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The Late Roman Republic: The Inception of Metaphysical Abstractness

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Scientia Iuris

Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 112))

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Abstract

This chapter identifies the origins of scientia iuris with the inception of juristic activities in the Late Roman Republic. In so doing, it offers a historical and philosophical contextualisation of some key claims which have been made about the relationship between Greek philosophy (i.e. metaphysics) and Roman culture and juridical thinking. Thereafter, the chapter examines the thought of Aldo Schiavone on the metaphysics of Roman jurisprudence from the perspective of Emanuele Severino’s scholarship on Prometheus Bound. It then concludes with some considerations on the biopolitical substratum of the linguistic-ontological draining of experience characterising Roman jurisprudence.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Heidegger (2014, p. 177).

  2. 2.

    Heidegger (2013a, p. 57).

  3. 3.

    Ibid. p. 57. Similarly, in Besinnung, written in 1938/39, we read that (Heidegger 2016b, p. 145): “[Tékhnē] is a word of ‘knowledge’ … as inabiding the truth … as openness of brings from out the clearing of be-ing. … [Tékhnē] neither consists of producing tools and machines, nor of the mere use and application of them within a procedure, not of this procedure itself, nor of being well versed in such a procedure.”

  4. 4.

    Ibid. pp. 57–58.

  5. 5.

    Ibid. p. 58.

  6. 6.

    Ibid. p. 58.

  7. 7.

    Ibid. p. 60.

  8. 8.

    Ibid. p. 60.

  9. 9.

    Ibid. p. 61.

  10. 10.

    Ibid. p. 62.

  11. 11.

    Heidegger (2013b, p. 14).

  12. 12.

    Ibid. p. 13.

  13. 13.

    Ibid. p. 13. See also, and among others, Heidegger (2015, pp. 123–124).

  14. 14.

    See Chap. 2, Sect. 2.2.2.

  15. 15.

    Heidegger (2013b, p. 13). Cf. Arendt’s (2008, pp. 301–302). See also Agamben (2017a, p. 108).

  16. 16.

    Heidegger (2016a, p. 8). Emphasis added.

  17. 17.

    Heidegger (2013d, p. 182). See also Heidegger (1982b, Pt 2; 2012a, p. 93; 2014, p. 215).

  18. 18.

    Heidegger (2013b, p. 13).

  19. 19.

    Heidegger (2014, p. 177). Emphasis in original.

  20. 20.

    Heidegger (2012c, p. 37). See also Heidegger (2014, p. 178): ‘Art is knowing and hence is [tékhnē]’.

  21. 21.

    A thinking that, being poetising, is ‘not “mere cogitating”, deliberating, calculating’: Heidegger (2013d, p. 279).

  22. 22.

    Particularly, by Plato’s and Aristotle’s substitution of lógos as factical thinking with logic as ‘the doctrine of correct thinking’: see Chap. 2, note 374.

  23. 23.

    This phrase refers to the ‘mathematical’ approach to life which translates ‘nature into the objectiveness of calculating representation[s] … where calculating is a quantitative measuring’ (Heidegger 2016a, p. 9). Thus, it also refers to the ‘machination’ process (i.e. the ‘human objectification … [and] annihilation [of] the earth’: Heidegger 2016a, p. 11) which was examined in Chap. 2.

  24. 24.

    Heidegger (2008a, p. 218).

  25. 25.

    Heidegger (2002, p. 61).

  26. 26.

    The Hellenistic age is conventionally dated from the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE to the end of Ptolemaic kingdom in 31 BC, after the battle of Actium and the Roman conquest of Egypt.

  27. 27.

    Veyne (2010, p. 155).

  28. 28.

    Ibid. pp. 141–224. Cf. Jaeger (1986, p. xvii); Bengtson (1989, Pt 5); Capogrossi Colognesi (2009, p. 208). Russo (2019, pp. 267–271); Brouwer (2021).

  29. 29.

    Schiavone (2012, p. 165).

  30. 30.

    Heidegger (1998a, p. 43).

  31. 31.

    Ibid. p. 69.

  32. 32.

    Ibid. p. 69.

  33. 33.

    Ibid. p. 69.

  34. 34.

    Heidegger aims here is to return to ‘language qua language’: Heidegger (1982a, p. 119); i.e. a language that is ‘simple saying’: Heidegger (2008b, p. 265). See further, Chap. 2, Sect. 2.2.2.

  35. 35.

    Heidegger (2008c, p. 125).

