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Article
How to obtain full privacy in auctions
Privacy has become a factor of increasing importance in auction design. We propose general techniques for cryptographic first-price and (M+1)st-price auction protocols that only yield the winners' identities a...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
On Correctness and Privacy in Distributed Mechanisms
Mechanisms that aggregate the possibly conflicting preferences of individual agents are studied extensively in economics, operations research, and lately computer science. Perhaps surprisingly, the classic lit...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Design Based on Distributed El Gamal Encryption
We propose a set of primitives based on El Gamal encryption that can be used to construct efficient multiparty computation protocols for certain low-complexity functions. In particular, we show how to privatel...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
Efficient Privacy-Preserving Protocols for Multi-unit Auctions
The purpose of multi-unit auctions is to allocate identical units of a single type of good to multiple agents. Besides well-known applications like the selling of treasury bills, electrical power, or spectrum ...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
Antisocial Agents and Vickrey Auctions
In recent years auctions have become more and more important in the field of multiagent systems as useful mechanisms for resource allocation and task assignment. In many cases the Vickrey (second-price sealed-...
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Chapter and Conference Paper
Cryptographic Protocols for Secure Second-Price Auctions
In recent years auctions have become more and more important in the field of multiagent systems as useful mechanisms for resource allocation, task assignment and last but not least electronic commerce. In many...