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On Why Quine’s Ontological Relativity Requires Reconsideration
We aim to show from a new perspective that Quine’s ontological relativity, based largely on his so-called “proxy-function argument”, falls short of...
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Quine’s conflicts with truth deflationism
Compared to the extensive amount of literature on various themes of W.V.O. Quine’s philosophy, his immanent concept of truth remains a relatively...
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Reconciling Ontic Structural Realism and Ontological Emergence
While ontic structural realism (OSR) has been a central topic in contemporary philosophy of science, the relation between OSR and the concept of...
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How Simplicity Can be a Virtue in Philosophical Theory-Choice
Sober and Huemer have independently argued that simplicity has no place in evaluating philosophical views. In particular, they have argued that the...
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The Ordinary Global
In this paper, I confront various conceptions of meaning and articulate them to anthropological styles of thought: W.V. Quine’s thesis of the...
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Quine, Carnap, and Analyticity
Amongst contemporary naturalists, under Quine’s influence, it is assumed that the rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction is necessary for or...
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Existence Is Not Relativistically Invariant—Part 1: Meta-ontology
Metaphysicians who are aware of modern physics usually follow Putnam (1967) in arguing that Special Theory of Relativity is incompatible with the...
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Carnap, Quine, and the humean condition
In his “Epistemology Naturalized,” Quine embraces a form of Humeanism. In this paper, I try to work out the significance of this Humeanism. In...
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Anti-essentialism, modal relativity, and alternative material-origin counterfactuals
In ordinary language, in the medical sciences, and in the overlap between them, we frequently make claims which imply that we might have had...
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The Enigma of ‘Being There’: Choosing Between Ontology and Epistemology
The aim of this paper is to show, based on Heidegger’s ontology of being and Husserl’s ontological aspects of phenomenology, the ways in which may be...
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Lagrangian possibilities
Natural modalities are often analysed from an abstract point of view where they are associated with putative laws of nature. However, the way...
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The Subject in Carnap, Quine and Others
This chapter is a supplementary demonstration of the problem of subject in contemporary philosophy raised in the last chapter. I will examine more...
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A Kantian-Rooted Pluralist Realism for Science
After the preeminence of logical positivism/empiricism during the most part of twentieth century, during the last decades many authors began to...
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Grace de Laguna’s 1909 critique of analytic philosophy: presentation and defence
Grace A. de Laguna was an American philosopher of exceptional originality. Many of the arguments and positions she developed during the early decades...
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Quantum ontology without textbooks. Nor overlap**
In this paper, I critically assess two recent proposals for an interpretation-independent understanding of non-relativistic quantum mechanics: the...
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Quine’s Ding an sich: Proxies, Structure, and Naturalism
In the fourth Immanuel Kant Lecture, Quine summons the specter of Kant’s Ding an sich, the thing in itself. Clearly antithetical to his naturalism,...
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Duality, Intensionality, and Contextuality: Philosophy of Category Theory and the Categorical Unity of Science in Samson Abramsky
Science does not exist in vacuum; it arises and works in context. Ground-breaking achievements transforming the scientific landscape often stem from...
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Mathematical Pluralism and Indispensability
Pluralist mathematical realism, the view that there exists more than one mathematical universe, has become an influential position in the philosophy...
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Philosophy of Mind: Mind-Body Identity and Eliminative Materialism
A critical outline is given of Rorty’s early, “eliminativist” attempt to formulate a materialist version of the mind-body identity theory that does...
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Sheldon Smith on Newton’s Derivative: Retrospective Assignation, Externalism and the History of Mathematics
To illustrate the view that a speaker can have a partial understanding of a concept, Burge uses the example of Leibniz’s and Newton’s understanding...
