Abstract
In this chapter, we deal first with the immediate reaction among Russian philosophers to the “Geat War” against Germany before turning to the criticisms of Kant from intuitivism, Solov’ëvian metaphysics, and common sense. The diatribe by a young philosopher Ern against Kant, linking the latter to German militarism met with consternation and criticism. However, criticisms of Kant came from several philosophical directions, some of which upheld various aspects of Kant’s thought. We, then, turn to two disciples of Marburg neo-Kantianism.
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Notes
- 1.
Kassow 1989: 340.
- 2.
Berdyaev 1977: 3.
- 3.
Trubeckoj 1912: 1. Trubeckoj’s remark opened the lead article in a Festschrift for Lev Lopatin. Of course, we must bear in mind that Trubeckoj’s understanding of “philosophy” may have been quite different from our own.
- 4.
Jakovenko 2000: 719.
- 5.
Pustarnakov 2003: 194.
- 6.
Obozrenie 1914: 2–5.
- 7.
Pustarnakov 2003: 214.
- 8.
Ringer 1969: 181.
- 9.
Quoted in Ringer 1969: 189. Notable in this regard is the detached attitude toward the war by Ernst Cassirer.
- 10.
Ern completed and defended a magister’s thesis on Rosmini and his Theory of Knowledge. His early death from a kidney disease in 1917 came just a few days before he had the opportunity to defend a doctoral dissertation on the Italian philosopher/politician Vincenzo Gioberti.
- 11.
“The entire content of consciousness for Kant and Kantianism is only an appearance. If all outer experience is phenomenalized through a necessary relation to space, then, with the same necessity and regularity, all of our inner experience is phenomenalized through an unavoidable relation to time.” Ern 1911: 100.
- 12.
Ern, puzzlingly, mentioned that Kant had also included the existence of metaphysics along with mathematics and natural science as unconditional starting points in philosophy. Perhaps, Ern simply meant that Kant took all three not as representing genuine knowledge, but as containing a priori synthetic judgments and launched his enquiry from there.
- 13.
Ern 1910: 315f.
- 14.
Ern 1912: 53.
- 15.
Ern 1912: 58–59.
- 16.
Ern 1915: 21.
- 17.
Among those of several who questioned Ern’s logic was Semion Frank, who wrote, in one essay, “On the Spiritual Essence of Germany,” “One may criticize Kant’s philosophy, and we, in fact, personally do not worship it. We find not only his theoretical, but also his moral philosophy, to be inadequate. But we must recognize that his formulation of the concept of the ‘categorical imperative’ … is one of the greatest achievements of the human spirit. … The significance of this truth for Germany, as a nation, lies in the fact that it revealed the healthiest and powerful root of the German national character.” Frank 1915: 16–17. Frank, in an essay “A Search for the Meaning of War,” responded that, instead of the actual title that Ern gave to his essay, he “should have called it ‘From Meister Eckhart and Luther to Krupp’.” Frank 2005: 408. Another who challenged Ern’s imputing of war responsibility to Kant was Moisej M. Rubinshtejn (Moses Rubinstein). He categorically rejected Ern’s train of thought that led responsibility for the World War back to Kant. Rubinshtejn argued that German culture as a part of European culture was under threat from Germany’s enemies. If Russia turned from one part of European culture, it would be turning away from all of Europe. Russia had its own responsibility to safeguard that culture. Russia had a choice. It could, in effect, take Ern to heart or it could “act justly, taking the best in German culture under its protection.” Rubinshtejn 1915: 5.
- 18.
For the concept of an intelligible freedom, see Kant 1997: 535 (A538/B566).
- 19.
Ern 1915: 23. Apparently, Ern, whose father was himself Lutheran, absolved German Catholics from responsibility for their nation’s militarism, since he ascribed it to their rationalism and Protestantism. In another essay, “The Spearhead of Russo-Polish Relations” from this same time period, he wrote, “Catholics and Orthodox should, above all, recognize the difference between the Western and the Eastern Churches is not ontological, but historical.” Ern 1915: 58.
- 20.
Ern 1915: 25.
- 21.
