Abstract
This chapter introduces the book’s main arguments, themes, and methodology of inquiry. Particular attention is paid to the key-notions at the centre of the book, i.e. ‘scientia iuris’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘experience’. In so doing, the chapter also argues that the crisis that legal education and practice are undergoing is not an isolated, or accidental, event. It is, rather, an instance of the broader phenomenon of ‘the radical intellectualization of … life’ (Ernst Cassirer). The chapter explains that the intellectualisation of life is a normative phenomenon through which we turn experience into knowledge by assigning intelligible meaning to whatever we encounter in life. The purpose of this meaning-assigning endeavour is to order the world. For as we order it, we avoid falling prey to the anxieties and fears that our factical finitude and a chaotic existence generate (‘chaos’ meaning, not incidentally, ‘abyss’ in Greek). The chapter supports this argument by establishing an analytical link between ‘scientia iuris’ origins and development to date, and Prometheus Bound as a theatrical representation of the overcoming of the anxieties and fears which experience’s finitude generates with the reassuring (i.e. rational and epistemic) decoding and management of life. Thereafter, the chapter presents several accounts that outline the difficulties which legal education and practice are currently facing in both Civil and Common law jurisdictions; discusses a few themes relating to the spreading of artificial intelligence into the legal domain; and outlines some potential objections that might be raised against the book’s arguments and methodology.
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Notes
- 1.
See below, Sect. 1.5.
- 2.
In the book, I use Capital ‘C’ to refer to the Common law as a legal tradition. ‘Common law’ and ‘common law’ are two different things: the former is a legal tradition; the latter is a part of the law of it which includes elements of both case law and customary law.
- 3.
- 4.
See below, Sect. 1.5.
- 5.
Mokyr (2016, p. 184).
- 6.
Cf. Tegmark (2018, p. 58).
- 7.
Blackmore (2017, p. 3).
- 8.
Arendt (2008, p. 207).
- 9.
- 10.
Well-known examples are Plato’s Republic and Statesman, 293d-e, or the relationship, in Aristotle’s philosophy, between knowledge and justice (Bodei 2019, Ch 2). For other, usually less familiar, examples, see Heraclitus, Fragments 23, 41, 50 (DK 22B23, DK 22B41, DK 22B50) Parmenides, Fragments 1, 2 (DK 28B1, DK 28B2). See further Chap. 2, Sects. 2.2 and 2.4.2, and Chap. 5, Sect. 5.1.
- 11.
Fine (2021, p. 221).
- 12.
For some preliminary reflections on this theme, see below, Sect. 1.7.
- 13.
Cassirer (1944, p. 171).
- 14.
To not overcomplicate the discussion, throughout the book I use the terms ‘world’, ‘life’, and ‘reality’ interchangeably, as well as leave scepticism aside whenever my analysis and argument allow it.
- 15.
Owens (2012, p. 12).
- 16.
Hatfield (2021, unpaged).
- 17.
Pinker (2019, p. 233).
- 18.
Gilson (2016, p. 190).
- 19.
See below, Sect. 1.4.
- 20.
- 21.
See the first quote which opens this book, as well as Prometheus Bound, 436ff.
- 22.
- 23.
See Jaeger (1965, pp. 152f).
- 24.
A term I employ in its etymological sense, pointing to the ‘thaumázein’ out of which the philosophical spirit sprang, and which still animates it: see Metaphysics, 982b14, 983a14; Severino (1989, pp. 349ff).
- 25.
One of the finest recounts of the first philosophers’ ability to supersede anxiety and fear through rational inquiry and epistemic knowledge is to be found in a work of political philosophy—namely, the De re publica, 1.16.25, where Cicero discusses Pericles’ ability, through Anaxagoras’ teachings, to overcome the Athenians’ fear of natural phenomena (i.e., the darkness caused by an eclipse).
- 26.
Popper (2012, p. 121).
- 27.
- 28.
- 29.
Gilson (1964, p. 49).
- 30.
‘Quid est veritas?’, asks Pontius Pilate (John 18:38), well encapsulating the Western mind’s attraction to truth’s normative power: for a brief discussion, see Siliquini-Cinelli (2021). Cf. Agamben (2020, unpaged), who in lamenting the lack of ‘scientificity’ of the Italian Government’s actions regarding the Covid-19 pandemic, speaks of ‘a human right … to truth’. See also Agamben (2021).
- 31.
See e.g. Russell (1962, p. 19): ‘… [K]knowledge must be defined in terms of “truth”’; and Nagel (2014, p. 8): ‘… [A]s soon as we recognize the falsity [of what we thought we knew], we have to retract the claim that it was ever known’.
Of course, the conviction that knowledge is (always) possible and that it is truly knowledge only if certain and incontrovertible, was (and still is) not shared by all thinkers. From Xenophanes of Colophon, to Gorgias, to Carneades of Cyrene and Philo of Larissa, or from Giambattista Vico to John Locke, David Hume, Jean le Rond d’Alembert, and Immanuel Kant, examples abound. However, for the purposes of my analysis, I am less concerned with this theme than with the one regarding (true) knowledge being (always) attainable.
- 32.
- 33.
Schiavone (2012, p. 158). Emphasis added.
- 34.
Zimmermann (1995, p. viii). Emphasis added.
- 35.
- 36.
- 37.
Honoré (1978, p. xiii).
- 38.
For those who are familiar with Severino’s work, it could be said that the fabric within which leal education and practice have been forged and are nourished is an ‘originary structure’ (1981) that continues to acts as an ‘essential unconscious’ (2016, p. 1). Emphasis omitted. See also ibid. pp. 14–15. More fully, see Severino (1981). Cf. Cacciari (2019, pp. 83–98).
- 39.
Kantorowicz (1997, p. xix).
- 40.
Rossi (2019, p. 1).
- 41.
Halliday (2018, p. 330).
- 42.
Ibid. p. 330. See also Del Mar (2016, p. 126).
- 43.
- 44.
See e.g. Fiori (2016, p. 582).
- 45.
Melandri (2017, pp. 66–67).
- 46.
- 47.
- 48.
Ibid. p. 10.
- 49.
Ibid. p. 9.
- 50.
Samuel (2018, p. 1).
- 51.
- 52.
- 53.
Severino (1989, pp. 17–18, 90, 324, 385; 2010, p. 79; 2013b, pp. 12, 45–46).
As mentioned, I clarify my take on Severino’s thought in Chap. 2, Sect. 2.2.3. For now, I shall only note that Severino’s reconstruction of the philosophical origins, nature, aims, and operations of reason and knowledge significantly departs from mainstream ones, especially within Anglophone literature. To give but one example, in The Open Society and Its Enemies Karl Popper (2011, p. 165) too argues that it was in the fifth century BC Greece that humans discovered the ability to embark upon ‘rational reflection’—i.e. the ability to ‘make rational decisions … based upon an estimate of possible consequences, and upon a conscious preference for some of them’. According to Popper, this is the highest and most desirable moral end of human existence and interaction as, through it, ‘[w]e recognize rational personal responsibility’ (ibid.; see also ibid. pp. 437ff). Yet, Popper never mentions Aeschylus or Prometheus; rather, the protagonist of his account is Socrates (see also ibid. pp. 11, 27–29, Ch 10, pp. 237, 433; 2002, pp. 194–195, 213–221; 2008, p. 283; 2012, p. 56). Cf. Kelley (1990, p. 33).
