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What Is Undesirable Belief?
Given trends toward social epistemology, what evidence or reasons we have for beliefs depend upon framework assumptions and practices within our...
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Recklessness, Agent-Relative Prerogatives, and Latent Obligations: Does Belief-Relativity Trump Fact-Relativity with Respect to Our Rights?
Are our rights—to our bodily integrity, to our possessions, to the goods and services promised us, and so on—matters of fact, or are our rights...
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Pritchard on ignorance and normativity
There is a debate on the nature of ignorance in contemporary epistemology. The standard view holds that ignorance is the lack of knowledge, while the...
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Epistemic Blame and the New Evil Demon Problem
The New Evil Demon Problem presents a serious challenge to externalist theories of epistemic justification. In recent years, externalists have...
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Scepticism about epistemic blame
I advocate scepticism about epistemic blame; the view that we have good reason to think there is no distinctively epistemic form of blame....
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Rational Belief in God
Many highly educated people think religious belief is irrational or naïve. This chapter shows the opposite: how religious belief can be, and often...
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Practical reasoning and degrees of outright belief
According to a suggestion by Williamson (Knowledge and its limits, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 99), outright belief comes in degrees: one has a...
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Knowledge as Justified True Belief
What is knowledge? I this paper I defend the claim that knowledge is justified true belief by arguing that, contrary to common belief, Gettier cases...
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Epistemic Reasons Are Not Normative Reasons for Belief
In this paper, I argue against the view that epistemic reasons are normative reasons for belief. I begin by responding to some of the most widespread...
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Bad social norms rather than bad believers: examining the role of social norms in bad beliefs
People with bad beliefs — roughly beliefs that conflict with those of the relevant experts and are maintained regardless of counter-evidence — are...
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Sosa’s virtue account vs. responsibilism
I first present a brief interpretation of Sosa’s virtue epistemology by showing how it is arguably better than Goldman’s process reliabilism, why...
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Epistemically blameworthy belief
When subjects violate epistemic standards or norms, we sometimes judge them blameworthy rather than blameless. For instance, we might judge a subject...
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Radical Pragmatism in the Ethics of Belief
In this paper, I defend the view that only practical reasons are normative reasons for belief. This requires viewing beliefs as the predictable...
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A Plea for Exemptions
Currently popular theories of epistemic responsibility rest on the (perhaps implicit) assumption that justification and excuse exhaust the relevant...
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From moral to epistemic responsibility
This paper originally expands the orthodox conception of moral blameworthiness to account for blameworthiness for conduct and outcomes across...
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Two accounts of assertion
In this paper I will compare two competing accounts of assertion: the knowledge account and the justified belief account. When it comes to the...
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Rescuing a traditional argument for internalism
Early moderns such as Locke and Descartes thought we could guarantee the justification of our beliefs, even in worlds most hostile to their truth, if...
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Refitting the mirrors: on structural analogies in epistemology and action theory
Structural analogies connect Williamson’s (Knowledge and its limits, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000; Acting on knowledge. In: Carter JA,...
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Blameworthiness Implies ‘Ought not’
Here is a crucial principle for debates about moral luck, responsibility, and free will: a subject is blameworthy for an act only if, in acting, she...
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Time-Slice Rationality and Self-Locating Belief
The epistemology of self-locating belief concerns itself with how rational agents ought to respond to certain kinds of indexical information. I argue...