Ern 1915: 27. Ern’s essay was not his final word. He recognized his critics and, in a sense, responded. He attempted to clarify his concept of phenomenalism, but in doing so he proceeded from the leaps of logic in his earlier essay to the absolutely bizarre. Ern, in this reply, “The Essence of German Phenomenalism,” delivered in a talk in Petrograd in late November 1914 and late January 1915, held, “A certain deep frustration of what can be called the sexual moment of the national-collective life in the German spirit preceded Kant’s philosophy. The relationships between the individual subject and reality could take the classic form of Kantian philosophy only because the German nation, in its historical self-determination, several centuries earlier, raised the anomaly of abstract masculinity and the denial of the positive feminine essence into a dogma.” Ern 1915: 43–44. Ern, also in this essay, attempted to draw an analogy between cognition as demanding a subject and an object to the sexes, with the subject being masculine and the object being feminine.
- 22.
For a number of Ern’s most “colorful” statements contrasting Protestant Germany’s “bloodthirsty culture” with Orthodox Russia’s “liberationist mission,” see Engelstein 2009: 206.
- 23.
Berdjaev 1910: 285.
- 24.
Berdjaev 1910: 286.
- 25.
Berdjaev 1910: 304.
- 26.
Berdjaev 1911: 23.
- 27.
Berdjaev 1915.
- 28.
Bulgakov 1916: 50.
- 29.
Bulgakov 1916: 56. To be fair, some Germans at the time disparaged their adversaries in the starkest terms and saw the German war effort in religious terms. One Lutheran pastor looked upon “the Anglo-Saxon mentality” as a “cancerous growth on mankind,” the French as “immoral atheists,” and the Russians as a “savage, semi-barbaric race.” Quoted in Kramer 2007: 176.
- 30.
- 31.
- 32.
- 33.
- 34.
- 35.
- 36.
Bulgakov 1914: 580; Bulgakov 1917: 1; Bulgakov 2012: 1.
- 37.
Bulgakov 1914: 584; Bulgakov 1917: 3–4; Bulgakov 2012: 3.
- 38.
Bulgakov 1914: 581; Bulgakov 1917: 2; Bulgakov 2012: 2.
- 39.
A stronger case can be made for an employment of the analytic method in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, where Kant “begins with the phenomenon of moral constraint.” Beck 1960: 84. However, whether Kant used the analytic method even there is questionable, for, although he proceeds from a “common moral cognition through reason,” he did not mean common sense beliefs about morality.” Wood 1999: 19. Mary J. Gregor, the translator of the Groundwork, alternatively rendered Kant’s expression, “gemeine sittliche Vernunfterkenntnis,” as “common rational moral cognition.” See Kant 1996: 49. As Wood points out, Kant realized “that some of the claims he attributes to moral common sense are at odds with traditional moral theories and moral teachings.” Wood 1999: 19. This makes it difficult for Bulgakov to draw an analogy between the Prolegomena’s usage of the analytic method and that in the Groundwork.
- 40.
Bulgakov 1914: 582–83; Bulgakov 1917: 3; Bulgakov 2012: 3.
- 41.
Bulgakov 1914: 637; Bulgakov 1917: 45; Bulgakov 2012: 47.
- 42.
Bulgakov 1914: 593; Bulgakov 1917: 16; Bulgakov 2012: 19.
- 43.
For a lively account of Kornilov’s break with Chelpanov, see Joravsky 1989: 222–223.
- 44.
Butina 2012: 71.
- 45.
- 46.
Ognëv’s talk of the sense manifold as inherently irrational, though peculiar, is not without precedent, particularly when he was writing this text. For example, the Baden neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert in 1902 spoke of “the irrational content of immediately given reality itself.” Rickert 1986: 53.
- 47.
Ognëv 2012: 82. He failed to provide any reference for this claim.
- 48.
Ognëv 2012: 83.
- 49.
Ognëv 2012: 86.
- 50.
“In fact, Kant did not ask himself the question: What is the difference between categories and schemata? … Kant not only did not show this difference, but there is no difference in his philosophy between categories and schemata. Ognëv 2012: 84–85. Cf. Lossky: “The schemata resemble the categories so closely that Kant himself confused them.” Lossky 1919: 56.
- 51.
Pavlov 2010: 221.
- 52.
Maslin et al. 2001: 485.
- 53.
- 54.
Quoted in Nosov 1994: xii.
- 55.
Trubeckoj 1917: i.
- 56.
Trubeckoj’s work dealt not only with Kant, but also the neo-Kantians Cohen, Rickert, and Lask. However, in his discussion, his concern was in refuting their positions, not to take advantage of their scholarship in order to improve his own understanding of Kant’s Critical texts.
