Abstract
In the previous chapter I argued that Neurath is correctly categorised as an epistemological naturalist, but noted that his naturalism does not always conform to expectations of typical contemporary naturalists. To specify the distinctive aspects of his naturalism, and the distinctive epistemology of science that resulted from it, is the goal of the current chapter. As in the previous chapter, Frank is utilised as an important companion to Neurath’s philosophical approach. Neurath never made any attempt to provide a systematic explanation of his philosophy of science. His writings are disparate and brief, and often the most insightful and intriguing ideas are implied, assumed, or simply stated and moved beyond. It is not always clear that a consistent, cohesive philosophy undergirds Neurath’s work. The purpose of this chapter is to tease out the systematic account of Neurath’s epistemology of science that he never provided himself.
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Notes
- 1.
This is no coincidence. Van Fraassen sees the logical empiricists as sharing his conception (Van Fraassen 2002, 49).
- 2.
See Hempel (1950/1959).
- 3.
See also Schlick (1932a/1979).
- 4.
See Frank (1935/1941, 149), Frank (1936c/1949, 205), and Hahn (1933/1987, 40–41).
- 5.
He may also be a holist about meaning. See Neurath (1921/1973, 198–99).
- 6.
Carnap gives a more technical explication of ‘empirical meaningfulness’, but his informal characterisation has clear affinities to Neurath’s: ‘that a certain assumption involving [the term] makes a difference for the prediction of an observable event. More specifically, there must be a certain sentence SM about M [the term in question] such that we can infer with its help a sentence SO in LO’ (Carnap 1956a, 49). For more detail, and an extensive defence of the formal acceptability of this 1956 criterion, see Justus (2014).
- 7.
Hahn’s diagnosis of ‘world-denying philosophy’ captures much the same thing (Hahn 1929/1980, 7).
- 8.
The rejection of pseudo-rationalism also expresses itself directly in Neurath’s social and economic thinking. Neurath’s arguments in the socialist calculation debate rejected Von Mises assumption that rational economic decision making requires a singular universal measure of value to allow for determination of an optimum distribution of goods. Neurath instead argued that the multiplicity of measures of value cannot be reduced in order to reach a singular correct outcome via a decision-calculus. There is no singularly rational optimal choice. See Neurath (1912/1973), Nemeth (1982b/1991), O’Neill (2007), and Uebel (2007e).
- 9.
Uebel shows that Neurath first presented a version of the argument to members of the Circle in a private ‘Discussion About Physicalism’ in March 1931 (Uebel 2007d, 222). Uebel also suggests the influence of the pragmatist James Dewey, Neurath’s mentor Ferdinand Tönnies, and Marx’s argument in The German Ideology on Neurath’s argument (Uebel 2007d, 413–417).
- 10.
Wittgenstein’s more famous private language argument has certain similarities to Neurath’s (Cat 2019, §2). There is however little evidence of direct influence in either direction. This interpretive issue is complicated by the controversy caused by Wittgenstein’s claim to be the originator of “physicalism” (against Carnap, who himself credits Neurath). For a disentangling of these controversies, and an account of the differing physicalisms and private language arguments of Carnap, Neurath, and Wittgenstein, see Uebel (1995).
- 11.
Neurath would probably not make this concession. As can be seen from Rose Rand’s notes, Neurath took these kinds of inexpressible experiences to be highly problematic, bordering on incoherent: ‘Can we even say such a thing? Is it possible even to express such a fact by a sentence? If not then in such cases we take the position of solipsism and cannot communicate… If it is held to be permissible to speak of such states, then this means that inexpressible experiences as such… have a place in science’ (Neurath, recorded in Rose Rand’s notes, in Stadler 2015, 90–91). It was these worries that lay beneath Neurath’s criticisms of Schlick’s affirmations.
- 12.
Strictly speaking there will be multiple Universal Jargons, corresponding to natural languages, capable of inter-translation (Neurath 1946a/1983, 234).
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
On the many facets of the Encyclopedia metaphor, see Pombo (2011).
- 16.
Kitcher distinguishes between permanent and transient underdetermination; the latter being a contingent consequence of currently insufficient evidence, the former being cases in which no amount of evidence will ever be sufficient to prevent underdetermination (Kitcher 2001, 31). But this distinction is irrelevant for Neurath. So long as there is underdetermination in the here and now, we are stuck in a decision position without a calculus. As Neurath rightly argues, no decision, delaying until we know all the facts, is a decision to do nothing.
- 17.
As Cat has emphasised, verificationism and falsificationism require the use of precise terms, and are therefore rendered impracticable by the ubiquity of Ballungen in natural language (Cat 1995, 239–240).
- 18.
Defenders of Popper may object that what Neurath rejects is only naïve falsificationism.
- 19.
Keas for instance lists twelve theoretical virtues, of four types (Keas 2018).
- 20.
For details of such a conception of objectivity, see Douglas (2007).
- 21.
There may have been some direct influence. Robert Butts recalls a lecture given by Frank, and attended by Kuhn, where Frank described what is now known as Kuhn-loss. See (Butts 1999, 12).
- 22.
- 23.
I think what I describe here is akin to what Nemeth describes as Neurath’s ‘will to hope’ (Nemeth 1982b/1991).
- 24.
Although he thinks the former too. Neurath says Popper has ‘No feeling for scientific research’ (Neurath, 22/12/1942, in Tuboly and Cat 2019, 566).
- 25.
The position Neurath arrives at is one with notable similarities to Laudan’s normative naturalism, according to which the normative rules of epistemology are hypothetical imperatives, contingent upon the ends of scientific enquiry and sensitive to empirical research of the frequency with which certain epistemic means lead to certain epistemic ends (Laudan 1990, 46).
- 26.
Frank similarly emphasises that ‘discussing the “acceptance” of theories as an activity of the scientist’ takes us out of the realm of the logic of science, and into the realm of the pragmatics (Frank 1957/2004, 348).
- 27.
Neurath broadly shares with Kuhn the view that normal science is not a process of perpetual radical revision, but of supplying tools for solving problems. See Kuhn (1962/2012, 35–42).
- 28.
While most philosophers would not argue that we know what these criteria are, most would argue that we are working towards finding them. On this assumption, once we find the right criteria, all we need to do from then on is apply them.
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Bentley, J. (2023). Neurath’s Epistemology of Science. In: Logical Empiricism and Naturalism. Vienna Circle Institute Library. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29328-3_2
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