Suzhi Discourse as a Structural Component of Institutionalized Individualism in Post-Maoist China

Abstract

This third chapter sheds light on how the State’s discourse on population “quality” (suzhi) represents a sophisticated means of governance from afar.

Initially emerging in the 1980s, the concept focused on population control. Eugenic slogans promoting “fewer births, better births” reflected a belief that both genetic and environmental factors shape quality. This approach aimed to cultivate a vibrant, competitive youth capable of propelling China onto the global stage.

In the 1990s and 2000s, the discourse gained prominence and underwent a shift. It ultimately encompasses moral, intellectual, psychological, ideological and physical characteristics. Zhang Weiqing’s 2007 speech highlights the Party-State’s push for an ideal of quality that would produce competent workers and citizens.

The concept is infused through various organizations, including TV dramas. The chapter argues that the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television controlling their content shown in, TV series act as powerful vehicles for norm dissemination. They actively participate in the socialization of the population. The chapter examine five TV dramas and how they depict the transition to adulthood through the prism of this discourse.

1 Engineering “Quality Citizens”

At the beginning of the 1980s, the concept suzhi was somewhat unheard of in public discourse and often used interchangeably with zhiliang (质量). From 1986 and throughout the 1990s, suzhi began to impose itself in official rhetoric to assess the quality level of the population¹ (Fig. 3.1). The concept refers to the intrinsic quality of a person as well as their conduct. It encompasses moral, intellectual, psychological, ideological, and physical qualities² (Jacka, 2009; Kipnis, 2006; Murphy, 2004).

Fig. 3.1

Occurrence of renkou suzhi and renkou zhiliang in Google books written in simplified Chinese, 1979–2015. (Source: Google books Ngram Viewer)

From then on, relying on propaganda posters, the Party-State has conveyed a message about the “quality” of the population, valuing people with a high level of quality. In other words, people who comply with the norms and values disseminated by the Party-State and the agencies directly and indirectly associated with it.

At the end of 1980s, Chinese officials no longer only aimed at containing the country’s demographic growth, but also at “producing” a population of “quality”. Chinese scientists then judged the country’s population too numerous, too rural and too uneducated compared to the populations of major world powers. The discourse on suzhi was therefore used to transform the country’s citizens by acting on both their appearance and their way of thinking to allow the country to become competitive on the international stage (Greenhalgh, 2010). Slogans, such as “fewer births, better births, to invigorate the Chinese Nation” (shaosheng yousheng zhenxing zhonghua) appeared (Greenhalgh & Winckler, 2005). At this time, the discourse on the “quality” of the population was eugenic. The word “ yousheng “ (优生) mobilized in the slogans, which means “better births”, referred to the idea that genetic characteristics was not the only factor to influence the quality of human beings. The environment in which they grew up and the education they receive were also among the factors not to be overlooked. In other words, acting on these factors could shape individuals who met the needs of the Nation. Such slogans also encouraged healthy couples to give birth and raise a vibrant youth capable of competing with those who have grown up in countries that are among the great economic and political powers (Greenhalgh, 2010).

Then, during the 1990s and 2000s, following the drastic drop in fertility levels, the discourse on the “quality” of the population moved towards a more encompassing notion. The notion of “quantity” is henceforth secondary and the word “ suzhi “ (素质) replaces “ yousheng “ (Greenhalgh, 2011). The idea of “quality” covered by this concept is broad: it includes education, health, patriotism, skills, ethics, civics, and cosmopolitanism. As illustrated at the beginning of 2007 by the speech given by Zhang Weiqing, Minister of the National Commission for Population and Family Planning, all social actors were encouraged to strive towards this ideal that will produce quality workers and citizens (see box below).

[…] The Decision is a programmatic document guiding population and family planning program in the new era. Its promulgation represents an important measure for implementing the concept of scientific development and the strategic thinking of building a harmonious socialist society, and marks the entry of China’s population and family planning program into a new stage of stabilizing the low fertility level, addressing population issues in a comprehensive way and promoting all-round human development.

The Decision adheres to the scientific development concept as a general guiding principle, regards all-round human development as its central focus and stresses upon comprehensive solution to population issues as the main theme.

