Abstract
This chapter covers uses of the concept of “ideology” in social psychological studies of social inequalities. I begin by exploring some ways that ideology has (and has not) been incorporated into research by sociological social psychologists and stratification scholars via an examination of several key sourcebooks published in these subfields over the past several decades. Subsequently, I provide some theoretical background on the relationship between ideology and social stratification (e.g., legitimation), as well as on relevant theoretical perspectives from sociological social psychology (e.g., social structure and personality) highlighting the importance of specifying relationships between social structure, culture, and the person. Building on this foundation, I turn to discussion of (1) the nature of ideologies as organized belief-systems, (2) implications of such for the intrapersonal organization of thought, and (3) selected antecedents of and consequences of individual-level patterns of ideological belief-adherence. I conclude with some suggestions for future research, including ways that sociological and psychological approaches complement one another and represent potentially fruitful sites of collaboration in advancing our understanding of the relationship between inequality, ideology, and the person.
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Notes
- 1.
Eighteenth century Enlightenment philosopher Antoine Destutt de Tracy was the first to use the term ideology to describe a “science of ideas” most closely related to today’s sociology of knowledge (Jost et al. 2008). Later, two broadly different usages of the term—one critical and one more value-neutral—emerged with (and following) the work of Marx and Engels (1845). The critical stance frames ideology primarily as an agent of mystification and obfuscation—i.e., as sets of ideas generating false consciousness, and designed to mask exploitation in social relations. Contemporary usages in this vein can be found in Marxist and Feminist sociologies, as well as in selected research programs within political psychology—e.g., system justification theory and social dominance theory (Jost and Sidanius 2004). That said, most social scientific research over the past half-century has used more value-neutral conceptions of ideology to describe relatively abstract systems of beliefs, values, and attitudes that organize and constrain thought (Knight 2006). For useful discussions of the critical/value-neutral distinction, see Jost (2006) and Jost et al. (2008).
- 2.
The study of ideology entails considerable epistemological debate amongst scholars across, and within, fields of study. Space limitations and the focus of the current volume preclude detailed exploration of these primarily philosophical matters. That said, Huber and Form’s (1973) Income and Ideology (especially Ch. 3), provides a useful treatment of epistemological issues within the sociological study of ideology, including the implications of what Geertz (1964, p. 48) has called Mannheim’s Paradox—i.e., the notion that, “if all knowledge is socially determined, then valid scientific knowledge is not possible… If every attempt at knowing is a function of one’s place in society, relativism is inescapable…The doctrine of relativism implies that sociology cannot be a science. Ultimately, it implies that science is not possible” (pp. 45–46 italics added). Huber and Form’s (1973) position on this matter, with which I concur, is that:
Students of society can do a number of things to improve the study of ideology. While such study may be socially influenced by forces acting on the scientist, those influences do not necessarily determine the outcome of the analysis. It is possible to reduce the ideological element in social science research even if it cannot be completely eliminated at the present stage of development of the discipline. To abandon the attempt at scientific analysis is to invite capture by any and every interest. (p. 61, italics added)
- 3.
This anecdotal evidence of increased attention over the years—in the form of a chapter authored by a team of psychologists in the most recent social psychology sourcebook I examined—may reflect the resurgence of interest in ideology within the field of psychology over the past 15 years (Jost et al. 2008, 2009).
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
Della Fave (1980) argues that legitimation can function with respect to any of four different system levels: a particular leader; a particular regime; a system of political economy; and, stratification itself. De-legitimation is less likely at ever-higher levels of abstraction—i.e., a leader or even an entire government may be forced out of power without fundamentally challenging the political economy, let alone stratification itself.
- 7.
The 2008 economic crisis may represent a classic “precipitating event” which released latent discontent following decades of growing inequality and declining social mobility.
- 8.
Interestingly, House’s definition of culture (particularly the phrase “beliefs about what is or what ought to be”) closely resembles some prevailing definitions of ideology. For instance, Huber and Form (1973) assert that “in contemporary industrial societies, an ideology is the rhetoric of a population concerning the way institutions actually function and the way they ought to function (p. 60, italics added). Similarly, political psychologists Jost et al. (2009) write, ideologies seek to “describe or interpret the world as it is—by making assertions or assumptions about human nature, historical events, present realities, and future possibilities—and to envision the world as it should be, specifying acceptable means of attaining social, economic, and political ideals” (p. 309, italics added). What these share with House’s definition of culture (and with each other), is explicit reference to what Huber and Form (1973) call the existential and normative tenets of ideology—i.e. references to both “what is” (a description of things) and “what should be” (a value-based, evaluative stance).
- 9.
