetric, i.e. they keep the same form whatever the point of view taken (of the object at rest and the observer moving, or the converse), precisely because of the principle of relativity (according to which the laws of nature have the same form in all inertial reference frames). Thus there is no need to specify that the observer is at rest and the object moving, or the converse: what matters is the relative speed v between them. But the length contraction takes place only in the direction of the movement, i.e. if both L and L0 are measured parallel to the direction of the vector v.
Note also that Frank makes a confusion in his example on p. 46: the table should be the longest (5 feet), i.e. should have its proper length, in its rest frame which is the Earth, and should be shorter (3 feet) in the reference frame of the stars which is moving relative to the earth.
- 13.
Apart from truth, all other values considered by Frank are moral values.
- 14.
Siegetsleitner (2017, 221–222) does not criticize Frank’s typology, and apparently subscribes to it.
- 15.
Note that such a position runs contra the one expressed by P. Frank (1957b, 144) who seems ready to accept the Ptolemaic system instead of the Copernican one on grounds of social utility (as providing “a feeling of security”), or to Frank (1954–55/1956a, 15) for whom we choose scientific theories “according to our purpose” (see Sect. 9.3.2).
- 16.
Frank talks indeed of an action having a “particular property” (48). On the contrary, he apparently considers that values – or rather, preferences – of the first kind cannot be specified in a particular situation (but see my critique below).
- 17.
Frank’s formulation is confused here: “These ‘values’ are recognized by a large group of people and it is hard to understand how the doctrine of the ‘relativity of truth’ could make these people change their preference [i.e. their values of the first kind]” (47, my emphasis). Here, not only does Frank say that the relativity of truth does not apply to values of the first kind, but he also seems to imply that the relativity of truth changes (or can change) one’s values. This contradicts the rest of his book, where he strives to show that the “relativity of truth” does not change the values (this would promote skepticism or agnosticism, which Frank fights), but merely qualifies or specifies them.
Besides, talking of the “relativity of truth” as applied to another value is a misleading formulation, because truth is already a value in itself (and the “truth of another value” does not make any sense). It would have been more correct (and simpler) to just talk of the relativity of the value in question.
- 18.
Here I follow Frank (48–49) who treats only moral values.
- 19.
Frank uses the term “valuation” in the received sense of evaluation (verification of the conformity to an existing value) and not valuation (creation of the value).
- 20.
For the sake of rigor, it would be better to talk of:
– the relativity of values (such as truth or democracy) which have the logical form of concepts: saying that these values (concepts) are relative (and not absolute) means that they are too vague and general, and that descriptive (for truth) or prescriptive (for moral values) statements or principles cannot be evaluated according to these values;
− the relativization of a statement or principle (such as “my head is above my feet”, “John is wicked” or “we should obey God’s will”), which have the logical form of judgments: saying that these statements or principles must be relativized means that their meaning must be specified or qualified relatively to a “frame of reference”.
But for commodity (and following Frank) I will not always make this linguistic distinction.
Frank also talks of the relativization of language (whether scientific or ordinary). This is a metonymical way of speaking. One should rather say that the language in itself remains the same, but the statements (which are formulated in this language) are relativized or qualified, i.e. additional information (expressed in the same language) is appended to the statement, to specify its “frame of reference”.
- 21.
On the next page, there is a strange sentence, somehow contradicting what has just been said: “The inspiring [i.e. absolute] slogans can and must lead our decisions, but they cannot and must not dominate our search for truth.” (56, emphasis added). It seems that Frank acknowledges that our actions are not always rationally motivated (this is the “can”), but the “must” introduces a normative component which is at odds with the rest of his conception.
- 22.
The use of this latter wording also suggests (in addition to “relative”) a kind of inter-subjective agreement on these values, which Frank apparently takes to exist (see e.g. 46, where Frank insists on “the ‘objectivity’ of human values”, whose denial would “imperil the foundations upon which decent human conduct is built”).
- 23.
Thus, “[t]he more we discourage the scientific attitude, which is based on ‘relativism’, the more we run the risk that the ethical or political system which we claim to be ‘absolutely true’ can be superseded in one rush by the opposite creed which other people believe to be ‘absolutely true’” (21).
- 24.
Nemeth’s (2003, 120) formulation, according to which “[Frank] argued [that] science calls into question all absolute knowledge claims and therefore in principle weakens the willingness to believe in absolute values” inherits the ambiguity of Frank’s vocabulary, in spite of her adding that “disbelief in absolute values does not mean disbelief in the objectivity of values”. It may give the impression of mixing the descriptive (with respect to knowledge claims) and normative (with respect to values) levels. But one may be open-minded with respect to knowledge (which entails factual or theoretical statements subject to potential revision), without necessarily putting into question, or relinquishing, one’s values (whether epistemic or not). For example, open-mindedness with respect to the truth of a particular statement does not necessarily entail open-mindedness with respect to the value of truth itself!
