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Russia’s 2022 Cyber-Enabled Warfare Against Ukraine: Why Russia Failed to Perform to Expectations

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Abstract

The security community was shocked as the presumed great cyber power, Russia, was unable to execute effective cyberspace operations at the outset of the Ukraine war in the spring of 2022, and then, throughout the rest of the year. This chapter argues this failure was due to several factors, ranging from an inability to agree on what is “cyber,” to the failure to pair cyberspace effects with kinetic action, to Russia’s unwillingness to burn niche cyber capabilities and accesses. While each of these elements individually hampered Russia, the convergence of these factors amplified the problem, especially when overlaid with Russia’s unwillingness to recognize that Ukraine altered the security environment since 2014. Loosely using the analogy of a baseball competition, this chapter details how a country must holistically compete in warfare, and explains that although it may have great individual capabilities, the military and intelligence organizations are only as effective as the product of their capabilities.

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Notes

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    Analogies are powerful ways to illustrate complexity and create effective understanding. However, when their logic is stretched too far, they can lead to erroneous conclusions. This chapter advocates staying within the analogy’s terms of reference to effectively understand the failure of Russian cyberspace operations in Ukraine.

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  1. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Florida, USA

    Mark Grzegorzewski

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  1. University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA

    Adib Farhadi

  2. Security Studies and International Affairs, Embry Riddle University, Daytona Beach, FL, USA

    Mark Grzegorzewski

  3. College of Public Health, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA

    Anthony J. Masys

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Grzegorzewski, M. (2023). Russia’s 2022 Cyber-Enabled Warfare Against Ukraine: Why Russia Failed to Perform to Expectations. In: Farhadi, A., Grzegorzewski, M., Masys, A.J. (eds) The Great Power Competition Volume 5. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40451-1_4

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