- 54.
- 55.
Kelley (1990, p. 5).
- 56.
Ibid. p. 9.
- 57.
Ibid. p. 5.
- 58.
Ibid. p. 5.
- 59.
Ibid. p. 11. See also ibid. pp. xi, xiii, 2, 6, 64–66.
- 60.
Ibid. pp. x, 11, 47, 64, 111, 113, 132–140, 181, 188, 197, 211, 219–222, 237.
- 61.
Not incidentally, for most if not all of its history, jurisprudence ‘operated against a background of generally recognized [philosophical] theories of society and ethics’ (Wieacker 1995, p. 342) and aimed at becoming ‘vera philosophia’ (Kelley 1990, Ch 3, pp. 53, 113ff, 125, 129, 137–147, 183, 197, 209, 213ff, 234ff, 252, Ch 15). See also below, note 484.
- 62.
Kelley (1990, p. 1). See also ibid. p. x: ‘[Nomos] implies the recognition of repetitions or regularities, the communication of common experiences, the establishing of rules, and the defining of “laws” … which constitute the premises and “forejudgments” of more systematic thinking about (if not management of) collective behaviour’. Emphasis added.
- 63.
Ibid. p. 16. Emphasis added.
While the history of physis and nomos is a history of ‘contest’ (ibid. pp. 1, 216), one ought not to conclude that the two have not ‘interacted’ (ibid. p. 1). In fact, Western jurisprudence is, in a way, the history of how one (nature) served as an inspiration for the other (convention): ibid. pp. xii, 1, 19, 38, 45, 49, 58, 116ff, 137–144, 168ff, 213ff, 234ff, Ch 15.
- 64.
Ibid. p. 17. Emphasis added.
See also ibid. pp. 25, where Kelley affirms that Prometheus ‘brought culture’ to humankind, through a gesture which resulted in ‘the separation of mind from life, of reason from reality’.
- 65.
This is, of course, not a critique being Kelley’s main concern historical.
- 66.
This book’s core argument appears to be flawed precisely where it is supposed to be most solid. If reason and knowledge define humankind as a species, the reader might observe, then it necessarily follows that they cannot be used to frame a cultural trait that would be pertaining to one macro-tradition only (in our case, the West). My reply to this objection would be that, as noted, my concern in these pages is of a philosophical, rather than cultural, nature. Specifically, I am interested in identifying a philosophical matrix that may enable us to understand the specificity (rather than uniqueness) of the Western experience.
- 67.
This categorisation ought not be taken as signalling a lack of creativity with respect to both activities. This aspect too is further considered as the analysis unfolds.
- 68.
- 69.
The reference is to Solicitors Qualification Examination (hereinafter, ‘SQE’), which has been defined as ‘the biggest shake-up in legal education in decades’: The University of Law (undated).
- 70.
Agamben (2017b, p. 93).
- 71.
Pamela Barmash’s (2020) recent scholarship has offered new, invaluable insights on the possible non-Roman (i.e. Mesopotamian) origins of certain Western categories of legal thought, epistemological constructs, juridical technicisms, and modes of (legal) education. Chapters 4 and 6 of Barmash’s marvellous book warrant special mention here as they bring to the surface the determinative role that royal scribes—that is, professional ‘legal functionaries’ (ibid. p. 11) ‘trained in legal terms, phrases, textual models, and concepts’ (ibid. p. 137) and whose works ‘advanced toward the systematic analysis of legal issues’ (ibid. p. 200; see also ibid. pp. 5, 164)—had in the establishment and fostering of an institutionalised ‘system of [legal] rules’ (ibid. p. 164) whose defining tracts are also evident or somehow noticeable in other legal cultures, ancient or present-day. More particularly, Barmash clearly elucidates that it was the ‘scribal tradition’ (ibid. p. 138; see also ibid. p. 141, where the author refers to it as a ‘common tradition’), rather than the king’s authority, that generated a juridical sensibility and ‘legal culture’ (ibid. pp. 1, 5) whose historical magnitude both within and outside Mesopotamia cannot, and should not, be overlooked or dismissed. The secret of the Laws of Hammurabi lies, then, in the sapiential, technical moulding and crafting of legal imaginaries, terminologies, and concepts carried out by a small group of skilled and creative intellectuals—a ‘scribal realm’ (ibid. p. 281), or ‘class[,] that owed allegiance to both itself and the king’ (ibid. pp. 211–212; see also ibid. p. 281). Crucially, this scribal ‘Copernican revolution’ (ibid. p. 5) would not have been possible without ‘an educational system’ (ibid. p. 282; see also pp. 137, 138, 141–142, 200, 249, 284) in which future scribes were nourished and prepared to provide various administrative and legal services, and which was copied, with adjustments, in other cultures as well (see the Excursus on scribal education, pp. 203–218, and Ch 7). Ultimately, ‘the statutes [which the scribes of the Laws of Hammurabi] composed’, Barmash affirms, ‘… manifes[t] patterns of thinking that anticipate later developments in jurisprudence’ (ibid. p. 284), including, arguably, those of Rome (ibid. pp. 4–5, 268–271, 279).
Also in light of these important new findings and claims, I ought to clarify from the outset that it is not my intention to profess any superiority and/or dominance of the Western (i.e. Roman or Roman-derivative) legal mind (or, for that matter, culture)—a topic reminiscent of both the Dantean ‘nobilissimo populo … romanus’ (Monarchia, II.3.2-3; ‘most noble Roman people’; all translations of Dante’s works are mine) and Vicean belief in the uniqueness of Roman jurisprudence (‘… iurisprudentia in terris inter unos romanos extitit’, De Constantia Iurisprudentis, Caput Ultimum, II; ‘jurisprudence could only emerge among the Romans in this world’; my translation), and which, under the political impulse towards the harmonisation (but according to some commentators, including myself, nullification) of European private law systems and related sensibilities has received much attention in the past few decades: see Monateri (2000, p. 515; 2006, p. 173; 2018b); Somma (2002, p. 174); Hespanha (2003, p. 96); Monateri et al. (2005); Tuori (2007a, pp. 5–6, 36, 46ff, 112, 133, 171–176, 187; 2007b, p. 39); Capogrossi Colognesi (2008); Schiavone (2012, pp. 19–23).
- 72.
- 73.
Mau (2019).
- 74.
- 75.
See especially Soshana Zuboff’s (2019) interdisciplinary appraisal and severe criticism of predictive behaviour as the experience-voiding managerial paradigm and operational dispositif of present-day capitalism, which Zuboff calls ‘surveillance capitalism’. Zuboff defines surveillance capitalism as ‘a market project … [whose] purpose is to fabricate predictions, which become more valuable as they approach certainty’ (ibid. p. 351; emphasis added). More particularly, ‘[surveillance capitalism] offers solutions to individuals in the form of social connection, access to information, time-saving convenience, and too often the illusion of support. [These] solutions … [take] the form of omniscience, control, and certainty’. ‘[S]urveillance capital derives from the dispossession of human experience, operationalized in its unilateral and pervasive programs of rendition’. (ibid. pp. 383, 498); see also (ibid. pp. 194, 197–202, 211, 290, 296, 360, Chs 14, 18).