Kluegel and Smith (1986), in their seminal study of stratification ideology, echo many of the emphases of both Huber and Form (1973) and Della Fave (1974)—particularly the notion that Americans’ thinking about inequality is shaped by both a dominant (hegemonic) ideology of individualism, and by various (more egalitarian) system-challenging alternatives. One implication of this (explored in greater detail below) is that most Americans’ thinking about inequality involves a combination of hegemonic and system-challenging belief-elements.
- 10.
Space restrictions preclude discussion of such ideologies in detail. But, see Davis and Greenstein (2009) for a recent review of research on gender ideology, emphasizing the notion of separate spheres for men and women vis-à-vis paid work and family responsibilities. See also Kane’s important work on beliefs about gender inequality (1992, 1995), and Jackman’s (1994) important treatment of inter-group ideologies governing gender, race, and class-based inequality. Finally, regarding ideological beliefs about the etiology of sexual orientation and support for related public policies (e.g., gay marriage, etc.), see: Wood and Bartkowski 2004; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008; Powell et al. 2010.
- 11.
For Bonilla-Silva (2006), colorblind ideology accomplishes this goal via four key frames that are commonly invoked by white Americans in their reasoning and language regarding race: abstract liberalism, naturalization, cultural racism, and the minimization of racism. Abstract liberalism reflects long-standing, individualistic strains of American political culture (Hartz 1955) that render group-based claims and grievances beyond the bounds of legitimate political discourse. Naturalization refers to persons’ tendencies to frame the status quo as the natural outgrowth of benign human preferences (e.g., racial residential segregation as the outcome of “neutral ethnocentrism” on the part racial minorities and majorities alike, rather than an outgrowth of active discrimination against minorities). Cultural racism refers to the above-mentioned tendency to explain racial inequality with reference to the cultural “deficiencies” of minorities (e.g., lack of will power to succeed), while the minimization of racism refers to the above-mentioned denials regarding the role of discrimination and/or other structural sources of black disadvantage.
- 12.
This, of course, assumes Converse’s definition of ideology, which has its share of critics. Jost (2006, p. 653) reviews several alternative viewpoints, including that of sociologist C. Wright Mills (1960/1968) who wrote, “It is a kindergarten fact that any political reflection that is of possible political significance is ideological: in its terms policies, institutions, men of power are criticized or approved” (p. 130). Further, to the extent that many Americans do not fit Converse’s model of the ideologue, Feldman (1988) advocates a focus on core beliefs and values (e.g., support for notions such as equality of opportunity and capitalist free enterprise) as important sources of structure, consistency, and organization in Americans’ political attitudes. As Feldman notes, “political evaluations may be based, in part, on the extent to which policies and actions are consistent or inconsistent with certain important beliefs and values. Viewed this way, people do not need to be ideologues in order to evaluate politics on the basis of beliefs and values.” (p. 418)
- 13.
Kluegel and Smith (1986), in Chap. 2 of their pioneering work, review a wide range of social psychological research providing the foundations of their perspective on how Americans think about inequality. I refer the reader to that chapter in the original, rather than trying to reiterate its many important points and insights.
- 14.
Such reasoning can be traced to thinkers such as Levi-Strauss (1966) who hold that such “bipolar” dichotomies are the result of oppositional human thought processes rooted in the structure of the mind.
- 15.
As such, Bobo (1991) argues against what he characterizes as the “consensus on individualism” position of most accounts of American public opinion (which treat individualism as a true “dominant ideology.” Instead, he argues, individualism retains its appearance as a hegemonic value in the larger society not because of the lack of alternatives, but rather because of the lack of political influence and low status of persons most committed to egalitarian beliefs.
- 16.
This greater minority dual consciousness was interpreted in line with Mann’s (1970) observation that relatively disadvantaged groups are more likely to combine seemingly inconsistent beliefs. Also considered was the possibility that individualistic and structuralist explanations may both be more salient to ethno-racial minorities given their greater average geographic and social proximity to the poor. The exposure-based geographic hypothesis found support in a study by Merolla et al. (2011), who observed a positive association between persons’ geographic proximity to concentrated disadvantage (measured at the zip-code level) and the dual consciousness belief pattern (measured at the individual-level). These authors suggest that living in closer proximity to poverty may reinforce both sides of the deserving/undeserving poor dichotomy in American public opinion (Gans 1995).
- 17.