  36. 36.

    Ibid. p. 128. See also Heidegger (2012e, p. 102).

  37. 37.

    Heidegger (1998a, p. 50).

  38. 38.

    Ibid. p. 51. Emphasis in original.

  39. 39.

    Including its future determinations, which are approached instrumentally.

  40. 40.

    Heidegger (1998a, p. 48). Emphasis in original. See also Heidegger (2016b, p. 38).

  41. 41.

    Ibid. p. 50. Emphasis in original.

  42. 42.

    Ibid. p. 51. Emphasis in original. See also ibid. p. 68.

  43. 43.

    Ibid. p. 51.

  44. 44.

    Ibid. p. 128.

  45. 45.

    Heidegger (1996).

  46. 46.

    Heidegger (1998a, p. 128).

  47. 47.

    Heidegger (2012b, p. 5).

  48. 48.

    On Heidegger’s understanding ‘positionality’, see Chap. 2, Sect. 2.2.2, as well as Chaps. 4 and 5.

  49. 49.

    Which a whole tradition of metaphysical philosophical thinking has refined: Heidegger (1982b, Pt 1).

  50. 50.

    Heidegger (1998b, 2012b).

  51. 51.

    Heidegger (1998a, p. 40). See also ibid. p. 50.

  52. 52.

    Ibid. p. 40. Emphasis in original.

  53. 53.

    Benveniste (2016, p. 392).

  54. 54.

    Ibid. p. 392.

  55. 55.

    Ibid. p. 392.

  56. 56.

    Ibid. p. 392.

  57. 57.

    Ibid. p. 393.

  58. 58.

    Ibid. p. 393. See also ibid. p. 391.

  59. 59.

    Ibid. p. 393.

  60. 60.

    Ibid. p. 393.

  61. 61.

    Ibid. p. 393.

  62. 62.

    Ibid. p. 395.

  63. 63.

    Ibid. p. 395.

  64. 64.

    Ibid. p. 395.

  65. 65.

    Ibid. p. 397.

  66. 66.

    Ibid. p. 396.

  67. 67.

    Ibid. p. 398. Emphasis added.

  68. 68.

    Ibid. p. 412. Emphasis added.

  69. 69.

    Watson (1995, p. 125). See also ibid. Ch 12; and Berman (1983, p. 129), using the expression ‘untheoretical’.

  70. 70.

    Nicholas (1975, p. 2); Berman (1983, pp. 134, 137); Kelley (1990, p. 35).

  71. 71.

    See Chap. 2, note 547.

  72. 72.

    Jones (1940, p. 5); Berman (1983, p. 129); Stein (1995, p. 1539; 1999, p. 18); Hespanha (2003, p. 90); Tuori (2007a, p. 22); Samuel (2018, p. 54). The casuistic element is defined as a ‘vital feature’ of Roman law by Zimmermann (1996, p. xii).

  73. 73.

    de Sutter (2021, p. 50).

  74. 74.

    Samuel (2018, p. 301).

  75. 75.

    Schauer (2009, p. 121).

  76. 76.

    Frier (2016, pp. 193–194). See also ibid. p. 270. Similarly, Schiller (1958, p. 1237); Gordley (1991, p. 30; 2013, p. 18); Watson (1995, Ch 10, p. 146); Hespanha (2003, p. 203); Johnston (2005, p. 634). But cf. Pugliese (1973, p. 117); Moatti (2015, pp. xviii, 23, 100–101, 126–128, Ch 5).

  77. 77.

    Schulz (1936, p. 43). Prominent among such abstract formulations are definitions which, as pointed out by Watson (1995, p. 146), were ‘rare’; cf. Moatti (2015, pp. xxi, 101, 144, 238). Yet, disinclination does not mean absolute rejection: see e.g. Pugliese (1973, p. 115); Moatti (2015, Ch 5, pp. 331–335); Ibbetson’s (2015, pp. 35, 36), as well as below.

  78. 78.

    Stein (1979, p. 439). See also Capogrossi Colognesi (2009, p. 174; 2016a, pp. 159–160).

  79. 79.

    Schulz (1936, p. 68).

  80. 80.

    Ibid. p. 72. See also ibid. p. 97, where the argument is pursued further and contextualised in relation to the Roman jurists’ conservative aversion towards ‘methodical and systematic legal criticism and legal policy’, or ‘rationalistic discussion[s]’ more generally.

  81. 81.

    Kelley (1990, p. 45).

