Self-awareness, Language, and Empirical Knowledge

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Abstract

I argue that the evolution of language had a huge influence on human knowledge and that much of our experiential knowledge evolved into empirical knowledge. This transformation happened because our resources of pre-linguistic concepts that structured our sensory beliefs were largely supplemented with linguistically defined concepts, which helped us to form non-sensory beliefs. Speaking a language is a form of practical knowledge by which humans can express their ideas and knowledge about their environment. However, where experiential knowledge is language-independent, empirical knowledge is language-dependent. To understand the evolution of language from the calls of animals to human speech acts, I draw upon Wayne Davis’s ‘expression theory of meaning’, which maintains that a speaker’s meaning determines word meaning. The theory is partly associated with Paul Grice and sometimes called intention-based semantics. In this context, I discuss how linguistic conventions nevertheless established among a group of language users drawing on works by Ruth Millikan. Based on these accounts of meaning, I describe how individual knowledge in the form of sensory and practical experiences constitutes the foundation of public knowledge we may express in observation reports by giving an empirical description of our individual experiences. I propose that the empirical description concerns entities we can see with the naked eye and that the description happens in terms of predicates whose extension we have defined to cover both visible and invisible qualities of the object.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Davis, W.A. (2003). Meaning, Expression, and Thought. Cambridge University Press.

  2. 2.

    Grice, P, (1989). Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press. The book contains some of his most important papers on meaning first published at the end of the 1960s.

  3. 3.

    Davis, W.A. (2003), p. 1.

  4. 4.

    Davis, W.A. (2003), p. 9. A little later, he adds, “Our ability to define word meaning independent of sentence meaning will enable us to account for the compositionality and productivity of meaning. The meaning of a sentence is determined recursively by the conventions pairing word structures with idea structures, and by the basic conventions pairing the words in the sentence with ideas” (p. 10).

  5. 5.

    See Austin, J.L. (1950). Truth. Reprinted in G. Pitcher (Ed.), Truth. Prentice-Hall, 18–31. In Faye, J. (2016) Experience and Beyond. Palgrave Macmillan, I have a discussion of the implications of Austin’s theory of truth, pp. 168 ff.

  6. 6.

    Davis, W.A. (2003), p. 12.

  7. 7.

    Davis, W.A. (2003), p. 20.

  8. 8.

    A typical example is Noam Chomsky. His main contention is that recursiveness is a linguistic property of all human languages such that the amount of syntactical information that might be expressed in a particular sentence is unlimited, and the number of possible sentences is infinite.

  9. 9.

    Ferrigno, S., Cheyette, S.C., Piantadosi, S.T., & Cantlon, J.F. (2020). Recursive Sequence Generation in Monkeys, Children, U.S. adults, and Native Amazonians. Science Advances. Published online June 26, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aaz1002. These observations are in agreement with other observations concerning the syntactic understanding of bonobos. “The bonobo decoded the syntactic device of word recursion with higher accuracy than the child; however, the child tended to do better than the bonobo on the conjunctive, a structure that places a greater burden on short-term memory.” Savage-Rumbaugh, E.S. et al. (1993). Language Comprehension in Ape and Child. (Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development 58:3–4, Serial No. 233), p. v.

  10. 10.

    Millikan, R.G. (2008). The Difference of Some Consequence between Conventions and Rules, Topoi, 27, 87–99, p. 88. Millikan rejects Lewis’s characterization of conventions in the sense that he holds that conventions has to be regularity followed by all members of a group, whereas she, rightly I think, argues that “Speakers and hearers may have quite different sets of linguistic conventions in their repertoires so long there is some overlap” (p. 88). She also notes, in opposition to Lewis, that “leader-follower” conventions survive only if their repetition helps both parts to coordinate successfully their mutual behavior more often than it produces failures.

  11. 11.

    The most complete demonstration of the need of a language with a sentential structure is to be found in Bickerton, D. (1981). Roots of Language. New edition 2016. Language Science Press, pp. 231 ff.

  12. 12.

    Ib Ulbæk, among others, points to this fact in his 1989-thesis Evolution, sprog og kognition.

  13. 13.

    Hamilton, W.D.  (1964). The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour, I & II. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7(1), 1–52.

  14. 14.

    Ib Ulbæk presents this argument in a private communication.

  15. 15.

    Savage-Rumbaugh, E. Sue et al. (1993) is the first extensive description of her and her colleagues’ comparative study of a bonobo’s and a child’s language skills. Both were exposed to the same 660 novel sentences. Many later studies of language skills in bonobos and children confirm these findings.

  16. 16.

    Savage-Rumbaugh, E.S. et al. (1993), pp. v–vi.

  17. 17.

    See Savage-Rumbaugh, E.S. et al. (1993), pp. 112 ff.

  18. 18.

    See Salmi, R., Szczupider, M., & Carrigan, J. (2022). A Novel Attention-getting Vocalization of Zoo-housed Western Gorillas. PLoS ONE, 17(8), e0271871. August 10, 2020.

  19. 19.

    Salmi, R., Szczupider, M.; & J. Carrigan, J. (2022), pp. 1–2. I have omitted from the quotation the references by which the authors substantiate their claims.

  20. 20.

    Salmi, R., Szczupider, M., & Carrigan, J. (2022), p. 2. Also here I have omitted the many references supporting the content of this quotation.

  21. 21.

    Salmi, R., Szczupider, M., & Carrigan, J. (2022), p. 14.

  22. 22.

    Zentall, T.R. et al. (2008). Concept Learning in Animals. Comparative Cognition and Behavioral Reviews, 3, 13–45. https://doi.org/10.3819/ccbr.2008.30002. This paper reviews a number of experimental studies that provide solid evidence for animals’ ability to form different types of concepts that supersede the basic classification of sensations.

  23. 23.

    Zentall, T.R. et al. (2008), p. 14.

  24. 24.

    Zentall, T.R. et al. (2008), p. 15.

  25. 25.

    Many experiments show that apes do not have the ability to understand false belief. See Tomasello, M. (1913). Why Don’t Apes Understand False Beliefs? In M.R. Banaji and S.A. Gelman (Eds.), Navigating the Social World, University Press. However, I find it in no way strange. Understanding a false belief in others or in oneself requires a high level of self-awareness that chimpanzees or other apes do not have.

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Faye, J. (2023). Self-awareness, Language, and Empirical Knowledge. In: The Biological and Social Dimensions of Human Knowledge. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39137-8_6

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