In jurisprudence, cf. Supiot (2007, pp. 168ff; 2017). In philosophy, see Tagliapietra (2017, pp. 47–50).
- 76.
Numbers are primary among the skills, or sciences, instruments (‘èxochon sofismaton’): Prometheus Bound, 459.
- 77.
- 78.
Mau (2019, p. 2).
- 79.
Ibid. p. 2.
- 80.
Ibid. p. 16. On how the self is being affected by these developments, see ibid. Ch 6.
- 81.
Ibid. p. 105.
- 82.
Ibid. p. 21.
- 83.
Ibid. p. 20.
- 84.
Ibid. p. 130. Cf. Schütz (2019, pp. 321–322, 330, 333).
- 85.
Ibid. p. 117.
- 86.
Ibid. p. 117.
- 87.
Ibid. pp. 11–12.
- 88.
Ibid. p. 12.
- 89.
Rosa (2013, p. 76, Ch 3).
- 90.
Ibid. p. 80.
- 91.
As mentioned, the normative character of the making-sense exercise is unfolded as our analysis progresses. For now, it suffices to observe that in uncovering the socio-cultural origins of ius and of its purposive dispositions, Schiavone (2012, p. 75) has affirmed that ‘it enabled a normalization of the present—a reduction of its uncertainties and traumas—endowing it with a self-confirming measure of its own continuity … [via] forms of reassurance in the face of the chaotic multiformity of life’. Emphases added.
- 92.
- 93.
Rosa (2013, p. 162).
- 94.
Mau (2019, p. 5).
- 95.
Ibid. p. 5.
- 96.
Ibid. p. 138. On university rankings in general, see ibid. pp. 47–53.
- 97.
Ibid. p. 139.
- 98.
- 99.
- 100.
- 101.
Errera (2007, p. 95).
- 102.
- 103.
Monarchia, II.5.1 (‘Law is a relation among humans concerning things and persons’).
- 104.
- 105.
- 106.
- 107.
- 108.
Kelley (1990, Ch 8); Hespanha (2003, p. 135); Padoa Schioppa (2007, pp. 94, 157); Gordley (2013, pp. 31, 44). See also Chap. 4, Sect. 4.2.1.
But one does not need to wait for the Commentators to see some changes in juristic analysis. Commenting on the reception of the Accursian gloss on Dig., 1.14.3 (known as ‘lex Barbarius’), Guido Rossi (2019, p. 61) has duly remarked that ‘the seeds of doubt as to Accursius’ reading of the lex Barbarius were already unambiguously visible in the teaching of some Bolognese jurists writing shortly after the Gloss’. On the lex Barbarius, see ibid. pp. 19–23.
- 109.
- 110.
- 111.
See e.g. Stein (1999, pp. 67–68): ‘Jacques de Revigny … and … Pierre Belleperche … did not introduce any particular novelty into the teaching of the civil law but extended certain tendencies which were already observable at Bologna, particularly the use of dialectical reasoning’. Likewise, Errera (2007, p. 90) writes of the Glossators’ ‘systematic re-construction of the Justinianian institutes’, further noting that: ‘… in reality, the novelty of the scientific approach developed at Orléans did not contain any radical modification of hermeneutic and didactic techniques or of the already noted explanatory works that had previously been in use’: ibid. p. 138; see also ibid. pp. 94, 119, and 141f.
Others have argued that Glossators lacked this systematising attitude, see e.g. Hespanha (2003, pp. 133–141, 147–148, 152, 154, 161–162). Such views are worth comparing to those of Brundage (2010, p. 248), according to whom the first aim of ‘[t]eaching practices in the law faculties of medieval universities … [was] to make sure that … students thoroughly and systematically mastered the authoritative texts of the discipline’; of Errera, just quoted; and of Jones (1940, p. 14), who narrates of ‘the Glossators[’] … systematic exposition of the Roman texts’. See also Berman (1983, pp. 139, 141, 154, 509); Padoa Schioppa (2007, pp. 97, 150–163); Livingston et al. (2015, p. 19), and Chap. 4, Sect. 4.2.1.
Finally, cf. Gordley (2013, p. 33), who claims that although the medieval jurists ‘gave law a unity that it lacked among the Romans’, none of them (that is, we can infer, neither the Glossators nor the Commentators) ‘organize[d it] systematically and doctrinally’. However, at the same time Gordley also writes that ‘the Commentators were engaged in the same enterprise as their predecessors: the resolution of every legal problem by a text and the explanation of every text by means of another. … [T]hey pursued this goal by the same methods’ (ibid. p. 31). See also Gordley (1991, pp. 30, 35).
- 112.
It is thanks to the Glossators, Wieacker (1995, p. 45) affirms, that jurists have ‘learnt to deal logically and exhaustively with every aspect of a legal problem. [The Glossators’] approach survives almost unaltered in the distinctive way lawyers have of dealing with cases, arguments, and texts’. Thus, and by way of an example, even ‘the humanists … did nothing to change the idea of law or the methods used by lawyers in the late Middle Ages’ (ibid. p. 200). See also Gordley (2013, p. 32): ‘… [T]he medieval jurists developed techniques of applying authoritative texts to new situations that are still used by lawyers’. For details on these techniques, see ibid. pp. 33ff.
- 113.
As we shall see in due course, things were not that different in Roman times.
- 114.
See e.g. Villa-Rosas and Fabra-Zamora (2022, p. 3): ‘… without the quest for objectivity, neither our contemporary understanding of key legal concepts nor our current jurisprudence would be possible’. I therefore disagree with Natalino Irti’s (2016, p. 8) Schmittian argument regarding the crisis and—regrettable, according to Irti—end of calculability and prediction in law.
- 115.
Supiot (2007, p. xxiv).
- 116.
- 117.
- 118.
Ibid. p. 325.
- 119.
Ibid. p. 326.
- 120.
Boyd White (2002, pp. 1397, 1399).
- 121.
de Sutter (2021, p. 3).
- 122.
Ibid. p. 3. See also ibid. p. 21.
- 123.
Supiot (2007, p. 168).
- 124.
Ibid. p. 168.
- 125.
- 126.
Ibid. p. 30. Emphasis added. On ‘the law’s resistance’ to this trend, see ibid. pp. 181–182.
- 127.
- 128.
Ibid. p. 18.
- 129.
Ibid. p. 18.
- 130.
Ibid. p. 22.
- 131.
Zuboff (2019, p. 488).
- 132.
De officiis, 1.20f, 2.40, 2.73, 2.78.
- 133.
Dig., 1.2.2.1.
- 134.
Dig., 18.1.77. Citing this passage, Peter Stein (1995, p. 1546) has remarked that ‘[f]or [Labeo] certainty was all-important and if the parties [to a contract] were not prepared to exploit the potentials for certainty that language offered them, they should not expect the law to bail them out’. See also ibid. p. 1555; and Chap. 2, note 859.