  82. 82.

    Berman (1983, p. 150). Emphasis added.

    See also Kelley (1990, p. 40): ‘In the most fundamental sense the Romans were “realists”—concerned with res—and in both a public and private way were devoted to “real estate”’.

  83. 83.

    See e.g. Bellum Catilinae, VIII.

  84. 84.

    Moatti (2015, p. 250). Emphasis added.

  85. 85.

    Heidegger (1998a, p. 41). Emphasis in original.

    Cf. Agamben (1999a, p. 69) who, not referring to Heidegger, in a similar vein writes that ‘[w]hat the Greeks conceived as poiesis is understood by the Romans as one mode of agere, that is, as an acting that puts-to-work, an operari’. Emphasis in original. See also ibid. p. 76.

  86. 86.

    Heidegger (1998a, p. 42).

  87. 87.

    Ibid. p. 42. Emphasis in original. See also ibid. p. 50.

  88. 88.

    Veyne (2010, p. 19). Emphasis in original. All translations are mine.

  89. 89.

    Ibid. p. 20.

  90. 90.

    See e.g. Heidegger (2012a, pp. 87–89, 92–98, 111; 2013d, pp. 81–82; 2015, pp. 130–131, 133).

  91. 91.

    On the legal knowledge and expertise of the ‘second-level’ order of jurists and those involved with the administration of justice, that is, procuratores, cognitores, scribae, etc., see Lehne-Gstreinthaler (2016).

  92. 92.

    Cf. Schiavone (2012, pp. 62, 79, 204, 505, fn 13). See also below, Sect. 3.3.1.

  93. 93.

    See e.g. Schulz (1946, p. 53); Watson (1974, Ch 7; 1991, pp. 100, 115, 258–259; 1995, pp. 60–63); Stein (1999, pp. 12–14); Capogrossi Colognesi (2009, pp. 174–175, 177, 183–185; 2016a, pp. 94, 112, 131, 158, 188–194; 2016b); Schiavone (2012, pp. 138, 143–144, 197); Gordley (2013, p. 5).

  94. 94.

    Heidegger (1998a, p. 77). See also Heidegger (1982b, pp. 177ff; 2015, p. 133) as well as Chap. 2, Sect. 2.2.2, and note 553.

  95. 95.

    Cf. Heidegger (2012a, p. 127).

  96. 96.

    Heidegger (1998a, p. 51). Emphasis in original.

  97. 97.

    Ibid. p. 51. Emphasis in original.

  98. 98.

    Heidegger (2013c, p. 152). See below, Sect. 3.4.

  99. 99.

    Heidegger (1998a, p. 52). See also Heidegger (2013c, pp. 151–152).

  100. 100.

    Ibid. p. 51. Emphasis in original.

    See also ibid. p. 43: ‘… the historical state of the world we call modern age … is also founded on the event of the Romanizing of Greece’. Cf. Kelley (1990, p. 64), who lists the term ‘certain’ in the ‘vocabulary [which] Roman law has provided … for much of civilized life in Western terms’.

  101. 101.

    See also the other lecture ‘The Thing’ Heidegger gave in 1950 and now published in Poetry, Language, Thought.

  102. 102.

    Heidegger (2012d, pp. 12–14). To be read along with Dig., 50.17.1, 1.2.2.13, already cited. Cf. Thomas (1980, p. 421); Severino (2016, p. 13).

  103. 103.

    Schiavone (2012, pp. 124, 189). See also Stein (1972, p. 29): ius ‘was not a man-made product but part of the Roman way of life’.

  104. 104.

    Ben-Dor (2007, p. 3).

  105. 105.

    Capogrossi Colognesi (2009).

  106. 106.

    Schiavone (2012).

  107. 107.

    Pölönen (2016).

  108. 108.

    Some would say ‘contextual’: Winkel (2015, p. 11).

  109. 109.

    du Plessis et al. (2016, pp. 4, 6).

  110. 110.

    See the Introduction.

  111. 111.

    du Plessis (2020, p. 35).

  112. 112.

    Ibid p. 37.

  113. 113.

    Ibid p. 46.

  114. 114.

    Ibid p. 50.

  115. 115.

    On this point, see e.g. Pringsheim (1944, p. 60): ‘Roman classical law is more juristic, more scientific, than any other law’. Likewise, for Stein (1979, p. 438), ‘[i]t was during the classical period that Roman law reached its highest point of technical development’.

