Abstract
As a member of the Young Hegelians, Marx is deeply influenced by their religious and political criticisms and successively developed two different concepts of the individual. In his critique of religion, Marx used the concept of the atomic individual, i.e. the abstract and isolated individual with individual self-consciousness. In his critique of politics, Marx uses the concept of the individual as a unity of the burgher and the citizen. For Marx, the separation of civil society from the state lead to the split of individuals into burghers and citizens. In this split, burghers and citizens represent man’s individual existence and man’s universal essence respectively. Marx argues that only the full emancipation of humanity as a whole could ultimately overturn this split.
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Notes
- 1.
See David McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx (London: Macmillan,1969) and David McLellan, Marx before Marxism (London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1980), See also Noboru Shirotsuka, Young Marx’s Thought: Establishment of Socialist Thought (Bei**g: Qiushi Press, 1988).
- 2.
See McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, 8. and see also Shirotsuka, The Thought of Young Marx, 20.
- 3.
McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, 64.
- 4.
See McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, 55.
- 5.
See G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 351.
- 6.
Karl Marx, Introduction to “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law,” in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), 175.
- 7.
This expression appears not only in the preface to The Phenomenology of Spirit, but also in the preface to Marx’s Doctoral Dissertation.
- 8.
Although Marx rarely mentions Bruno Bauer’s influence on himself, the full extent of this influence is revealed in his Doctoral Dissertation and later work On The Jewish Question. Bauer’s influence is particular clear in the prominent role of self-consciousness and religious criticism Marx’s thesis.
- 9.
McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, 88.
- 10.
Ludwing Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Elliot. (New York: Prometheus Books, 1989), 1–2.
- 11.
Ludwing Feuerbach,“Principles of the Philosophy of the Future,” in The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings, trans. Zawar Hanfi (London: Verso, 2012), 204.
- 12.
Feuerbach, “Principles,” 243.
- 13.
Feuerbach, “Principles,” 243.
- 14.
G. W. F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia of Logic (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 1991), 29.
- 15.
McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, 161.
- 16.
See Shirotsuka, Young Marx’s Thought, 15–18. See also McLellan, Marx before Marxism, 14–15.
- 17.
Karl Marx, “Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature,” in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 1 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), 30.
- 18.
This refers to the juxtaposition of God with human self-consciousness. Marx wrote in the foreword of his Doctoral Dissertation that “Philosophy makes no secret of it. The confession of Prometheus: In simple words, I hate the pack of gods (Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound). Is its own confession, its own aphorism against all heavenly and earthly gods who do not acknowledge human self-consciousness as the highest divinity? It will have none other beside.” See Marx, “Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature,” 30.
- 19.
Hegel, Phenomenology, 6.
- 20.
“while the French troubled themselves little about them. Finite determinations were made to hold good against the infinite; against the Trinity it was asserted that One cannot be Throe; against original sin, that each must bear his own guilt, must have done his own deeds of himself, and must answer for them; … to sum up generally, the incommensurability of the human nature with the divine.’’ (405) “But, on the other hand, the point of most importance with these philosophers is that what is to be accepted as valid must have presence, and that man in all knowledge must be himself the knower; for, as we may see, those philosophers made war on all external authority of state and church, and in particular on abstract thought which has no present meaning in us. Two determinations found in all philosophy are the concretion of the Idea and the presence of the spirit in the same; my content must at the same time be something concrete, present. This concrete was termed Reason, and for it the more noble of those men contended with the greatest enthusiasm and warmth.’’ (397) “On the theoretical side of their philosophy, therefore, the French proceeded to materialism or naturalism. … Hence they accept sensation and matter as the only truth, to which must be reduced all thought, all morality, as a mere modification of sensation.’’ (398) The passages above were quoted from G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 3, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1895).
- 21.
Epicurus believed that “It is a misfortune to live in necessity, but to live in necessity is not a necessity. On all sides many short and easy paths to freedom are open. Let us therefore thank God that no man can he kept in life. It is permitted to subdue necessity itself.’’ See Marx, “Difference,” 43.
- 22.
“…the sensations are true. … And the reality of … perceptions guarantees the truth of our senses.’’ See Karl Marx, “Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy,” in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 1 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), 405–406.
- 23.
“Limits of pleasure are prescribed to the flesh, but the yearning for unlimited time has made them recede to infinity; but the mind, which has made clear to itself the aim and the limits of the flesh and has extinguished desires concerning eternity, has made a complete life possible for us and we no longer need infinite time.’’ See Marx, “Notebooks,” 409.
