On the Consistency of a Slight (?) Modification of Quine’s New Foundations

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Words and Objections

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 21))

Abstract

Quine’s system of set theory, New Foundations (NF), can be conveniently formalized as a first-order theory containing two predicates ≡ (identity) and ε (set membership). One of the most attractive features of NF is its simplicity. Apart from the rules and axioms of first-order identity logic, we need only two specifically set theoretical axiom schemes: the extensionality axiom: (Ext) \(\wedge z(z \in x \leftrightarrow z \in y) \to x \equiv y,\) and the set abstraction schema: (Abst) \(\vee y\, \wedge x(x \in y \leftrightarrow \mathfrak{A}),\) where y is not free in \(\mathfrak{A}\) and \(\mathfrak{A}\) is stratified (as usual, we call a formula stratified if indices can be assigned to its variables in such a manner that it becomes a formula of simple type theory).

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Bibliography

  1. A. Ehrenfeucht, and A. Mostowski, ‘Models of Axiomatic Theories admitting Automorphism’, Fundament a Mathematica 43 (1956) 50–68.

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References

  1. Cf. [6].

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  2. The unprovability of Inf can also be demonstrated directly by exhibiting a model, as will be apparent from the proof of Theorem 1.

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  3. Written out in full S2-S4 read: \(\vee z\, \wedge u(u \in z \leftrightarrow u = x\, \vee \,u = y)\) \(\vee z\, \wedge u(u \in z \leftrightarrow \vee y: \in x\,\,\,\,u \in y)\) \(\vee z\, \wedge u(u \in z \leftrightarrow u \subset x).\)

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  4. We write ⊧ M \(\mathfrak{A}\) [u 1,…, u n] to mean: <u 1,…,u n> satisfies \(\mathfrak{A}\) in the model M. Frequently we use an even more abbreviated notation; e. g. ⊧ M u 0ϕ for ⊧ M (xϕ) [u 0].

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  5. i.e. U 0* = {xU 2∣ ⊧ N (x is a finite cardinal)}

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  6. Thi.s method of proof appears to have been first used by Ehrenfeucht and Mostowski in [1]

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  7. R0is provable as a schema in elementary number theory.

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  8. If Ind held, we could define the notion W n(x) of truth for prenex NFU statements with ⩽ n quantifiers. We could also define the notion P(x) of provability in first-order predicate logic. By Herbrand’s theorem, if a statement with ⩽ n quantifiers is provable in predicate logic, then there exists a proof in which no formula has more than n quantifiers. Hence, by Ind, we could prove in NFU:P(\(\mathfrak{A}\)) ↔ W n(\(\mathfrak{A}\)) for all NFU statements \(\mathfrak{A}\) with ⩽ n quantifiers. In particular, taking \(\mathfrak{A}\) as an axiomatization of NFU, we have: W n(\(\mathfrak{A}\)), therefore: \(\left. {\overline {\, {} \,}}\! \right| P(\left. {\overline {\, {} \,}}\! \right| \mathfrak{A})\), which would give us a consistency proof for NFU within NFU itself, thus violating Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem.

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  9. i.e. Ext, the pair set axiom, the sum set axiom, the replacement axiom, the power set axiom, and the axiom of infinity.

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  10. More precisely, there is an r such that, ⊧ M (r is a linear ordering) and {xy| ⊧ M (<x,y>εr)} is of type α.

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  11. We identify cardinals with their corresponding initial ordinals.

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  12. cf(δ) is the smallest ordinal which is cofinal with δ. Thus cf(δ) > λ says that any partition of δ into λ parts must have at least one part of cardinality δ.

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  13. i.e. Vx = \(\begin{array}{*{20}{c}} { \cup \mathfrak{B}{V_v}} \\ {v < x} \end{array}\)

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  14. Morley has used similar methods to obtain ω-models with collections of indiscernibles.

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© 1969 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Jensen, R.B. (1969). On the Consistency of a Slight (?) Modification of Quine’s New Foundations . In: Davidson, D., Hintikka, J. (eds) Words and Objections. Synthese Library, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1709-1_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1709-1_16

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0602-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-010-1709-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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