  116. 116.

    du Plessis (2020, p. 47). Emphasis omitted.

  117. 117.

    Ibid p. 45, quoting Stein.

  118. 118.

    See also the Chap. 1, note 134; and Chap. 2, note 859.

  119. 119.

    Heidegger (2012f, p. 121).

  120. 120.

    Gordley (2013, p. 1). See also Gordley (2008, p. 219); and Sacco (1995, 2007), discussed in Chap. 1.

  121. 121.

    Ibid. p. xi.

  122. 122.

    See e.g. Watson (1991, pp. 3, 122).

  123. 123.

    Tuori (2007a, p. 23). Cf. Tellegen-Couperus and Tellegen (2013, p. 31).

  124. 124.

    Moatti (2015, p. 1).

  125. 125.

    Ibid. p. 1.

  126. 126.

    See e.g. ibid. pp. 32–34, 43.

  127. 127.

    Ibid. p. 2.

  128. 128.

    Ibid. p. 44.

  129. 129.

    Ibid. p. 6. See also ibid. pp. 169, 242.

  130. 130.

    Ibid. p. 7.

  131. 131.

    Ibid. p. 7. Emphasis in original. See also ibid. p. 5.

  132. 132.

    Ibid. p. 7. Emphasis added.

    See e.g. ibid. pp. 23ff, 330: the lost meaning of key-terms, such as ‘tradition’ and ‘custom’, is a clear instance of this.

  133. 133.

    Ibid. Ch 4, of which see especially p. 166.

  134. 134.

    Ibid. p. 172. Emphasis added.

  135. 135.

    See e.g. ibid. pp. 31f, 41–45, 87, 165, 166, 172, 180, 184, 190, 228, 230, 240, 255, 320, 323, 330; and above, note 126. Cf. Schiavone (2012, pp. 137, 103, Chs 10, p. 15).

  136. 136.

    Recall Heidegger’s views on the Roman ‘domination’: above, Sect. 3.1.

  137. 137.

    On the origins of Rome’s ‘territorial symbolism’, see Kelley (1990, p. 37), where, following Ovid, the author also speaks of Rome’s ‘irresistible “territorial imperative”’.

    However, I employ this term, ‘imperative’, literally, relating it to the Roman imperium which Heidegger so vehemently criticised. See e.g. Richardson (2016, p. 115): ‘The imperium … was the reason for the allocation of a provincia to a particular individual magistrate or protomagistrate and was the basis of all his activity including jurisdiction …’; see also ibid. p. 113.

  138. 138.

    Capogrossi Colognesi (2009, p. 207). All translations of Capogrossi Colognesi’s Italian works are mine.

  139. 139.

    Kelley (1990, p. 1).

  140. 140.

    Geraci et al. (2017, pp. 103–104).

  141. 141.

    Kunkel (1966, p. 36).

  142. 142.

    Some would say capitalist and profit-driven: see e.g. Capra and Mattei (2015, pp. 46–50); Geraci et al. (2017, p. 162). Cf. Kelley (1990, pp. 39, 50–52, 61); Schiavone (2012, pp. 249, 265, 286, fn 3; pp. 319f, 362–363, Ch 22).

  143. 143.

    Capogrossi Colognesi (2009, p. 209). Cf. Schiavone (2012, p. 161); Moatti (2015, pp. 41–44).

  144. 144.

    Ibid. pp. 140–145, 163, 203, 214–216, 242–246. See also Kunkel (1966, pp. 74–77); Tuori (2007b, p. 47).

  145. 145.

    Ibid. p. 129.

  146. 146.

    This was a league within the Latin region which lasted from 493 BC to 338 BC, when a Latin faction rebelled against Rome; after its victory, Rome unilaterally redefined the juridical status of the defeated cities: ibid. pp. 132, 155; Capogrossi Colognesi (2016a, p. 100); Geraci et al. (2017, pp. 99ff).

  147. 147.

    Capogrossi Colognesi (2009, p. 207).

  148. 148.

    Ibid. p. 207.

  149. 149.

    Ibid. p. 288; Richardson (2016, p. 117). I speak of a beginning of the Roman Empire for ease of narration, leaving aside the distinction between Principate and Dominate.

  150. 150.

    Capogrossi Colognesi (2009, pp. 321–327, 339, Ch 14, pp. 349–357, Ch 17); Richardson (2016, pp. 119–121); Roselaar (2016); Ando (2016).

  151. 151.