- 24.
Both Democritus and Epicurus recognised two kinds of motion of atoms: one in a straight line, and the other in collisions between atoms. However, Epicurus also proposed a third kind of motion, “deflection from a straight line.” This was the biggest difference between their views.
- 25.
Marx, “Difference,” 52.
- 26.
Marx, “Difference,” 53.
- 27.
Marx, “Notebooks,” 505.
- 28.
Marx, “Notebooks,” 506.
- 29.
See Marx, “Notebooks,” 506.
- 30.
Marx, “Difference,” 52.
- 31.
In modern political philosophy, nearly all works regard the “natural state” of individuals as their original state, and this kind of state is a purely individual state of existence without social relations, i.e. an atomic existence. Different theorists hold different views about this atomic existence. For example, Hobbes views it negatively, calling it “a war of all against all.” Rousseau, by contrast, viewed it positively, holding that people in this state are free and equal. In any case, it is undeniable that almost all social contract theories drew on this quasi-Epicurean theory of atomism. See Louis Dumont, Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological perspective (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 76–88.
- 32.
Epicurus, “Principal Doctrines,” in The Essential Epicurus, trans. Eugene O’Connor (New York: Prometheus Books, 1993), 74.
- 33.
See Marx, “Notebooks,” 475.
- 34.
Marx, “Difference,” 85.
- 35.
Marx, “Notebooks,” 482.
- 36.
Marx, “Notebooks,” 438.
- 37.
This kind of criticism of religion on the premise of equating God with self-consciousness is the same as Bruno Powell’s criticism of religion.
- 38.
Marx, “Notebooks,” 482.
- 39.
Marx, “Notebooks,” 450.
- 40.
See Marx, “Difference,” 70.
- 41.
Marx, “Difference,” 70.
- 42.
Marx, “Difference,” 70–71.
- 43.
According to the traditional metaphysical conception, the individual is a combination of body and soul, or of matter and form. Hence, this traditional conception entails that the individual cannot escape the limits imposed by matter, and cannot avoid becoming a concrete being in the phenomenal world.
- 44.
Marx, “Difference,” 85.
- 45.
Karl Marx, “Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction,” in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 1 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), 116.
- 46.
Marx, “Comments,” 116.
- 47.
Marx, “Comments,” 117.
- 48.
Karl Marx, “Proceedings of the Sixth Rhine Province Assembly. First Article,” in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 1 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), 138.
- 49.
Karl Marx, “Proceedings of the Sixth Rhine Province Assembly. Third Article,” in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 1 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), 232.
- 50.
Karl Marx, “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Part One,” in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 29 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1987), 261–262.
- 51.
Frederick Engels, “Engels to Richard Fischer 15 April, 1895,” in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 50 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2004), 497.
- 52.
See McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, 95.
- 53.
Karl Marx, “Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher,” in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), 137.
- 54.
Marx, “Letters,” 144.
- 55.
Marx, “Letters,” 143.
- 56.
Marx, “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy,” 262.
- 57.
G. W. F. Hegel, Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, trans.T.M. Knox, ed. Stephen Houlgate (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 161.
- 58.
See Hegel, Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, 161–162. Hegel’s description of the externalisation of family, civil society and state has something in common with the three stages of individual development later mentioned by Marx. “Relationships of personal dependence (which originally arise quite spontaneously) are the first forms of society, in which human productivity develops only to a limited extent and at isolated points. Personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things is the second great form, and only in it is a system of general social exchange of matter, a system of universal relations, universal requirements and universal capacities, formed. Free individuality, based on the universal development of the individuals and the subordination of their communal, social productivity, which is their social possession [Vermögen], is the third stage.” See Karl Marx, “Economic Manuscripts of 1857–1858 (First Version of Capital),” in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 28 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1986), 95. Both Hegel’s concept of the family and Marx’s idea of the first stage of individual development are reflected in a kind of naturalness, that is, a direct, natural and integrated relationship between the individual and the community. In fact, Hegel’s idea of civil society coincides with Marx’s second stage, since both are manifested in the external relations between the individual and community, as well as in the separateness of individuals. There are similarities between the state and the Marx’s third stage. Both reveal the true identity between individual and community by criticising reasons for thinking they are opposed to each other. Of course, there are fundamental differences between these two statements of Hegel and Marx. The former is based on an abstract universality and so effectively melts individuals in the state. The latter, however, is based on concrete sensuous individuals. and so emphasises their actual unity. In short, Hegel’s position is informed by idealism and Marx’s position is informed by historical materialism.
