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Chapter and Conference Paper
Cryptographic Protocols for Secure Second-Price Auctions
In recent years auctions have become more and more important in the field of multiagent systems as useful mechanisms for resource allocation, task assignment and last but not least electronic commerce. In many...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
Antisocial Agents and Vickrey Auctions
In recent years auctions have become more and more important in the field of multiagent systems as useful mechanisms for resource allocation and task assignment. In many cases the Vickrey (second-price sealed-...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
Efficient Privacy-Preserving Protocols for Multi-unit Auctions
The purpose of multi-unit auctions is to allocate identical units of a single type of good to multiple agents. Besides well-known applications like the selling of treasury bills, electrical power, or spectrum ...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
On Correctness and Privacy in Distributed Mechanisms
Mechanisms that aggregate the possibly conflicting preferences of individual agents are studied extensively in economics, operations research, and lately computer science. Perhaps surprisingly, the classic lit...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Design Based on Distributed El Gamal Encryption
We propose a set of primitives based on El Gamal encryption that can be used to construct efficient multiparty computation protocols for certain low-complexity functions. In particular, we show how to privatel...
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Article
How to obtain full privacy in auctions
Privacy has become a factor of increasing importance in auction design. We propose general techniques for cryptographic first-price and (M+1)st-price auction protocols that only yield the winners' identities a...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
Symmetries and the Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibrium
Strategic games may exhibit symmetries in a variety of ways. A common aspect, enabling the compact representation of games even when the number of players is unbounded, is that players cannot (or need not) dis...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
PageRank as a Weak Tournament Solution
We observe that ranking systems—a theoretical framework for web page ranking and collaborative filtering introduced by Altman and Tennenholtz—and tournament solutions—a well-studied area of social choice theor...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
On the Hardness and Existence of Quasi-Strict Equilibria
This paper investigates the computational properties of quasi-strict equilibrium, an attractive equilibrium refinement proposed by Harsanyi, which was recently shown to always exist in bimatrix games. We prove...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
Equilibria of Graphical Games with Symmetries
We study graphical games where the payoff function of each player satisfies one of four types of symmetry in the actions of his neighbors. We establish that deciding the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
The Computational Complexity of Weak Saddles
We continue the recently initiated study of the computational aspects of weak saddles, an ordinal set-valued solution concept proposed by Shapley. Brandt et al. gave a polynomial-time algorithm for computing w...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
On the Complexity of Iterated Weak Dominance in Constant-Sum Games
In game theory, a player’s action is said to be weakly dominated if there exists another action that, with respect to what the other players do, is never worse and sometimes strictly better. We investigate the...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
The Complexity of Computing Minimal Unidirectional Covering Sets
Given a binary dominance relation on a set of alternatives, a common thread in the social sciences is to identify subsets of alternatives that satisfy certain notions of stability. Examples can be found in are...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play
Fictitious play is a simple learning algorithm for strategic games that proceeds in rounds. In each round, the players play a best response to a mixed strategy that is given by the empirical frequencies of act...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
Tournament Solutions and Their Applications to Multiagent Decision Making
Given a finite set of alternatives and choices between all pairs of alternatives, how to choose from the entire set in a way that is faithful to the pairwise comparisons? This simple, yet captivating, problem ...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
From Arrow’s Impossibility to Schwartz’s Tournament Equilibrium Set
Perhaps the most influential result in social choice theory is Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which states that a seemingly modest set of desiderata cannot be satisfied when aggregating preferences [1]. While ...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
Pareto Optimality in Coalition Formation
A minimal requirement on allocative efficiency in the social sciences is Pareto optimality. In this paper, we identify a far-reaching structural connection between Pareto optimal and perfect partitions that ha...
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Article
The Computational Complexity of Weak Saddles
We study the computational aspects of weak saddles, an ordinal set-valued solution concept proposed by Shapley. F. Brandt et al. recently gave a polynomial-time algorithm for computing weak saddles in a subcla...
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Article
On the Complexity of Iterated Weak Dominance in Constant-Sum Games
In game theory, an action is said to be weakly dominated if there exists another action of the same player that, with respect to what the other players do, is never worse and sometimes strictly better. We inve...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
On Popular Random Assignments
One of the most fundamental and ubiquitous problems in microeconomics and operations research is how to assign objects to agents based on their individual preferences. An assignment is called popular if there ...