Abstract
Consent is what allows us to tell others whether their actions unto us are acceptable from our point of view. Proceeding with an action without our consent, or after consent has been refused, would constitute a moral wrongdoing. However, consent is only required for giving moral evaluation to actions that are directed towards other actors and affect them. An action can be considered as intended towards another person if it interferes with this person’s “zones of control”—borders of physical objects with which one creates a particular relationship. This relationship is ownership—it assumes that any hindrance to the use of the object without the consent of the owner is a wrongdoing. Ownership comes from the direct control of bodies, and original appropriation of external objects and voluntary transfers forms the foundation of property rights—violation against property is a violation against the owner. A legal system based on the idea that property rights violations constitute an offence recognises the validity of the non-aggression principle. The non-aggression principle prohibits the initiation of force, which is understood as an action of border crossing without the owner’s consent. The concept of consent and the concept of borders are ontologically based on communication, which means that communication is the basis of the non-aggression principle.
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Slutskiy, P. (2021). The Role of Property Rights in the Ethics of Consent. In: Communication and Libertarianism. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-6664-0_6
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