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Putin’s Playbook: The Development of Russian Tactics, Operations, and Strategy from Chechnya to Ukraine

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The Great Power Competition Volume 5

Abstract

To better understand the reasons for and methods of Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022 one needs to look at Putin’s entire period in power—from August 1999 to the battlefields of present-day Ukraine. During the more than two decades in question, the former KGB officer learned how to wage war—partly by drawing upon methods from Russia’s past, partly by adapting Western models of war, and even partly through innovation and learning. From Chechnya in the fall of 1999 to the present fighting in Ukraine, Putin has been attempting new methods and making them his own—adding to his playbook, if you will, just as a coach does who studies and learns from repeated engagements with opponents. Only this playbook is one of assassination, genocide, and regime toppling, all with the goal of resurrecting remnants of the Russian Empire. This chapter surveys Putin’s wars, attempting to analyze the tactics, operations, and strategies that he employs. Such an analysis is intended to shed light on how Putin wages war so the U.S. can better counter his moves, from the diplomatic realm to the battlefield.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Isachenkov, V. (2022, February 15). Russians scoff at Western fears of Ukraine invasion. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-colin-powell-joe-biden-business-vladimir-putin-d9246bee4d6aee4fdd27aa9e1e738f0c. Accessed 23 April 2023.

  2. 2.

    Litvinenko, A., and Y. Felshtinsky. (2007). Blowing Up Russia: Terror from Within. London: Gibson Square Books.

  3. 3.

    Murphy, P. (2004). The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror. London: Brassey’s.

  4. 4.

    Here I am referring to studies that label Russia’s COIN operation in Chechnya a failure. See, for example, C. Paul, C. Clarke, and B. Grill (2010). Victory has a thousand fathers: Sources of success in counterinsurgency. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.

  5. 5.

    (2004, December 11). Yushchenko and the poison theory. BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4041321.stm. Accessed 23 April 2023.

  6. 6.

    V. Putin (2007, February 10). Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034. Accessed 21 April 2023.

  7. 7.

    Shultz, R., and R. Godson (1984). Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy. Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s.

  8. 8.

    Michta, Andrew A. (2022, August 7). China, Russia and the West’s Crisis of Disbelief. Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-russia-and-the-wests-crisis-america-democracy-fight-military-threat-disarmament-cold-war-putin-xi-response-11659892566. Accessed 21 April 2023.

  9. 9.

    Titan Rain. (n.d.). Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/cyber-operations/titan-rain. Accessed 23 April 2023.

  10. 10.

    Felgenhauer, P. (2012, August 9). Putin Confirms the Invasion of Georgia Was Preplanned. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 9(152). https://jamestown.org/program/putin-confirms-the-invasion-of-georgia-was-preplanned/. Accessed 13 April 2023.

  11. 11.

    Galeotti, M. (2023). Russia’s Five-Day War: The Invasion of Georgia, August 2008. Oxford: Osprey, 61. See also M. Galleotti (2022). Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine. Oxford: Osprey, 120–141.

  12. 12.

    Galeotti, M. (2023). Russia’s Five-Day War: The Invasion of Georgia, August 2008. Oxford: Osprey.

  13. 13.

    Grau, L. and C. Bartles (2016). The Russian way of war: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office. See also R. McDermott (2012). The Reform of Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges, & Policy Implications. Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation.

  14. 14.

    For a more detailed analysis of Russia’s special operations units, see C. Marsh (2017). Developments in Russian Special Operations: Russia’s Spetsnaz, SOF and Special Operations Forces Command. Kingston, ON: Canadian Special Operations Forces Command. https://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.831086/publication.html. Accessed 13 April 2023.

  15. 15.

    McDermott, R. (2016, April 26). Putin’s Secret Force Multiplier: Special Operations Forces, Eurasian Daily Monitor. 13(81). https://jamestown.org/program/putins-secret-force-multiplier-special-operations-forces/. Accessed 13 April 2023.

  16. 16.

    Mikhailov, A. (2016, April 20). Boitsy Chetvertogo Izmereniya, Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer. http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/30319. Accessed 10 October 2017.

  17. 17.

    Nikolsky, A. (2015). Little, Green and Polite: The Creation of Russian Special Operations Forces. In (eds.) C. Howard and R. Pukhov, Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine (3–22). Minneapolis: EastView.

  18. 18.

    GEN Richard Clarke (2020). Special Operations Forces Vision and Strategy. MacDill AFB: USSOCOM. https://www.socom.mil/Documents/SOF%20Vision%20and%20Strategy.pdf. Accessed 21 April 2023.

  19. 19.

    Sakwa, R. (2015). Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. London: I.B. Tauris.

  20. 20.

    Bradenkamp, N., and M. Grzegorzewski. (2021). Supporting resistance movements in cyberspace. Special Operations Journal. 7(1): 17–28.

  21. 21.

    Galeotti, M. (2014, July 7). Putin’s Secret Weapon, Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/07/putins-secret-weapon/. Accessed 21 April 2023.

  22. 22.

    Galeotti, M. (2015). Spetsnaz: Russia’s Special Forces. New York: Osprey, 56.

  23. 23.

    U.S. Army Special Operations Command (2016). “Little Green Men”: A Primer on Modern Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine, 2013–2014. Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

  24. 24.

    Nikolsky, A. (2015). Little, Green and Polite: The Creation of Russian Special Operations Forces. In (eds.) C. Howard and R. Pukhov, Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine (3–22). Minneapolis: EastView.

