Abstract
In this paper I attempt to provide a brief introduction to the thesis of the indeterminacy of radical translation, as this is presented in Chapter Two of Quine’s Word and Object. I begin by explaining what the thesis is, as I conceive it. Then I consider how one might defend the thesis. Finally I examine several aspects of Quine’s discussion of the thesis.
I have benefited from reading unpublished work of Howard Darmstadter, Ronald de Sousa, and Steve Stich. This work was supported in part by a grant from the National Endowment in the Humanities (# H-67-0-28).
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This has been argued in several places by Noam Chomsky. See e. g. his Cartesian Linguistics, Harper and Row, New York 1966.
Miller, Galanter, and Pribram, Plans and the Structure of Behavior, Henry Holt, New York, 1960; Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass., 1965; Gilbert Harman, Galanter, and Pribram, Plans and the Structure of Behavior, Henry Holt, New York, 1960; Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass., 1965; Gilbert Harman, ‘Psychological Aspects of the Theory of Syntax’, Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967) 73–87; Harman, ‘Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation’, American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1968) 164–173.
As in Jerrold J. Katz, The Philosophy of Language, Harper and Row, New York 1966. Cf. my review in Harvard Educational Review 36 (1966) 558–63.
Quine claims the most accuracy for his substitutes when they are applied to ‘observation sentences’. But he so defines ‘observation sentence’ that the conjunction of an observation sentence with a stimulus analytic sentence (a sentence that everyone in the community firmly accepts so that no brief perceptual experience could lead them to give it up) is another observation sentence with the same stimulus meaning as the first (although, e. g. one would not ordinarily take these sentences to be ‘synonymous’). I discuss the nature of Quine’s enterprise in providing such substitutes for outmoded notions in ‘Quine on Meaning and Existence’, Review of Metaphysics 31 (1967) 124-151, 343–367.
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© 1969 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Harman, G. (1969). An Introduction to ‘Translation and Meaning’ Chapter Two of Word and Object . In: Davidson, D., Hintikka, J. (eds) Words and Objections. Synthese Library, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1709-1_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1709-1_3
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