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Salmón, Schiffer and Frege’s Constraint
In his (Philosophical Perspectives 1:455–480, 1987) and (Noûs, 40:361–368, 2006), Schiffer devised a puzzle about Salmón’s (in: Frege’s puzzle, MIT...
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Grundlagen der Arithmetik, §17: Part 1. Frege’s Anticipation of the Deduction Theorem
A running commentary is offered on the first half of Frege’s Grundlagen der Arithmetik, §17, and suggests that Frege anticipated the method of...
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Understanding Frege’s notion of presupposition
Why did Frege offer only proper names as examples of presupposition triggers? Some scholars claim that Frege simply did not care about the full range...
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Frege’s Class Theory and the Logic of Sets
We compare Fregean theorizing about sets with the theorizing of an ontologically non-committal, natural-deduction based, inferentialist. The latter...
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Can Bayesianism Solve Frege’s Puzzle?
Chalmers ( Mind, 125 , 499–510,
2016 ), responding to Braun ( Mind, 125 , 469–497,2016 ), continues arguments from Chalmers ( Mind, 120 , 587–636,2011a )...
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Overcoming Frege’s curse: heuristic reasoning as the basis for teaching philosophy of science to scientists
A lot of philosophy taught to science students consists of scientific methodology. But many philosophy of science textbooks have a fraught...
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Frege on the introduction of real and complex numbers by abstraction and cross-sortal identity claims
In this article, I try to shed new light on Frege’s envisaged definitional introduction of real and complex numbers in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik ...
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Truth and Satisfaction: Frege Versus Tarski
In this chapter I discuss the philosophical presuppositions and consequences of Tarski’s and Frege’s approaches to truth. Tarski’s is the most...
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Two Versions of Meaning Failure: A Contributing Essay to the Explanation of the Split Between Analytical and Phenomenological Continental philosophy
Theories of meaning developed within the analytic tradition, starting with Gottlob Frege, and within continental philosophy, starting with Husserl,...
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An object-centric solution to Edelberg's puzzles of intentional identity
My belief that Socrates was wise, and your belief that Socrates was mortal can be said to have a common focus, insofar as both these thoughts are...
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Grue, Tonk, and Russell’s Paradox: What Follows from the Principle of Propositional Priority?
In this chapter, the structural connections between three paradoxes—Goodman’s ‘grue’, Prior’s ‘tonk’, and Russell’s—are traced. It is argued that...
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Naive Russellians and Schiffer’s Puzzle
Neo-Russellians like Salmon and Braun hold that: ( A ) the semantic contents of sentences are structured propositions whose basic components are...
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The Relational Analysis of Belief Ascriptions and Schiffer’s Puzzle
Using a variant of Schiffer’s puzzle regarding de re belief, I recently presented a new argument against the so-called Naive Russellian theory,...
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Singular concepts
Alonzo Church proposed a powerful and elegant theory of sequences of functions and their arguments as surrogates for Russellian singular propositions...
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The Myth of A-temporality: Time and Progress in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
Having begun his studies in philosophy shortly before, in 1912 the young Wittgenstein was asked to write a review of P. Coffey’s The Science of Logic...
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Rescuing Implicit Definition from Abstractionism
Neo-Fregeans in the philosophy of mathematics hold that the key to a correct understanding of mathematics is the implicit definition of mathematical...
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Perceptual Modes of Presentation as Object Files
Some have defended a Fregean view of perceptual content. On this view, the constituents of perceptual contents are Fregean modes of presentation ...
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Ricoeur: Hermeneutics of Self-Recognition
The chapter identifies self-recognition as a leading insight amongst Ricoeur’s ideas on hermeneutics, a commitment however which, the chapter argues,...
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Logic Discovered and Logic Imposed (A Purim Story)
In his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein said that “turning our whole investigation around” is the only way to shake the illusion of a...
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The Completeness Theorem? So What!
Bolzano reduced inferential validity of the inference (from premise judgements to conclusion judgment) to the holding of logical consequence between...