[…] The plan and the program, as a component of the six special programs for China’s national economic and social development, have recently been approved by the State Council for implementation. The plan and the program state the national strategic thinking and objectives for population development and put forward major tasks for population development during the 11th Five-Year Plan Period. (1) Stabilize the current fertility policy, and implement socioeconomic development policies in an integrated way, so as to maintain the total fertility rate at around 1.8 and ensure realization of the quantitative population objective; (2) Upgrade general health of newborn population, comprehensively address unbalanced sex ratio at birth and proactively respond to population ageing; (3) Prioritize development of education and fully develop human resources; (4) Take coordinated development of urban and rural areas and of different geographic regions into overall consideration and guide orderly movement and rational distribution of population; (5) Develop the undertakings for public health, women and children, social welfare, and promote social harmony and equity.

Source: Excerpts from the speech of Zhang Weiqing, Minister of the National Commission for Population and Family Planning, January 23, 2007³ .

Zhang’s speech reveals that, in the eyes of the Party-State, in order to build a society of small prosperity, many contradictions still need to be resolved. This includes maintaining control of the number of births within households. However, unlike the strict fertility limitation practiced in the 1980s, since 2007 couples where both the husband and wife are only children can have a second child. This provision of the law implies that the problem of excessive fertility is concentrated on the rural population. It is also striking to note that this law, which legislates not only on birth control issues but also on various aspects related to the “quality” of the population, initially only allowed city dwellers to have two children. This law, imbued with the discourse on the “quality” of the population, emerges in the wake of neoliberal ideology. It shows that, in the eyes of the Party-State, it is young urbanites who are seen as the standard-bearers of the national project to produce “quality” individuals who are “self-entrepreneurs” (reflexive).

At the end of the 1980s, while the use of this umbrella concept spread within society, its meaning remained vague in the minds of Chinese researchers. At the end of a conference convened to define this concept, the only consensus found was this: “suzhi [however defined] is for the most part higher in the city than in the countryside, higher in Han areas than in minority areas, higher in the economically advanced areas than in backward areas. And generally, the quality level of the Chinese population is too low” (Li, 1988:60). According to Kipnis, the use of the concept suzhi at the beginning of the twentieth century stems from the desire of Chinese intellectuals to ensure that efforts to improve the quality of the population were not only aimed at eugenics, but served the national project more broadly by increasing both the level of education and its physical, psychological, and moral qualities (Kipnis, 2006).

Subsequently, the concept was subject to several reappropriations. During the launch of the five-year plan in 1991, the country’s economic backwardness was attributed to the low-quality level of the rural population (Anagnost, 2004). The concept was then used to get the population to adhere to socioeconomic reforms initiated since the mid-1980s, the dissemination of this concept and its reappropriation by the Party-State was probably facilitated by the fact that it existed in the thought of Confucius (Cheng, 1997:67–68).

Since 2010, the concept suzhi has been mobilized by a multitude of actors: governmental organization such as family planning, the CCP urging its members and citizens to improve their moral and political level, business leaders who complain about the low level of “quality” of their employees, parents who try to improve the quality level of their children by providing them with the best care, food and education, the urban population who complain about the low level of quality of migrant workers, etc. (Fig. 3.1).

As the interviews I conducted illustrate, suzhi not only has a normative character, it also refers to a social value. The definition proposed by the respondents refers to both the moral value of a person (daode suzhi), as well as their physical (shenti suzhi), psychological (xinli suzhi), or even intellectual qualities. A respondent named Han formulates it this way: “if the rural population and the urban population do not have the same level of education and the same values, it is because they do not have the same quality level” (born in 1989, rural, Jilin hukou at birth, Bachelor).

The use of this concept allows young people to distance themselves from certain people and assert their difference and their open-mindedness (kaifang), which is characteristic of cosmopolitan youth. In other words, its use allows to differentiate and hierarchize individuals: urban and rural population, rural and urban migrants, planned and unplanned person⁴, etc. (Anagnost, 2004; Greenhalgh, 2003). The use of the discourse on “quality”, mobilized by the Chinese government, while aiming to form autonomous young adults, capable of leading China towards its historical destiny, namely the construction of a rich, powerful and respected Nation on the international stage, tends, at the same time, to essentialize and legitimize the socio-economic inequalities that are deepening in post-collectivist China⁵ (Sigley, 2009; Woronov, 2009; Yan, 2003a, b).