- 135.
- 136.
Postema (2017, pp. 190–191).
- 137.
- 138.
Miles v Fletcher (1779) 1 Doug 231, 99 ER 152. For a historical appraisal, see Poser (2013, Ch 13).
- 139.
Berry (2018, pp. 49, 87).
- 140.
Postema (2019, pp. 143, 151ff, 308–310, 331, 418, 425, 432, 462–465, 487).
- 141.
Schauer (2009a, pp. 125–126).
- 142.
Shirlaw v Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 206, 227.
- 143.
- 144.
- 145.
Shapiro (2011, p. 119). Emphasis in original.
- 146.
Ibid. p 200.
- 147.
Valcke (2018, p. 19).
- 148.
Ibid. pp. 19, 20. Emphasis added.
- 149.
Ibid. p. 21. Emphasis omitted.
- 150.
Ibid. p. 20.
- 151.
Ibid. p. 18.
- 152.
Ibid. p. 39.
- 153.
Ibid. p. 41.
- 154.
- 155.
Ahdar (2014, p. 41).
- 156.
Mak (2020, p. 21).
- 157.
Shmilovits (2021).
- 158.
See e.g. Branting et al. (2021).
- 159.
See e.g. Wurzel (1969, p. 297): one of jurisprudence’s ‘postulates … is certainty or consequentiality, so that a judgement may be foreseen’. Emphasis added.
See also ibid. pp. 302f.
- 160.
Katz (2013, p. 912).
- 161.
Toope (2023, p. 6).
- 162.
Schiavone (2012, p. 38). Emphasis added.
- 163.
- 164.
See above, especially note 62.
- 165.
- 166.
Heidegger (2008d, p. 119). Emphasis added.
- 167.
Mau (2019, p. 123).
- 168.
Samuel (2016b, p. 9; 2018, p. 30). The dialectical method of jurisprudential problem-solving was well-known to the Romans too (Samuel 2018, p. 50). Yet it was institutionalised, thanks to the establishment of systematic legal education and professional formation, in the Middle Ages only (see Chap. 4).
- 169.
- 170.
Dasgupta (2016, p. 42).
- 171.
Mau (2019, p. 124).
- 172.
Luhmann (1977).
- 173.
Santos (2020, p. 52).
- 174.
- 175.
- 176.
- 177.
Cf. Susskind (2010, pp. 27ff).
- 178.
- 179.
- 180.
- 181.
Ibid. p. 238.
- 182.
- 183.
- 184.
Denvir (2020a, p. 1).
- 185.
See e.g. Resta (2021).
- 186.
Norman (2019, p. xiv).
- 187.
See, again, Thornton (2012, 2022).
With respect to the United Kingdom, one could also list official reports on English students’ over-qualification, signalling an impressive gap between university studies and real-life dynamics (Office for National Statistics 2019), as well as journalistic inquiries into universities’ financial deficits, academic malpractices, maltreatment of undergraduate and postgraduate students, staff members’ increasing poor mental health, increased loss of degrees’ value, etc. In academic literature, see e.g. Molesworth et al. (2010).
- 188.
Deiser (1908, p. 136).
- 189.
Esposito (2017a, p. 5).
- 190.
- 191.
Ibid. p. 8.
- 192.
- 193.
See e.g. Agamben (2015b), commenting on Yan Thomas’ thought on the matter.
- 194.
Esposito (2017b, p. 19). My translation.
See e.g. the remark made by the Humanist judge and scholar Jeanne Gaakeer (2019, p. 229). In a book which right from the title (Judging from Experience) shows a close connection to the themes of our concern, Gaakeer has affirmed that ‘[i]f a being is able to narrate its ipse identity adequately, this enhances its options to fully achieve the idem identity of legal personhood, and, with it, the rights-and-duties-bearing consequences’.
- 195.
Esposito (2017a, p. 4). Emphasis added.
- 196.
Ibid. p. 4. Emphasis added.
- 197.
- 198.
Esposito (2017a, p. 4).
- 199.
This might explain the success of Jean Piaget’s theory of cognitive, experience-based constructivism: see Thomas (2013, pp. 71–77).
- 200.
van Marle (2018).
- 201.
Jasinski (2018, p. 65).
- 202.
Ibid. p. 48.
- 203.
Ibid. p. 58.
- 204.
Ibid. p. 46.
- 205.
Ibid. p. 58.
- 206.
- 207.
Agamben (2015a, pp. 111, 208).
- 208.
- 209.
Heidegger (2008b, p. 217).
- 210.
With Rome’s Twelve Tables, where the Western legal tradition is commonly said to having commenced, writes Émile Benveniste (2016, p. 398), ‘[w]e find ourselves in the domain of the word’. Earlier examples, including the Laws of Hammurabi, mentioned earlier, could be given as well.
- 211.
- 212.
Agamben (2015a, pp. 203, 264, 265).
- 213.
Agamben (2016a, p. 265).
- 214.
- 215.
Agamben (2007a, p. 50).
- 216.
Lucy (2017, p. 36).
- 217.
Absolute in the literal sense of the term, i.e. ‘solutus ab’, because, being intellectual artifacts, legal persons are independent of natural life’s finitude. Accordingly, ‘universitas non moritur’: Kantorowicz (1997, pp. 302f).
- 218.
Ibid. p. 70. Emphasis omitted.
- 219.
Ibid. p. 70. Emphasis added.
- 220.
Kelley (1990, p. 8).
- 221.
Ibid. p. 49.
- 222.
Lucy (2017, p. 76).
- 223.
- 224.
Jaeger (1965, p. 292).
- 225.
Ibid. p 3. See also ibid. p. xvi.
- 226.
Ibid. p. xxiii. See also ibid. pp. xiii, xixf, 9, 287.
- 227.
Ibid. p. xxiv.
- 228.
Ibid. p. 9.
- 229.
Ibid. p. xxiv.
- 230.
Ibid. p. xx.
- 231.
Ibid. pp. 286ff.
- 232.
Politics, 1337a33ff.
- 233.
Education’s cultural end (or final good, cause: télos) is related to that of humankind generally (i.e. the type of humans Aristotle had in mind, the only one which he thought capable of achieving the virtuous life he envisaged) and can only be actualised through the polis: see e.g. Nicomachean Ethics, 1094b7, 1095a14-20, 1097a15ff, 1098a17, 1099b25f, B.I, 1129b15-19, 1176a30ff; Politics, 1252a1ff, 1252b27ff, I.4, 1278b15-29, 1280a25-1280b39, 1323b21-28, 1328a37, 1337a11ff; The Art of Rhetoric, 1360b4f. In secondary literature, cf. Duke (2019, Chs 2–4); Cacciari (2019, p. 90); Critchley (2019, p. 146).
- 234.
Esposito (2016, p. 35).
- 235.
- 236.
Bell (2003, p. 904).
- 237.
Kronman (1995, p. 2).
- 238.
Ibid. p. 2.
- 239.
Ibid. p. 2.
- 240.
Ibid. p. 2.
- 241.
Bell (2003, p. 903).
- 242.
Kronman (1995, pp. 3, 11f).
- 243.
Ibid. pp. 2f.
- 244.