    Merola (2020, p. 488).

  152. 152.

    Moatti (2015, p. 4). See also ibid. Ch 6, pp. 334–335.

  153. 153.

    Austin (1911, p. 58). Also cited by Sugarman (1986, p. 29).

  154. 154.

    For our purposes, see Schiavone (2012); Capogrossi Colognesi (2009, 2016a).

  155. 155.

    De officiis, 1.11-13.

  156. 156.

    De officiis, 2.65; Brutus, 41.152f. Cf. De Oratore, 1.42ff; Pro Murena, 22-29.

  157. 157.

    Of particular interest is that Cicero uses the term ‘expertise’, the same David Kennedy and many others employ today, when commenting on the jurists’ legal knowledge and interpreting skills: see Chap. 2, Sect. 2.1.

  158. 158.

    Agamben (2013b, pp. 67–86).

  159. 159.

    For some references, see Chap. 2, note 556.

  160. 160.

    Kunkel (1966, p. 95). Cf. Schiavone (2012, Ch 16).

  161. 161.

    Moatti (2015, p. xviii).

  162. 162.

    Ibid. p. xviii.

  163. 163.

    Ibid. p. xviii. See also ibid. p. 166.

  164. 164.

    Ibid. p. 4.

  165. 165.

    Ibid. p. 4.

  166. 166.

    See Chap. 1, note 71.

  167. 167.

    Giltaij (2016, p. 188). See also Tuori (2007a, p. 58).

  168. 168.

    Ibid. p. 188.

  169. 169.

    Ibid. p. 188. Cf. Volk (2023, Chs 3–5).

  170. 170.

    Monateri (2000, p. 546).

  171. 171.

    Watson (1974); see especially Ch 16.

  172. 172.

    Watson (1995, pp. 90, 109, 125, 154, 155). See also ibid. p. 117, where the adjective ‘extreme’ is used in relation to the jurists’ conceptualisations.

  173. 173.

    Ibid. p. 98.

  174. 174.

    Which in another book, Watson noted was generally ‘making progress at Rome’, along with the dialectical method: Watson (1971, p. 2). See also Watson (1974, p. 2).

  175. 175.

    Watson (1995, p. 158).

  176. 176.

    Ibid. p. 66.

  177. 177.

    Ibid. p. 64.

  178. 178.

    Ibid. pp. 64–73.

  179. 179.

    Ibid. p. 64. But see also ibid. p. 98, where Watson reinforces his claim regarding the jurists’ ‘distance from the courts, their artificial (for private law) mode of reasoning, and their conceptualization’ while at the same time specifying that ‘they were not always and entirely remote from reality’.

  180. 180.

    Ibid. p. 65. Emphasis added.

  181. 181.

    The jurists’ (partial, following Watson) remoteness from the actual ought not be confused with reality’s (i.e. Roman elite society’s) interest in juristic literature: see Howley (2013).

  182. 182.

    Watson (1995, p. 72).

  183. 183.

    Ibid. pp. 195–200.

  184. 184.

    Ibid. p. 73. See also ibid. pp. 79, 94, and Watson (1991, pp. 5–6, 261).

  185. 185.

    Ibid. p. 72. See also ibid. p. 123.

  186. 186.

    Nicholas (1975, p. 1).

  187. 187.

    Ibid. p. 1.

  188. 188.

    Vacca (2017, p. 241). All translations are mine.

  189. 189.

    Ibid. pp. 232, 236, 241.

  190. 190.

    Ibid. p. 153.

  191. 191.

    Berman (1983, p. 139).

  192. 192.

    Vacca (2017, p. 284). See also Capogrossi Colognesi (2009, pp. 170–171); Schiavone (2012, pp. 13, 62–63, 158, 194–195, 198ff, 250ff, Chs 14, 16); Bretone (2023, Ch 7, pp. 274–278).

  193. 193.

    Ibid. p. 237. This also includes the abstract, scientific technique of analogical reasoning mentioned earlier: see ibid. pp. 177–178.

  194. 194.

    On the extent of purely pragmatic reasoning in the later Republic and classical age, cf. Watson (1969, pp. 376–368).

  195. 195.

    Vacca (2017, p. 235). The literature on this theme is vast: see e.g. Gordley (2013, p. 7); Capogrossi Colognesi (2009, p. 174; 2016a, 2016b, pp. 527ff); Fiori (2016, p. 593); Ando (2018, pp. 672–674).

  196. 196.