- 57.
Trubeckoj 1917: 6.
- 58.
Trubeckoj 1917: 10. A strong case, no doubt, can be made that at least some of the arguments presented in, for example, the “Metaphysical Exposition” of space (A22–25/B37–40) in the “First Critique” are psychological in nature. However, unless one is to maintain that geometry contains propositions valid only for an individual, then if Kant’s arguments are themselves valid, space, contrary to Trubeckoj, is a universal a priori intuition.
- 59.
Trubeckoj 1917: 44.
- 60.
For Solov’ëv’s understanding of “intellectual intuition,” see Nemeth 2014: 84–87.
- 61.
Trubeckoj 1917: 72.
- 62.
Trubeckoj 1917: 73. Quoting from Kant’s Prolegomena that the unification of representations in a consciousness “either arises merely relative to the subject and is contingent and subjective, or it occurs without condition and is necessary or objective,” Trubeckoj sees Kant affirming his own position. With the subjectivity of the categories, cognition has a purely subjective character. See Kant 2002: 98 (§22). Trubeckoj incorrectly gives the reference to the Prolegomena as §2. See Trubeckoj 1917: 75.
- 63.
Trubeckoj 1917: 77. Once again, we see that Trubeckoj’s entire criticism arises from utter incomprehension of Kant’s transcendental idealism.
- 64.
Trubeckoj 1917: 84.
- 65.
From the Kantian perspective, Trubeckoj missed the point. It is not that the “I think” must accompany each and every representation, but only that the “I think” must be able to accompany my representations if they are to function cognitively for me as representations.” Allison 2004: 164.
- 66.
Trubeckoj 1917: 147. A proper Kantian reply to Trubeckoj would require pages. For one thing, Kant did not invoke the representability of an infinite series. Nevertheless, Trubeckoj’s argument against Kant is essentially a quite common one put forward by, among others, Kemp Smith, as Allison points out and who gives an extended Kantian reply to it. Allison 2004: 367–372.
- 67.
Trubeckoj quoted from the “First Critique.” Kant 1997: 535 (A537/B565).
- 68.
Trubeckoj 1917: 166.
- 69.
Trubeckoj 1917: 201.
- 70.
Trubeckoj 1917: 201–202.
- 71.
Prodan died in early January 1920 as reckoned by the Gregorian calendar, which Russia adopted in February 1918. The Julian calendar lagged behind the Gregorian by 13 days. Thus, Prodan died in late December 1919 according to it.
- 72.
- 73.
As quoted in Popova, Pushkarskij 2011: 99.
- 74.
As quoted in Abashnik 2011: 20.
- 75.
Prodan stated that Kant “undoubtedly began to write his Critique of Pure Reason under the immediate influence of Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind, which appeared in 1764. Kant was undoubtedly familiar with Reid’s work, since he polemicizes with Reid.” Prodan 1913: 259. Prodan’s confidence may well be misplaced. There is no firm historical grounds for it. As one recent study states, “Most philosophical scholars do not think it likely that Kant knew Reid. Further, those who admit the possibility are not convinced that Reid (and Beattie) could have contributed anything of significance to Kant’s critical philosophy.” Kuehn 2004: 167.
- 76.
Prodan 1913: 259–260.
- 77.
Prodan 1913: 232.
- 78.
Prodan 1913: 236.
- 79.
Prodan 1913: 261.
- 80.
In addition to the replies to reviewers, Prodan also charged Aleksandr Vvedenskij with plagiarizing from the former’s own logic textbook in his Logic. Besides a public accusation, Prodan initiated legal proceedings in a court in St. Petersburg in 1916. Vvedenskij, of course, denied the charge, calling it a “deliberate lie” (umyshlennaja nepravda). The entire affair was tragic and surely traumatic for all involved – and there were others besides Vvedenskij and Prodan. For a superb account, see Ermichëv 2014: 90–101.
- 81.
Prodan 1914: 170.
- 82.
The chief example of a Russian disciple of Cohen’s is Vasilij A. Saval’skij (1873–1915), whose published thesis submitted to Moscow University was the first Russian language monograph devoted to Cohen and the Marburg School. Dmitrieva 2007: 212. German Idealism after Kant, according to Saval’skij did not understand the essential Critical element of Kant’s philosophy. In their metaphysical constructions, these post-Kantian idealists shed the “living” connection of philosophy to science. The goal of Kant’s Critical method is to ground the facts of science. Saval’skij 1909: 4, 12. Saval’skij’s thesis was accepted, but its defense of the Marburgians was at the expense of those in Moscow, particularly Novgorodcev, thereby “complicating” his career path as a professor. Nevertheless, he obtained a position at Warsaw University in 1910 but died from cancer. See Rjabov 2010; Dmitrieva 2007: 192–93.