- 25.
Frank clearly condemns this (illusional) belief, as he makes clear e.g. on pp. 19–20. To understand how and why “absolute values” could be considered as ramparts against totalitarianism, it would probably be illuminating to study the other contributions of the Conference, especially those endorsing this opinion (compare with footnote 3), but this exceeds the scope of this article.
- 26.
See the quote of p. 12 in the introduction.
- 27.
However, Frank is not consistent in his use of words: see p. 46 where “sceptic”, “relativist” and “agnostic” seem to be taken as synonyms. In the same way, on p. 85, Frank criticizes immovable, “firm ethical convictions” and ethical “principles that are of eternal validity, and not dependent on the advancement of science”: an attitude which could be qualified as skeptic or agnostic in the positive sense (see below).
- 28.
Merton (1942/1973, 277) defines organized skepticism as “the temporary [and not permanent] suspension of judgment and the detached scrutiny of beliefs in terms of empirical and logical criteria”. Merton (1938, 334) explains that “organized scepticism involves a latent questioning of certain bases of established routine, authority, vested procedures and the realm of the ‘sacred’ generally. [...] Most institutions demand unqualified faith; but the institution of science makes scepticism a virtue.”
- 29.
That Frank understands skepticism in this ancient, pejorative sense is clear from e.g. p 30 (where it is associated to the “bankruptcy of science” and the “despair ever to penetrate into the realm of ‘absolute truth’”) or p. 106 (where skepticism in science is implicitly defined as a “lawless doubt of the principles of science”).
- 30.
“The meaning of a concept is defined not by an ‘idea’ of which it is to be the image [like in the ‘idealistic theory of meaning’], but by the observable consequences that we can draw from sentences in which this concept occurs. [...] a concept is identical with the set of operations from which it has been derived” (36).
- 31.
This is a quote from Bridgman (1958, 25).
- 32.
See also footnote 23.
- 33.
It is not about the truth conditions of statements neither (such as in Harman and Thomson 1996).
- 34.
But in fact, these external criteria can also be considered scientific in the large sense of the social sciences (psychology, sociology) (see e.g. Frank 1951; 1956b 1954–55/1956a).
- 35.
“Relativists about science have argued that only with the addition of auxiliary hypotheses could the scientist choose between various theories and that such auxiliary hypotheses are colored by socially and historically grounded norms as well as by personal and group interests” (ibid.). In Frank’s relativism the norms and interests are common (social and political) rather than personal.
- 36.
Here we understand why Uebel (2000, 148) talks of “cheerful anti-realist relativism”.
- 37.
See Barberousse (2011, 220–223) for a systematic critique of the methodological principles of the “Strong Programme”. I will pass over the contradictions inherent in Barnes and Bloor’s (1982) conception, for example the fact that their article (absolutely) assumes the rules of logic (by using the principle of non contradiction p. 22, or with respect to its very argumentative structure), or uses other concepts or terms absolutely (e.g. “primitive cultures” p. 26).
- 38.
Boghossian presents this conception as a consequence of the “social dependence conception of knowledge” (according to which “whether a belief is knowledge necessarily depends at least in part on the contingent social and material setting in which that belief is produced (or maintained)” (pp. 6–7). However, such a social dependence conception of knowledge does not necessarily lead to a “doctrine of equal validity”, as the conception of Frank typically illustrates (which endorses the former, but not the latter claim).
- 39.
See his many writings on the subject in his bibliography in Frank (1998, 290–296).
- 40.
Because of its focus on invariance, Holton (2006, 269) writes that “modern relativity is simple, universal, and, one may even say, ‘absolute’”.
- 41.
It should be clear by now that this acceptation of relativism is not Frank’s.
- 42.
Frank does not treat the empirical thesis of moral relativism noticing the existence of “deep and widespread moral disagreements” (ibid.). Although less visibly, Frank indirectly defends a metaethical thesis of moral relativism (e.g. when claiming p. 90 that “every ethical system consists of the principles and the operational definitions of the terms”), in addition to a semantic thesis based on meaning (“only if a principle is accompanied by operational definitions does it specify a definite way of life”, ibid.).
- 43.
Principles like Kant’s categorical imperative or “obeying God’s will” may be better examples in support of Frank’s position and less vulnerable to my critique below, insofar as they are more complicated to interpret and respect.
- 44.
If we take the shorter definition of killing as taking someone’s life (not necessarily against her will), then there are more obvious cases where the commandment of not killing must be discussed – in particular, if someone else (e.g. a terminally ill patient) asks to be killed (to end his unbearable pain, etc.).
- 45.