Ibid. pp. 16, 165.
- 245.
Alfieri (1995, pp. 1205–1206).
- 246.
Kronman (1995, pp. 26f).
- 247.
Ibid. p. 35.
- 248.
Ibid. p. 35.
- 249.
Ibid. p. 109.
- 250.
Cf. Arendt (2006, p. 171), where, referring to the crisis of America’s educational system generally (‘a political problem of the first magnitude’: ibid. p. 170), it is held that ‘the essence of education is natality, the fact that human beings are born into the world’. Emphasis in original.
- 251.
Kronman (1995, p. 36).
- 252.
Ibid. p. 36.
- 253.
Ibid. p. 109.
- 254.
Ibid. p. 40. See also ibid. p. 42.
- 255.
Ibid. pp. 36ff.
- 256.
Ibid. p. 41.
- 257.
Ibid. p. 2. Cf. Smith (2023).
- 258.
Ibid. p. 4. See also ibid. Ch 6.
- 259.
Ibid. pp. 166–167.
- 260.
Ibid. p. 167.
- 261.
Tamanaha (2012, p. ix).
- 262.
Ibid. p. 130.
- 263.
Ibid. p. x.
- 264.
Ibid. p. x.
- 265.
Ibid. p. ix.
- 266.
Ibid. p. x.
- 267.
Ibid. p. x.
- 268.
Ibid. p. 181.
- 269.
Ibid. p. 168. Cf. Barton (2015).
- 270.
Cownie (2004, p. 1).
- 271.
Ibid. pp. 159f.
- 272.
Ibid. p. 161.
- 273.
Ibid. p. 165. See also ibid. pp. 160ff.
- 274.
Ibid. p. 129.
- 275.
Ibid. p. 163.
- 276.
Morss (2019, p. 39).
- 277.
Ibid. p. 39.
- 278.
- 279.
Ibid. p. 39.
- 280.
Morss (2019, p. 39).
- 281.
Ibid. p. 39.
- 282.
van Marle (2018, p. 298).
- 283.
Ibid. p. 300.
- 284.
See e.g. Rice (2023).
- 285.
van Marle (2018, p. 298).
- 286.
Ibid. p. 309. See also Adebisi (2020, unpaged): ‘[T]he neoliberal university operates to obscure its own complicity in creating and maintaining its own colonial knowledge hierarchies … [I]t can only survive through the colonial logics of commodification of space, nature, humanity and variably valued labour’. Cf. Braidotti (2019, pp. 23–27).
- 287.
Ibid. p. 308.
- 288.
Ibid. p. 294.
- 289.
Ibid. p. 301.
- 290.
Ibid. p. 301.
- 291.
Ibid. p. 309.
- 292.
Ibid. p. 309.
- 293.
Wintersteiger (2019, p. 124).
- 294.
Ibid. p. 124.
- 295.
Ibid. p. 125.
- 296.
Ibid. p. 125.
- 297.
Ibid. p. 125.
- 298.
- 299.
In her article, van Marle sets forth a pro-Humanities argument with respect to South Africa, thereby (erroneously, in my view) implying that (neo)liberalism—the object of her critique—and Humanistic thinking are two different things. On the benefits of a Humanities-inspired attitude to legal reasoning, cf. Monateri (2006, pp. 61ff); Watt (2013).
- 300.
- 301.
Ibid. pp. 124–125.
- 302.
Kahn (2017, p. 499).
- 303.
Ibid. p. 500.
- 304.
Ibid. p. 500.
- 305.
Ibid. p. 500.
- 306.
See also Brown (2015, Ch 6).
- 307.
Ibid. p. 504.
- 308.
But see also Gaakeer (2019, p. 95), to whom ‘law as an academic discipline belongs firmly to the humanities …’. Emphasis added.
- 309.
Kahn (2017, pp. 502–504, 524).
- 310.
Ibid. p. 502.
- 311.
Ibid. p. 507.
- 312.
Ibid. p. 518. See also ibid. p. 524.
- 313.
Ibid. p. 521.
- 314.
Ibid. p. 519.
- 315.
Ibid. p. 524.
- 316.
Ibid. p. 523.
- 317.
Alemanno and Khadar (2018, p. 1).
- 318.
Ibid. p. 1.
- 319.
Ibid. p. 2.
- 320.
Vladec (2012, p. 188).
- 321.
Ibid. p. 186.
- 322.
Auchie (2021, p. 16).
- 323.
Ibid. p. 16.
- 324.
Ibid. p. 17.
- 325.
Ibid. p. 17.
- 326.
- 327.
Ibid. pp. 138–139. Cf. Czarnota et al. (2018, pp. 123–128).
- 328.
Clark (2012a, p. 336).
- 329.
Cf. Zenati-Castaing (2017).
- 330.
- 331.
Tamanaha (2006, pp. 127–128).
- 332.
- 333.
Hadfield (2017, p. 2).
- 334.
Ibid. p. 3. The United Kingdom’s recent approach to regulating AI seems to prove Hadfield right: see Clarke (2023).
- 335.
Ibid. p. 20.
- 336.
Capra and Mattei (2015, p. x). See also ibid. Ch 6.
- 337.
Ibid. p. 172.
- 338.
Ibid. p. 160.
- 339.
Denvir (2020a, p. 4).
- 340.
Ibid. p. 4.
- 341.
Ibid. p. 4.
- 342.
- 343.
Cf. Webley et al. (2019).
- 344.
Ashley (2017, pp. 8–11).
- 345.
- 346.
- 347.
Cf. Braidotti (2019, pp. 14–15).
- 348.
- 349.
Ashley (2017, p. 6).
- 350.
- 351.
Cf. Tranter (2019, p. 1).
- 352.
- 353.
- 354.
Abbott (2020, p. 3).
- 355.
Ibid. p. 7.
- 356.
- 357.
OpenAI (2023b, p. 1).
- 358.
OpenAI (2023a, unpaged).
- 359.
OpenAI (2023b, p. 1).
- 360.
Ashley (2017, p. 4). Emphasis added.
- 361.
Ibid. pp. 128–129. Emphasis in original.
- 362.
Ibid. pp. 223–226, Ch 11.
- 363.
Ibid. pp. 210ff, Ch 4.
- 364.
- 365.
- 366.
This become clear when the following statements by Ashley (2017, pp. 172, 178) are combined: ‘[Legal] ontologies make concepts in a domain explicit so that a program can reason with them’ (emphasis added); ‘Legal ontologies have traditionally been constructed by hand but, increasingly, [text analysis/natural language processing] and [machine learning] provide automated assistance’.
- 367.
According to Ugo Mattei (2017), universities are the ‘smart’ environments par excellence and therefore, the optimal laboratory where the so-called internet of things can be tested and is currently being nourished. If Mattei is right, and I believe he is, then my argument regarding scientia iuris’ constructivism and AI’s ontological capabilities can be extended beyond the law school to the whole of the higher education system qua knowledge-production, realities-crafting system.
Noticeably, AI’s ontological potential has profound biopolitical implications, too: ‘Abstract intelligence and immaterial signs’, writes Sylvère Lotringer (2004, p. 7), ‘have become the major productive force in the “post-Fordist” economy we are living in and they are deeply affecting contemporary structures and mentalities’.
- 368.
Solicitors Regulation Authority (2021).
- 369.
- 370.
- 371.
Romano (2006). All translations are mine.
- 372.
Ibid. p. 7. See also ibid. pp. 173, 175, where Romano describes the jurist’s progression from being a technical servant to a software.
- 373.
Prosperi (2008).
- 374.
Romano (2006, p. 17).
- 375.
Ibid. pp. 16, 48.
- 376.
Ibid. pp. 9, 14, 65, 71, 125, 175, 229, 333.
- 377.
Ibid. p. 65.
- 378.
Ibid. p. 283.
- 379.
Ibid. pp. 49, 57, 69, 87, 177, 309, 324, 333.
- 380.
Ibid. p. 320. See also ibid. p. 21.
- 381.
- 382.
Romano (2006, p. 298). See also ibid. p. 119.
- 383.
Ibid. p. 14.
- 384.
See e.g. ibid. pp. 35, 228.
- 385.
Ibid. pp. 33, 100, 117, 331, 340. This applies to all ‘science-theories’, however: see ibid. pp. 22–23, 167, 253.
- 386.
See e.g. ibid. p. 60.
- 387.
Ibid. pp. 167, 173, 178.
- 388.
Ibid. pp. 79, 92, 119, 187, 198, 296, 339.
- 389.
Ben-Dor (2007, pp. 156–157).
- 390.
Romano (2006, p. 75). See also ibid. pp. 24, 33, 59.
- 391.
Ibid. p. 125.
- 392.
Ibid. pp. 23, 320.
- 393.
See e.g. ibid. pp. 7, 15, 35, 89, 145, 163, 173, 177, 225, 229.
- 394.
Ibid. pp. 23, 104, 175, 302.
- 395.
Ibid. p. 179.
- 396.
Ibid. pp. 19–20: a key-move of Romano’s philosophy is to replace ‘society’ with ‘community’.
- 397.
See e.g. ibid. pp. 7, 35, 73, 89, 145, 165, 283–307, 329.
- 398.
- 399.
Institutes (Gaius), I.2, I.7; Dig., 1.1.1.1, 1.2.2.13, 1.2.2.35ff.
- 400.
Stein (2007, p. 1).
- 401.
Watson (1991, p. 99).
- 402.
Schiavone (2012, p. 32). See also ibid. p. 57.
- 403.
Sacco (1995, p. 456). See also ibid. p. 406: ‘Before the Roman era, the resolution of legal issues was entrusted to religious or administrative authorities (with the possible exception of Mesopotamia)’.
- 404.
Sacco (2007, p. 100). All translations are mine.
- 405.
Ibid. p. 100. See also Sacco (1995, p. 455).
- 406.
Ibid. p. 99.
- 407.
Sacco (1995, p. 467). See also ibid. p. 460.
- 408.
- 409.
Sacco (1995, p. 464).
- 410.
Ibid. p. 465.
- 411.
Sacco (2007, p. 100).
- 412.
Watson (1991, pp. 250–251).
- 413.
Baker (2019, p. 165). Emphasis added.
- 414.
On the origins of this ‘law-jurists’ topos, cf. Schiavone (2012, p. 125), where it is traced back to Cicero’s De re publica.
- 415.
- 416.
See e.g. Luhmann (2004, p. 99): ‘[T]he legal system operates largely outside the organization-professional inner core. Accordingly, law in everyday life is governed by completely different conditions from those that lawyers see and imagine’. Compare Luhman’s remark with Alan Watson’s view (1989, p. 118) that ‘[l]aw … is above all and primarily the culture of the lawyers’ (see also Watson 1991, Ch 23). When juxtaposing these two views, cf. Berman (1983, pp. 8, 37); Somek (2021, §§ 1, 4, 9).
- 417.
Bederman (2012).
- 418.
Kelley (1990, p. 1).
- 419.
- 420.
Both anthropologically and sociologically, (the) law’s operativity requires a subject (or object) whose conduct (or existence) it purports to regulate: see Kelley (1990, pp. 8–9). However, whether this means that, as Hale perhaps put it best, and as is still widely and variously believed today (see e.g. Falzea 1999, p. 228), (the) law—both in the form of ‘judicial decisions’ and ‘enacted law’ (Postema 2019, p. 25)—can exert its regulatory function only ‘through acceptance, use, and practice’ (ibid. p. 25; cf. Dig., 1.3.32), is a consideration I do not share. In fact, following Walter Benjamin, it could be argued that our ‘ignorance and potential to overstep the boundaries of legality is a feature of law’s self-preservation’: Wintersteiger (2019, p. 126). In comparative law literature, cf. Watson (1991, Ch 26); Gambaro and Sacco (2018, p. 6); Sacco and Rossi (2019, p. 117).
Needless to say, it is an altogether different matter why, despite being consistent with it, some or even, most of our conduct is the result of ‘law-independent judgments’: Schauer (2015, p. 7). See also ibid. pp. 50, 64–65, 67–69, 73.
- 421.
- 422.
- 423.
Van Hoecke (2002, p. 26). Although, for Van Hoecke, ‘the degree of professional institutionalisation allows us to determine the level of development of legal systems’ (ibid.; see also ibid. p. 178). See also above, note 416.
- 424.
- 425.
Kelley (1990, pp. 225–228); Wieacker (1995, pp. 258–259, 279); Grossi (1998); Van Hoecke (2002, p. 178); Van Hoecke and Ost (2002, p. 200); Hespanha (2003, pp. 220, 242); Monateri (2006, pp. 28–29, 59, 157); Padoa Schioppa (2007, pp. 476, 493ff); Marinelli (2009, p. 94).
Frequent expressions to describe this period of Western jurisprudence are the Hobbesian one ‘auctoritas non veritas facit legem’, or all those employed to emphasise the movement from the imperio rationis of medieval jurists’ ‘lawmaking powers’ (Watson 1991, p. 99), however grounded in the Corpus Iuris Civilis, to the modern sovereign’s ratione Imperii: see e.g. Kelley (1990, pp. 129, 132ff); Casavola (1994, p. 164); Hespanha (2003, p. 105); Costantini (2007, p. 217); Galli (2021, p. xxiii). Cf. Kelley (1984, pp. 41–55; 1990, p. 228); Gordley (1991, Ch 7; 2013, Ch 9); Van Hoecke (2002, p. 6); Grossi (2007, pp. 37ff, 153f; 2017, pp. 29f, 41–52, 142–144, 153ff, 162–168, 223); Livingston et al. (2015, pp. 220–221); Gambaro and Sacco (2018, pp. 169f, 196, 204f, 240f); Sacco and Rossi (2019, pp. 198f, 211f). In philosophy, see de Giovanni (2004, pp. 87, 104–105, 108–111, Ch 10).
- 426.
- 427.
- 428.
- 429.
In his acclaimed account of the subject, Klaus Schwab (2017, p. 114) uses such phrases as ‘cultural renaissance’, ‘true global civilization’, and ‘new collective and moral consciousness based on a shared sense of destiny’ to describe and promote the potential of our new, technological age. See also Schwab and Davis (2018). Cf. Bootle (2019, pp. 280–281); Deneen (2019, Ch 4), as well as Rosi Braidotti’s argument (2019, p. 32) that this technological revolution ‘rests upon the bio-genetic capitalization of all living systems, and a pervasive use of self-correcting technologies, driven by artificial intelligence’.
Worth mentioning are also Hardt and Negri (2017), who describe ours as an ‘artificial’ (ibid. p. 112), post-Fordist type of society (ibid. pp. 112, 185) characterised by widespread, networked sites of ‘productive knowledges’ (ibid. p. 171). While Hardt and Negri call for a diverse, anti-capitalist type of social existence, their political programme does not ditch knowledge (ibid. pp. 119, 128, 239). Moreover, in framing an ontology and politics (ibid. p. 245) capable of putting ‘the emerging powers of the multitude’ (ibid. p. 269) into revolutionary (that is, Fransciscan; ibid. p. 58) use ‘to combat the existing forms of rule, to deploy social forces in lasting institutions, to create new forms of life’ (ibid. p. 269), Hardt and Negri philosophically blend, as many others do, knowledge and experience together. As a result, experience fades into the background for the benefit of knowledge (ibid. p. 67). This alone is indicative of the confusion which permeates the political-philosophical debate on the role of knowledge in our times. For an application of Hardt and Negri’s thought in the biopolitics of education, see Pierce (2013, pp. 166ff).
- 430.
Randall Jr. (1956, p. 262): According to Zabarella, ‘knowing is not a personal function at all; it is Truth which knows itself, now in this man, now in another’. See also ibid. p. 264: ‘[k]knowledge is not a fragmentary individual possession; it belongs to all mankind, which forms, as it were, taken as a whole, a single man. Men are essentially communistic in knowing’. The fact that this position belongs to a ‘current … [which] sprang from the teaching tradition of the universities and derived in an unbroken line from the academic thinking of the preceding centuries’ (Kristeller and Randall Jr. 1956, p. 8), should make us all seriously reflect on higher education’s de-individualising properties. See also Kessler (1988, pp. 531–532).
- 431.
See e.g. Arthurs (2013, pp. 6, 7): “Law schools are knowledge communities: they exist to collect, critique, produce and disseminate knowledge … Obviously the profession is (or should be) as concerned about knowledge as the academy. After all, its monopoly over legal practice rests on the claim that lawyers know things that other people don’t. However, the profession and the academy relate to “knowledge” differently. Practitioners tend to consume knowledge, academics to produce it … The future of law schools, I argue — and the future of law as a profession, social institution and intellectual discipline — depends on who controls knowledge.”
- 432.
Critically and more broadly, see Laboratory for Education and Society (2018).
- 433.
Brownsword (2019, p. 6).
- 434.
Fuller (1969, p. 106).
- 435.
- 436.
- 437.
- 438.
Viellechner (2020, p. 348).
- 439.
Jemolo (1970). My translation.
- 440.
- 441.
- 442.
Or, for that matter, as ‘scienza giuridica’ (Italian); ‘Rechtswissenschaft’ (German); ‘science juridique’ (French); ‘ciencia jurídica’ (Spanish); or ‘ciência jurídica’ (Portuguese), to name just a few.
- 443.
Tuori (2007a, p. 21).
- 444.
Vaquero (2013, p. 56).
- 445.
Ibid. pp. 61–73.
- 446.
Cf. Livingston et al. (2015, p. 174).
- 447.
Bobbio (2011, p. 16). All translations are mine.
- 448.
Ibid. pp. 4–9.
- 449.
Ibid. p. 2.
- 450.
Ibid. pp. 1. See also ibid. p. 81; and Gambaro and Sacco (2018, p. 179).
- 451.
Ibid. p. 23.
- 452.
Ibid. p. 23.
- 453.
Ibid. p. 16.
- 454.
Ibid. p. 16
- 455.
Ibid. p. 27.
- 456.
Ibid. p. 137.
- 457.
Ibid. p. 40.
- 458.
Ibid. p. 118.
- 459.
Ibid. p. 118.
- 460.
Ibid. p. 118.
- 461.
Ibid. p. 121.
- 462.
Ibid. p. 27.
- 463.
Ibid. p. 27.
- 464.
Ibid. p. 27.
- 465.
Ibid. p. 27.
- 466.
Wootton (2016, p. 421).
- 467.
As seen above, Sect. 1.4, legal certainty (‘certezza del diritto’ in Italian; ‘certitude du droit’ in French; ‘Rechtssicherheit’ in German; etc.) is a fundamental principle (if not a dogma) in law. Regardless of whether certainty in law (and in life more generally) can in fact be achieved, the ideal of certainty presupposes that of truth as well as the possibility of validly distinguishing (i.e. knowing) what is true from what is false. Irti’s (2011, p. 12) claim that law that is unhinged from (universal) truth is uncertain law expresses this general sentiment well (see also the other works by Irti cited in this book, which all somehow revolve around the ‘law-truth-certainty’ theme). Alternatively, consider Angelo Falzea’s (2010, pp. 337–339) placement of legal certainty at the centre of his considerations on the relationship between law and ethics (the latter Falzea calls ‘the first legislator and judge’: ibid. p. 334; my translation).
For an early jurisprudential illustration, see Dig., 1.1.1.1, as well Cicero’s remarks on Servius Sulpicius Rufus in Brutus, 41.152f (both are well-known and much commented passages in jurisprudential studies; they are, for instance, also cited by Stein 1966, p. 42; Kelley 1990, p. 52, fn 59; Fantham 2004, p. 113; Tuori 2007a, pp. 26, 31; Schiavone 2012, pp. 191–192, 416, 435; Moatti 2015, p. 197; and Brouwer 2021, p. 55). Cf. De Legibus, 1.18-19, 2.8, 2.11.
Other, ancient as well as recent, examples are discussed throughout the book. For now, by way of an introduction to this pivotal theme, see above, note 61 and Sect. 1.4, and below, notes 484f.
- 468.
- 469.
Dig., 1.2.2.35ff. See also, ad pluribus, Dig., 1.1.10.2, 1.2.2.6, 1.3.17, 37.1.10, 45.1.91.3; Pro Murena, 23; De oratore, 1.5.18, 1.11.48, 1.42.191, 1.46.201, 1.55.235, 1.55.236, 1.56.239, 1.59.250; De re publica, 5.1.1; Brutus, 41.152; De officiis, 2.65.
- 470.
Schiavone (2012, p. 122); ‘civil doctrine’, quoting De oratore, 1.42.191.
- 471.
Kelley (1990, p. 113); ‘civil wisdom’, quoting the Accursian Gloss.
- 472.
Ibid. p. 131; ‘intellectual embodiment of tradition’.
- 473.
Kelsen (1967, p. 85). See also ibid. pp. 1, 71, 102, 355.
- 474.
Cairns (1969, p. 70).
- 475.
Ibid. p. 13: The object of jurisprudence ‘as a science … must be to ascertain if the complex reality of the phenomena with which it is concerned exhibits elements of orderly recurrence which may be formulated in terms of generalizations or specific laws’. See also ibid. p. 129.
- 476.
- 477.
Ibid. p. 8.
- 478.
Ibid. pp. 120–121.
- 479.
MacCormick (1999, p. 10).
- 480.
Smits (2012, p. 41). See also ibid. Ch 3, and p. 149. Smits describes this as the ‘ultimate question’ (ibid. p. 41) of normative legal science, which he favours over descriptive (doctrinal), empirical (socio-legal), and meta-legal (philosophical-theoretical), as he calls them, types of legal science.
- 481.
Frändberg (2018, p. 8).
- 482.
- 483.
Wurzel (1969, p. 289).
- 484.
See above, note 61.
Still to this day, legal academics are convinced that knowledge and truth are complementary. Thus, we are told that the ideal of ‘vera philosophia’ (‘true science’) can still guide jurisprudential inquiries and reflection (Postema 2016); that ‘[l]egal knowledge must expect of itself to grasp the law correctly’: Somek (2021, § 9); see also ibid. §§ 1, 7, 12; that ‘[t]he goal of jurisprudence proposes for itself is knowledge of truth, of the nature of legal institutions, and of the relationship between them’ Padovani (2007, p. 56); that legal scholarship’s only objective should be the ‘advancement of knowledge’ through the discovery of ‘truths’ (Komárek 2021, pp. 427, 441); that ‘a scholar’s role … specifies two pursuits: discovering truth and disseminating knowledge (the latter includes providing explanations that give reasons to others to justifiably accept their truth claims)’ (Khaitan 2022, p. 549); and that private law should be aiming at ‘human flourishing’, an existential condition which ‘involves a quest to lead a truthful life’: McBride (2020, p. 32).
In criminal law literature, see e.g. Ferrajoli (2000, pp. 8f), who explicitly endorses the ‘veritas, non auctoritas facit iudicium’ maxim. Ferrajoli, it should be noted, believes that ‘certain, or objective truth is … unattainable’ (ibid. p. 23; all translations are mine). Drawing from Popper, he therefore clarifies that a judicial finding can only pursue ‘contingent … relative … approximate’ (ibid. pp. 23, 24, 36) truths. Put otherwise, there is no such thing as a ‘perfect judicial cognitivism’ (ibid. p. 19; see more fully ibid. pp. 16f). However, Ferrajoli too grounds the ‘veritas, non auctoritas facit iudicium’ maxim on the notion of ‘certainty’ (ibid. p. 9), which he considers to be, ultimately, ‘ethical-political’ (ibid. p. 9; see also ibid. pp. 67ff). More recently, see De Luca (2011), whose analysis takes as its starting point Ulpian’s maxim ‘res iudicata pro veritate accipitur’ (Dig., 50.17.207).
- 485.
Irti (2007, p. 18). My translation.
- 486.
Ibid. p. 17. See also Barcellona (1996, p. 11), according to whom ‘the problem of law’s scientificity concerns the cognitive foundation of [legal] interpretation, that is, of that activity aimed at the comprehension of the meaning of [legal] norms’. My translation.
- 487.
- 488.
Irti (2019, p. 143). Translated: ‘Law dwells inside ourselves’. See also ibid. pp. 144f.
- 489.
Fine (2021, p. 221).
- 490.
Chapter 2, note 52.
- 491.
As Benveniste (2016, p. 398) has observed in his semantic analysis of ‘ius’: ‘What is constitutive of “law” is not doing it, but always pronouncing it’. Emphasis in original.
See further ibid. pp. 391–404, 412; and Cacciari (2019, pp. 67–82): The ‘iu-dex’, as Díkē did in Ancient Greek culture, shows (‘in-dicates’) justice (Thḗmis). Cf. De legibus, 3.2. See also below, note 517.
- 492.
Convivio, IV.6.8 (‘master and knight of human reason’).
- 493.
Divina Commedia, Inferno, IV 131 (‘master of those who know’). Cf. Metaphysics, 980a; De Anima, 402a1.
- 494.
Nicomachean Ethics, 1139a3-15, 1139b12-15.
- 495.
See Dig., 1.1.10.2: there cannot be ‘prudentia’ without ‘scientia’. In secondary literature, cf. Kelley (1990, pp. 56–61, 118, 145, 282); Simmonds (1993, p. 53); Schiavone (2012, pp. 79, 121, 490–491, fn 46); and Cavallar and Kirshner’s (2020, pp. 113–114) remarks on Bartolus’ (2020, pp. 117–123) Oration on Conferring the Doctorate of Law.
- 496.
Dig., 50.17.1, to be read in conjunction with Dig., 1.2.2.13.
- 497.
Paz (1947, p. 574). Emphasis added.
- 498.
See e.g. Kelsen (1967, p. 72); Pugliatti (1978, Ch 3); Murphy (1997, p. 110); Van Hoecke (2002, p. 126); Van Hoecke and Ost (2002, p. 200); Latour (2004); Coyle and Pavlakos (2005); Samuel (2008, 2018, Ch 7); Bobbio (2011); Santos (2020, pp. 7, 71); Gambaro and Sacco (2018, p. 178). Cf. Pugliese (1973, pp. 115–116, fn 71), discussing some views in favour and against law’s scientificity from within German jurisprudence. See also above, note 440.
- 499.
Tuori (2007a, p. 47).
- 500.
- 501.
- 502.
Brożek (2019, p. 49). See also ibid. pp. 7, 46, 121.
- 503.
Ibid. p. 51. In philosophical literature, see Galimberti (2021b, p. 96).
- 504.
- 505.
White (2002, p. 1399).
- 506.
- 507.
Cacciari (2014, p. 49).
- 508.
Ibid. p. x.
- 509.
Kelley (1990, p. 9).
- 510.
Gadamer (2008, p. 67).
- 511.
Cassirer (1944, p. 117).
- 512.
- 513.
Virno (2005).
- 514.
Tractatus, 2.012.
- 515.
Sacco (1995, p. 460).
- 516.
de Sutter (2021, p. 55). Emphasis added.
- 517.
- 518.
- 519.
- 520.
Tractatus, 2.1. See also ibid. 2.11–2.12, 2.18–2.182, 3, 4.02–4.023.
- 521.
Heidegger (2008a, p. 119).
- 522.
Ibid. p. 116.
- 523.
- 524.
Supiot (2017, p. 2).
- 525.
Kelley (1990, p. 9).
- 526.
- 527.
- 528.
Donlan (2013, p. 291).
- 529.
See e.g. Twining (2019, pp. xiv–xv), who restricts the term ‘jurists’ to those who engage self-reflectively with the nature, scope, etc. of law as a discipline: ‘“Jurist” is a broad term referring to a thoughtful or learned person whose main subject, field or profession is Law [as a discipline], and who reflects about it strategically or in relatively abstract ways. The term applies to judges and reflective legal practitioners as well as to legal educators, scholars and theorists’.
- 530.
- 531.
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Milles v Fletcher (1779) 1 Doug 231, 99 ER 152
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Shirlaw v Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 206
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MWB Business Exchange v Rock Advertising [2019] AC 199
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Siliquini-Cinelli, L. (2024). Introduction. In: Scientia Iuris. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 112. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-51936-9_1
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