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Replies

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Words and Objections

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 21))

Abstract

In the first half of his paper Smart describes my position clearly, correctly, and approvingly. It is a pleasure to be thus understood and agreed with.

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References

References

  1. Robert Kirk, ‘Translation and Indeterminacy’, Mind (forthcoming).

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  2. Gilbert Harman, ‘Quine on Meaning and Existence’, Review of Metaphysics 21 (1967) 124–151, 343–367, specifically pp. 142ff.

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References

  1. Hilary Putnam, ‘The “Innateness Hypothesis” and Explanatory Models in Linguistics’, Synthese 17 (1967) 12–22.

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  2. When Chomsky finds “this factual assumption far from obvious”, he is assuming that the mechanism of conditioned response has to apply simply to each of the innumerable sentences as an unstructured whole. I discussed this misunderstanding in § 2 of the present reply.

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References

  1. Reply to Professor Marcus’, in The Ways of Paradox And Other Essays, p. 181.

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  2. Existence and Quantification’, in Fact and Existence (ed. by J. Margolis ), Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1969.

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References

  1. Cf. ‘Carnap and Logical Truth’, in The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, pp. 104f.

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References

  1. Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in From a Logical Point of View, p. 33.

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  2. I made a point of this superiority in ‘Carnap and Logical Truth’, in The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, p. 123.

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  3. P. F. Strawson, ‘Propositions, Concepts, and Logical Truth’, Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1957) 15–25.

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References

  1. See Anders Wedberg, ‘On the Principles of Phonemic Analysis’, Ajatus 26 (1964) 235–253.

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  2. See Word and Object, pp. 111, 140f.

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  3. See Principia Mathematica, 2nd ed., I, p. 24.

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References

  1. See ‘On an Application of Tarski’s Theory of Truth’, in my Selected Logic Papers, pp. 144f.

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  2. Anatomy of Inquiry, pp. 108ff.

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References

  1. Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’, in The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, p. 188.

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  2. Robert Sleigh, ‘On Quantifying into Epistemic Contexts’, Nous 1 (1967) 1-31, p. 28. See also Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief pp. 141–144.

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  3. From a Logical Point of View, 2nd ed., 1961, pp. 152f.

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  4. A. F. Smullyan, ‘Modality and Description’, Journal of Symbolic Logic 13 (1948) 31 - 37.

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  5. Dagfinn Follesdal, ‘Knowledge, Identity, and Existence’, Theoria 33 (1967) 1–27.

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References

  1. Dagfinn Follesdal, ‘Knowledge, Identity, and Existence’, Theoria 33 (1967) 1 - 27.

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  2. N. L. Wilson, ‘Substances without Substrata’, Review of Metaphysics 12 (1959) 521 - 539.

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  3. In a 1965 lecture ‘Propositional Objects’, forthcoming in Critica, I explored this possibility somewhat.

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  4. See the last paragraph of my reply to Sellars.

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  5. R. M. Chisholm, ‘Identity through Possible Worlds’, Nous 1 (1967) 1–8.

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  6. Word and Object, pp. 164, 168, 192, 194.

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  7. Word and Object, p. 216. The term ‘attitudinative’ is a classroom addition.

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  8. See my adjoining reply to Davidson, and see his ‘Truth and Meaning’, Synthese 17 (1967) 304–323.

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References

  1. Dana Scott, ‘Quine’s Individuals’, in Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science (ed. by E. Nagel, P. Suppes, and A. Tarski ), Stanford 1962.

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  2. A. A. Fraenkel, ‘Der Begriff “definit” und die Unabhängigkeit des Auswahlsaxioms’, Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phys.-math. Kl., 1922, 253–257.

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  3. See my Set Theory and Its Logic, § 41.

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  4. See op. cit.,§ 42.

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  5. By ML, of course, I mean the system of the revised edition of Mathematical Logic, which incorporates Wang’s repair of an earlier inconsistency.

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  6. Hao Wang,’A Formal System of Logic’, Journal of Symbolic Logic 15 (1950) 25–32. Or see Set Theory and Its Logic, § 44.

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Authors
  1. W. V. Quine
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Princeton University, USA

    Donald Davidson

  2. University of Helsinki, Finland

    Jaakko Hintikka

  3. Stanford University, USA

    Jaakko Hintikka

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© 1969 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Quine, W.V. (1969). Replies. In: Davidson, D., Hintikka, J. (eds) Words and Objections. Synthese Library, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1709-1_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1709-1_17

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0602-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-1709-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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