Such neo-Marxian work includes (1) the Critical Theorists (Habermas 1970; Horkheimer 1972; Marcuse 1964), who turned to an analysis of culture in an effort to preserve Marxist theory in the face of the predictive failures that hallmark the twentieth century (Zaret 1992), and (2) the so-called Hegelian Marxists such as Gramsci (1971) who, drawing primarily on Marx’s earlier philosophical writings, contributed concepts such as “hegemony” to our understanding of the role of culture as a barrier to revolutionary social change. Such forces are believed to operate by dominating or colonizing the consciousness of potentially recalcitrant groups (Habermas 1987) in a way that renders even the desire for radical social change unlikely. Thus, whereas functionalists view societal consensus as healthy, natural, and productive of social integration, Marxists view this consensus as the result of exploitation, coercion, and the exercise of ruling-class power creating a barrier to emancipation and progressive social change.
- 18.
Huber and Form (1973) argue similarly that, since ideologies exist to legitimate unequal social arrangements which benefit some groups more than others, those in the dominant strata, following simple self-interest, are expected to evaluate the status quo as more legitimate than will subordinate strata. In their words, “those who profit most from the system are most likely to believe that both the normative and empirical statements in the dominant ideology are true” (p. 10).
- 19.
Kluegel and Smith (1986) devote separate chapters to explanations of economic outcomes (e.g., attributions for wealth and poverty) and related issues of distributive justice (e.g., beliefs about the justice of inequality in principle and about whether the current distribution of rewards—such as the income received by persons in different occupations—is fair). Summarizing their observations from these chapters, Kluegel and Smith (1986) note a paradox: “On the one hand, most Americans believe that as individuals the wealthy have merited their positions through superior talent and effort. On the other hand, most Americans also believe that the average incomes from the occupations that the wealthy typically hold are too high in proportion to their contributions to society” (p. 121). Kluegel and Smith note that such findings confirm a key hypothesis of prior work (e.g., Alves and Rossi 1978; Jasso and Rossi 1977; Rainwater 1974) that “many Americans would prefer a more restricted range of incomes in the ideal than currently exists” (p. 122). More recent studies extend the examination of Americans’ beliefs about distributive justice to cross-national settings (Kelley and Evans 1993; Osberg and Smeeding 2006).
- 20.
Along these lines, an “enlightenment” thesis associated with the effects of education holds that higher levels of education increase social liberalism by exposing persons to more accurate information about intergroup relations and inequalities (Hyman and Wright 1979; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Robinson and Bell 1978). However, Mary Jackman (e.g., Jackman and Muha 1984) has challenged this assessment, arguing that education is, first and foremost, a component of SES and, as such, the primary effect of higher levels of education is the maintenance of privilege. Specifically, Jackman’s “ideological refinement” perspective holds that education socializes persons into the use of socially liberal, politically correct language that masks underlying prejudice toward the disadvantage and a calculated defense of group-interests. Seen this way, the effects of education are primarily conservative in their implications, as they foster a surface-level liberalism on matters of (general) principle while at the same time reducing support for redistributive policies designed to actually reduce inequality.
- 21.
See Kluegel and Smith (1981, pp. 37–38) for further discussion of various “blockage theses”—i.e., ideologically-based barriers to the formation of full class consciousness (in the traditional Marixan sense) among working class persons.
- 22.
Specifically, SDT draws most closely from: authoritarian personality theory (Adorno et al. 1950), Rokeach’s (1973) two-value theory of political beliefs; Blumer’s (1958) group position theory; Marxist and neoclassical elite theories (Michels 1911/1962; Mosca 1896/1939; Pareto 1901/1979); social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986), evolutionary psychology (Reynolds, Falger and Vine 1987), and results from a variety of political attitude and public opinion research (Sidanius and Pratto 1999, p. 31).
- 23.
Sidanius and Pratto (1999) offer a thorough review of the literature in their Ch. 1, which covers Psychological theories (i.e., Frustration-Aggression, Authoritarian Personality Uncertainty/Anxiety models), Value and Value Conflict models (e.g., social-cognitive approaches to stereoty**), Social Psychological theories (e.g., socialization/social learning; modern racism; realistic group conflict; social identity theory), Social structural/elite theories (e.g., group position; Marxism; Neo-Classical Elite), and Evolutionary Theory (pp. 3–30).
- 24.
LMs are further differentiated by their potency, which refers to the “degree to which it will help promote, maintain, or overthrow a given group-based hierarchy” (p. 46). Potency is itself a function of several factors, including: mediational strength, which refers to the degree to which it serves as an important link between persons’ SDO levels and their support for hierarchy-enhancing (HE) or hierarchy-attenuating (HA) social policies. Other aspects of potency include consensuality (the degree to which relevant ideologies are broadly shared), embeddedness (the degree to which an LM is strongly anchored in other dimensions of a culture), and, certainty (the degree to which an LM appears to have “moral, religious, or scientific” truth) (p. 46–47).
- 25.
For more on how political elites (e.g., elected officials, party leaders, media representatives) accomplish this “communication process,” see Jost et al. (2009, p. 315–317).