2 Suzhi Discourse and Hukou as Instruments of Governmentality

The construction and mobilization of the discourse on the “quality” of the population by the State and its institutions can be analyzed as a means of governance from afar (Ong & Zhang, 2008). If the Party-State exercised firm control over the individual during the Maoist period, by the end of the twentieth century, its influence had loosened and become less direct. The discourse on “quality” allowed the Party-State to define and instill “indirectly” in the public new norms and values in health and education, via a multitude of relays within public administration (laws, public policies, school, etc.), businesses, associations, families and individuals themselves.

Under the Hu **tao-Wen Jiabao administration, the problem of population growth was stated as a question of social, economic, and human development. The goal was to transition from an economy reliant on cheap labor to a knowledge economy benefiting from skills of highly qualified workers. However, in 2008, officials from the National Commission for Population and Family Planning estimated that the quality of the workforce at the time was detrimental to social development and harmony, efficient resource use, and the country’s competitiveness. The solution found to solve this problem was to link birth control policies to the improvement of care and education systems in cities. In other words, in order to assert itself on the international stage, the country needed educated, well-bred, patriotic, highly skilled young adults who are ready to learn throughout their life-course (Greenhalgh & Winckler, 2005:244). State investments to develop human resources, combined with efforts to shape young people ready to become self-entrepreneurs is therefore, a cornerstone on which the Chinese dream rests: regaining the country’s past greatness.

Young adults whose level of “quality” is deemed “high” are reflexive, meaning they are able to choose their lifestyle, their identity and they are responsible for their life-course. Young adults belonging to the urban middle class⁶ symbolize the government’s success in forming a politically docile youth, but eager to contribute to the ethical and moral elevation of their community, for instance in the name of consumers’ rights, social stability, or virtue (Tomba, 2009). The continuous improvement of their individual “quality” level and that of their family becomes both a personal aspiration and a social injunction.

The residence booklet system (hukou) is another instrument of governance established by the Party-State. It institutionalizes forms of discrimination and exclusion between different population groups, making it more difficult for people from the provinces or the countryside to conform to the ideal of “high quality”. The hukou (jumin hukou bu) was introduced by the Party-State in the 1950s⁷ to control population flows within the country (Cai, 2011; Liu, 2005; Wang, 2005). To this day, it serves individuals to prove their identity, since it records information on the type of hukou (collective household⁸ or family household⁹) and on the different members of the household: the name, date and place of birth, the relationship with the head of household, sex, ethnicity, children under 16 are also mentioned along with the address, paternal grandfather’s address, religion, identity card number, education level, marital status, height, blood group, profession and workplace. A copy of this document is kept by the public security office. Two indications with significant implications are also included in the residence booklet: the type of hukou, hukou leibie (agricultural, nongye hukou or non-agricultural, feinongye hukou)¹⁰ and its place of registration, hukou suozaidi (Hukou, 1958).

The combination of these two criteria leads to a “complex categorization of individuals”, dividing the population in two ways (Froissart, 2008). On the one hand, by distinguishing between rural and urban populations, and assigning them unequal rights; and on the other hand, by establishing a social hierarchy between the local population and the population coming from outside. Individuals are attached to a locality, whether it is rural or urban, and their rights and duties are dependent on the economic and social resources of this locality. The Maoist organization, which favored the economic and social development of major urban centers, resulted in a spatial hierarchy in which villages are located at the bottom of the scale, followed by county capitals, district capitals, municipalities, provincial capitals, autonomous municipalities and Bei**g, country’s capital at the top. As a result, people at the top of the pyramid receive and benefit comparatively more from social investments than residents of villages, towns, or even small and medium-sized cities.

3 Chinese TV Drama as a Vector of Institutionalization

The discourse on the “quality” of the population is widely present in the media and in TV drama, which are channels for disseminating the norms and values the Party-State considers important. They can be envisaged as a means to govern “from afar” (Ong & Zhang, 2008).

The content of TV drama is very interesting to study from a sociological point of view. Since in China it is the State administration of the press, publication, radio, film and television (SARFT)¹¹ that controls – from conception to broadcast – the content of television production, TV drama reflect norms and values endorsed by the Party-State. Scripts have to be submitted for approval to the SARFT before they can be produced by a television unit registered with the administration. It should be noted, that the final script must go before the censorship commission of the SARFT, or its local affiliated office, to receive a license that officially validates its distribution/production¹² (Zhu, 2008; Zhu et al., 2008). The regulations issued by the SARFT produce a powerful instrument of self-censorship for scriptwriters. Especially since broadcast authorization does not necessarily mean that the television series will be broadcast in its entirety. Through the SARFT, the Party-State can at any time decide to suspend the broadcast or even demand modifications in the script. While television production in China is subject to political influences, it also responds to market influences such as financial profitability.