    I elaborate on this point at the end of Chap. 5, Sect. 5.1.

  197. 197.

    Schiavone (2012, pp. 35–40).

  198. 198.

    Schulz (1946, pp. 38–39). But see also ibid. p. 137, on the jurists’ declining interest in dialectical methods during the classical period.

  199. 199.

    Ibid. p. 38.

  200. 200.

    Schiavone (2012, p. 23).

  201. 201.

    Ibid. p. vii.

  202. 202.

    See Chap. 2, Sect. 2.4.

  203. 203.

    Schiavone (2012, p. 140).

  204. 204.

    Ibid. p. 156.

  205. 205.

    Ibid. p. 157.

  206. 206.

    According to Watson (1974, p. vii), ‘… these two hundred years form a historical unity, different from what preceded and what came after, and without doubt they constitute the period of the world’s greatest legal development’. ‘[T]he major force in [this] development’, Watson further remarks (ibid. p. 101), were the jurists. See also Watson (1991, p. 111).

  207. 207.

    Schiavone (2012, p. 197).

  208. 208.

    Ibid. p. 198.

  209. 209.

    While, Schiavone holds, ‘the concepts developed by [Quintus] Mucius … in no way resembled those employed in Greek philosophy’ (ibid. p. 198), he integrated the diaretic, logical method with the Roman legal experience (ibid. p. 186). ‘The end result would be the birth of a new way of conceiving law, which would transmute its protocols into those of a science without equal in antiquity, no less compact and conceptually dense than the great classical philosophy’ (ibid. p. 186). Ultimately, this new path would consign juridical thinking ‘to the rigorous syntax, impersonal and formalized, of abstract acts of knowledge’ (ibid. p. 186). See also ibid. pp. 184–185, 245–246.

  210. 210.

    Ibid. p. 198.

  211. 211.

    Ibid. p. 199.

  212. 212.

    Ibid. p. 200. See also ibid. p. 198.

  213. 213.

    Ibid. p. 200. Emphasis added.

  214. 214.

    Ibid. p. 202. See also ibid. p. 204: the new ‘juridical entities … [were] elaborated as pure essences’. This remark is further reinstated later on: see e.g. ibid. pp. 251, 286.

  215. 215.

    Ibid. p. 202.

  216. 216.

    Ibid. pp. 202–203.

  217. 217.

    Ibid. p. 202. A categorisation also employed by Moatti (2015), as seen above.

  218. 218.

    Ibid. p. 203. See also ibid. pp. 251, 285–288.

  219. 219.

    Ibid. p. 203.

  220. 220.

    Ibid. p. 504. Emphasis added.

  221. 221.

    In the footnote, Schiavone cites Severino’s Legge e Caso, a short book which also covers the origins of epistḗmē in Greek philosophy, but where Prometheus is not mentioned.

  222. 222.

    Ibid. p. 38.

  223. 223.

    Ibid. p. 40.

  224. 224.

    Ibid. p. 11. See also ibid. pp. 104, 125, 135, 162, 203, 251.

  225. 225.

    Ibid. p. 72.

  226. 226.

    Ibid. p. 79.

  227. 227.

    Ibid. p. 162.

  228. 228.

    Ibid. p. 197.

  229. 229.

    Ibid. p. 203.

  230. 230.

    Ibid. p. 251.

  231. 231.

    Ibid. p. 251.

  232. 232.

    Ibid. p. 266.

  233. 233.

    Ibid. p. 286.

  234. 234.

    Ibid. p. 288.

  235. 235.

    Ibid. p. 292.

  236. 236.

    Ibid. p. 299.

  237. 237.

    Agamben (1991a, pp. xiii, 108; 1999a, p. 59; 1999b, p. 75; 2005, pp. 26–27, 41–43, 95–99, 121–122; 2007b, p. 59; 2013a, pp. xi–xiii, 119; 2013b, 2015a, pp. 56–57, 273; 2016a, pp. 123ff; 2016b).

  238. 238.

    Agamben (2015a, p. 174; 2016a, pp. 55–56).

  239. 239.

    Agamben (2015a, pp. 203, 276).

  240. 240.

    Agamben (1993, p. 10).

  241. 241.

    Agamben (2015a, p. 105).

  242. 242.

    Ibid. pp. xxi, 207, 225, 262.

  243. 243.

    Agamben (1998, p. 9).

  244. 244.

    Agamben (2015a, p. 60).

  245. 245.

    Ibid. p. 61.

