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Oblivious RAM-Based Secure Processors

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Encyclopedia of Cryptography, Security and Privacy

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Definitions

Processors that use oblivious RAM algorithms to hide its access pattern to untrusted storage devices.

Background

A secure processor typically refers to a small piece of trusted hardware that serves as the trusted computing base for processing private and sensitive data. From a security perspective, it is desirable to make the trusted computing base as small as possible, preferably a single-chip processor. In this paradigm, the main memory and disk are untrusted, and trusted single-chip secure processors or secure enclaves (Intel, 2013) need to use an oblivious RAM (ORAM) algorithm to hide its access pattern to these untrusted external storage components.

Recent Results

Path ORAM (Stefanov et al., 2013, 2018) is the most embraced choice in secure processor designs due to its concretely efficiency, small client storage, and, perhaps most importantly, its conceptual simplicity. The Ascend secure processor (Fletcher et al., 2012; Ren et al., 2019), the Phantom secure processor...

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA

    Ling Ren

Authors
  1. Ling Ren
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ling Ren .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Secure Information Systems, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, VA, USA

    Sushil Jajodia

  2. University of Milan, Milan, Italy

    Pierangela Samarati

  3. Google Inc, New York, NY, USA

    Moti Yung

Section Editor information

  1. Department of Electronics, Information and Bioengineering (DEIB), Politecnico di Milano, Milano, Italy

    Gerardo Pelosi

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Ren, L. (2023). Oblivious RAM-Based Secure Processors. In: Jajodia, S., Samarati, P., Yung, M. (eds) Encyclopedia of Cryptography, Security and Privacy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27739-9_1553-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27739-9_1553-1

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-27739-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-27739-9

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