Abstract
The restructuring of firms in Eastern Europe still requires massive amounts of investment. At the same time, the process of restructuring is creating high unemployment. The problems of raising capital and fighting unemployment would have to be faced even if the transformation process were functioning organically and smoothly. They are, however, aggravated by the fact that there hardly existed a financial infrastructure in Eastern Europe. Capital markets needed to be built up at the same time. In the communist regime, private investment and private savings were operating only to a very limited extent. Private firms could not borrow to finance investment, and the main means of savings by households had been either stockpiling of goods or money deposits. The liberalization of financial markets was likely to promote private savings. As long as capital markets were not well established, however, the channeling of savings to the most efficient forms of investment would have been impeded, limiting expected efficiency gains.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
AGP (Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Förderung der Partnerschaft in der Wirtschaft) (1992), Mitarbeiterbeteiligung im Freistaat Sachsen — 15 Praxisbeispiele, Kassel.
Demougin, D./ Sinn, H.W. (1994), Privatization, Risk Taking and the Communist Firm, Journal of Public Economics 55(2), 203–231.
Fink, U. (1992), Aufschwung durch Arbeitnehmer-Kapital, Die Zeit, No.20, 8.5.1992.
Grossman, S./ Hart, O. (1983), Implicit Contracts under Asymmetric Information, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98,Supplement, 123–156.
Harris, M./ Raviv, A. (1992), Financial Contracting Theory, in: Laffont, J.J. (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory: 6 th World Congress, Vol. 2, Cambridge.
Kreps, D./ Porteus, E. (1979), Dynamic Choice Theory and Dynamic Programming, Econometrica 54, 91–100.
Meade, J. (1986), Different Forms of Share Economy, London.
Pohjola, M. (1987), Profit Sharing, Collective Bargaining and Employment, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 143, 334–342.
Sievert, O. (1992), Für Investivlöhne. Plädoyer für ein vernachlässigtes Konzept, Frankfurt.
Sievert, O./ Tomann, H. (1977), Allocational Aspects of Profit Sharing, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, Special Issue, 19–42.
Sinn, G./ Sinn, H.-W. (1991), Kaltstart, Tübingen.
Snower, D. J. (2000), Revenue-Sharing Subsidies as Employment Policy: Reducing the Cost of Stimulating East German Employment, in: Riphahn, R.T./ Snower, D. J./ Zimmermann, K. F. (2000), Employment Policy in Transition: The Lessons of German Integration for the Labor Market, Heidelberg, 172–191.
Stiglitz J./ Weiss, A. (1981), Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, American Economic Review 71, 393–411.
Weitzman, M. (1984), The Share Economy, Cambridge, Massachussetts.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2001 Springer-Verlag · Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Illing, G. (2001). Investment Wages and Capital Market Imperfections. In: Riphahn, R.T., Snower, D.J., Zimmermann, K.F. (eds) Employment Policy in Transition. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56560-1_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56560-1_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-41166-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-56560-1
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive