Abstract
In this chapter, I frame what I believe to be a plausible account of meaning in life—the passionate yearning theory. This view loosely draws inspiration from Ada Agada’s metaphysical system, which he calls “consolationism” (specifically the idea of yearning) and draws from my contestation with traditional African conceptions of meaning (especially the communal normative function theory). Within the context of this view, meaning is conceived as the internally derived passionate yearning and striving, for an ideal, or a particular state of affairs that corrals a plausibly objective claim to facticity, that is not immoral and that is worth pursuing for its own sake. To argue for this theory of meaning, I begin by presenting an analysis of what I take to be the foundational criteria for the view. These criteria, I take to be: the lack of immorality, intrinsic subjectivity, passion, yearning and striving. I will then show how these foundational ideas coalesce to form the passionate yearning theory. Finally, I shall defend the view against possible criticisms and distinguish it from other views that appear to bear a similarity to it.
I acknowledge that this chapter is primarily derived from the article “Attoe, A. (2022). The Passionate Yearning Theory as a Theory of Meaning in Life. Philosophia, 50: 1579–1599”.
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Notes
- 1.
The African-inspired conversational philosophy, for instance, is fully invested in the idea that through creative struggle between seemingly opposed ideas from different contexts (and, perhaps, those that hold said ideas), and the shedding of implausible beliefs through that creative struggle, we can arrive at some semblance of truth (See, for instance: Chimakonam 2021; Attoe 2021).
- 2.
Stephen Cambell and Sven Nyholm (2015) have also theorized quite robustly about a similar idea that they call “anti-meaning”. Anti-meaning (and anti-matter) is distinguished from meaninglessness in that while the latter informs an absence of meaning, the former implies a deliberate attempt at pursuing evil/harmful goals.
- 3.
Gratitude to Fionn O’Donovan for this critique.
- 4.
Again, gratitude to Fionn O’Donovan for this critique. Steven Luper’s views about meaning would also endorse this sort of critique (Luper 2014).
- 5.
This reply is honed out my discussion with Jonathan Chimakonam regarding this critique. I also thank Mihlali Faltein, Segun Samuel, Abiola Azeez and Oyekan Adeolu for also engaging me in this particular debate.
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Attoe, A.D. (2023). Passionate Yearning Theory as a Theory of Meaning in Life. In: The Question of Life's Meaning. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41842-6_7
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