For example – and this is a conception I fully endorse – human rights can be considered as standing on top of any other legal (whether national or international) norm, and must therefore be respected absolutely (i.e. whatever the circumstances, and contrary to Frank’s conception).
- 46.
This is what Siegetsleitner (2017, 221) calls “standard relativism”: “If we use ‘evil’ as an evaluative term, morality is indeed relativized to a certain standard. If the standard is held by a certain group, it is also relativized to a certain group—for example, a cultural or religious group. Here, relativization adds the moral standards of said group, the relevant moral system, so to speak. We can call this kind of relativism “standard relativism”. Standard relativism does not imperil objectivity relative to shared standards, but objectivity in this case does not encompass criteria for the right standards. Although Frank does not endorse moral skepticism, standard relativism allows for the perspective that fundamental moral principles are unknowable.” Thus “relativization in morality may also mean a relativism of standards, and where there is no agreement on shared standards, the door is left open for subjectivism and skepticism” (ibid., 225).
- 47.
Even if, of course, some reference frames are more convenient than others for expressing a physical quantity, depending on the problem at hand. But this is just a matter of mathematical formulation, which can be more or less complicated, but can always be equivalently transformed from one reference frame to another. On the contrary, in morality it is not the same thing to choose one reference frame or another. As Frank rightfully remarks, in the case of “John if wicked”, we may chose “God’s will”, or Kant’s categorical imperative, or the “voice of our own conscience” as the “supreme authority” with respect to which wickedness is defined, and the result will vary accordingly.
- 48.
But, since the Enlightenment, it could hardly be so: universal values (e.g. in the French Revolution) and absolute demands (e.g. in Kant) have become common place philosophy.
- 49.
The formulations of Frank (1946, 23) are particularly striking in this respect, where he endorses statements such as “Bombing an enemy city is not killing”, or claims that killing a dictator does not deserve the term “killing”, but rather “liquidating”. As in RRT, he claims that absolute ethical principles “fail to define an exact line of action just in cases in which moral advice is needed the most”, and that “the most ardent advocates of ‘absolute truth’ avail themselves of the doctrine of the ‘relativists’ whenever they have to face a real human issue” (1946, 24). I certainly do not agree, as I show in this section.
- 50.
- 51.
Illustrated for example by Frank’s (1949, 52) summary of RRT, presented as an attempt to “prove that the ‘relativism of science’ has also penetrated every argument about human behavior.” (see footnote 4).
- 52.
It is consistent with Frank’s expanding conception of logical empiricism, as he wrongly incorporates Cassirer’s conception in it (Frank 1938a).
- 53.
I originally wanted to write a few words about Frank’s scientism, but this would take me too far and will be the object of another article. In a nutshell, the idea is that Frank’s taking into account of extra-scientific (in the strict sense of the natural sciences), i.e. psychological, social and political, factors in scientific theory choice, is itself supposed to be resolved scientifically (in the large sense of a “science of man”). This “naturalistic” understanding of extra-scientific factors, as Howard (2003, 62) puts it, leads to the ambition of a “general science of human behaviour” (Frank 1954–55/1956a, 6). This, together with the claim that the “scientific spirit” has permeated all areas of human life, could be taken as illustrative of a certain (mild) scientism, where for example “social conditions [...] produce the conditioned reflexes of the policymakers” (Frank 1954–55/1956a, 15). However, Frank’s position is complex, as he also carefully considers “physics, and science in general, as part of our general pattern of thinking and acting”, “as one of the means of expressing man’s attitude towards the world, the small world of society and politics and the large world that is our astronomical universe” (Frank 1949, 51–52), and warns that “[s]cience cannot be used as a model for the construction of a ‘super-science’ that teaches us on a ‘higher level’ what is ‘good’ in the same way as ordinary science teaches us what is true” (p. 93). Thus Uebel (2003, 162), mentioning the self-reflection of (unified) science on its own theories’ choice which Frank advocates (and which he calls “active positivism”) instead of letting philosophy perform the reflective work from the outside, writes: “It is important that ‘active positivism’ does not defend this autonomy [of unified science from philosophy] for the price of the naturalistic fallacy, by prescribing social goals on purely scientific grounds. Rather, it does so by pointing out the wider contexts into which questions of theory choice are embedded and how the relevant means-ends relations are to be assessed, by providing a scientific analysis of the choice situation.”
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Acknowledgements
I thank Ádám Tuboly for very helpful comments. This work was supported by the MTA Lendület Values and Science Research Group.
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Stamenkovic, P. (2022). Philipp Frank’s Relativism: Presentation, Appreciation, and Critique. In: Damböck, C., Tuboly, A.T. (eds) The Socio-Ethical Dimension of Knowledge. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, vol 26. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80363-6_9
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