During the conduct of the interviews with the respondents, they frequently referred to TV drama to illustrate their accounts, so it felt necessary to me to “take television series seriously” (Laugier, 2022). Especially since they reach a very large audience given that the entire population in China has access to television (directly or indirectly through the Internet). Chinese viewers watch an average of 52 min of TV drama per day (Sartoretti, 2014:37). As producers of norms and values approved by the Party-State, television series can be considered as actively participating in the socialization of the population (Laugier, 2023; Widder, 2004). In this sense, they constitute a relevant window through which to observe the coexistence and mixing of norms and values borrowing from both classical cultural elements (pre-Maoist period), elements dating from the collectivist China (Maoist period) and others revealing a China open to the world (the contemporary period). The reconfiguration of these past and present, national and transnational elements, as well as their reappropriation and reinterpretation by the viewers contribute ultimately to the production of shared representations, which spread in daily conversations. Located at the interface between public and private spheres, we will see that there is a very strong convergence between the paths to adulthood valued in the corpus of TV dramas I analyzed and the representations that young Chinese have of a successful path to life.

As part of this research, five television series were examined in detail: “Bei**g Youth” (bei**g qingnian), “Ants’ Struggle” (yizu de fendou), “Rules Before Divorce” (lihun qian guize), “The Era of Naked Marriage” (luohun shidai) and “Struggle” (fendou). All were produced in mainland China. Each episode lasts on average 45 min and is available for free online on the Internet in Chinese and subtitled in Chinese. I chose these five television series in particular because they were often mentioned by the respondents during the conduct of the field research. The first three TV dramas had just been released on screens and were very popular at the time. The other two series are a bit older.

“Bei**g Youth” was broadcast during the summer of 2012. Through its 36 episodes, the spectator can follow the transition to adulthood of four cousins (on the paternal side) from Bei**g: Hedong, Hexi, Henan and Hebei whose social origin, character and aspirations differ. The series “Ants’ Struggle”, which was first broadcast in 2012, consists of 33 episodes. It tells the hopes and disappointments of young University graduates who are not originally from Bei**g. They studied in this city, but once they graduated, they only found low paid jobs that barely allow them to rent a tiny room together. Their strained financial situation makes it difficult for them to fulfill their desire to get married. “Rules Before Divorce” was also first broadcast in 2012. The TV drama takes place in Bei**g. It features, in over 40 episodes, the marital trajectories of three young adults couples. There are, on the one hand, Wang Mingxuan and Jiang ** centers, and a portion of the foreign population are concentrated, or by shooting scenes of the symbolic buildings of the capital, such as the tower of the national television network CCTV and the immense expressways on which dense traffic circulates and the new guarded residential districts with tall buildings.

Bei**g embodies “the” Chinese city par excellence in the TV dramas. It portrays the life of middle-class Chinese. Its name appears directly in four of the series. It is only in “Struggle” (fendou) that Bei**g is referred to indirectly. This narrative creates a myth of the cosmopolitan city, bustling with activities and with modern architecture (Sartoretti, 2014). Bei**g embodies dreams, desires, difficulties, and fears of cosmopolitan emerging adults, but not all of them are equally successful on their path to adulthood. The image of the cosmopolitan city is also chosen to stage and promote lifestyles associated with the middle and upper classes. In creating a sense of belonging (Bourdieu, 2007), consumption is presented as a means to achieve social distinction and affirmation of a cosmopolitan identity. Tingting, a young Shanghainese, declared during a discussion in which I asked him to describe his impressions of contemporary China:

To me, modernity is urbanization. It’s also a way of life. Some foreigners think that we still dress in a Chinese way, but we dress in a Western way..

By staging young adults born in the 1980s–1990s who have a Sino-Western lifestyle or who appreciate it, TV dramas act as a powerful means to convey and promote norms and values associated with a high level of suzhi. Cosmopolitanism thus appears as a central concept for understanding the process of individualization in China. The images broadcast show individual and State desires that converge in the formation of a same project: reassert China’s power on the international stage by forming high-quality citizens. In other words, citizens with a high level of education, healthy, cosmopolitan, and faithful to ethical and civic values. The government project aims to create a “high quality” workforce, competitive and citizens able to navigate at ease in a globalized world. Therefore, individualization is the consequence of the development strategy carried out by the Party-State.