- 83.
- 84.
Jakovenko 1911: 68.
- 85.
- 86.
Jakovenko 1914a: 677.
- 87.
Jakovenko 1913: 742.
- 88.
Jakovenko’s position here bears a remarkable similarity to those that Gustav Shpet would utter in his 1917 essay “Wisdom or Reason?” The difference in the respective positions was that for Jakovenko “philosophy as a rigorous science” could now be constructed on a Kantian foundation, whereas for Shpet such a philosophy was already being constructed, namely Husserlian phenomenology. See Shpet 1917.
- 89.
Jakovenko 1910b: 427.
- 90.
- 91.
Jakovenko 1910b: 471. Jakovenko viewed the psychological elements in the “A-deduction” as psychologistic and dogmatic.
- 92.
Jakovenko 1910a: 252.
- 93.
Jakovenko 1914b: 258.
- 94.
- 95.
Ermichëv 2000: 24–25.
- 96.
Moisej should not be confused with Sergej L. Rubinshtejn (1889–1960), a quite prominent Soviet psychologist. Sergej too studied in Germany, but after two semesters at Freiburg transferred to Marburg, where he defended in 1914 a dissertation, Eine Studie zum Problem der Methode.
- 97.
Among his first, if not the first, Russian-language publication is a slim book from 1909 on The Idea of the Individual as the Foundation of a Worldview. Kant, certainly, is mentioned and quoted in it, but there is no extended discussion of Kant’s views as such in it. See Rubinshtejn 1909.
- 98.
This is not to say, though, that a concern with the meaning and value of life was absent from Russian intellectual discourse at the time. With Dostoyevsky’s literary works and then with the penetration of Nietzsche’s ideas into Russia, such issues became a particularly popular topic. Solov’ëv explicitly devoted the “Preface” to the first edition of his Justification of the Moral Good to it, and, in fact, the entire book can be read as addressed to the issue, as we can see from the book’s “Conclusion.” Solov’ëv 2015: 419–423.
- 99.
Rubinshtejn 1916: 258.
- 100.
Rubinshtejn 1916: 260.
- 101.
Rubinshtejn included this article on Kant as Chap. 5 in a book, On the Meaning of Life, that included individual chapters on Fichte, Hegel, Solov’ëv, Bergson, and others. There, he came out as espousing that life was of the highest value and the supreme category in philosophy. See Rubinshtejn 1927: 182. The publication from 1927 was at his own expense and among the last legally printed non-Marxist tracts in the Soviet Union until the Gorbachev era.
- 102.
Predpolagaemoe 1911: 239.
- 103.
We cannot rule out the possibility of a conflict with Lopatin, whose deeply held convictions against Kantianism would have clashed with those of Fokht. Lopatin was a family friend of Fokht’s father. It may not have been just a coincidence that Fokht’s thesis defense took place only in the year following Lopatin’s death due to influenza. As an indication of the philosophical “climate” at the time, Fedor A. Stepun, who was generally speaking sympathetic to the Baden School of neo-Kantianism, related his own encounters with Lopatin, who did not take kindly to attempts to import “foreign” schools of thought into Russia. Stepun wrote that after further meetings with Chelpanov and the jurist V. M. Khvostov, he automatically began to think that he should pursue philosophy outside a university setting. Stepun 1956: 194–195.
- 104.
Dmitrieva 2003: 28.
- 105.
- 106.
Fokht 2003: 57.
- 107.
Here, as throughout, Fokh followed Cohen very closely. Cohen wrote, “Nature is experience. It is mathematical natural science, the possibility of which is based in the ‘universal natural laws’ of synthetic fundamental principles.” Cohen 1885: 501.
- 108.
Fokht 2003: 75.
- 109.
- 110.
- 111.
Fokht 2003: 121.
- 112.
Dmitrieva 2007: 383–84f.
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Nemeth, T. (2017). The Specter of War and Revolution. In: Kant in Imperial Russia. Studies in German Idealism, vol 19. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52914-1_14
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