- 26.
Needs for certainty (e.g., cognitive closure) and security (e.g., terror management) are both associated with conservative/right-wing issue positions (Greenberg et al. 1997; Jost et al. 2003), while socialization by parents, peers, and reference groups (Jennings and Niemi 1981; Jost et al. 2008), as well as motives for social identification and affiliation (Fiske 2004), influence the nexus between needs for solidary and ideological self-placement.
- 27.
Another important line of inquiry on the relationship between ideologies and emotions is found in Hochschild (1979,1990). As she notes, “rules for managing feeling are implicit in any ideological stance; they are the ‘bottom side’ of ideology” (1979, p. 556). Her “emotion management” perspective thus acts as a corrective to the tendency of scholarship to construe ideology as a “flatly cognitive framework, lacking systematic implications for how we manage feelings, or, indeed, for how we feel” (1979, p. 566). See also Schwalbe et al. (2000, p. 434–439) on the nexus between emotion management and the reproduction of inequality.
- 28.
Evaluations of issues, parties and candidates include political behavior such as voting (e.g., Left-wing identification leads to greater support for liberal candidates, etc.), as well as value orientations and justice judgments such as including attributions for inequalities (p. 324). Intergroup attitudes include stereotypes, prejudice, and intolerance toward a host of out-groups (p. 325).
- 29.
Sidanius and Pratto (1999) highlight some of their contributions, as follows: “While the ideas of Marx, Gramsci, Pareto, Mosca, and Moscovici all suggest that ideology justifies group dominance, these ideas provide us with no empirical standard for testing whether any given ideology actually does so in any given situation….The notion of mediation provides us with a relatively crisp empirical standard by which to judge whether a given ideology or belief is functioning as an LM. Namely, a given belief, attitude, opinion, or attribution can be classified as an LM if and only if it is found to have a mediational relationship between the desire for group-based social dominance on the one hand and support for HE and HA social policy on the other hand” (p. 48).
- 30.
- 31.
These points are also reminiscent of key tenets of the “negotiated order” perspective within symbolic interactionism (Strauss 1978; Maines 1977)—a point I return to in the final section of this chapter. I thank the editors for this insight.
- 32.
More specifically, Della Fave argues that advantaged and disadvantaged actors alike tend to see advantaged actors’ abilities (e.g., to control the larger environment) and societal “contributions” as greater. This results in (1) higher self-evaluations for the advantaged and (2) a societal consensus on the legitimacy of existing reward-levels (i.e., objectively disadvantaged persons with low self-evaluations are especially unlikely to challenge to the status quo). While empirical support for Della Fave’s theory has been mixed (e.g., both Stolte (1983) and Shepelak (1987) failed to substantiate the expectation that disadvantaged actors would tend to see their reward levels as deserved), Della Fave (1986) argues some of these predictive failures likely stem from inadequate measures of self-evaluation as he outlines the construct in his work (i.e., scales measuring “self-esteem” do not adequately capture the perception of one’s own ability to control the larger socio-political environment).
- 33.
Hunt (2001) has also demonstrated how two other aspects other aspects of persons’ self-concepts—self-esteem and personal mastery—shape ideological accounts of poverty (with self-esteem observed to be more consequential for adherence to individualistic beliefs, and mastery more closely-aligned with system-blaming, structuralist outlooks).
- 34.
While beyond the scope of this chapter, the project of develo** a truly comprehensive, multi-level account of ideological processes would require specification the organizational bases from which ideologies are propagated and resisted—i.e., the roles played by schools (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977; MacLeod 2009), the media (Gilens 1999), churches (Emerson and Smith 2000) and other institutions. While not on ideology per se, Kohn’s (1969) and Kohn and Schooler’s (1983) research specifying the role of occupational conditions linking persons social class locations and their psychological orientations is exemplary in this regard.
- 35.
To their credit, Jost et al. (2009) attempt to make certain such linkages via the concept of elective affinities, though their conception of House’s components principle is largely limited to the notion of an elite-sponsored (cultural) super-structure, and their conception of the proximity principle is not well-developed.
- 36.
In specifying such, Schwalbe et al. (2000) draw heavily on the “negotiated order” perspective, which they summarize as critical of “the tendency to reify organizations, institutions, and systems, arguing that these social entities must be understood as recurrent patterns of joint action. We take from this the implication that the reproduction of inequality, even when it appears thoroughly institutionalized, ultimately depends on face-to-face interaction, which therefore must be studied as part of understanding the reproduction of inequality” (p. 420, italics added).
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Hunt, M. (2014). Ideologies. In: McLeod, J., Lawler, E., Schwalbe, M. (eds) Handbook of the Social Psychology of Inequality. Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9002-4_14
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