  246. 246.

    Ibid. p. 65.

  247. 247.

    Ibid. p. 237. See also Abbott (2019, p. 216).

  248. 248.

    Ibid. p. 145. See also ibid. pp. 60, 268, 272.

  249. 249.

    Ibid. p. 225.

  250. 250.

    Agamben (2008, pp. 11–34); Wald Lasowski (2019, p. 552).

  251. 251.

    Agamben (2015a, p. 207). See also ibid. p. 262.

  252. 252.

    Ibid. pp. 59ff. See also Agamben (1998, p. 46).

  253. 253.

    Agamben (2014, p. 56; 2017b, p. 18). See also Wald Lasowski (2019, p. 551).

  254. 254.

    Agamben (2015a, p. 58).

  255. 255.

    Agamben (2013b, p. 112). See also Agamben (2015a, p. 65).

  256. 256.

    Agamben (2007a, p. 60).

  257. 257.

    Agamben (2015a, pp. 62–63).

  258. 258.

    Ibid. p. 62.

  259. 259.

    Agamben (1993, p. 43; 2000, pp. 94–95; 2004, p. 76; 2017a, p. 139).

  260. 260.

    Agamben (2015a, p. 63). See also ibid. pp. 276–279; 2016b, p. 53; Cavalletti (2019a, b); Bonacci (2019).

  261. 261.

    Ibid. p. 62. Emphasis omitted.

  262. 262.

    Watkin (2014); Coccia (2019, p. 130); Abbott (2019, p. 217); Salzani (2019, pp. 472ff). On the perils of analogical-paradigmatic reconstructions, see Canfora (2010, pp. 24–26). Like Agamben, Canfora too draws from Melandri (2017). Canfora’s warnings also apply, of course, to the very method employed in this book.

  263. 263.

    Agamben (2015a, p. 164): ‘… the problem is that of finding the concepts that allow us to correctly think modality’. Emphasis added. See also ibid. pp. 80, 174.

  264. 264.

    ‘The … improper and senseless form[s] of individuality’ ought to be abandoned in favour of ‘singularit[ies] without identit[ies]’: Agamben (1993, p. 65). Consequently, the only ‘self-experience’ that Agamben allows is that through which we ‘constitute [ourselves] as using’ (Agamben 2015a, p. 62). See also Agamben (1993, pp. 1, 48; 2007b, p. 59; 2015a, pp. 60, 224, 277; 2016b, pp. 58, 62, 71); Badiou (2019, p. 107); Coccia (2019, p. 133); Abbott (2019, p. 216).

  265. 265.

    Agamben (2017a, pp. 20, 32ff). See also Agamben (2015b).

  266. 266.

    Ibid. p. 36. All translations are mine.

  267. 267.

    Ibid. p. 36.

  268. 268.

    Chapter 2, Sect. 2.2. See also below, note 295.

  269. 269.

    Agamben (2015a, p. 111).

  270. 270.

    Ibid. p. 111. See also ibid. p. 208.

  271. 271.

    Agamben (2017c, p. xxv).

  272. 272.

    Agamben (2016a, p. 17). All translations are mine.

  273. 273.

    Ibid. p. 16. As we shall see in Chap. 4, Agamben has in mind any being which qualifies as a primary substance in Aristotelian terms. However, he specifically refers to the human being.

  274. 274.

    Agamben (2015a, p. 129); See also ibid. pp. 119, 130, 131; Agamben (2016a, p. 23).

  275. 275.

    Agamben (2016a, p. 17). See also Agamben (2015a, pp. 115, 118).

  276. 276.

    Agamben (2015a, pp. 119, 271). See also Agamben (2016a, pp. 17, 18, 60).

  277. 277.

    Ibid. pp. 118, 121.

  278. 278.

    Agamben (1991a, p. 39; 2016a, p. 35).

  279. 279.

    Agamben (2016a, p. 35). Cf. Agamben (1998, pp. 7–8).

  280. 280.

    See Chap. 2, Sect. 2.4.1.

  281. 281.

    Agamben (2015a, pp. 114, 200; 2016a, p. 18).

  282. 282.

    Kunkel (1966, pp. 103–105, Ch 10); Capogrossi Colognesi (2009, pp. 171, 191–194); Wolf (2015); Meyer (2015); Mantovani (2016); Harries (2016); Babusiaux (2016); Ando (2018, pp. 672–674).