- 59.
William Barrett, Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc, 1958), 102.
- 60.
See Paul Foulquié, Existentialism, trans. Kathleen Raine (London: Dennis Dobson, 1948), 26–28.
- 61.
Susan Leigh Anderson, On Kierkegaard (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Thomson Learning, 2000), 26.
- 62.
Here we borrow Hegel’s terms “true infinity” and “bad infinity.” Hegel made a distinction between “infinity” as “true” and “bad” without any moral judgement. “True infinity” refers to the infinity achieved by the “spirit” through a process of “affirmation - negation - the negation of negation” within itself, namely the absolute spirit that involves everything (including finite things). “Bad infinity” refers to a kind of infinite regress, especially concerning questions about the origin of the world. Hence, the so-called “bad independence” means that individuals create isolated independence within themselves, thus contradicting the independence of others. “True independence,” by contrast, refers to the realisation of one’s own independence through the relationship between individuals and others.
- 63.
See Karl Marx, “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law,” in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), 80.
- 64.
Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law,” 80.
- 65.
Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law,” 21–22.
- 66.
Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law,” 9.
- 67.
Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law,” 8.
- 68.
This was quoted from McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, 103.
- 69.
Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law,” 11. Aristotle pioneered the study of metaphysics by combining the relationship between subject and predicate. From Aristotle onwards, the subject in the true sense was understood as representing the entity or ontology, while the predicate is only used to illustrate the entity’s attributes. Therefore, the subject must be the basis of the predicate. In pre-Hegelian metaphysics, the real entity was thought to have identical forms of subject and predicate (i.e. as “A = A”). This was because pre-Hegelian philosophers firmly believed that the entity could not be properly explained in terms of incidental attributes, but only by comprehension of the entity itself. In fact, this idea persists in the description of God. The so-called “I AM WHO I AM.” refers to God. However, Hegel added new content to the absolute identity of the subject and the predicate in the form of dialectics, i.e. an intermediary. As a result, A achieves its identity through non-A. Additionally, both state and civil society are set up by Hegel in order to realise the logic of thinking. Or more specifically, he understood state and civil society not as real entities, but as the externalised form of the spirit.
- 70.
See Marx, “Jewish Question,” 147.
- 71.
Marx, “Jewish Question,” 149.
- 72.
Marx, “Jewish Question,” 151.
- 73.
Marx, “Jewish Question,” 151.
- 74.
Marx, “Jewish Question,” 167.
- 75.
Marx, “Jewish Question,” 168.
- 76.
Marx himself defined this term as follows: “It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that man really proves himself to be a species-being. This production is his active species-life. Through this production, nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of labour is, therefore, the objectification of man’s species-life….”Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844,” in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), 277.
- 77.
Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx and several other authors all used the concept of alienation in their works. However, Marx’s interpretation of this concept was developed on the basis of critical reflection on the earlier notions of alienation, and he used the term entfremdung (“Estrangement” in English) to refer to this concept. Moreover, this concept is at the core of Marx’s theory of estrangement. Therefore, in our translation, we use the term “alienation” and its variants to indicate the concept of alienation in works other than Marx’s, and the term “estrangement” and its variants to indicate Marx’s concept of estrangement and his associated concepts such as estranged labour.—Trans.
- 78.
“Marx’s concept of man is rooted in Hegel’s thinking. Hegel begins with the insight that appearance and essence do not coincide. The task of the dialectical thinker is ‘to distinguish the essential from the apparent process of reality, and to grasp their relations.’ Or, to put it differently, it is the problem of the relationship between essence and existence.” (24) “For Marx, as for Hegel, the concept of estrangement is based on the distinction between existence and essence, on the fact that man’s existence is estranged from his essence, that in reality he is not what he potentially is, or, to put it differently, that he is not what he ought to be, and that he ought to be that which he could be.” (39) See the passages above in Erich Fromm, Marx’s Concept of Man, trans. T. B. Bottomore (London: Continuum, 2004).
- 79.
Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach [Original Version],” in Marx–Engels, Collected Works, vol. 5 (New York: International Publishers, 1976), 5.
- 80.
See Shirotsuka, Young Marx’s Thought, 66.
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Li, Z. (2023). The Concept of the Individual in the Context of the Young Hegelian School. In: The Concept of the Individual in the Thought of Karl Marx. Marx, Engels, and Marxisms. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22591-8_4
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