Abstract
This chapter examines the contribution that the rationality theory of L. von Mises and the theory of scientistic explanation and the “hermeneutic circle” of H.-G. Gadamer can offer to define a more comprehensive theory of IM. The chapter focuses, in particular, on the fact that Gadamer’s “hermeneutic circle” describes a Popperian cognitive process that proceeds by conjecture and refutation and that it is fundamental to scientifically explain the actor’s interpretation of the problematic context in which she finds herself. This hermeneutical approach allows the social scientist to reconstruct the “good reasons” that lead individuals to identify a certain hypothesis of action as a solution for a problem given the situation of uncertainty in which they find themselves.
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Notes
- 1.
This thesis had already been advanced by M. Weber (2012 [1903–1906]: 101–2), for whom “the categories of ‘aim’ and ‘means’, without which there is in general no teleological ‘thinking’, contain, as soon as one proceeds scientifically with their aid, conceptually formed nomological knowledge, i.e. concepts and rules developed in relation to the category of causality. Indeed, there is indeed a causal relationship without teleology, but there can be no teleological concepts without causal rules”.
- 2.
“Motivations and determining beliefs, Hempel and Oppenheim argued, must be classified among the preceding conditions of a motivational explanation, and in this respect there is no difference between a motivational and a causal explanation” (Hempel, Oppehneim 1948: 143).
- 3.
As Weber writes, “the goal is the representation of an effect which becomes the cause of the action” (Weber 2005 [1903–1906]: 11). Equally necessary is the use of NDM to explain the intentional and, above all, unintentional genesis of macro-social phenomena. In this case, the actions and the programmed and unplanned ways in which they combine must be considered as explanans (initial conditions), while the systemic effects, from the most banal to the most complex, as explanda. A very clear example of an individualistic and nomological explanation is that proposed by Weber (2005 [1904–1905]: 101 ff) of the genesis of capitalism. Weber answers the three key questions for the methodological individualist: (i) who caused the phenomenon: the Calvinist entrepreneurs who avoided accumulating profits and reinvested them; (ii) why they acted in this way: because, on the basis of a religious belief, they regarded professional success as a signum salutis, etc.; (iii) how one moves from the micro level of individual actions to the macro level of macro-social events: the simple addition of a very large number of actions of Calvinist entrepreneurs who behaved in this way gave rise to what Weber called the “spirit of capitalism”. Weber’s theory is built around a dual causal explanation: (i) when he states that Calvinist entrepreneurs reinvested their profits because they believed that professional success was an indication of their salvation, he proposes a causal relationship between these actions and the reasons behind them, based on an implicit law, according to which “anyone who wants to expand his econo-nomic activities tends to reinvest his profits”; (ii) when he makes explicit the link between the individual actions of entrepreneurs and the “spirit of capitalism”, he uses a law that can therefore be made explicit: “The large scale diffusion of economic activities by individual entrepreneurs gives rise to the system of economic relations called ‘capitalism’”.
- 4.
- 5.
Examples of laws used implicitly or explicitly are: “Everyone at the beginning (of a war) is more determined” (Thucydides); “Individuals tend not to change what they hold sacred” (Dilthey); “You are more certain to win if your enemies are separated” (Mommsen).
- 6.
Regarding the nature of laws in both the natural and social sciences, see S. Berry, “On the Problem of Laws in Nature and History: A Comparison”, in History and Theory, n. 4, 1999: 121 ff.
- 7.
For more examples of this kind, see Opp (2013).
- 8.
The interpreter, Gadamer explains, approaches the text with a tabula plena mindset, rich in “pre-understanding”, which derives from tradition. On the basis of this knowledge, he formulates a first “interpretive sketch” about the meaning of the text, which checks on the “text” and the “context”, where “context” means all the information that is “around the text” and that can be useful for checking this interpretive hypothesis. In case of conflict between a part of the text or the context and the “interpretive project”, the interpreter is forced to formulate a new hypothesis, to be submitted to the same control. This cognitive procedure is the “hermeneutic circle”, which for Gadamer is a “virtuous circuit”, in principle infinite, because it advances knowledge of a text by eliminating interpretations that conflict with the text itself and with the context (Gadamer 1976 [1960]: 180ff).
- 9.
I have developed this thesis in Di Nuoscio (2014).
- 10.
From a hermeneutical point of view, for traces, whatever they may be, what Ricoeur writes about human action is valid: they are “an open work” to “whoever knows how to read”, whose meaning “is waiting for new interpretations which decide their meaning” (Ricoeur 1986: 189).
- 11.
It is precisely the possibility of producing an objective interpretation (admitted by the former and denied by the latter), which represented one of the most important points of contrast between Gadamer and Derrida (in Michelfelden, Palmer 1989).
- 12.
This thesis finds significant confirmation in the very words of Gadamer, who said: “One element that connects me to Popper—not so much to Albert—is that he sees research as a process of discovering truth and, ultimately, the criterion of truth: the very process of research is revealed as the only possible way to find truth”; (in C. Grossner 1980 [1971], 335). And Popper in turn observed: “in truth, I am as far from positivism as Gadamer: in fact, I have discovered—and my critique of positivism is based on this—that the natural sciences do not operate positivistically, but essentially use a method that operates with ‘prejudices’, only that they eventually use new prejudices and prejudices that are subject to criticism, and expose them to rigorous criticism […]. What distinguishes me from Gadamer is a better understanding of the ‘method’ of natural science, a logical theory of truth and a critical attitude. But my theory is just as anti-positivist as his, and I have shown that the interpretation of texts (hermeneutics) functions with the same methods as the natural sciences”; ivi.
- 13.
It is significant that Ricoeur himself has argued that Gadamer’s “hermeneutic circle” is not a “virtuous circle”, since it is subject to “validation procedures”, which include “invalidation procedures comparable to the criterion of falsifiability defined by K. Popper in his logic of scientific discovery” (Ricoeur 1986: 195).
- 14.
- 15.
The same thesis has been expressed by R.J. Bernstein (1983: 30).
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Di Nuoscio, E. (2023). Methodological Individualism, Scientific Explanation, and Hermeneutics. In: Bulle, N., Di Iorio, F. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Methodological Individualism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41512-8_10
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