    It is worth pointing out that these techniques are but part of the broader phenomenon of the ‘diffusion of writing’ that Moatti (2015, pp. 5–6, 98ff) places at the centre of Rome’s epistemological revolution, mentioned above.

  283. 283.

    Schiavone (2012, p. 164).

  284. 284.

    Ibid. p. 165. See also ibid. p. 184.

  285. 285.

    See Brundage (2010, pp. 38–39): “[These] specialized legal scribes or stenographers [where] sometimes described as notarii … By the third century CE, these specialists in the redaction of legal documents formed a distinct occupational class whose members were known known as tabelliones or tabularii … By Constantine’s reign, judges assumed that document that tabelliones produced were authentic records of the transactions that they recorded unless the contrary could be proved.”

  286. 286.

    Agamben (2016a, pp. 22–23).

  287. 287.

    Agamben (1993, pp. 80, 83).

  288. 288.

    Ibid. p. 82.

  289. 289.

    Ibid. p. 82.

  290. 290.

    Agamben (1991b, p. 14). My translation.

    See also Agamben (1993, p. 79; 2000, pp. 73ff).

  291. 291.

    Agamben (2011, p. 72). See also Agamben (2012b, p. 336).

  292. 292.

    Agamben (2015a, p. 119).

  293. 293.

    Ibid. p. 119. See also ibid. p. 237.

  294. 294.

    Agamben (2016a, p. 39).

  295. 295.

    Agamben (2016a, pp. 11–45). Conversing with Alain Badiou (2019, p. 119), Agamben has asserted that ‘we ought to think the event … of language itself’. My translation.

    See also Agamben (1999c, p. 60; 1999d, p. 76); Lagaay and Schiffers (2019, p. 142).

  296. 296.

    Agamben (2012a, p. 108). See also Agamben (1993, pp. 47–50).

  297. 297.

    Pringsheim (1935, p. 360); Frier (2016, p. 257, Ch 4); Zimmermann (1996, p. 258). Cf. Kelsen (1967, p. 191); Crook (1967, pp. 259ff); Wieacker (1995, p. 155); Thomas (2021, Chs 6, 10). See also above, note 142.

    Along with Cicero (see e.g. De officiis, 1.20f, 2.40, 2.73, 2.78), the greatest advocate of the Romans’ liberal values is, arguably, Dante: see Monarchia, II.V.5.

    Importantly, this reading of Roman law has been extended to its medieval reception and subsequent intellectual influence: see e.g. de Sousa Santos (2020, p. 26); Tuori (2019, p. 41).

  298. 298.

    Schulz (1936, p. 146). See also ibid. pp. 21, 84, 159; Kelley (1990, pp. 49, 52); Stein (1999, p. 121); Moatti (2015, pp. 11, 329).

  299. 299.

    Capogrossi Colognesi (2016a, p. 188).

  300. 300.

    Kelley (1990, pp. 49–52); Somma (2002, pp. 157, 164–167, 174); Solidoro Maruotti (2011, p. 249).

  301. 301.

    Gilson (1964, p. 220). See also Schulz (1936, pp. 209ff).

  302. 302.

    Agamben (2013a, pp. 111–125; 2017a, pp. 118–124, 135).

  303. 303.

    Pottage (2014, p. 162): “[T]he specificity of [the Roman jurists’] legal technique becomes visible only if one remains within the space between form and frame, retracing the recursive analogies that loop the forms of person and thing (back) into the frame of a legal action. There is nothing social about the agency or instrumentality of legal technique. To employ terms that would scandalize Kantians, one might call legal technique a ‘means in itself’, a means that is its own principle of being. Legal knowledge generates and sustains itself, and is practicable and intelligible without reference to its possible actions upon a social context.”

  304. 304.

    Gaius, Institutes, II 12-14; Dig., 1.8.1.1.

  305. 305.

    Brożek (2019, pp. 165–166). Given the Western Legal Tradition’s embeddedness with the Roman experience, should it be answered negatively, this interrogative would, at a second order of inquiry, prompt a reconsideration of those arguments that—by emphasising the space of imagination(s), emotion(s), and the like in legal reasoning and matters more broadly—conceive of law more as a poetic art than a sterile mechanic of legislation, adjudication, and so forth. See Chap. 2, note 274.

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    Luca Siliquini-Cinelli

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Siliquini-Cinelli, L. (2024). The Late Roman Republic: The Inception of Metaphysical Abstractness. In: Scientia Iuris. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 112. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51936-9_3

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