  25. 25.

    Lavrov, A. (2015). Civil War in the East: How the Conflict Unfolded Before Minsk In (eds.) C. Howard and R. Pukhov, Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine (204–205). Minneapolis: EastView.

  26. 26.

    Lavrov, A. (2015). Civil War in the East: How the Conflict Unfolded Before Minsk In (eds.) C. Howard and R. Pukhov, Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine (204). Minneapolis: EastView.

  27. 27.

    Taylor, A. (2014, April 18). “Novorossiya,” the Latest Historical Concept to Worry about in Ukraine. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/04/18/understanding-novorossiya-the-latest-historical-concept-to-get-worried-about-in-ukraine/. Accessed 15 October 2017.

  28. 28.

    Leonard, P. (2014, April 29). This shadowy commander is the face of insurgency In Eastern Ukraine. Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/insurgency-eastern-ukraine-2014-4. Accessed 23 April 2023.

  29. 29.

    Dergachev, V. and D. Kirillov. (2015, May 20). Proekt ‘Novorossiya’ Zakrit: Samoprovozglashennye respubliki ob’yavili o zakritii proekta ‘Novorossiya’,” Gazeta.ru. https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2015/05/19_a_6694441.shtml. Accessed 13 April 2023.

  30. 30.

    Galeotti, M. (2016, March 21). The Three Faces of Russian Spetsnaz in Syria. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/the-three-faces-of-russian-spetsnaz-in-syria/. Accessed 13 April 2023.

  31. 31.

    Ramm, A. (2016, February 3). Pervie Pobedy Rossiiskikh Instruktorov – Chast’ I. Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer.

  32. 32.

    Ramm, A. (2016, February 3). Pervie Pobedy Rossiiskikh Instruktorov – Chast’ I. Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer.

  33. 33.

    Gibbons-Neff, T. (2016, March 29). How Russian special forces are sha** the fight in Syria. Washington Post.

  34. 34.

    (2015, October 1). Rossiya otpravila v Siriyu spetsnaz i morskikh pekhotintsev, TSN. http://ru.tsn.ua/svit/rossiya-otpravila-v-siriyu-specnaz-i-morskih-pehotincev-497202.html. Accessed 10 October 2017.

  35. 35.

    Ramm, A. (2016, February 3). Pervie pobedy Rossiiskikh instruktorov – Chast’ I. Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer.

  36. 36.

    Galeotti, M. (2016, March 21). The Three Faces of Russian Spetsnaz in Syria. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2016/03/the-three-faces-of-russian-spetsnaz-in-syria/. Accessed 13 April 2023.

  37. 37.

    Sharkov, D. (2018, January 15). Russian military used Syria war to train forces and learn US combat moves, says general. Newsweek.

  38. 38.

    Sharkov, D. (2018, January 15). Russian military used Syria war to train forces and learn US combat moves, says general. Newsweek.

  39. 39.

    Sharkov, D. (2018, January 15). Russian military used Syria war to train forces and learn US combat moves, says general. Newsweek.

  40. 40.

    Musumeci, N. (2022, March 2). Ukraine revealed secret battle plans left behind by Russian troops and claimed they showed Russia planned a 15-day war. Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-revealed-secret-battle-plans-left-behind-by-russian-troops-2022-3. Accessed 23 April 2023.

  41. 41.

    Glantz, D. (1989). Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War. London: Frank Cass. See also: Bouwmeester, H. (2017). Lo and Behold: Let the Truth Be Told—Russian Deception Warfare in Crimea and Ukraine and the Return of ‘Maskirovka’ and ‘Reflexive Control Theory’. In P. Ducheine and F. Osinga (eds.). Winning Without Killing: The Strategic and Operational Utility of Non-Kinetic Capabilities in Crises (pp. 125–154). New York: Springer.

  42. 42.

    (2023, April 22). Voennaya tsenzura: Kak izmerit’ strakh i kak tsenzura vliyet na rossiyan? https://www.chronicles.report. Accessed 21 April 2023.

  43. 43.

    Kremlin spokesperson on Putin’s objectives in Ukraine. (2022, March 22). https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2022/03/22/russia-spokesman-dmitry-peskov-russian-invasion-amanpour-vpx.cnn. Accessed 21 April 2023.

  44. 44.

    Petit, B. (2022, February 18). Can Ukrainian resistance foil a Russian victory? War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2022/02/can-ukrainian-resistance-foil-a-russian-victory/. Accessed 21 April 2023.

  45. 45.

    Madhani, A., L. Cook, and S. Fraser. (2022, February 3). US says new intel shows Russia plotting false flag attack. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-business-europe-belarus-jens-stoltenberg-43c9151532de706a2edec5684dfcf07d. Accessed 23 April 2023.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs, Fort Liberty, NC, USA

    Christopher Marsh

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  1. University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA

    Adib Farhadi

  2. Security Studies and International Affairs, Embry Riddle University, Daytona Beach, FL, USA

    Mark Grzegorzewski

  3. College of Public Health, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA

    Anthony J. Masys

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Disclaimer: The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of the Army, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, or the Department of Defense.

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Marsh, C. (2023). Putin’s Playbook: The Development of Russian Tactics, Operations, and Strategy from Chechnya to Ukraine. In: Farhadi, A., Grzegorzewski, M., Masys, A.J. (eds) The Great Power Competition Volume 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40451-1_8

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